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AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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Contributors to this issue

Dr. Vijay Sen Budhraj is Reader in Political Science at the Kurukshetra University, Punjab. He took his doctorate from the American University, Washington.

Mr. R. C. Pradhan is a Research Scholar in the Political Science Department of the Ranchi University, Bihar.

Mr. Sunil Guha is Senior Research Officer in the Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, Government of India.

Mr. K. B. Rai is a lecturer in political science at the Kurukshetra University, Punjab.

Pan-African Unification

by VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ

THE process of decolonization in Africa has been as rapid as was the process of colonization. The scramble for colonies in Africa began in the 1880's. By 1890 the vast continent had been virtually divided, leaving behind only two independent countries, namely, Ethiopia and Liberia. The partitioning and subjugation of the African continent took so short a time that it may be said to have occurred with the force of an explosion. Another explosion some seventy years later created new states "with a velocity unknown in historical times." When the African process of independence (decolonization) began in 1955, there were only five independent countries on the map of Africa—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and the Union of South Africa. Today there are 37 independent countries in the continent of Africa.¹ There appears to be no doubt that in a couple of years colonies will practically cease to exist.

Never in history have so many countries become independent in such a short period of time. The emergence of 32 new states in a mere 10 years—17 in 1960 alone—must be considered one of the most significant politico-geographic phenomenon in modern times. Africa now has more states than any other continent although it is not, in area or population, the largest continent in the world. Asia with 29 countries is one and a half times the size of Africa and its population seven times as much. China alone has three times more population than the whole of Africa and in area the USA is about two-thirds the size of Africa.²

Consequences of Balkanization of Africa

It may be remarked that in an age of global interdependence, which calls for larger and larger political and economic units, disintegration of Africa should have been avoided and that the problems of small sovereign states in Africa (about half of them have fewer than 3 million people each and some are unviable³), their national jealousies and rivalries and, above all, their boundary disputes, resulting from the fact that "many of the boundaries are either inaccurately or incompletely described,"⁴ are likely

1. Their dates of independence and admission to the United Nations are given in Table 1, p. 18.

2. Rand McNally Cosmopolitan World Atlas, New York, 1962, p. 167.

Asia, the biggest continent, has an area of 17,075,000 square miles with a population estimated at 1,792,000,000; whereas the area of Africa is 11,700,000 square miles and its population 261,300,000. Ibid p. 167.

3. For areas and populations of African states see Table 2, p. 19.

4. R. D. Hodgson and E. A. Stoneman, *The Changing Map of Africa* (New York Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 112.

to baffle the United Nations and threaten the peace of the world. There are few African states that do not have frontier problems because the continent was partitioned in the last quarter of the 19th century to meet the interests and convenience of the imperialists who divided their empires into several administrative units. The boundaries carved out by them cut across tribes and override the dictates of geography and economics with the result that most of the new African states are not natural units as they stand today. At places one tribe finds itself split into two nations, or people speaking the same language and of the same cultural traditions are separated into two and, at places, three different nations. For example, the Ewe tribe is divided between Ghana and Togo⁵, "the boundary between Angola (Portuguese) and the Congo (ex-Belgian) divides several tribes" or "Somali Bararetta tribes live in Somali, Ethiopia and Kenya."⁶

The division of Africa among the European powers also resulted in the economic and social isolation of peoples who live side by side. For example, from Lome, Togo, Paris can be reached on the telephone, but it is not possible to place a call to Lagos, Nigeria, only 250 miles away. Again, it takes a few hours for an air mail letter to reach Paris from Lome, whereas it takes the same letter several days to reach Accra, Ghana, a mere 120 miles away. In fact, the means of communication and transportation between the African states are almost non-existent. Highways have been constructed from the coast inland to link the former colonies with the metropolitan countries. Railway tracks rarely connect at international boundaries and where they do differences in gauges necessitate transloading. The productive centres of Ghana, Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria are "as remote from each other as if they were separate continents."

This may give the impression that the imperialists are responsible for the balkanization of Africa. This is not exactly true, for colonialism also created Africa's larger nations out of the hundreds of separate tribal units into which the continent was divided when the scramble for colonies began. Nevertheless, small enclaves like Gambia, Dahomey, Mauritania and Togo and a large number of boundary disputes are the heritage of European colonialism. Evidently, the solution lies in merging the smaller political units with larger ones, in establishing federations of states in different regions or, as some revolutionary or radical leaders of Africa have urged, in the establishment of a United States of Africa.

Pan-African Movement outside Africa

Pan-African ideas originated among the people of African origin in the United States, the West Indies and Europe during the first half of the present century. The pan-African movement had its modest beginning in the West when some intellectuals of African descent living in Great Britain and the New World organized the first pan-African Congress in London in 1900. Its sponsor was a Trinidad barrister, H. Sylvester Williams, "who, so far is known, was the first person to talk about pan-Africanism—although in 1897 Dr. William E.

5. R.J.H. Church, *Environment and Policies in West Africa* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 75.

6. J. P. Cole, *Geography of World Affairs* (Pelican, third edition, 1964), p. 304.

Burghardt du Bois, an American Negro of mixed blood, had said that if the Negro were to be a factor in the world's history it would be through a pan-Negro movement."⁷

But at this stage the movement was concerned with the treatment of Africans in the colonies and with the nature of the relationship between "the darker and lighter races" in Asia, Africa, the United States and other parts of the world. This meeting had no roots in Africa itself, and the movement and the idea died for a generation.

The second pan-African Congress was held at Paris, contemporaneously with the Peace Conference, in 1919. It was the first under du Bois,⁸ who was to continue to dominate the pan-African movement until its transplantation on the soil of Africa in 1958. There were 57 delegates from 15 countries, including nine African countries, which were represented by 15 delegates. The Congress adopted a lengthy resolution which nowhere spoke of the African's right to independence or pan-African unification. It demanded that the League of Nations should establish a permanent Bureau to safeguard and promote the political, social and economic welfare of the natives of Africa and the peoples of African descent. It declared that "the natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the Government as fast as their development permits."⁹

The third and the fourth pan-African Congresses were held in London in 1921 and 1923 respectively. The delegates spoke of "the absolute equality of races, physical, political, and social" and demanded local self-government for "backward groups." In those days they were concerned with social rather than political reforms. They were idealists and social reformers rather than men of action and revolutionaries.

The next Congress, fifth in the series, was held in New York in 1927 and was attended by 208 delegates. Africa was represented by only a few delegates from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria.¹⁰

The sixth pan-African Congress, and the last outside Africa, met in Manchester in 1945. It was attended by more than 200 delegates, many of whom came from 10 African countries, and some of whom later won fame and power when they successfully led their peoples to independence. Their impact is to be noticed from the new radical themes of the resolutions passed at this Congress. For the first time the Congress demanded for Africa "autonomy and independence and the application of the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter"¹¹—a significant change indeed in the ideas that now began to guide and inspire the pan-African movement.

7. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (London: Pall Mall, 1962), p. 24.

See also G. Padmore (ed.), *History of the Pan-African Congress* (London: Hammersmith, 2nd edition, 1963).

8. Perhaps for this reason some authorities call it the First Congress. See, for example, K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 133.

9. See text of resolution in G. Padmore (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

10. *Ibid.* p. 23.

11. See text of resolutions passed in G. Padmore (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 55-66.

The First Conference of Independent African States

The pan-African movement ceased to be led by Negro intellectuals in the West and African students abroad when the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) met in Accra, the capital of Ghana, in April 1958. It had moved organizationally to the African continent where it really belonged. "It was an historic occasion. Free Africans were actually meeting together, *in Africa*, to examine and consider African affairs."¹² Except for South Africa, all eight independent African states were represented. Only Ghana and Liberia belonged to Black Africa; Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, and Morocco were predominantly Arab and Muslim; the eighth, Ethiopia, was unique.

At the time of the Accra Conference nearly two-thirds of the peoples of Africa were still under foreign domination. Some of the resolutions adopted at the Conference, therefore, condemned all colonial systems and segregation, urged the administering and colonial Powers to recognize the right of the people of Africa to independence and self-determination and recommended to all participating Governments to give all possible assistance to the dependent peoples in their struggle for independence. The resolutions on cultural and economic affairs recommended the exchange of visiting missions, the establishment of joint African enterprises and a Joint Economic Research Commission. The last resolution stated that the Permanent Representatives of the participating Governments at the United Nations were to constitute the informal permanent machinery of the CIAS.¹³

The United States of Africa

At the first CIAS there was no mention of the United States of Africa, nor of regional federations. But some eight months later at the first Conference of the African Peoples Organisation (AAPO), founded at Accra in December 1958, a new element was introduced in the pan-African movement when it was resolved :

1. To promote understanding and unity among the peoples of Africa,
2. To accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism,
3. To mobilize world opinion in favour of Africans, and
4. To develop the feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of the emergence of a *United States of Africa* (emphasis author's).¹⁴

The AAPO was a parallel movement to the CIAS but restricted to non-governmental political organizations. The first Conference was attended by delegates from 62 African nationalist organizations. Its programme of action was concrete and more radical than that of the

12. K. Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 136.

13. See text of resolutions in Conference of Independent African States : Declaration and Resolutions, Accra, 1958.

14. C. Legum, op. cit., Appendix 22, p. 223. This book contains 145 pages of appendices consisting of important documentation on the birth and development of the pan-African movement.

CIAS, which tended to split the pan-African movement into two—the radicals, who advocated a political union, and the gradualists, who favoured a slower functional approach. It is worth noting that although since then all the conferences of non-governmental organizations of African states like the AAPO, the All-African Trade Union Federation and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference have supported the ultimate objective of a U.S. of Africa, this concept has never been endorsed by any of the several official conferences of independent African states (Addis Ababa, 1960 ; Brazzaville, 1961 ; Casablanca, 1961 ; Monrovia, 1961 ; Lagos, 1962 ; Addis Ababa, 1963 ; Cairo, 1964).

President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana is the leading and, indeed, virtually the only prominent exponent of the Union of African States. For him it is an article of faith, a cardinal objective of his policy. He stands for the establishment of a close Union of African States, like the USA or the USSR. He subscribes to this policy for a variety of reasons. Being the leader of the first country of tropical Africa to achieve independence and having worked in the pan-African movement for a number of years, he displays a sense of destiny and leadership. He is convinced that only through continentally integrated planning can the African states make progress along the desired lines. He argues :

If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples.¹⁵

He sincerely believes that only a United Africa can fearlessly afford to cooperate with former colonial powers and fears that small or thinly-populated African states might be tempted, or possibly forced, to make alliances with rival powers outside Africa, so that a world war could easily originate in Africa.¹⁶ To facilitate the establishment of a continental government, he wrote into the constitution of Ghana that its sovereignty, in whole or in part, could be surrendered for the furtherance of African unity. Similar provisions are to be found in the constitutions of Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, and the UAR as well.¹⁷

The first concrete step towards African political Union was taken on May 1, 1959, when Guinea and Ghana solemnly agreed to establish the Ghana-Guinea Union. This, according to President Nkrumah, was "to form a nucleus for a Union of African States,"¹⁸ or to be the beginning of a Union of Independent African States. But it was a loose Union which permitted each state to have its own flag, anthem and motto ; its own citizenship, army and representatives abroad—though, at the same time, it was agreed that the Union too would have a flag (which, like the American flag, would have as many five-pointed stars as there would be members of the Union), an anthem and a motto.¹⁹

15. K. Nkrumah, *op. cit.*, p. XVII.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

17. K. Nkrumah, *I Speak for Freedom* (London : Heinemann, 1961), pp. 221-22.

18. K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 141.

19. See text of May 1, 1959, Declaration in Colin Legum, *op. cit.*, Appendix 6, pp. 160-61.

When Mali joined the Union in July 1961, the Charter for the Union of African States was proclaimed simultaneously in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.²⁰ The Union was considered to form "the nucleus of the United States of Africa and was declared open to every state or federation of African states which accepted its aims and objectives. But the Charter did not authorize the establishment of any common institutions, except that it provided for regular conferences between the Heads of State of the Union. In practice the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union did not make any significant move toward an actual political merger; little or nothing appeared to have been unified. Talk of a common currency proved to be just a talk. None of the states surrendered any part of their sovereignty to the Union. Many practical matters prohibited such an action, not the least of which was territorial non-contiguity—Ghana being separated from the contiguous Guinea and Mali.

The Nkrumah Plan and the African Leaders

The Nkrumah plan for an African continental government and a merger of all African sovereignties immediately has not found favour with most African leaders. The main reasons for its rejection are not difficult to determine. Mutual rivalries and love of power operate everywhere in the world, and Africa is no exception. The young leaders of Africa who have struggled for freedom are reluctant to sacrifice independence for an uncertain supranational order. Moreover, the motives of President Nkrumah are often suspect. Many leaders in West Africa allege that he has "reckless" ambitions for expansion, that his real aim is to "swallow" up little Togo, Upper Volta and Ivory Coast.

Nigeria, the biggest country in West Africa, clearly stated its attitude towards the proposed Union of African States (UAS) at the second CIAS, held at Addis Ababa in 1960. The leader of the Nigerian delegation, Yussuf Maitima Sule, said :

. . . We would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature We feel such a move is too radical—perhaps too ambitious—to be of lasting benefit. . . . At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form union with any African state by surrendering our sovereignty. . . . We believe that many of the African states would very much prefer to rule themselves by themselves. . . .²¹

Continuing, he made a significant warning that

If anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of pan-Africanism will, I fear, be defeated. We all can recall . . . that . . . Hitler thought he had a mission to rule the whole world and in pursuance of his mission he . . . plunged the whole world into war.²²

Many other African leaders have frankly stated that they did not fight the battles for independence in order to abandon it again in favour

20. See text of the Charter in *ibid.*, Appendix 14, pp. 183-86.

21. Colin Legum, *op. cit.*, Appendix 11, pp. 172-73.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

of someone else's rule. The late Sylvanus Olympio (assassinated on January 13, 1963), President of the Republic of Togo, spoke for most African nations when he stated that national independence, achieved at great sacrifice, "is not to be cast away lightly; nor should the national will, once unified, be diluted by the formation of nebulous political units. . . . Furthermore, few serious governments would be willing to relinquish their hard-won seats in international councils."

The African states are still in the period of turbulent and adventurous youth and are understandably sensitive about their sovereignty. The men in power are not prepared to retire from politics or accept subordinate positions in a continental government.

Rival Associations in Africa

Between 1960 and 1962 several rival associations were formed in Africa. The most important of these were the group of former French colonies, originally established in January 1960 as the Brazzaville group (officially known as the Union of African and Malagasy States, USM) and the more militant and the radical Casablanca group, established a few months later in reaction to the consistently pro-Western stand taken by the Brazzaville group. The Brazzaville group "joined with the majority of English-speaking African States outside the Casablanca group in May 1961 to form a much looser association that came to be known as the Monrovia group."²³

The Casablanca and Monrovia groups drew up separate charters which reflected the different attitudes to African unity that the two groups had. While the Casablanca Charter expressed "determination to promote the triumph of liberty all over Africa and to achieve its unity,"²⁴ the resolution adopted by the Monrovia Conference laid more emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, referred to unity in only the most general terms and emphasized the need for functional co-operation.²⁵

In central Africa there had already come into existence (1958) the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, which eventually was to embrace 20 countries and change its title in 1962 to the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA).²⁶ With the principal exception of Milton Obote of Uganda, who has made common cause with President Nkrumah, the leaders of member-states generally favour "a relatively loose association of states and functional cooperation while praising the theme of African unity."²⁷

The countries of northern Africa "are susceptible to appeals made in the name of Islam and Arab slogans," and are members of the Arab

23. B. Boutros-Ghali, *The OAU Charter*, International Conciliation, No. 546 (January 1965), p. 7.

24. See text of the Charter in Legum, op. cit., Appendix 15, pp. 187-88.

25. See text of the resolution in *ibid.*, Appendix 17, pp. 198-99.

26. For a detailed study of the PAFMECSA see Richard Cox *Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

27. Norman J. Padelford, *The Organization of African Unity*, International Organization, Summer 1964 (Vol. XVIII, No. 3), p. 524.

League, an organization of 13 Arab states in Africa and the Middle East. Essentially anti-Israel in conception, the League is similar in design, if not in detail, to other great regional pact organizations. Rivalries between the leaders of (and within) member-states have limited the effectiveness of the League. President Nasser's attempts to forge a political union, to establish a United Arab State, have remained unsuccessful. Egypt remains the only member of his United Arab Republic, proclaimed in February 1958 by Syria and Egypt.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the African states decided to maintain close ties with the former colonial powers. Former African dependencies of the United Kingdom are members of the Commonwealth of Nations; six of the former French dependencies agreed to remain within the remodelled French Community; the rest, except Guinea, have negotiated cultural and economic ties with France. Moreover, almost all the former dependencies of France, Italy and Belgium elected to become associate members of the European Economic Community (EEC).

For President Nkrumah the maintenance of close ties with former colonial powers is a new form of colonialism and regional groupings another form of balkanization. At the Cairo Conference (1964) of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he said: "I seek no regional unions as a basis for unity. Indeed the more independent states there are, the stronger will be our unity."²⁸ He seems to be a visionary when he seeks to apply to Africa some version of the principle of federal union which over the years has achieved such success in the United States. But Africa today faces far more serious, different and complex problems than those which confronted the thirteen American colonies when they broke away from Great Britain. The American colonies had been ruled by only one country and upon becoming independent faced a common enemy as they feared aggression from the United Kingdom, which created a sense of urgency in the formation of a bigger political unit, the United States. The people in them were all Christians, spoke the same language, belonged to the same race and were familiar with the same system of government and administration. Africa, on the other hand, is far less homogeneous, less compact and, at this stage, far less prepared, both politically and socially, for federal union. It contains an empire in Ethiopia, kingdoms in Burundi, Libya and Morocco, federations in Nigeria and Uganda, and a large number of republics of varying forms with different systems of administration. Finally, "over 800 languages are spoken among Africans apart from English, French, Portuguese and Spanish."²⁹

Politics and sentiments apart, is it in the interest of the African states to merge their sovereignties at this stage of their development in order to establish a United States of Africa? Their economies are competitive rather than complementary—all of them are producers of raw materials for industrialized Europe, America and Japan, with the result that most of their trade is external to the continent. All are in the early stage of industrial development and therefore look to the industrially advanced countries (both in the Western and Soviet blocs) for economic and techni-

28. Africa Research Bulletin, Political (hereinafter cited as A. R. B.), July 1964 (Vol. 1, No. 7), p. 123A.

29. N. J. Padelford, op. cit. p. 525.

cal assistance. In the cold war struggle between East and West and also among the countries of the two blocs they are able to play one bloc against the other and thereby secure favourable credits and terms of trade. Both the Communists and the "Imperialists" are pouring economic aid into Africa, each side hoping to prevent thereby the African states falling into the opposite camp. At times it is observed that if the USSR gives aid to an African state, the United States starts showing interest in the economic development of its neighbour. It is also observed that the two blocs try to outdo each other. It may be recalled that when the Americans and the World Bank refused to finance the Aswan dam the Russians assumed the financial and physical burden of building it. Or, when the French withdrew from Guinea with their officials, telephones and typewriters, "Moscow virtually agreed to do whatever the latter asked."³⁰ But today the UAR is the largest recipient of American foreign aid in Africa and Guinea the fourth largest "(\$59 million annually) after the UAR, Tunisia, and Ethiopia."³¹

If the African states are successful in achieving continental unity, it is doubtful whether the Big Powers will continue to take as much interest as they are taking today in their industrial and economic development, whether the former French and British colonies will continue to receive substantial aid from their former masters ranging from trade subsidies to outright budget support and whether the overseas members of the European Common Market will be allowed to profit economically from the EEC association and enjoy benefits from the European Development Fund.

Finally, if the African nations were to dissolve their individual independent identities, they would surely hope for some compensatory advantage—and the advantage must be big enough to make good the loss of separate individuality. No such advantage seems to exist. Only in the face of grave danger to their security may their individual existence cease to be of vital importance to them. But no such threat to their security is discernible at present. Instead, some of them seem to be more afraid of their neighbours than of any outside power.

It is not implied here that regional groupings—political and/or economic—are not desirable or possible. The concept of regional organizations and viable political units is sound. Contiguous areas have common problems resulting from common geography, history, ethnic composition and economic productivity. Secondly, large size and bigger population have obvious economic advantages in the modern world and therefore it is plain to see the advantages of such groupings in Africa. Foreign capital is more likely to be forthcoming if the country is sizable than if it is split up into small units. Thirdly, in the 20th century, government is expected to provide public utilities and render social services, to establish institutions of higher studies and research, to provide credit for agriculture and industry, and so on. Small states cannot discharge such responsibilities. Fourthly, a country has to be big enough to be able to both defend itself and effectively negotiate trade and other agreements. Some of the countries in Africa are too small to stand on

30. M. I. Goldman, *A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid*, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965 (Vol. 43, No. 2), p. 354.

31. C. Legum, *What Kind of Radicalism for Africa*, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965 (Vol. 43, No. 2), p. 242.

their own feet. Take, for instance, Gambia with an area of 4,003 square miles and a population of 315,486. It is still dependent on Great Britain, which has agreed to continue the budgetary grant-in-aid to the new state for some years to come.³² Similarly, Mauritania, with a population of 791,000 is dependent on France for balancing her budget. Togo is another small country in West Africa with an area of 22,002 square miles and a population of about 1.5 million, almost half the population of Delhi.

The most logical solution appears to be the consolidation of small states into federations or their merger with big neighbours. There have been some promising signs in this direction. The people of British Cameroons (a trust territory) decided to merge with neighbouring Nigeria and Cameroon. Again, British Togoland ceased to exist when its people voted in favour of union with Ghana. In East Africa, Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged their sovereignties in April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later renamed simply the United Republic of Tanzania. It is proposed to establish an East African Federation consisting of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and, perhaps, Somali and Zambia.³³ Mauritius may also join the Federation upon attaining independence.³⁴ Such efforts should be encouraged in all parts of Africa.

Over the years a great many trade and economic agreements have been signed between the African States. Talks are going on for the establishment of free trade areas, customs unions, common services, and common markets in several parts of Africa and in some cases they have been successfully concluded. Such steps are likely to be identified when the newly independent states become aware of the advantages of this kind of cooperation. From such functional cooperation closer union, or large federal groupings, may follow.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

President Nkrumah's vision seems to have been partially fulfilled with the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May 1963. Representatives of 30 out of 32 independent African states (excluding the Republic of South Africa) participated in the conference. The states not represented at the conference were Togo, whose President was not invited, and Morocco, whose king refused to attend it because of the presence of the President of Mauritania. However, these two countries have been admitted to the OAU together with four other states which have recently become independent.

The Charter of the OAU was drafted in large measure by Mr. Truco, Chile's representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), who was asked by Ethiopia to be consultant for the occasion. It is, therefore, similar in its legal basis, procedures, and functions to the OAS. The Charter consists of a preamble and thirty-two articles.³⁵ Article 3 recognizes the sovereign equality of all member-states and the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state. Article 7

32. African World, March 1965, p. 21.

33. A. R. B., February 1965 (Vol. II, No. 2), p. 238B.

34. See the statement of the Prime Minister of Mauritius in A. R. B., January 1965 (Vol. II, No. 1), p. 219C.

35. See text of the Charter in OAU: Basic Documents and Resolutions (Addis Ababa: Provisional Secretariat of the OAU, 1964), pp. 7-13.

provides for the establishment of four organs : (1) the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, (2) the Council of Ministers, (3) the General Secretariat, and (4) the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Assembly of Heads of State is to meet at least once a year and is the supreme organ of the OAU. As in the General Assembly each state has one vote. Resolutions require a two-thirds majority except those dealing with procedural matters.

The Council of Foreign Ministers, or such other Ministers as may be designated by the member-states, is to meet at least twice a year and is subordinate to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

The General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General and its international character is spelled out in Article 18, which reproduces the language of Article 100 of the U. N. Charter. It is subordinate to the Council of Ministers. The first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the first Assembly), held in Cairo from July 17 to July 21, 1964, adopted the recommendation of the Dakar Session (August 1963) of the Council of Foreign Ministers that Addis Ababa be the site of the headquarters of the OAU.³⁶

The fourth organ, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, is not a "judicial organ." Article 19 stated that a separate Protocol, to be adopted subsequently, would define its composition and conditions. The first Assembly adopted this Protocol, according to which the Commission is to consist of 21 members who will form a panel from which states may appoint a number to act, the number depending on whether mediation, conciliation or arbitration is involved. The power of the Commission to act in any particular dispute is based, essentially, on the consent of the parties.³⁷

Article 20 provides for the establishment of such specialized commissions as (1) Economic and Social Commission, (2) Educational and Cultural Commission, (3) Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission, (4) Defence Commission, and (5) Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.

The Significance of the Charter

The form of the OAU Charter is clearly a rejection of the radical views of President Nkrumah, who had advocated the acceptance of a political union of all African states "along the lines of the USA or the USSR." In a personal communication to all heads of state he urged the establishment of a central political organization with two Houses and power to formulate "a common foreign policy, common continental planning for economic and industrial development, a common currency, a monetary zone and a central bank of issue, and a common defence system."³⁸

36. A.R.B., July 1964 (Vol. I, No. 7), p. 107A.

37. Ibid., p. 107C.

38. Colin Legum, Addis Ababa Conference, Britannica Book of the Year 1964 p. 18.

The Conference was almost unanimously against the idea of political union and did not pay any heed to it. Nevertheless, an organization of all independent African states with a permanent machinery was created. Both the radicals and the gradualists of all shades gave the OAU their unqualified support and subsequently agreed to liquidate the various rival regional groupings that had been established between 1958 and 1963. Thus in conformity with the OAU decisions against regional political groupings, the President of Guinea announced on June 3, 1963, the dissolution of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.³⁹ Similarly the Casablanca and Monrovia groups and the PAFMECSA were dissolved the same year for the same reason. For some time the UAM alone refused to dissolve itself. However, in March 1964 it too was dissolved, only to be replaced by a new African and Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation (UAMCE).⁴⁰ The OAU has thus replaced a number of regional groupings of African states.

President Nkrumah and the OAU

But for President Nkrumah the OAU is a means for the establishment of a federal union embracing the whole of Africa. At the Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government (July 1964) he again proposed the framework of a Union government body. This Union government "shall consist of an assembly of heads of state" to be headed by a President. The executive "will be a cabinet or council of ministers with a chancellor or prime minister as its head and a federal house consisting of two chambers . . ."⁴¹

Though his plan was once more rejected, it has not dampened his enthusiasm. In a nation-wide broadcast on March 5, 1965, the eve of Ghana's independence anniversary, he reiterated that continental unity was a historical necessity for Africa.

It is not because Kwame Nkrumah wants it; I am only the instrument of history, not its creator. I am convinced, beyond all doubt, that whether we like it or not, the continental unity of Africa will be achieved.⁴²

A few weeks earlier he had predicted that the Accra Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU (scheduled for September 1965) "will see the birth of a continental union government for Africa. If we go slow, we shall go to pieces and perish."⁴³

President Nkrumah's call for continental unity has had a violent reaction in West Africa. At a recent meeting of the Entente States (consisting of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta) President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta described President Nkrumah as "an African monster" who "must disappear from the realm of right-thinking men and go and live in the regions of monsters."⁴⁴ It is reported that the Entente

39. Ibid., p. 23.

40. International Organization, Autumn 1964 (Vol. XVIII, No. 4), p. 871.

41. A.R.B., July 1964 (Vol. I, No. 7), p. 123B.

42. A.R.B., March 1965 (Vol. II, No. 3).

43. A.R.B., January 1965 (Vol. II, No. 1), p. 219A.

44. The Statesman, New Delhi, April 19, 1965.

States have refused to go to Accra next September for the OAU Conference—because, to quote President Hamanai Diori of Niger, “we are not going to rush into the lion’s mouth.”⁴⁵

Evidently, President Nkrumah seems to have taken up an extreme position which is likely to divide the African leaders again into two groups—the radicals and the gradualists. For the time being he will have to feel satisfied with what was achieved at Addis Ababa in 1963; otherwise, some members of the OAU are likely to boycott the forthcoming Accra session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.⁴⁶ The prospects of a closely-knit political unit embracing the whole of Africa are nowhere in sight. The Africa of many nations is a reality. At this stage all energies should be directed to work the OAU system and to promote functional cooperation among the African states.

Conclusions

Although all Africans are committed, in different ways and with different intentions, to pan-African unity, the lack of an agreed definition of “unity”, rivalries between African leaders and the love for power, the strength of narrow nationalism and the absence of any external threat to the security of the African states all tend to overshadow the lure of political unity based on an accident of geographic contiguity. The Africans borrowed their notions of boundaries (or the states’ frontiers) and of sovereignty from the West—notions which have a somewhat different meaning for them; for they frequently talk of various kinds of unions—economic, customs, cultural, social and political. Broadly speaking, their loyalty to their nations is not as deep-seated and deep-rooted as that of, say, the Germans or the Italians. The possibility of their forming bigger political units cannot therefore be ruled out. When they realize that development outside the framework of large federal groupings is not possible, “they will move from the stage of little states to that of large ones.”⁴⁷

Compared to old states, they have undoubtedly demonstrated remarkable dynamism in the field of international regional cooperation—social, economic and political. It is impossible to find an answer to Professor H. T. Spiro’s question: “Which other continental region in history, of comparable size, scope and diversity, set up only three years after the majority of its states gained independence a functioning and slowly but surely growing organization of continental unity?”⁴⁸

It may be recalled that in the Americas the movement for pan-Americanism was launched in 1826 at the Panama Conference called by Simon Bolivar. But it took the movement 122 years to adopt the Bogota Charter, establishing the Organization of American States. The movement for European integration goes as far back as 1305 when Pierre Dubois

45. Ibid. When contacted, the Information Officer of the Ghana High Commission at New Delhi stated that his office had not received any official information about this matter.

46. President Tsiranana of Madagascar warned Ghana about such a possibility in February last. A.R.B., February 1965 (Vol. II, No. 2) p. 237C.

47. B. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 52.

48. Political Stability in the New African States, Annals, July 1964 (Vol. 354), pp. 103-104.

advocated that the Christian powers of Europe unite in order to have a stable peace. Though the idea of European unity has been revived from time to time, not much success has been achieved. In 1930 the Foreign Minister of France proposed a "United States of Europe." Study of the project continued for several years but led to no lasting results.

After the end of the Second World War, the fear of Soviet expansion and a feeling of impotence on the part of the "once-dominant" nations of Europe in the presence of the big giants (the USSR and the USA) resulted in some progress toward unity in the western part of the continent. There have come into existence a number of regional organizations operating in the economic, military and political fields and indicating impressive regional tendencies. But Europe with 31 states is seriously divided into two camps—the Western and the Eastern, a far cry from a "United States of Europe."

Efforts made by Asians in this direction have not borne any fruit either. The first Asian Relations Conference was convened in India in 1947 and it was expected that Asia too would have a permanent regional organization. But serious differences among Asian states have stood in the way of a regional organization like the OAS or the OAU coming into existence.

President Kwame Nkrumah's goal of continental unity in Africa is still far off. The present arrangement is but one step on a long road to federal union. The OAU is merely a consultative machinery, a relatively weak institution whose continued existence depends upon the willing co-operation of the member-states. It lacks sanctions ; it has no organ with disciplinary powers. It does not possess armed forces to punish those who disregard their obligations under the Charter of the OAU. Like other similar organizations, it can promote cooperation, but cannot exact it. It is based on the unity of purpose of the member-states—a unity it cannot itself create. Although not even two years old, it has faced many stresses and strains and has successfully weathered them. If the Addis Ababa spirit continues to guide the destinies of the OAU and if the Simon Bolivar of Africa continues to display a spirit of tolerance and patience, the organization can move towards something more nearly approaching a United States of Africa. During the past few years the African states have established a variety of new relationships among themselves which cut across international frontiers and tend to undermine the Western concept of sovereignty—a healthy sign indeed, worth encouraging, appreciating and emulating in Asia.

TABLE 1
Independent States of Africa in Chronological Order

<i>State</i>	<i>Date of Independence</i>	<i>Date of U.N. Membership</i>
Ethiopia	Since ancient times	November 13, '45
Liberia	1847	November 2, '45
Republic of South Africa	1910	November 7, '45
United Arab Republic	1922	October 24, '45
Libya	December 24, '51	December 14, '55
Sudan	January 1, '56	November 12, '56
Morocco	March 2, '56	November 12, '56
Tunisia	March 20, '56	November 12, '56
Ghana	March 6, '57	March 8, '57
Guinea	October 2, '58	December 12, '58
Cameroon	January 1, '60	September 20, '60
Togo	April 27, '60	September 20, '60
Madagascar	June 26, '60	September 20, '60
Congo (Leopoldville)	June 30, '60	September 20, '60
Somalia	July 1, '60	September 20, '60
Dahomey	August 1, '60	September 20, '60
Niger	August 3, '60	September 20, '60
Upper Volta	August 5, '60	September 20, '60
Ivory Coast	August 7, '60	September 20, '60
Chad	August 11, '60	September 20, '60
Central African Republic	August 13, '60	September 20, '60
Congo (Brazzaville)	August 15, '60	September 20, '60
Gabon	August 17, '60	September 20, '60
Senegal	August 20, '60	September 28, '60
Mali	September 22, '60	September 28, '60
Nigeria	October 1, '60	October 7, '60
Mauritania	November 28, '60	October 27, '61
Sierra Leone	April 27, '61	September 27, '61
Tanganyika*	December 9, '61	December 14, '61
Burundi	July 1, '62	September 18, '62
Algeria	July 3, '62	October 8, '62
Rwanda	July 11, '62	September 18, '62
Uganda	October 9, '62	October 25, '62
Zanzibar*	December 10, '63	December 16, '63
Kenya	December 12, '63	December 16, '63
Malawi	July 6, '64	December 1, '64
Zambia	October 24, '64	December 1, '64
Gambia	February 18, '65	Not admitted as yet

(*Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged their sovereignties in April 1964. Following the ratification, on April 26, 1964, of the Articles of Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of the Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single member of the United Nations, later changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania.)

TABLE 2
African Countries by Area and Population

<i>State</i>	<i>Area in square miles</i>	<i>Estimated population (1962)</i>
Algeria	917,537	11,150,000
Burundi	10,747	2,300,000
Cameroon	183,333	4,150,000
Central African Republic	238,224	1,275,000
Chad	495,800	2,750,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	132,000	850,000
Congo (Leopoldville)	905,381	14,500,000
Dahomey	44,696	2,060,000
Ethiopia	457,147	20,000,000
Gabon	103,100	450,000
Gambia*	4,003	315,486
Ghana	91,843	7,050,000
Guinea	94,925	3,000,000
Ivory Coast	124,503	3,340,000
Kenya	224,960	7,400,000
Liberia	43,000	1,300,000
Libya	679,358	1,225,000
Madagascar	227,800	5,625,000
Malawi (formerly Nyasaland)	46,066	2,920,000
Mali	464,874	4,150,000
Mauritania	419,230	740,000
Morocco	171,599	11,950,000
Niger	458,995	2,900,000
Nigeria	356,669	36,100,000
Rwanda	10,169	2,725,000
Senegal	76,124	3,050,000
Sierra Leone	27,925	2,500,000
Somalia	246,202	2,035,000
South Africa	472,926	16,350,000
Sudan	967,500	12,300,000
Tanzania	362,820	9,813,000
Togo	22,000	1,475,000
Tunisia	48,332	4,260,000
Uganda	93,981	6,925,000
United Arab Republic	386,000	27,000,000
Upper Volta	105,839	3,735,000
Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia)	238,130	2,525,000

(From Rand McNally Cosmopolitan World Atlas, op. cit., pp. 162-166).

*African World, March 1965, p.21.

Africa in the Indian Parliament

by K.B. RAI

INDIA'S interest in Africa is partly due to the genuine sympathy Indians feel for Africans and their causes and partly due to India's stake in the newly emerged African nations. Active support for the independence of African countries, fighting for self-determination and self-expression, was the natural outcome of India's experience of British domination for nearly two centuries and her protracted struggle for independence in the present century. Mr. Joachim Alva (Congress) expressed the sentiments of Indians when, making an appeal in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) for supporting freedom movements in Africa, he referred to Africans as "fellow-brethren in our fellow-continent of Africa."¹ Another issue on which Africans and Indians share the same thoughts is the policy of *apartheid*, still practised in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. India has been as vocal as any African country in demanding an immediate end to the discriminatory treatment of people on the basis of race and colour. The presence of a large number of Indian settlers in some of the African countries² and the difficulties they have been experiencing since the achievement of independence are other factors arousing India's interest in Africa. This however is in sharp contrast to India's indifference to the people of Indian origin in some of the Caribbean countries. Since India was one of the first countries to achieve independence in the post-war era and evolve an independent foreign policy called non-alignment, she was naturally anxious that other independent nations, including those in Africa, should pursue the same policy so that, as Indian leaders put it, the area of peace may be broadened. India has played at the United Nations a role which may be regarded as significant in certain respects. In 1958 the African member-states of the United Nations formed a separate group, commonly known as the African bloc.³ They, however, continue to be members of the Afro-Asian group, which was organised as a regular group in 1955 after having existed as an informal *ad hoc* group for some years. One of the questions before India in recent years has been to evolve a policy in the UN with regard to the African group. This has become all the more important with the rapid increase of African members in the UN. As

1. India, Lok Sabha Debates (hereinafter referred to as simply L. S. Deb.), Second Series, Vol. 27, No. 27, March 16, 1959, Col. 6469.

2. There are at present 500,000 people of Indian origin in South Africa, 1,87,000 in Kenya, 87,300 in Tanganyika, 65,960 in Uganda, 16,000 in Zanzibar, 13,000 in Malagasy (Madagascar), 10,800 in Malawi (Nyasaland), 6,500 in Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), 7,300 in Southern Rhodesia, 2,100 in Ethiopia, 1,200 in Somalia, 500 in Burundi, and 250 in French Somaliland.

3. For a recent study of the working of this group see Catherine Hoskyns, The African States and the United Nations, 1958-64 International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July 1964), pp. 466-480.

the number of independent countries in Africa increased, the Indian Foreign Office was faced with the problem of evolving an Africa policy which would be acceptable to African nations and consistent with India's national interests. The challenge of China's entry into Africa and her well-planned efforts to establish a stronghold in that continent and distort India's image there had also to be met. All these questions were discussed in the Indian Parliament.

Members of the Indian Parliament belonging to various political parties, including the independents, have shown deep concern over the freedom movements in African countries. In his first address to the Lok Sabha Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the then President of the Indian Republic, referred to "the great nationalist upsurge in various parts of Asia and Africa."⁴ It was in North Africa, perhaps more appropriately called Arab Africa, that the nationalist forces asserted themselves first. In the debates of the Indian Parliament in the early years there are several sympathetic references to the freedom movements in Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and, later, Algeria.⁵ As the awakening in Africa gathered momentum and the freedom movements spread to the countries south of the Sahara, the Indian Parliament rose to the occasion and supported the Africans fighting for their liberation. Sentiments were expressed in favour of the peoples of Sudan, Gold Coast, British Togoland, French Togoland, British Cameroons, French Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Somaliland, Belgian Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique, South-West Africa and other African countries.⁶ In 1960—"the year of decision in Africa"—the whole of the continent was in ferment. The late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, declared in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian Parliament) on August 17, 1960: "After a very long period of colonial domination the countries of Africa have suddenly come out with a bang."⁷ India continues to voice her concern inside as well as outside Parliament for the countries which are still dependent, notably the Portuguese colonies, South-West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia.⁸

We may now refer to the discussions in the Indian Parliament on certain other issues which could be considered as colonial problems, especially the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, the invasion of Egypt by Anglo-French and Israeli forces on the issue of nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, the question of Congo after it was granted freedom by Belgium

4. L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 1, No. 3, May 16, 1952, Col. 61.

5. See, for example, Vijaya Laxmi Pandit (Congress) speech, L.S. Deb., Pt. II Vol. 2, No. 1, June 12, 1952, Col. 1609; H.N. Mukherji (Communist) speech, L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 5, May 15, 1954, Cols. 7530-31; and Acharya Kripalani's (at that time in PSP) speech, *ibid.*, Cols. 7552-53.

6. See, for example, Kasliwal (Congress) speech, L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 1, No. 5, Feb. 20, 1956, Cols. 357-362, and Jaganatha Rao (Congress) speech, L.S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 40, No. 28, March 16, 1960, Col. 6284.

7. Nehru and Africa, New Delhi, Indian Council for Africa, 1964, p. 26. An interesting viewpoint was advanced in an editorial in the London Times of 4-1-1961. The writer maintained that it was not perhaps strictly true to describe 1960 as the year of decision in Africa because most of the decisions had been taken long before. This, however, indicates the impact of the force of African nationalism.

8. Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister, reiterated India's views on Southern Rhodesia in a speech in the Lok Sabha on Nov. 23, 1964. He categorically stated that "our thinking has been in tune with the aspirations of the African people." See L.S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 35, No. 6, Nov. 23, 1964, Col. 1231.

in 1960, and the Bizerta crisis of 1961. Indians were distressed at the unhappy events in Kenya and at the declaration of a state of emergency there in October 1952. They were deeply moved by the fate of those Africans who were killed, detained or imprisoned as a result of the British Government's repressive measures. The safety of Indian settlers in Kenya was also a matter of concern to them. The discussions in Parliament reflected these feelings.⁹ Over the issue of Suez there was an unusual degree of unanimity reflecting the people's sympathy for the cause of Egypt. As Mr. A.K. Gopalan (Communist) said in the Lok Sabha: "There has been unprecedented unity in our country in support of Egypt."¹⁰ The Anglo-French action was considered to be a calculated move to reverse the whole process of emergence of dependent countries in Africa and Asia.¹¹ India displayed remarkable freedom of action on this issue, for the stand taken by her went against Britain, the leader of the Commonwealth. On Congo India supported the UN action and contributed troops to the UN force. As the controversy developed over this issue and some of the countries began to withdraw their forces, some members of Opposition in Parliament felt that India should take a similar step.¹² There was great sympathy among all sections of the country for the Congolese people and their cause. The French bombing of Bizerta in Tunisia also evoked similar feelings in India. In a speech in the Lok Sabha on August 17, 1961, Mr. Nehru called it "a very deplorable and distressing incident" and supported "the complete freedom of Tunisia and the removal of foreign bases."¹³ Some of the Opposition leaders, however, felt that the Indian Government's reaction was not strong enough, and they urged the Government to take "necessary steps through the United Nations and otherwise for ensuring Tunisian sovereignty and compelling France to respect it."¹⁴

On several occasions the Government was criticised in Parliament for adopting a lukewarm attitude towards the freedom movements of some of the African countries. It was asserted that it had not taken a forthright stand on Kenya,¹⁵ French Cameroons,¹⁶ and Algeria. On the question of Algeria it was felt that the Government attitude was not in accord with its traditional anti-colonial policy and that it was designed to appease France.¹⁷ After the Provisional Government of Algeria was set up by the Algerian nationalists in 1958, the Government was urged to

9. See question by Prof. Ranga (at that time in Congress), Rajya Sabha Debates (hereinafter referred to as simply R.S. Deb.) Vol. 2, No. 4, Nov. 27, 1952, Col. 424, and question by Diwan Chaman Lall (Congress), R.S. Deb., Vol. 11, No. 21, Dec. 19 1955, Col. 3113.

10. L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 9, No. 4, Nov. 19, 1956, Col. 393.

11. See *ibid.*, Col. 395.

12. See, for example, question by Niren Ghosh (Communist), R.S. Deb., Vol. 40, No. 3, August 8, 1962, Col. 598.

13. Nehru and Africa, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

14. See Bhupesh Gupta (Communist) speech, R.S. Deb., Vol. 35, No. 6, August 22, 1961, Col. 1152.

15. See H.N. Mukherjee (Communist) speech, L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 5, May 15, 1954, Cols. 7530-31 and Acharya Kriplani (at that time in PSP) speech, *ibid* Cols. 3552-53.

16. See Renu Chakravarti (Communist) speech, L.S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 27, No. 27, March 16, 1959, Col. 6446.

17. See, for example, Asoka Mehta (at that time in PSP) speech, L.S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 9, No. 4, Nov. 19, 1956, Col. 405.

accord recognition to it. Some Congress members also advocated this view.¹⁸ The criticisms of the Opposition were trenchant. Mrs. Parvathi Krishnan (Communist) maintained that because of non-recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government there had been some doubts among African nations about the policy of the Indian Government towards the liberation movements in Africa and that African nations felt that "India has been rather out of step with the events that have been taking place in Africa."¹⁹

India has opposed with vigour and consistency the ruthless *apartheid* policy of the South African Government. The discriminatory treatment meted out to the people of Indian origin in South Africa is an additional reason for India hating this policy. The question of treatment of people of Indian origin was raised in the very first session of the General Assembly and has been discussed in the UN a number of times. But as Dr. Rajendra Prasad explained in his Address to the Lok Sabha in 1952: "This question is no longer merely one of the Indians of South Africa; it has already assumed a greater and wider significance. It is a question of racial domination and racial intolerance. It is a question of the future of Africans more than that of Indians in South Africa."²⁰ Prof. D. C. Sharma (Congress) voiced the feelings of the Indian people when he said: "South Africa, in the world of today, represents a system of government, a system of economy, and a system of administration, which are, I believe, outmoded."²¹ It was because of her obduracy in following the *apartheid* policy that South Africa had to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. Some Opposition members of the Indian Parliament have asserted that India should adopt a stronger and more constructive policy on South Africa to ensure that the Africans are treated with dignity.²²

The Indian people were shocked at the brutal police firings resulting in the death of a large number of Africans at the Sharpeville and Langa townships near Capetown (South Africa) in March 1960. On March 28, 1960, Mr. Nehru moved a resolution in the Lok Sabha deploring the tragic incidents and expressing sympathy for the Africans in South Africa. Some of the Opposition members, however, regarded the resolution as timid and insipid.²³ It is somewhat strange that the Indian Parliament has not paid equal attention to the *apartheid* policy practised by the

18. See Dinesh Singh's speech, L.S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 40, No. 28, March 16, 1960, Col. 6336. Mr. Dinesh Singh advocated *de facto* recognition of the 'National Government of Algeria'. He, however, spoke in favour of full and complete (apparently *de jure*) recognition in Dec. 1961. See L.S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 60, No. 15, Dec. 7, 1961, Col. 3926. For a critical analysis of the attitude of the Government of India from the point of view of international law see K.P. Misra, Recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic: A study of the Policy of the Government of India, Political Studies, Vol. X, No. 2 (June 1962), pp. 130-145.

19. L.S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 60, No. 15, Dec. 7, 1961, Col. 3871.

20. L. S. eb., Pt. II, Vol. 1, No. 3, May 16, 1952, Col. 61.

21. L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 40, No. 28, March 16, 1960, Col. 6319.

22. See, for example, A. K. Gopalan (Communist) speech, L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 1, No. 4, May 19, 1952, Col. 93; U. M. Trivedi (Jan Sangh) speech, L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. I, No. 6, Feb. 21, 1956, Col. 528; and A. B. Vajpayee (Jan Sangh) speech, L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. XI, No. 4, Feb. 13, 1958, Col. 685.

23. See speech by Braj Raj Singh (Socialist), L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 41, No 35, March 25, 1960, Cols. 8390 ff.

white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. It also overlooked the Rivonia trial of October 1963 in South Africa.

It was natural that India should evince greater interest in the future of Indian settlers in Africa after she achieved independence. Apart from the ill-treatment meted out to them by the whites in South Africa, Indian settlers have been faced with two major problems in Africa—denial of full citizenship rights and a sense of insecurity, especially after the emergence of independent African countries. Mr. Nehru stated the policy of the Government in unambiguous terms. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, he asserted that “while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand we cannot protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in.”²⁴ Mr. Nehru and other spokesmen of India’s foreign policy have reiterated this view on several occasions and emphasised that the Indians settled in Africa should identify themselves with Africans.²⁵

Several members of Parliament have felt that the Government of India has been apathetic towards the Indian settlers in Africa. Indian settlers have been adversely affected, particularly in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar following the Africanisation of the civil services and because of the Africans’ desire to secure a bigger share in the commerce of their own countries. The Government of India has been called upon to take concrete steps to protect their interests.²⁶ The “revolution” in Zanzibar in early 1964 and the developments affecting the safety and property of the Indian settlers there figured in the Indian Parliament. The policy of the Government in regard to the protection of Indian settlers was considered to be weak and callous.²⁷ It may be mentioned here that when the Portuguese authorities detained in camps about twenty-three hundred Indian nationals in Mozambique after Goa was liberated by India in December 1961, the issue was raised in Parliament. Mr. Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha on May 29, 1962, in reply to Prof. D. C. Sharma (Congress) that the detained Indian nationals had been examined by the representative of the UAR (who looks after Indian interests in Portugal and Portuguese colonies) and representatives of the Vatican and the International Red Cross. He added that their condition was satisfactory and that they had since been released.²⁸

Members of the Indian Parliament have shown increasing awareness of the role the independent nations of Africa are destined to play in the world and the relations India should cultivate with them. Seth Govind Das (Congress) declared in the Lok Sabha in 1955 that

24. Nehru and Africa, op. cit., p. 39.

25. See Dinesh Singh’s speech, L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 25, No. 9, Feb. 20, 1964, Col. 1737.

26. See, for example, questions by Savitri Devi Nigam (Congress), N. Rama Reddy (Congress), Dayabhai Patel (Swatantra), A. B. Vajpayee (Jan Sangh) and Jaswant Singh (Independent), R. S. Deb., Vol. 30, No. 12, August 12 1960, Cols. 1992, 1994, R. S. Deb., Vol. 36, No. 4, Nov. 30, 1961, Cols. 578-79, and R. S. Deb., Vol. 40, No. 8, August 16, 1962, Cols. 1765-1817.

27. See Ranga (Swatantra) speech, L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 25, No. 4, Feb. 23, 1964, Col. 6637 and P. K. Leo (Swatantra) speech, L. S. Deb., Vol. 29, No. 46, April 9, 1964, Col. 10210.

28. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 4, No. 33, May 29, 1962, Col. 7442.

the future of the world would now depend on Asia and Africa.²⁹ In recent years the awakening of Africa has been hailed in the Indian Parliament and appreciation expressed for the emergence of the "African Personality". In a speech in the Rajya Sabha on December 15, 1958, Mr. Nehru emphasised that "one of the most striking things today is the gradual development of what has been called the "African Personality."³⁰ The "African Personality", in the words of Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana, President of the 19th UN Assembly, "is, in the largest sense, the cultural expression of what is common to all peoples whose home is on the continent of Africa."³¹ Mr. Quaison-Sackey maintains that although the term "African Personality" has had a long history in Africa, it has come into constant use only within recent years.³² Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, according to him, was the first to give the term its modern connotation at the first Conference of Independent African States, held at Accra in April 1958.³³ It is difficult to say whether the "African Personality" has its roots in the distant past. It is still more difficult to prophesy the role it will play in the future. But it is a hard fact that its impact on recent developments in the world has been tremendous. Perhaps it was the Bandung Conference of April 1955 which helped, more than any other recent event, to make Africa a force to reckon with in the contemporary world and contributed to the emergence of the concept of "African Personality."³⁴

A related concept is that of pan-Africanism which has a longer history and has in a sense helped the development of the idea of "African Personality." It was at the Accra Conference of 1958 that Dr. Nkrumah gave concrete shape to the concept. It may be observed here that there has been no parallel development of concepts of Asian Personality or pan-Asianism. The Asian nations have been too engrossed in their own problems to look beyond their borders to the whole of the continent for the solution of common problems.³⁵ It is disappointing that pan-Africanism has not figured adequately in the Indian Parliament although Mr. Nehru sometimes did refer to it.³⁶

Africa with 35 members has now the largest single group in the UN. On colonial issues African nations act with a virulence which cannot be fully supported by India. This has affected India's leadership of the Afro-Asian group. The African nations have been critical of her moderate role. The Indian Parliament has taken note of this develop-

29. L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 2, No. 30, March 31, 1955, Col. 3930.

30. Nehru and Africa, op. cit., p. 25.

31. Alex Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1963, p. 36.

32. Ibid., p. 35.

33. Loc. cit.

34. Cf. Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations*, Northwestern University Press, 1963, pp. 24-26. Mr. Hovet maintains that it was at the Bandung Conference that the concept of "African Personality" took root.

35. See, on this, Rupert Emerson, *Pan-Africanism*, International Organization, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Spring 1962), p. 275.

36. See, for example, Nehru & Africa, op. cit., p. 25. There is an indirect reference to pan-Africanism in a speech of Ravindra Varma (Congress) in the Lok Sabha on May 14, 1962. See L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 3, No. 22, May 14, 1962, Col. 4524.

ment and members of Parliament have expressed concern over it.³⁷ But concrete proposals have seldom been put forward.

The increase in the membership of the United Nations due to the admission of African and, for that matter, Asian nations has highlighted the need for revising the UN Charter. On December 17, 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for increasing the strength of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council from eleven to fifteen and from eighteen to twenty-seven respectively.³⁸ India supported this move. The issue has been discussed in Parliament. In 1956 the Lok Sabha considered a motion tabled by Mr Brajeshwar Parsad that the UN Charter should be revised so that African and Asian nations might be represented in the UN in proportion to their population and that all representatives and delegates to the UN and its subsidiary bodies be elected on the basis of adult franchise.³⁹ The motion, which implicitly advocated the adoption of weighted voting at the UN, could not be passed. As Mr. Menon pointed out, the advocacy of this attitude would have the effect of arousing the suspicion of the people in other countries.⁴⁰ The African nations, most of which have small populations, would be obviously at a disadvantage if this system of voting were adopted. If India advocated this viewpoint, they would be the first to remonstrate. However, Dr. Radhakrishnan, now President of the Indian Republic, criticised the "one state—one vote" system and spoke in favour of weighted voting in 1951.⁴¹

The Indian Parliament has naturally given greater consideration to the more immediate problem of India's relations with the new African nations. The creation of a new division for Africa in the External Affairs Ministry in 1961 has been welcomed. One of the first questions regarding India's relations with African nations discussed in Parliament concerned India's diplomatic representation in African countries. In reply to a question in the Lok Sabha Mr. Nehru stated in March 1961 that although this issue was being considered, the Government had taken no final decision.⁴² A few months later he announced in the same House that India had decided to have diplomatic representation in Senegal, Tanganyika, Somalia, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and that the establishment of more missions was under the active consideration of the Government.⁴³ The question continues to engage the attention of the Government and Parliament. Of special interest is the pleading of some of the members for closer diplomatic relations with Mauritania, Dahomey,

37. See, for example, Nehru, R. S. Deb., Vol. 45, No. 22, Dec. 17, 1963, Col. 3678, and Renu Chakravarti (Communist), L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 27, No. 27, March 16, 1959, Col. 6445.

38. General Assembly Res. 1991-A, B (XVIII) Dec. 17, 1963. This amendment of the U.N. Charter can come into force only if it is ratified by two-thirds of the total membership of the U.N., including the five permanent members of the Security Council. India has already ratified the amendment.

39. See L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 6, No. 4, July 20, 1956, Cols. 484-85, and L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 6, No. 15, August 3, 1956, cols. 2158-2216.

40. L. S. Deb., Pt. II, Vol. 6, No. 15, August 3, 1956, Col. 2211.

41. See the Statesman, Calcutta, Dec. 24, 1951.

42. L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 52, No. 23, March 16, 1961, Col. 5325.

43. L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 58, No. 25, Sept. 8, 1961, Col. 8018.

Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and other former French African countries.⁴⁴

Although India has opened diplomatic missions in about twenty-five countries in Africa the response of African countries has been slow.⁴⁵ In reply to a question in November 1964, Mr. Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs, said that Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Congo (Leopoldville), Malawi, Kenya, Madagascar, and Somalia had not opened diplomatic missions in India, although India had appointed envoys to these countries.⁴⁶ He gave no satisfactory reason for this development. He said : "The question of opening diplomatic missions abroad falls entirely within the competence of each state. However, the reasons for the non-opening of missions generally are the lack of finances and dearth of trained personnel."⁴⁷

The Government of India has been criticised for not sending its most capable diplomats to African countries. Mr. Nath Pai (PSP) assailed the Government's attitude of categorising diplomatic missions not according to their importance but according to climatic conditions.⁴⁸ He asked whether Africa and Asia were not of vital importance to India.⁴⁹ Congress members have also been critical of the Government's attitude. Mr. Ansar Harvani stated in the Lok Sabha in November 1964 that "the *bare sahibs* of our External Affairs Ministry consider it beneath their dignity to go to one of these Afro-Asian countries and they much prefer to stay in Rome, Paris, London, or Washington and, if that is not possible, at least at Beirut or Cairo."⁵⁰

Members of the Indian Parliament have advocated with vigour promotion of closer economic and cultural relations with African countries. Mrs. Parvathi Krishnan (Communist) declared in the Lok Sabha in December 1961 : "Closer economic and cultural and political ties with the new nations of Africa will certainly help our country also."⁵¹ She added that this would be especially so because "Britain is going into the ECM and the breaking up of the Commonwealth is now becoming a stumbling block rather than a help."⁵² Other prominent members of Parliament, particularly those belonging to the ruling party, have often advanced the argument that the Africans are more likely to appreciate the lofty ideals of *Panchsheel* than the people in Europe and that preservation of their freedom and maintenance of close relations with India will extend the area of non-involvement and consequently of peace.⁵³

44. See, for example, Ravindra Varma (Congress) speech, L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 3, No. 22, May 14, 1962, Col. 4524.

45. Including the embassy of Algeria, which has been recently set up, there are only eight diplomatic missions from Africa in Delhi.

46. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 35, No. 6, Nov. 23, 1964, Col. 1129.

47. Loc. cit.

48. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 3, No. 21, May 12, 1962, Cols. 4256-57.

49. Ibid., Col. 4257.

50. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 35, No. 7, Nov. 24, 1964, Col. 1493.

51. L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 60, No. 15, Dec. 7, 1961, Col. 3874.

52. Loc. cit.

53. See, for example, Dinesh Singh's speeches, L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 10, No. 28, Dec. 17, 1957, Cols. 5941-42, and L. S. Deb., Second Series, Vol. 40, No. 28, March 16, 1960, Col. 6335.

In recent years India's trade with African countries and the technical and economic aid she has extended to them have been discussed in Parliament on several occasions. In March 1963 Mr. Manubhai Shah, then Minister of International Trade in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, gave both Houses of Parliament an exhaustive account of India's efforts to expand trade with African countries.⁵⁴ As Mr. Shah explained, India has taken steps to open commercial offices, appoint representatives of Export Promotion Councils, organise exhibitions of Indian goods, set up permanent show-rooms for display of Indian goods, exchange delegations, start joint ventures, encourage Indian firms to open foreign branches and conclude trade agreements with African countries.⁵⁵ Replying to Mr. Bhupesh Gupta (Communist), Mr. Shah said in the Rajya Sabha on Feb. 25, 1965, that India would participate in joint ventures in African countries on the basis of the policies and terms and conditions laid down by these countries "provided they are acceptable to us."⁵⁶ India has strengthened her cultural relations with African countries. The number of African students studying in Indian universities on Government of India scholarships has increased markedly in recent years. The Government has taken measures to ensure that African students after their studies should return home with happy impressions of their stay in the country.⁵⁷

The question of strengthening India's information and publicity services in Africa has assumed special significance because of the anti-Indian propaganda by China and Pakistan in Africa. It is felt that India's image in African countries has been distorted and that India's publicity has not met the situation adequately. As Mr. Harish Chandra Mathur (Congress) stated in the Lok Sabha: "Even the best friends of India have always complained, more particularly recently, that India's image is not properly projected in these countries."⁵⁸ An opposition leader, Mr. P.K. Deo (Swatantra), observed: "Our external publicity is far from satisfactory; it has to be streamlined In populous places like Nigeria we should have our news bulletins."⁵⁹ Mr. Ajit Gopal, a correspondent of the Hindustan Times, wrote a year ago that it is a little known fact in African countries that with 50 million Muslims India has the third largest Muslim community in the world.⁶⁰ The Government of India has, however, set up information posts in several African countries and, as Mr. Dinesh Singh explained in the Lok Sabha in March 1963, all the media available locally—the press, television, and radio—are being utilised.⁶¹

China's increasing influence in Africa is viewed in India with grave concern. The Government is taking steps to counteract Chinese

54. See L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 14, No. 15, March 8, 1963, Col. 2948 and R. S. Deb., Vol. 42, No. 20, March 18, 1963, Cols. 3123-26.

55. Loc. cit.

56. Reported in the Statesman, Delhi, Feb. 26, 1965. The Official Debates of the Rajya Sabha were not available at the time this article was written.

57. See, for example, question by A. C. Gilbert (Congress) and reply by K. L. Shrimali, R. S. Deb., Vol. 36, No. 8, Dec. 6, 1961, Cols. 1247-48.

58. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 14, No. 20, March 16, 1963, Col. 4066.

59. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 29, No. 46, April 9, 1964, Col. 10210.

60. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 31.5.1964.

61. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 14, No. 20, March 16, 1963, Col. 4066.

propaganda, particularly propaganda against India, by proper publicity and cooperation with African countries. As Mr. Joachim Alva (Congress) put the issue squarely : "Today we must take care of the fact that China is springing over our heads on the frontiers and territories of Africa. There is a scramble for Africa. Unless we take note of the events in Africa we have grave danger not only on this side of South-East Asia on our heads but also on the continent of Africa."⁶² In another speech a year later Mr. Alva pointed out that the Chinese had done things effectively in Africa and that "they have driven out the British and other Western influence from Africa. They are driving out the American influence too. They seek to nullify our influence in Africa although we have been pioneers there."⁶³ Mr. H. N. Mukherjee (Communist) observed that "it is only because our conduct in regard to many things has been such that now no longer does Africa look up to us in a way it used to."⁶⁴ Mr. Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1956 to 1963, has advanced an explanation for the increasing influence of China in Africa which is not altogether unconvincing.⁶⁵ Mr. Welensky maintains that the Chinese are not associated with the exploitation of Africans and this gives them an advantage over the Russians—Mr. Welensky is not much concerned with the Western influence in Africa—who have white skin and over the Indians, who took commercial advantage of their (Africans') inexperience and lack of education."⁶⁶

The treatment of Africans in the defunct Central African Federation, the nuclear explosion by France in the Sahara, the Moshi Conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation of 1963, and the Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government of non-aligned countries of October 1964 have been discussed in Parliament. But the sub-Sahara French Africa has attracted little attention. It is strange that in the Parliament Debates there is practically no reference to the developments leading to the formation of one-party governments in several African countries. One would also expect members of Parliament to discuss the issue of human rights in Africa. It is widely felt that not all Africans are enjoying the rights they had hoped they would enjoy after independence. Pan-Africanism and regionalism in Africa have been only casually dealt with in Parliament. However, members of Parliament have done a commendable job in focussing the attention of their countrymen on Africa.

62. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 15, No. 21, March 18, 1963, Col. 4507.

63. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 29, No. 48, April 11, 1964, Col. 10576.

64. L. S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. 15, No. 21, March 18, 1963, Col. 4454. Mr. Mukerjee was mainly concerned with the fact that India's role on colonial issues is no longer so dynamic and inspiring as it used to be. See, *ibid.*, col. 4455. He quoted Prof. Vernon McKay (Africa in World Politics, New York, Harper, 1963, pp. 179, 189) to prove this.

65. See Roy Welensky, the United Nations and Colonialism in Africa, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 354 (July 1964), p. 151.

66. *Loc. cit.*

OAU and the Congo crisis

By R. C. PRADHAN

AN examination and evaluation of the role of the Organisation of African Unity in the Congo crisis is called for for two reasons. First, prior to the establishment of the OAU in May 1963, the Congo¹ was one of the two issues which created great cleavages and conflicts among the African States. The other issue was that of Algerian independence². Their solution (Algeria won independence in July 1962 and the Katanga secession was ended in January 1963) made a significant contribution to the lessening of tension in Africa, which in turn led to the establishment of the OAU at Addis Ababa. This was widely recognised as a milestone in the Africans' march towards continental unity. It will be useful to examine how far the existence of the OAU has affected the basic attitudes of the African States towards the Congo crisis.

The second reason why the issue merits consideration is that an examination of how the OAU has handled a difficult and delicate crisis like the Congo will reveal not only the strength and weakness of the organisation but also its direction and dynamism. The swift and efficient handling of the Morocco-Algerian and the Somali-Ethiopia-Kenya border conflicts greatly enhanced the prestige of the OAU³. In the Congo, however, the OAU was faced with a problem which had divided Africa for long and defied all attempts of the UN to find a peaceful and permanent settlement. Thus it will be both interesting and instructive to examine how the OAU has responded to one of the greatest challenges of its life, namely, the Congo crisis.

An attempt is made here to analyse and appraise the role of the OAU in the Congo crisis. It is not an attempt to find out the genesis of the crisis or to pronounce judgment on the actions of the factions involved. The questions this paper seeks to answer are : How has the OAU responded to the Congo crisis ? How far has it succeeded in its twin objective of national reconciliation in the Congo and insulation of the country from the outside world ? What are the factors and forces that stood in the way of its success ? How far, in its zeal to find an African solution of the problem, has the OAU worked in keeping with its basic principles and purposes ? What are the prospects ?

1. Thomas Hovet, *Africa in the United Nations*, Faber and Faber, London, pp. 255-57.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 254-55.

3. *The Organisation of African Unity*, African Heads of Missions, New Delhi, 1965, p. 12.

I

Ever since its independence on June 30, 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been the problem child of the world community. The United Nations made tremendous efforts to reform it. The UN's achievements were by no means unimpressive. It prevented outside interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, made possible the formation of a National Reconciliation Government headed by Adoula in August 1961, helped the Republic in the maintenance of its territorial integrity and political independence, extended economic aid to it and, above all, gave it a protective umbrella under which the Congolese might have set themselves firmly on the path of peace and prosperity. Two problems that remained unsolved were : (1) indiscipline in the ANC and (2) differences and dissensions among the Congolese leaders. This failure could be attributed to : (a) colonial legacies ; (b) political inexactitude of its political leaders ; and (c) attempts of the outside world to woo the Congo. In June 1963, Tshombe went into self-exile after the division of Katanga which destroyed his political base⁴. In September, Parliament was suspended and the political opponents of Adoula persecuted. They fled to the neighbouring countries of the Congo (Brazaville) and Burundi and set up a Committee for National Liberation. In March 1963 a rebellion was launched and by June it had spread to Kivu, Kwilu and North Katanga. On June 30, the last batch of UN troops was withdrawn. A crisis was looming large. Finding himself unequal to the occasion, Premier Adoula resigned. Tshombe, who had already returned to the Congo, was called upon to form a Government. He succeeded and was sworn in on July 10. Prominent among his colleagues were Munongo and Kalonji—the secessionist leaders of Katanga and South Kasai respectively.

II

It is in the context of the Congolese situation that the deliberations and decisions of the Second Summit Conference of the OAU, held from July 17 to 21, should be viewed. The African states found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, under the provisions of the OAU Charter, they were committed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country and, on the other, they looked at Tshombe's rise to power as a patent case of neo-colonialism which they were determined to eliminate from the soil of Africa.

In an attempt to reconcile these contradictory commitments, a compromise formula was reached. President Kasavubu was requested not to include Tshombe in the Congo delegation to the conference. The Congo chose to boycott it⁵. Criticising this decision of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, *West Africa* remarked :

“The decision was not merely an insult to President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe but an affront to the Congolese people. When did the OAU assume the right to determine which leaders a particular state must elect and present ?”⁶

4. The Times (London), June 17, 1963.

5. The Times of India, July 18, 1964.

6. West Africa, August 15, 1964.

The decision has been criticised on two grounds : (1) it amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of the Congo and (2) by excluding Tshombe from the conference the African states missed a great opportunity to influence him and thereby find an African solution of the crisis.

Taking the second point first, it would be erroneous to assume, as many observers seem to do, that had Tshombe been allowed to attend the conference, he might have been more amenable to African pressures. Perhaps these observers have forgotten the history of Tshombe's life. His knack of exploiting any and every situation to bolster up his own position is unparalleled. What the Congo needed most at that time was national reconciliation. The African leaders perhaps thought that by excluding Tshombe they would be indirectly forcing him to seek genuine reconciliation in his faction-torn country. Moreover, at least two leaders—the Prime Minister of Algeria and the King of Morocco—had made it clear that they would not sit with Tshombe at the same table. Thus there was the danger of the conference being wrecked by Tshombe's presence⁷. All these considerations weighed with the African leaders in their decision to exclude Tshombe from the conference.

The second criticism of the decision to exclude Tshombe from the conference is that Tshombe was the head of a legally constituted government and that the denial of his right to attend the conference amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. In reply, it may be said that Tshombe's case of being the legal Prime Minister is not as clear and coherent as it is sometimes made out to be. Two important points should be borne in mind. The first is that Tshombe's rise to power was not legal procedurally. The President's right to call upon him to form the government in itself was unconstitutional. True, such a right was granted to him under the new constitution, framed by a commission appointed by him in October 1963 and approved at a nationwide referendum in June 1964. But the dissolution of Parliament in September 1963 and the subsequent appointment of the constitution commission was itself unconstitutional. According to the provisional constitution of the Congo, Parliament itself was to work as the Constituent Assembly⁸. But it was not allowed to do so. The second point to remember is that when the referendum was being held, one-third of the country was in the grip of a revolt and therefore the result of the referendum was not above suspicion, at least in the eyes of the outside world⁹.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that Tshombe was and is the legal Prime Minister of the Congo. Was, then, the Africans' decision to exclude him from the conference an interference in the internal affairs of the Congo? Here, too, two points should be clearly understood : (1) Such a decision was not without precedent. At the first African summit conference at Addis Ababa in May 1963, the new President of Togo was not admitted because of the assassination of the former President, Sylvanus Olympio. Later on, Togo was admitted to the organisation but only after holding free elections as stipulated by the organisation¹⁰.

7. The Hindustan Times, July 14, 1964.

8. World Today, February 1965, p. 43.

9. Ibid.

10. The Ghanaian Times, July 19, 1964.

The exclusion of Tshombe was meant to force him to make a sincere effort to achieve genuine national reconciliation and therefore it could not be taken as interference in the internal affairs of the Congo.

Meanwhile the situation further deteriorated. The revolutionaries gained new ground and captured provincial capitals like Stanleyville and Kindu. Tshombe took a number of measures to strengthen his position. He called back his Katanga gendarmerie for reintegration with the ANC. He also sought and received military help from the United States. When all this did not prove of much help, he started recruiting white mercenaries from South Rhodesia and South Africa. He appealed to a number of African States like Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia and Malagasy for military help but they refused to respond¹¹. It was under these circumstances that the Council of Ministers of the OAU met in Addis Ababa on September 5, 1964.

On September 10, the Council passed a resolution which reads as follows : The Council of Ministers of the OAU,

(1) Appeals to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo so as to facilitate an African solution ;

(2) Notes the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms ;

(3) Requests, especially all those now fighting, to cease hostilities so as to seek with the help of the OAU a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and the restoration of order in the Congo ;

(4) Appeals to all political leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seek, by all means, to restore and consolidate national reconciliation ;

(5) Decides to set up and to send immediately to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) and the Kingdom of Burundi an ad hoc commission consisting of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somali, Tunisia, UAR, and Upper Volta, placed under the effective chairmanship of H. E. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, which will have the following mandate :

(a) to help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with paras 2 and 3 above ;

(b) to seek by all possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, especially, the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazaville).

11. The Times of India, August 25, 1964.

(6) Appeals strongly to all powers at present interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo to cease their interference. The member-states are further invited to give instructions to these powers with a view to impressing on them this appeal ;

(7) Requests all member-states to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or worsen the relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours.¹²

The Council of Ministers of the OAU reportedly made two concessions to Tshombe : (1) On his insistence the words "immediate removal" of mercenaries were replaced by the words "as soon as possible" ; (2) Departing from its stand at Cairo, it admitted Tshombe to the meeting and refused admission to the rebel leaders. This was interpreted by *West Africa* as the OAU's commitment to support "Tshombe and not the rebels whatever misgivings some members may have".¹³ This was all the more significant because the People's Republic of the Congo was proclaimed on September 6 to coincide with the Council of Ministers' meeting.¹⁴ This change in attitude on the part of the Council of Ministers may be attributed to three factors : First, by that time Tshombe had strengthened his position in the Congo, both politically and militarily, to such an extent that it was not possible to write him off. Second, he was employing mercenaries and the Council thought it prudent to impress on him personally to stop their recruitment. Third, Tshombe had threatened to boycott the Council's meeting if the rebels were admitted. It would be erroneous to say that the Council had made too many concessions to Tshombe. The Council's main stress was on the need to remove mercenaries from the Congo and to stop the foreign military help Tshombe was getting to suppress the revolution. That the OAU tried to follow a middle path is evident from the reactions of Tshombe and the revolutionary leader, Gbenye. Tshombe pledged to carry out the resolution "in the light of our sovereignty, our territorial integrity and our inalienable right to national independence."¹⁵ Not only that. He even regretted the Council's failure so far to "send African troops to fight the rebellion" to enable him to dispense with the services of those (white mercenaries) whose presence in the Congo is embarrassing to us."¹⁶ Gbenye regretted that the Council had admitted Tshombe but hastened to congratulate the OAU "on its concern to end the conflict, which is a danger to unity". He however made it clear that "the revolutionary government will not accept the ceasefire until the last of Tshombe's mercenaries disappear from the Congo and this is followed by the removal of Kasavubu and Tshombe from the political scene. The revolutionary government will facilitate the task of the OAU".¹⁷

The ad hoc commission appointed by the Council of Ministers met for a week and on September 20 passed two resolutions.

12. *Current History*, April 1965, p. 237.

13. *West Africa*, September 15, 1964.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *West Africa*, September 29, 1964.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *The Hindu (Madras)*, September 17, 1964.

The first resolution called upon the Governments of the Congo (Leopoldville), Burundi, and the Congo (Brazaville) "to do what they can to facilitate the commission's contacts with the leaders of the opposing groups" and to encourage national reconciliation in the Congo.¹⁸ By its second resolution the commission decided to ask the "three governments to furnish a detailed report to facilitate the work of the commission and to ask the Congo Government in particular to make concrete proposals for obtaining national reconciliation".¹⁹

On September 22, the ad hoc commission took two steps which were strongly resented by Tshombe :

(1) It gave a hearing to the delegation of the revolutionary leaders and
 (2) it decided to send a delegation consisting of Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria under the leadership of Kenya Foreign Minister Murumbi to Washington to "impress upon President Johnson to withdraw all the military supplies, equipment and men from the Congo and halt further assistance to Tshombe's Government."²⁰ This drew sharp reactions from Leopoldville and Washington. President Kasavubu, in a strongly worded protest to the Secretary-General of the OAU, described the move as a "manifest interference" in the internal affairs of the Congo. The OAU, he said, had "called the Congo's independence into question by seeking to prevent the execution of an agreement which the Congo, as a sovereign country and in accordance with international law has made with friendly countries."²¹ A spokesman of the State Department made it clear that the United States would not "agree to discuss aid to the Congo without participation of the Congolese Government at whose request the aid is being given".²²

The delegation visited the United States in the last week of September but failed to get any definite assurance from it. A communique issued at the end of the talks said the delegation had come on a "goodwill mission" and had no "intention to raise with the United States matters affecting the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo". "In welcoming this assurance", the Secretary of State "asked the delegation to convey to the chairman of the commission, Mr. Kenyatta, the sympathetic understanding of the U.S. Government that he is engaged in a most significant undertaking in the service of Africa, to the success of which the U.S. Government attaches great importance".²³

It is clear that the delegation failed to persuade the U.S. Government to stop giving military aid to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

OAU and the second non-aligned conference

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was a participant in the first non-aligned conference held in Belgrade in 1961 and had also been invited

18. West Africa, September 29, 1964.

19. Ibid.

20. The Hindu (Madras), September 21, 1964.

21. The New York Times, September 22, 1964.

22. Ibid.

23. The New York Times, October 1, 1964.

to attend the second non-aligned conference at Cairo in October 1964. Meanwhile the situation changed and Tshombe came to power. The Committee of Ambassadors, which met at Cairo, stressed the "undesirability" of Tshombe's presence at the Cairo conference. Consequently, all the three sponsors of the conference, namely, President Nasser, President Tito and Premier Bandaranaike, in a joint message to President Kasavubu, requested him not to send Tshombe to the conference. They went on to add: "We feel that it is indispensable that you should personally represent your country at the conference whereby you will assist the conference to proceed with its work normally and to achieve full success".²⁴

Despite this, Tshombe arrived at Cairo on October 6, 1964. He was taken to a house and prevented from attending the conference. When the Congolese retaliated against the Algerian and Egyptian embassies in Leopoldville the African participants in the conference, in a message to the President, requested him to "repair quickly the situation and to ensure better conditions for brotherly cooperation and understanding between the people and Government of the Congo and the rest of the African peoples and Governments."²⁵

The conference passed a resolution on the situation in the Congo under the head "Concerted action for the liberation of the countries still dependent, elimination of neo-colonialism and imperialism." The resolution in part read as follows:

Deeply concerned at the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Congo, the participants,

1. Support all the efforts being made by the Organisation of African Unity to bring peace and harmony speedily to that country;
2. Urge the ad hoc commission of the OAU to shirk no effort in the attempt to achieve national reconciliation in the Congo, and to eliminate the existing tension between the Congo and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi;
3. Appeal to the Congolese Government and to all combatants to cease hostilities immediately and to seek with the help of the OAU a solution permitting national reconciliation and the restoration of order and peace;
4. Urgently appeal to all foreign powers to prevent interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, particularly to those engaged in military intervention in that country, to cease such interference which infringes the interest and sovereignty of the Congolese people and constitutes a threat to neighbouring countries;
5. Affirm their full support for the effort being made to this end by the OAU's ad hoc commission of good offices in the Congo;

24. The Review of International Affairs (Belgrade).

25. Ibid.

6. Call upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to discontinue the recruitment of mercenaries immediately and to expel all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo in order to facilitate an African solution.²⁶

Two important points emerge from the Cairo conference decisions on the Congo situation : (1) The decision to exclude Tshombe from the conference and the final resolution on the Congo were the outcome of the initiative taken by the African participants in the conference, and (2) the conference realised and commended the vital role the OAU was playing in the Congo crisis.

OAU and Belgo-American intervention

However, all these efforts of the African States to bring about national reconciliation in the Congo were of no avail. Tshombe's army, with the help of mercenaries, pushed back the revolutionaries. There were chances of Stanleyville being retaken by the Congolese Army. The revolutionary leader, Mr. Gbenye, appealed to all African states to see that bombing by American planes was stopped.²⁷ Mr. Kenyatta was approached by a number of foreign dignitaries, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, to ensure that the lives of civilians in the Congo were protected. Mr. Kenyatta urged both factions of the Congolese to cease hostilities but his appeal fell on deaf ears. Tshombe took strong exception to Kenyatta's appeal and accused him of departing from the spirit of the Council of Ministers' resolution of September 10. "This (resolution)", he added, "asked the rebels to lay down their arms with a view to achieving national reconciliation and does not place the Congolese Government on an equal footing with the rebels as your message appears to do."²⁸

Mr. Gbenye sent Mr. Thomas Kanza to Nairobi on November 22 with the understanding that the "discussion should concern not only the question of the civilian hostages but all elements of the Congo situation."²⁹ A meeting was arranged by Mr. Kenyatta between Mr. Kanza and Mr. Attwood, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya. On November 24, Mr. Attwood abruptly broke off the talks and Belgian paratroops carried by American planes landed in Stanleyville on the same morning. This created confusion and resulted in a considerable loss of human lives. The action was taken on the express request of the Tshombe Government and lasted only five days. But the intervention caused violence and loss of human lives on a big scale. No hostages were killed before the landing took place. But in the chaos created by the intervention, the revolutionaries got scared and shot dead some of the white hostages. This tilted the balance in favour of Tshombe and left a tremendous impact on the course of the civil war.

The ad hoc commission met on November 27 to consider the situation arising from the Belgian intervention. Chairman Kenyatta

26. Ibid.

27. The Times of India, October 16, 1964.

28. The Hindu, October 21, 1964.

29. The Times (London), November 23, 1964.

apprised the commission of the course of the Kanza-Attwood talks and blamed Mr. Attwood for breaking them off. According to him, two courses of action were open to the commission: (i) The question could be referred to the parent body—the OAU—so that its mandate might be reviewed in the context of the new development and (2) the commission could resume its efforts to promote national reconciliation after “the dust of the current military operation has settled.”³⁰ On November 29 the commission passed a resolution condemning the Belgo-American intervention in Stanleyville, calling for a meeting of the OAU to consider the situation and appealing to the Congolese leaders to cease hostilities, stop the recruitment of mercenaries and remove those already there. The resolution was preemptorily rejected by Tshombe.³¹

Congo and the Security Council

On December 1, 22 states (including 18 African states) requested for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Belgo-American intervention in the Congo which they regarded as “an intervention in African affairs, a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and a threat to peace and security.”³² Another request for a meeting was made by Tshombe, who alleged that Algeria, UAR and the Soviet Union were extending help to the “rebels which amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of his country.”³³ The Council met on December 9 to discuss the situation. After a prolonged procedural debate, it rejected a Soviet demand not to put Tshombe’s complaint on its agenda. It debated the issue for nearly three weeks. The Council was divided on the point whether the Belgian intervention violated the principles of the Charter and thus amounted to a case of aggression or whether it was justified because it had a humanitarian motive, viz., to rescue the hostages from the rebels’ hands, and because it was made on the express request of the Congo Government. Most of the African states condemned the Belgian intervention.

Mr. Charles David Gonao of the Congo (Brazaville), who initiated the discussion, characterised the Belgian intervention as “the most savage and most scandalous operation ever launched.”³⁴ Ridiculing the humanitarian pretext of the interventionists, Mr. Bapsio of Ghana asked how the United States would feel if Ghana sent a military contingent to the southern states to help Negroes fighting there for their rights. The Guinea delegate said the intervention was an attempt “to bring imperialism back to the Congo.” Similar sentiments were expressed by a number of other African States, including Mali, Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania and the Central African Republic. All of them requested the Council to endorse the OAU’s recommendations and to put it on record that the Congo question should be settled under OAU auspices without any outside interference.

The intervention was defended by Belgium, the U.K. and the U.S. They argued that the intervention in Stanleyville was solely motivated by humanitarian considerations, and that it was made on the request of the Congolese Government. What was interesting about the Council’s deli-

30. The Times (London), November 29, 1964.

31. The Observer (London), November 30, 1964.

32. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, January 1965, p. 7.

33. Ibid, p. 8.

34. Ibid, p. 9.

berations was that Nigeria vigorously defended the intervention on the ground that the Congolese Government was entitled to seek and receive help. He blamed those African States which had refused to extend military help to the Congo through the OAU, and found it a case of "inconsistency" that they were critical of Tshombe getting help from outside.³⁵

The Council adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by Morocco and Ivory Coast, incorporating an amendment moved by Guinea on behalf of the 18 African States. The resolution in its preamble commended the efforts of the OAU to find a peaceful solution of the Congo crisis. Its operative paras run as follows :

The Council,

1. Requests all States to refrain or desist from interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo ;
2. Appeals for a ceasefire in the Congo in accordance with the Organisation of African Unity resolution dated September 10, 1964 ;
3. Considers, in accordance with the OAU resolution of September 10, 1964, that the mercenaries should, as a matter of urgency, be withdrawn from the Congo ;
4. Encourages its efforts to help the Government of the Congo to achieve national reconciliation in accordance with the OAU's resolution of September 10, 1964.
5. Requests all States to assist the Organisation of African Unity in the attainment of these objectives ;
6. Requests the OAU, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, to keep the Security Council fully informed of any action it might take under this resolution ;
7. Requests the Secretary-General of the U.N. to follow the situation in the Congo and to report to the Security Council at the appropriate time."³⁶

The fact that the Congo question was taken to the Security Council showed that the African States had failed to solve it. Probably, the issue was referred to the Council to seek wider condemnation of the Belgian intervention. The Council failed to condemn the Belgian intervention in the way some of the African States would have liked it to do. But what was important from the viewpoint of the OAU was that it was for the first time that the Council had requested the OAU to attempt to find a solution of the Congo crisis.

The recommendations and exhortations of the Council had little effect on the Congolese leaders. Indirectly rejecting the Council's call for national reconciliation, President Kasavubu, in a New Year message to the nation on December 31, said :

"Certain Congolese, but especially foreigners, continue to think that the solution of our problems lies in national reconci-

35. Ibid, p. 11.

36. Ibid, p., 22.

liation. I believe for my part that this is putting the problem in a false light. The parties that really needed to be reconciled today are foreign interests and not the Congolese themselves."³⁷

Meanwhile the fighting continued. Algeria and UAR openly declared that they were extending military aid to the Congo. The rebel leaders visited UAR, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda and were assured moral and military help. But despite all this support, the rebels were pushed back by the Congolese Army. On January 19, 1965, Tshombe invited Mr. Diallo Telli, the OAU Secretary-General, to visit the Congo "to know the real facts." Addressing a public meeting in Leopoldville on January 21 he said his Government supported the "OAU's resolution of September 10, 1964, in which it solemnly undertook to support and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo aimed at the restoration of order and the achievement of national reconciliation."

The ad hoc commission met on January 27. Mr. Kenyatta attributed the failure of the commission to bring about national reconciliation in the Congo to the continued presence of mercenaries in the Congo and the failure of the Leopoldville regime and the rebel regime to respond to his ceasefire appeal.³⁸ After a two-day closed-door session the commission passed two resolutions, the first inviting representatives of the Leopoldville Government and those of the "Congo revolutionary regime" to meet the commission at Nairobi on February 12 to discuss the problem of national reconciliation and the second setting up a sub-committee consisting of Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria, and authorising it to visit Leopoldville, Brazzaville and Buzumbra with a view to preparing the way for the visit of the commission as a whole.³⁹

On February 12 the commission had to postpone its meeting to February 22 as Tshombe failed to turn up. Meanwhile the sub-committee visited Leopoldville on February 20. Ghana failed to send its representatives. By this time Tshombe had considerably strengthened his position.

The Council of Ministers of the OAU met on February 26 in Nairobi. Tshombe arrived there on March 4. He deprecated the OAU's tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo.

By this time the differences among the African States on the Congo question had become deeper. Sudan's move to seat the revolutionaries at the council's meeting for the purpose of hearing them on specific points was defeated by 13 to 7 votes with 14 abstentions.⁴⁰ On March 7 the Cameroun delegation circulated a draft resolution proposing (a) withdrawal of all mercenaries; (b) an African police force to go to the Congo under a bilateral agreement between the Congo Government and the African Government concerned; (c) a general amnesty for rebels who lay down their arms; (d) an OAU supervisory commission—whose members should be subject to the approval of the Congo Government—

37. The New York Times, January 1, 1965.

38. The Times of India, January 28, 1965.

39. The Times (London), January 31, 1965.

40. The Hindu (Madras), March 5, 1965.

for the general election in the Congo ; (e) an appeal to all states to desist from interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo.⁴¹

But the African States differed so widely that no solution could be recommended by the Council of Ministers. The final communique issued on January 8 stressed three points :

(1) Reference of the Congo question to the third summit conference of the OAU to be held at Accra in September 1965 ;

(2) An appeal to the African States not to take any action which might aggravate the situation ;

(3) Continuation of the OAU ad hoc commission.⁴²

IV

This survey makes it abundantly clear that the OAU has not succeeded in finding a solution to the Congo question. It could neither bring about national reconciliation in the Congo nor prevent outside interference.

Two main reasons for the failure of the OAU are : First, the OAU was faced with a very complex and controversial issue. Second, the OAU has its limitations, constitutional as well as circumstantial. Its Charter prohibits it from interfering in the internal affairs of a member-State. It is, at the same time, dedicated to the cause of solidarity of the African States and the elimination of all forms of colonialism. Herein lies the root cause of the ineffectiveness of the OAU. It cannot take any measure which might amount to interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. A sizable section of African opinion looks at Tshombe's rise to power as a neo-colonialist attempt on the part of the West. Naturally, they have tried to use the OAU to foil this neo-colonialist bid. The circumstantial limitations of the OAU arise from the deep division among the African states on the question of the Congo. The member-states are divided so widely that both factions in the Congo have been getting support and sympathy from different African States. It is quite possible that if the African States could have presented a united front, Tshombe might have been more amenable to the African pressure and an African solution might have been found. A third reason for the ineffectiveness of the OAU is to be found in the interference in the Congo by Belgium and others. Whatever its justification, the Belgian intervention in Stanleyville strengthened the position of Tshombe and thus made him more intransigent. But for outside support, Tshombe might have been inclined to find a genuine solution of the problem. A fourth reason is the personal dynamism and high sense of opportunism of Tshombe himself. All along he has tried, not totally without success, to use the forum of the OAU to enhance his own image and to create division among the African States.

But it would be erroneous to conclude that the OAU has met total failure in the Congo. It succeeded in putting both Tshombe and his supporters on the defensive. This resulted in the quick withdrawal

41. The New York Times, March 10, 1965.

42. Ibid.

of Belgian para-troopers. The OAU made Tshombe feel that he should take some radical measures to improve his image, both at home and abroad. The important role the OAU is playing in the Congo was stressed by the second non-aligned conference at Cairo and the Security Council. This clearly brings out the importance the world attaches to the OAU.

Rural Works Programme in India

by SUNIL GUHA

IN rural India self-employment tends to be characterised by severe under-employment and wage employment is often accompanied by unemployment during the slack agricultural season. As a result of land reform measures and supply of irrigation water, seeds, manures, fertilisers, etc., under-employment among self-employed cultivators is supposed to have been reduced ; but wage employment continues to depend, by and large, on the demand for wage employment in agricultural operations which has to come from the ex-intermediaries taking to direct cultivation on their holdings with the help of hired labour. Beyond this there was hitherto no other mechanism in the Indian agriculture to utilise fully the large masses of agricultural labourers who, according to Professor Daniel Thorner, can be classified into the following sub-groups :

(a) The sub-groups within free labour relationship

- (i) Those arrangements which continue for a year or more.
- (ii) Employment for a single crop season, such as rabi or kharif.
- (iii) Short-term jobs, lasting either for a few days or for a single operation, such as ploughing or harvesting.
- (iv) Daily labour in which workers are hired for one day at a time.

(b) Un-free labour relationship

- (i) Full-time service on an annual or more than annual basis for a dependent status.
- (ii) "Beck and Call" relationship under which labourers must work for a single master, whenever he so requires ; on days when the master has no work they may seek other employment.
- (iii) Types of forced labour in which tenants have to perform a certain number of works each year for their landlords at low, nominal or even no wages.

The distinction among the three types of un-free labour is not, as in the case of free labour, primarily in terms of the duration of the job. The sub-groups can be differentiated according to the mode in which the labourers are obliged to work for the master. The problem of seasonal unemployment and under-employment is thus likely to affect most the sub-groups within the free labour relationship. While a permanent

solution to this problem lies in the universal adoption of scientific agriculture and diversification of the rural economic structure. Experience of Plan implementation has shown that despite the intensification of agricultural operations and development of a wide range of processing and small industries, the problem of rural unemployment and under-employment persists in an acute form in many areas. It is the recognition of this fact that led to the formulation, in the Third Five-Year Plan, of the special Rural Works Programme for providing supplementary employment opportunities to rural workers during the slack season in areas especially exposed to pronounced seasonal unemployment and under-employment.

For the purpose of logical presentation this paper is divided into five sections : (i) Size and functional aspects of the problem of rural unemployment and under-employment ; (ii) Approach and content of the Rural Works Programme ; (iii) Review of progress ; (iv) Results of evaluation and employment studies ; and (v) Lessons for the future.

Size and Functional Aspects of the Problem

A precise assessment of the size of rural unemployment and under-employment in India presents many difficulties and only rough estimates can be made. Thus, on the basis of the National Sample Survey data, the Labour and Employment Division of the Planning Commission have estimated that the total number of the unemployed in rural areas (in the working age-group 15-59) was at least 50 lakhs in 1961. Of this, Uttar Pradesh accounted for more than 9 lakhs, Bihar for nearly 6 lakhs and Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra for more than 4 lakhs each. The various estimates given for rural under-employment are : 19.4 million (by Dr. Bhabotosh Dutta for 1954, which does not include seasonal unemployment), 22.8 million (by Prof. Mahalanobis for 1957) "for those suffering from real under-employment", and 70 million (by Mr. V. L. Mehta for 1959) for "persons having work of less than half a day in a week on an average in rural India." Comparing from the data in the National Sample Survey on Rural Employment and Under-employment (No. 88/1, for the period July 1959 to June 1961, draft form issued in June 1961) the number of persons in the Rural Labour Force (age-group 15-59) who work less than 28 hours and 42 hours a week comes to 27 million and 57 million respectively. But if calculated on the basis of the number in the Rural Labour Force who are available for additional work for up to 29 hours and 15 hours respectively the figures come to 11 million and 17 million respectively.

A fuller understanding of the problem of rural unemployment and under-employment is impossible without an examination of the functional aspects of the labour force in the rural areas. These may include the following facets :

- (i) For example, comparing from the data contained in the N. S. S. Report No. 88/1, published in June 1961, one finds that if a criterion of "rural labour force working less than 43 hours a week" is used, then the percentages of under-employment among the various groups would be as follows : agricultural labourers 40% (12 million persons out of 30 million), cultivators 36% (30 out of 84 million), working proprietors in trade 36% (30 out of 84 million), working proprietors in trade 36% (0.6 out of 1.7 million).

- (ii) The second important functional aspect concerning rural labour in India is related to regional and local differences. For example, under-employment in Punjab and Gujarat is much less pronounced, because of better development of industries and less population pressure, than that in Bihar, Mysore and Kerala. During 1956-57, the number of employment days for adult male agricultural labour was 244 (Punjab), 241 (Bombay), 220 (Bihar), 217 (Mysore) and 170 (Kerala). The regional variation in rural labour supply is partially reflected in the peak daily wage rates (1956-57) for agricultural (male) workers, such as Rs. 3.25 (in April) for Amritsar district in Punjab and Rs. 1.01 (in August) for Coimbatore district in Madras.
- (iii) On the whole, the smaller the farm, the more severe the degree of under-employment. The following chart showing the under-employment per permanent farm worker in Punjab illustrates the point.¹

<i>Holding size group</i>	<i>Employment (days) 8 hours a day</i>	<i>Unemployment (days)</i>	<i>Total</i>
0— 5	187	128	315
5—10	222	93	315
10—20	266	49	315
20—50	283	32	315

- (iv) Employment in Indian agriculture is linked with the peaks and curves of agricultural operations. While during the busy season a particular area may experience shortage of labour, during the slack season there may be a plethora of labour looking for work. It has been observed that even in areas where there is double cropping and irrigation there is general seasonal unemployment for not less than 60 days in a year. In areas which have single crops or no irrigation facilities, the period of seasonal unemployment may be as long as 180 days, but certainly not less than 100 days in a year. These phenomena call for special attention in planning for effective utilisation of rural manpower. The planners should bear in mind the impracticability of requiring the so-called "superfluous" labour in Indian villages to take up work at distant places for any long stretch of time. Moreover, the rural labour in India generally operate with the family as the working unit and their "leisure" time is often fractional and "unmemorable". This is one of the supporting arguments in favour of organising short-term works programmes in rural areas which seek to augment the local community assets and earnings of the labourers without displacing them from their householders.

1. It may be mentioned that in areas with predominantly small and medium-sized holdings, but a high proportion of agricultural labour, the problem of unemployment among agricultural labour will be most acute because of dependence on family labour.

Approach and content of the Rural Works Programme

It is important to point out at the very outset that the mechanism of rural public works has been conceived in India to serve as a marginal addition to an existing and reasonably well-knit scheme of development and not as the principal means for providing employment as has been done in Korea, Tunisia, Morocco and, perhaps, East Pakistan. In India, the stress under the programme is more on the precise study of the types of surplus labour which exists in different years, of finding out the scope for integrating the works programme, such as could be undertaken in the slack agricultural season, with the operations and needs of the agricultural economy, and determination, as precisely as possible, of the scale on which, as part of the development programme in the block, full-time opportunities must be brought into existence from year to year. It has been emphasised that the Rural Works Programme is not to be viewed as an isolated programme taken up for execution without reference to the regular development plans that are implemented in any area and that the area approach, as distinguished from the project approach, is basic to the programme. It also represents the logical development of the idea of breaking up the employment problem in terms of specific action at a number of points in order to make a decisive dent in the problem as a whole.²

Certain criteria have been prescribed by the Government of India for the selection of areas. These include the proportion of agricultural labour to total rural population, facilities for irrigation, migration pattern, prevailing wage rate of agricultural labour and opportunities for non-agricultural employment in the area, recurrent incidence of drought, etc. Only such small community works are eligible under the programme as are labour-intensive, do not involve higher technical skill, would utilise local resources, do not involve large expenditure on materials and are capable of being completed within a short period. Normally, the cost of a scheme should not exceed Rs. 50,000 and wages must account for 60 per cent of the cost of each scheme. The labourers employed under the programme are to be paid the prevailing local slack season rates. The following are the other salient features of the programme :

- (i) In order to study the combined impact of the Rural Works Programme, the Intensive Agricultural District Programme and the Rural Industries Projects, a few blocks under the Rural Works Programme should be located in areas where the I. A. D. P. Programme and the Rural Industries Projects are undertaken simultaneously.
- (ii) The schemes are to be executed by the Block Organisation with the help of Panchayat Samitis, Panchayats, Voluntary

2. Two pilot studies undertaken in Shahjahanpur District in Uttar Pradesh during June-July 1959 and Dumraon (South) N.E.S. block in Bihar during the middle of 1960 by a group of senior officers of the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Labour & Employment and the two respective State Governments indicated that the unemployment problem needed to be broken down and that at each appropriate level as much of it should be tackled directly as may be possible. One of the common findings of both the studies was that in the formulation of programmes as well as in their implementation the least thought was given to the vital aspect of additional employment generation on a continuing basis. The studies pointed out that decidedly better results by way of employment could be obtained than at present by co-ordinated working of the various development programmes in an area.

Organisations, wherever available, and labour cooperatives. The employment of contractors, who often get the works executed by imported labour from other areas and take away a large slice of the income flowing from each work contract, is to be avoided.

- (iii) In order to ensure that the Rural Works Programme does not run counter to the departmental programmes and lead to the replacement of similar schemes undertaken by the departments as part of their normal plans, all similar schemes undertaken in an area, whether under Community Development or departmental programmes or the Rural Works Programme, should be based on a common scheme of local community contribution. There should also be scope for various forms of community contribution, according to local conditions and possibilities without attempting to reduce these two set formulae.
- (iv) Loans are not to be given to individuals under the programme.
- (v) There should be close and continuous study of economic conditions and employment needs in the selected areas. Besides eliciting information about persons available for work during the slack season, their job preferences, etc., the employment studies should provide bench marks for subsequent surveys regarding the impact of development programmes on the local unemployment situation.

Review of Progress

In the report on the Third Five-Year Plan it was envisaged that the Rural Works Programme would provide employment to 2.5 million persons for 100 days by the last year of the Third Plan and that the programme as a whole might entail an expenditure of Rs. 150 crores. However, this amount was not provided for within the financial limits of the Third Plan. Because of the onset of the emergency only limited provisions could be made available for the programme. It now appears that the total outlay over the Third Plan period on the Rural Works Programme would be roughly of the order of Rs. 18 crores to Rs. 19 crores. At present, the programme covers nearly 1,000 community development blocks all over the country. On the present scale of the programme, about 3.5 lakh persons would obtain work for an average of 100 days a year.

Among the States the performance of Maharashtra, Madras and, of late, Uttar Pradesh deserve special mention. In many blocks of these States the annual expenditure has ranged between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 1.50 lakhs resulting in provision of employment to 500 to 750 persons for 100 days. It may be mentioned that even if we seek to provide employment to only 5% of the working force in a block under this programme we will have to take care of 1,600 persons and the per block expenditure has to be stepped up to Rs. 3 lakhs and more.

The limited expenditure incurred under the programme so far, against what had been envisaged in the Plan document, might give an impression that the programme has not fared better than test relief

works undertaken during drought, etc. Yet this is far from true. In the initial period of the first two years, the Planning Commission, which was then administering the programme, placed great emphasis on the development of the programme on proper and sound lines. The stress on quality in the earlier stages was necessary to lay proper foundations for rapid expansion during the remaining period of the Third Plan. The implementation of only such schemes as would lead to the creation of community assets and the stepping up of agricultural production, the involvement of Panchayati Raj institutions, which would be called upon to shoulder much greater responsibilities in economic development at the grass-root level in the years ahead, the emphasis on study of employment needs according to the size of the problem of rural unemployment and job preferences of those seeking work, the stress on non-employment of contractors and the organisation of local labourers into informal labour teams or regular labour cooperatives, are among the qualitative gains of the programme which stand out prominently. Another redeeming feature of the programme is that in several States, like Madhya Pradesh, U. P., Madras, Orissa, Mysore and Gujarat, the employment generated for every Rs. 100 of expenditure under the programme was between 55 and 63 man-days. According to the Second and Third Reports on "Employment Aspects of the Rural Works Programme" in certain selected blocks, prepared by the Directorate-General of Employment and Training and the Rural Works Division of the Ministry of C.D. & Cooperation, the Rural Works Programme has been twice as labour-intensive as the other normal development programmes undertaken in these blocks. This is an unmistakable indication of the fact that the emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the programme resulted in labourers deriving the maximum benefit from the works. In States like Maharashtra, Madras, U. P., Mysore, etc., the achievements of the programme in terms of new areas brought under minor irrigation, areas covered under flood protection and soil conservation and milage of the new roads constructed or the existing ones repaired have been quite significant.

The Estimates Committee of Parliament studied the working of the Rural Works Programme in 1963-64. The Committee observed that uncertainty about funds was, to a large extent, responsible for the peripheral impact of the programme. Indeed, the inability to indicate a definite provision for the Plan period introduced an element of uncertainty about the future of the programme against the background of which the State Governments hesitated to make advance planning regarding selection of areas, building up of administrative and technical organisations, etc. In their 55th report the Estimates Committee has observed that during the Fourth Plan a definite provision should be made for the programme and included within the financial limits of the Plan. The Committee has nowhere, in its report, questioned the usefulness of the programme. On the contrary, it has suggested its strengthening in several directions.

Results of evaluation and employment studies

The Programme Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission and the Directorate-General of the Employment and Training of the Ministry of Labour and Employment have been engaged in evaluating the Rural Works Programme in selected blocks since its inception. The first set of evaluation studies prepared by the Programme Evaluation Organisation drew attention to the inadequate appreciation of the objectives and

approach of the programme by the implementing agencies at ground level, administrative and organisational deficiencies, such as delays in the preparation of plans and estimates and flow of funds, shortage of overseers, etc., and selection of certain areas which did not fulfil the criteria laid down for the programme. However, the subsequent studies of the Programme Evaluation Organisation reported marked improvement in all these directions. The upshot of the findings of the PEO is that to produce better results, the State Governments must get over the present shortage in rural engineering personnel quickly and give more attention to the preparation of integrated block plans.

The Directorate-General of Employment and Training have studied the employment aspects of the programme in selected blocks in three rounds since the inception of the programme. The one outstanding fact revealed by the interpretation of the data thrown up by the studies is that in many areas the combined impact of the Rural Works Programme and all the normal development programmes on the local unemployment situation was at best marginal. In the course of these surveys, data was collected regarding the expenditure incurred under the normal development programmes and the Rural Works Programme in the selected blocks, the employment generated as a result of it, and the number of persons available for work during the slack season. The following table has been drawn up on the basis of an analysis of the data thrown up in respect of a few selected blocks by the Second and Third Employment Surveys conducted by the Directorate-General of Employment and Training :

Sl. No.	Name of block (State)	No. of man-days available during slack season (in lakh man-days)	Emp. provided under normal dev. programme during 62-63 (lakh man-days)	Emp. provided under R.W. programme during 62-63 (lakh man-days)	Total of col. 4 & 5	Extent of non-utilisation (lakh man-days)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<i>1st Series :</i>						
1.	Ibrahimpattanam (Andhra)	17.22	0.42	0.39	0.81	16.40
2.	Balijana (Assam)	1.10	0.012	0.30	0.31	0.79
3.	Dhanera (Gujarat)	14.93	4.52	0.52	5.04	9.89
4.	Parassala (Kerala)	21.04	1.87	0.31	2.19	18.85
5.	Ater (M. Pradesh)	11.0	1.14	0.53	1.68	9.32
6.	Babulgaon (Maharashtra)	17.01	1.02	0.55	1.57	15.44
7.	Hindol (Orissa)	6.13	0.15	0.52	0.67	5.50
8.	Jawaja (Rajasthan)	18.49	0.52	0.15	0.68	17.81
9.	Kunihar (Himachal Pradesh)	7.35	0.98	0.40	1.39	5.96
<i>2nd Series :</i>						
10.	Patamda (Bihar)	13.37	0.09	0.38	0.48	12.91
11.	Nalampalli (Madras)	7.90	0.60	0.12	0.72	7.18
12.	Chhapia (U. P.)	4.75	0.08	0.13	0.22	4.53
13.	Khadda (U. P.)	9.56	0.05	0.63	0.69	8.87

It will be apparent from the table that in areas with pronounced seasonal unemployment a much more intensive effort is called for than what is now being attempted on a modest scale through the Rural Works Programme and the normal development programmes.

The finding of the D. G. E. & T. surveys regarding the size of the working force requiring additional employment during the agricultural slack season is also corroborated by about 115 employment surveys which have been conducted by the State Governments themselves in areas selected for the Rural Works Programme. The surveys, though varying in scope and method, revealed that 5 to 20 per cent of the working force in these blocks was in need of additional employment during the slack season. Two other findings of the surveys, which are relevant for the future planning of the programme, are that even among unskilled workers there are job preferences, those belonging to higher castes being generally reluctant to do earth work and, in States like Kerala, Mysore and the desert areas of Rajasthan etc., a sizable proportion of the labourers wanting skilled jobs, say, in cottage industries.

Lessons for future

A question has been raised in recent months that in view of the intensification of various agricultural programmes contemplated during the Fourth Plan, the need for a separate rural works programme was not quite obvious. The points that this school of thought has failed to appreciate are that (i) the Intensive Programmes would tend to be concentrated only in areas which have more favourable agricultural conditions and they may not necessarily be the areas which have a high incidence of unemployment and under-employment; (ii) any scheme of distribution of allocations under the general programmes may not, in actual practice, be found adequate for the scale of operation required to relieve the distress in areas exposed to pronounced seasonal unemployment and under-employment and marked economic backwardness; and (iii) it is only through comprehensive area planning that the problem of fuller utilisation of manpower in some of the areas indicated in the table in Para 12 could be fully tackled. But during the Third Plan hardly any work was done to evolve the procedure and organisation necessary to ensure this at the appropriate levels in any State.

The lessons for the future can be summed up as follows :

- (i) During the Fourth Plan, especially in the first two years, efforts should be made in each State to identify the areas which are economically more backward than others and are exposed to pronounced unemployment and under-employment.
- (ii) A beginning should be made in a few selected areas in each State on a pilot basis to gain experience in integrated area planning with the focus on matching of programmes to employment needs on the basis of an objective assessment of the development potential.
- (iii) In the rest of the areas found to be exposed to pronounced seasonal unemployment, a much more ambitious rural works programme should be taken up, in addition to what has been provided for under the plan for normal

development programmes, supported by the requisite administrative and technical personnel.

- (iv) Side by side with the Rural Works Programme, an attempt should be made to identify those agricultural workers who wish to be permanently rehabilitated with improvement in skills which would be in demand in the near future for rural development programmes, and provision should be made within the programme for imparting these skills.

The recommendations of the recent Inter-State Conference on Rural Manpower Programme, it may be noted incidentally, are very much on the above lines.

DOCUMENTATION

ECA Programme of Work

In the last issue of this journal, we published a summary of the proceedings and recommendations of the 7th session of the Economic Commission for Africa and a review of the ECA activities during the previous year. We now give below the programme of work for 1965-67 adopted at the conference and detailed proceedings on some of the important points discussed at the conference—Editor.

THE programme of work for 1965-67, adopted at the 7th session of the Economic Commission for Africa held in Nairobi from Feb. 9 to 23, 1965, covers a full two-year period. The projects included are the first instalment of a five-year programme, now 'under preparation, divided into continuing and *ad hoc* projects. Advisory services, under almost all headings in the programme, are provided either by regional advisers, regular staff members or other means. In addition, the Governments, on request, are assisted in the programming and execution of projects. Studies are being carried out and will be undertaken on the following subjects :

I. Planning For Economic And Social Development

(a) *Projections.* Studies under this heading include projections already prepared for the economic survey of Africa by sub-regions; analyses and evaluation of developmental plans and performance of African countries ; causes underlying the weakness of indigenous entrepreneurship and management and measures for correcting these ; introduction of measures harmonizing industrial and commercial legislation, specially on a sub-regional basis ; research on the general problem of unemployment, particularly the problem of displacement of manpower resulting from agricultural modernization and selection of advanced technology in industry with a view to formulate proposals for minimizing their effects, etc.

II. Economic Growth

(a) *Trade expansion.* Studies on prospects and problems of increasing intra-African trade and trade between African and non-African countries ; possibilities of forming free trade areas or common markets on a zonal, sub-regional or regional basis and, in appropriate cases, on a sectoral basis ; organisation of training courses in foreign trade and commercial policy ; invisible trade and its effect on African countries.

(b) *Industrialization.* Continuing build-up of an inventory of industrial establishments in Africa ; preparation of an industrial map of Africa ; industrial situation, progress and problems in individual African countries ; industrial strategy to harmonize rational industrial development ; marketing of industrial products ; training course in industrial programming.

(c) *Infra-structure development.* Compilation of inventories of natural resources and research on the development of natural resources ; studies on the development of natural resources ; studies on the development of sub-regional transport networks ; inventory of technical features of existing railway systems ; investigations on road research facilities and establishment of an African civil aviation organ ; transit problems of land-locked countries ; establishment of intra-African telecommunication links and assistance in the assessment of requirements, provision of equipment and *ad hoc* training.

(d) *Mapping and Surveying.* Establishment of photogrammetry training centres and airborne geophysical surveys ; assistance to governments in designing cartographic services on modern lines.

(e) *Agricultural development.* Analyses of agricultural plans and programmes ; examination of the policies and operations of national marketing schemes, including price stabilization programmes and measures to improve marketing ; formulation of surveys on specialized manpower requirements for agriculture ; development and coordination of applied research in agriculture in collaboration with FAO on a regional basis ; continuing analyses on handling, processing and storage of agricultural products and the promotion of industries based on them ; rural animation, agricultural credit, cooperatives and extension services ; integration of livestock raising and the processing of animal products ; fertilizer consumption ; economic response to expenditures on fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation works under varying conditions ; economics of selected State farms and steps to harmonize methods to achieve modernized farming on a relatively large scale in cooperation with FAO ; possibilities of meeting the problem of specific grain deficits in West Africa ; increased catch of marine and inland water fish ; economics of soil conservation techniques ; land reforms programmes, including settlement and consolidation schemes to promote agricultural advance ; policies regarding production and trade in timber products, etc.

III. Social Advancement

(a) *Population.* Studies of demographic structures and trends to provide basic information and analysis for planning economic and social development ;

(b) *Economic, social and technical aspects of housing and physical planning.* Policies, programming and administration in housing, building and physical planning ; review of regulations and standards in the field of housing, building and physical planning ; documentation of information on housing, building and physical planning ; assessment of needs of technical staff to implement housing and building programmes and assistance to governments in improving existing training facilities ;

(c) *Social problems.* Socio-economic problems in development and improvement of rural life and institutions ; social problems of urbanisation and industrialization ; organization, administration and training in social welfare services ; eradication of illiteracy, etc.

IV. Money and Finance

(a) *Monetary institutions and policies.* Methods of fostering incentives to savings, prevention of hoarding and flight of capital, appraisal of existing

financial institutions and recommendations for development of new financial institutions to promote trade and development of capital markets; analysis of trends in balance of payments difficulties, exchange control operations, formulation of policies to achieve permanent equilibrium in the balance of payments without depressing the rate of growth; monetary cooperation among African central banks; problems of establishing and operating a multilateral payments compensation scheme and a payments union; measuring inflationary and deflationary trends and methods of detecting sources of inflation;

(b) *Public finance and fiscal policy.* Revenue and expenditure policies and patterns in African countries, analysis of existing tax and revenue systems; harmonization of national budgeting with development planning; standardization of customs tariff nomenclature, harmonization of rates of customs duties and other import charges; incentives and allied legislation for industrial development and capital investment; public debt management; measures for improved regulation and control of frontier traffic; training in budget management, tax administration and training of customs officials, etc.

V. Institutional and Administrative Development

(a) *Personnel systems and training.* Comprehensive survey of training requirements by fields of activity and by categories of personnel; survey of training facilities in Africa by fields of activity and categories of personnel, promotion of intra-African assistance on a bilateral basis; survey of facilities for training and Africans undergoing or who have undergone training outside Africa by fields of activity and by categories of personnel; coordination of information on, and stimulation of demand for, training; analysis of training methods; in-service training for African economists and statisticians; training in specified fields;

(b) *Public administration.* Preparation of personnel administration manual; review of laws and regulations governing government purchasing and supply and publication of a manual to be used in training officials; management of government enterprises; developing guides for improving and modernizing local government training programmes; organization of a course to cover the fields of local government finance; establishment of a pool of civil servants in Africa available and competent to serve in other countries of the region; study of existing national and international postal facilities in Africa, etc.

VI. Development of National and International Statistics

An overall plan for statistical survey of Africa; regional cooperation in training statistical personnel and in the field of data processing; exchange of information on statistical activities; processing and publication of statistical data, etc.

VII. Human Rights

The Commission has no activities under this heading.

VIII. Basic Information

Publication of a bulletin including review of current economic and social trends in African countries; publication of bulletins on specialized topics, etc.

After adopting the two-year programme of work and priorities and deciding to hold the sessions once in two years, it was decided that the Executive Secretary should, in the years the Commission did not meet, submit to the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the Chairman, a full report on the activities of subsidiary bodies and of the secretariat.

Formation of working parties

Introducing the draft programme of work for 1965-66, the Executive Secretary referred to a note on the establishment of working parties. In this connection he recalled the existence of two standing conferences of African Statisticians and African Planners which met every two years and also three standing committees, *ad hoc* meetings of a regional character, including expert groups, sub-regional meetings, seminars and training courses, etc. He proposed that the standing committees should be replaced by working parties covering monetary management, natural resources, transport and telecommunications, manpower and training and agriculture. Finally, he suggested that a council of ministers for economic cooperation in Africa be set up to provide the focal point for the review and coordination of aid policies and programmes and it was hoped that the OAU would fully associate with them.

Most delegates welcomed the proposal for the working parties as it was thought that they would provide an effective link between the growing volume of sub-regional activities and the examination of regional problems and also establish close working relations with the OAU. Some delegates expressed their reservations about the proposed working parties and their apprehension about handing over the discussion of problems of development in Africa to technocrats. Some delegates had also some objections to the setting up of a council of ministers whose functions, they thought, could be carried out by the OAU. According to some delegates the proposal was somewhat premature as the governments had also to be consulted. Several delegates were in favour of setting up working groups on the lines of the Committee of Nine appointed for the African Development Bank and the adoption of four or five priorities.

At this stage, the Executive Secretary intervened and made a statement clarifying some of the issues raised by the delegates. He said that the idea of working parties was to build up the organization from below and to provide a method of consulting governments on specific projects and associating them with their execution. The proposed council of ministers was intended to avoid duplication of work between the Commission and the OAU. A resolution sponsored by Algeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Uganda was adopted on the establishment of seven working parties and their terms of reference.

TAB and EAC

Reviewing the activities of the Commission many delegates felt that the presence of the TAB and ECA activities in their countries was creating confusion and emphasised the need for coordination of TAB and ECA activities in Africa in the same way as it was done in regions served by the ECAFE and ECLA.

Economic and Social Development

All the delegates emphasized the advantages of economic integration initiated and directed by the Commission in cooperation with the OAU. The recurrent theme was the need for a unified attack on the problems of under-development in Africa which required cooperation at both regional and continental levels and also assistance from many outside agencies. But it was recognised by the delegates that the key to real progress lay in the willingness of Africans to work hard and forego some national advantages for the good of all. Suggestions were made that in order to determine viable units, the Commission should undertake an economic survey of the entire continent bearing in mind economic and political factors, care being taken that one region was not isolated from another and that African unity was not hampered in any way.

It was agreed that economic development was determined not so much by the availability of abundant natural resources in a country or region but rather by the extent to which they were exploited. Delegates stressed the importance of utilising many known resources and exploration of others.

Appreciation of the work carried out by the Secretariat of the Commission underlining the importance of a proper balance between the social and economic aspects of development was expressed by the delegates. Among points mentioned were the need to include social aspects of developmental planning in the work of the Dakar Institute for Development and Planning as the predominance of the human factor should always be recognised because the object of good planning was to improve the lot of the common man.

Welcome to new members

The Commission welcomed Malawi and Zambia as full members of the Commission and also recognised the United Republic of Tanzania as a member with a single identity, replacing the two members, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, who had formed one political union.

Deliberations on some of the important topics

Agriculture. Two-thirds of Africa's agriculture is carried out at subsistence level which means that the larger part of the continent's rich resources in land, in water for irrigation and in livestock are presently exploited to the extent that is necessary to satisfy the immediate needs of the family units while an enormous quantity of food has to be imported. Under-exploitation of resources is considered by experts to be the key to the problem facing Africa in the field of agriculture.

While stressing the importance of the role of agriculture in the African economy, most of the delegates noted with regret the general stagnation in agricultural production. The Commission was urged to direct its best efforts and talents, in cooperation with the FAO, towards the solution of this vexed problem. In addition to the specialised studies undertaken, emphasis was laid on the problems raised by structural reforms relating to the system of land tenure, the conversion to and/or promotion of new crops, training and extension services, etc. to facilitate determination of agricultural policy.

Industry : By 1962 the ECA Secretariat had carried out an overall study of industrial growth in Africa which included a forecast of likely developments up to 1972, as well as a general assessment of the gap between the continent's present levels of industrial development and those of Europe. The compilers suggested that it would be possible for Africa to reach the present level of industrialisation in Europe in 50 years provided there is a heavy increase in agricultural production, more processing of agricultural and mineral resources, both for local and foreign consumption, replacement by African manufactures of many consumer and light industrial goods now imported, etc.

This kind of growth would only be possible if modern industries were laid down on a scale large enough to have a critical impact on the overall economy which would call for heavy investment at the beginning and markets large enough to absorb the products of new industries.

Delegates noted with interest the proposal of the Commission to draw an industrial map of Africa on a sub-regional basis and stressed the need to accelerate the preparation of this map taking into account the individual developmental plans of member-states and it was emphasised that future industrial coordination of Africa should be based on this map. It was explained that the sub-regional approach was intended only as an instrument, the ultimate target being industrial coordination throughout the continent and an African Common Market.

Considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that forcible competition between African countries for capital investment was detrimental to orderly and coordinated industrial development. A resolution sponsored by Kenya was adopted by the Commission to coordinate their industrial legislation and incentives.

Transport & Communications : Recalling the recommendations of the West African Conference held in Monrovia in 1961, the delegates stressed the desirability of effectively joining the proposed trans-Sahara road link with the West African sub-regional network on comparable standards. The Secretariat was requested to accelerate all transport studies on roads and railroads and the proposed working parties to study transport requirements were approved. A resolution sponsored by Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia on the establishment of an integrated transport network was adopted unanimously.

A long-term telecommunications work programme on a continental basis has been drawn up including training for management and instructors. A pilot telecommunications project on a long-distance intra-African link, including telex, is due to start in July 1965 between Addis Ababa and Lagos. A resolution on the development of telecommunications was adopted unanimously by the Commission.

Natural Resources : The Commission adopted unanimously a resolution sponsored by Kenya on the organisation of research and training in Africa for exploitation of natural resources. The Commission recommended that an inventory of equipment and laboratory facilities be undertaken and appealed to all member-states to provide the Secretariat with all available and relevant information in this respect.

African Payments Union : Formation of a committee of experts to consider the problems involved and to appraise the advantages and disadvantages of alternative payment arrangements was recommended. While some delegates took the view that implementation should await further development of intra-African trade, others felt that the establishment of a payments union would help in fostering such trade. A resolution sponsored by Guinea, Mali and Nigeria was adopted on the creation of an African payments union and of a pan-African clearing system.

International assistance to Africa : Several delegates levelled serious criticism against bilateral and multilateral agencies who interfered in the planning of the recipient countries and the tendency of donors to suggest that knowing what was best for a particular country they had the right to alter priorities. It was urged in the strongest possible terms that no condition should be attached to aid and technical assistance given to under-developed countries. There was general agreement on the following points :

- (a) Procedure for UN technical assistance should be simplified and speeded up ;
 - (b) Donor countries should recognise that the receiving countries had the final say in determining priorities ;
 - (c) Technical assistance should be without any political strings ;
 - (d) Under-developed countries should not be used as testing grounds for experiments of new ideas and techniques by donor countries.
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Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

INDIA on May 7 became the first country in the world to break off diplomatic relations with Southern Rhodesia. The decision to withdraw the Indian mission in Salisbury was prompted by the series of measures taken by the minority settlers' government, especially the elections ordered for that day indicating its determination to take positive steps towards the declaration of independence unilaterally. It demonstrated India's disapproval of the manner in which the Rhodesian regime was persisting in the achievement of its illegal objectives. Announcing the decision in Parliament, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, said India had been greatly concerned at the political developments taking place in Rhodesia. He said any semblance of constitutionality sought to be given by the process of conducting spurious elections would be completely unacceptable. India had repeatedly made it known that Rhodesia should gain independence without delay on the basis of the establishment of a duly-constituted democratic government elected on the principle of one-man one-vote. He continued : "We consider that the status of Southern Rhodesia as a non-self-governing territory, which has been confirmed in the U.N. General Assembly resolution of June 28, 1962, remains unchanged. It is a matter of great concern that despite opposition from the majority population of Southern Rhodesia and expressions of disapproval by the international community in the U.N. and the Organisation of African Unity the minority Government in Salisbury persists in the achievement of its illegal objectives."

Demands for the withdrawal of the Indian mission had been made several times in and outside Parliament. The argument given against such a step on those occasions was that the mission was accredited to the British Government and not to Salisbury. The decision to snap diplomatic ties with Rhodesia now showed that India was no longer certain of Britain's ability to effectively intervene in Rhodesian affairs to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence by the white regime.

In a statement issued from Dar-es-Salaam on May 12 the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) hailed India's decision as a firm expression of solidarity with the people of Rhodesia. "It demonstrates by action and not by mere words the absolute sincerity of the largest democracy in the Commonwealth."

The May 7 elections gave a landslide victory to Mr. Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front, which won all 50 of the predominantly white 'A' roll seats in the 65-seat Parliament, sweeping the white Opposition Rhodesia Party into wilderness. This resulted in a strange situation in that the Rhodesia Party had to name an African from "B" roll as the official Leader of the Opposition.

The elections strengthened the position of Mr. Smith, who declared after his victory that he would negotiate for nothing less than independence. The negotiations with Britain were resumed in Salisbury on May 27. It was reported that Britain, in an effort to get rid of a most embarrassing problem, would be prepared to grant Rhodesia independence on three conditions :

- (i) That African seats be increased to a blocking third which will prevent Mr. Smith's Government from meddling with the constitution ;
- (ii) Phasing out of the Land Apportionment Act, which virtually splits Rhodesia into pockets of "white man's land" and "black man's land" ; and
- (iii) Guarantees from the Rhodesian Government of an intensive African education scheme backed by massive financial grants from Britain.

Observers of the Rhodesian scene pointed out how the South African Government had proceeded to scrap the entrenched clauses of its constitution. Thus, the provision of entrenched representation was not a valuable safeguard.

While the Salisbury negotiations were under way, the U.N. Committee on Colonialism on May 29 passed a resolution calling for the independence of Rhodesia under African rule. The motion, adopted by 20 votes to nil with two abstentions—Australia and the U.S.—drew the attention of the U.N. Security Council "to the extremely grave situation in which the Rhodesian authorities went to execute people sentenced under the Law and Order Maintenance Act". It called on Britain to take the necessary steps to enable a sub-committee to proceed to Rhodesia so as to make contact with the various sections of the people. By another resolution the Committee called on the Rhodesian Government to set free 24 people at present under death sentence in Rhodesia for subversive activities. The British delegate, Mr. Francis Brown, said Britain was unable to interfere in Rhodesia's internal affairs. This "legal position" upheld by the British Government had been condemned by jurists, said Mr. Natwar Singh, India's representative. Mr. Sori Couliably, Chairman of the Committee, said Africans might have to resort to "an armed fight" to oust the present regime in South Rhodesia.

The first resolution was passed by the Committee only hours after Mr. Smith declared a state of emergency in two provinces, with the result that Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the African nationalist leader, was virtually cut off from the outside world. Observers pointed out that these measures made a mockery of the British Government's protestations of securing African rights under an independent white Government.

Economic Cooperation

The Indian Government has approved the setting up of a new company—I. U. (India—Uganda) Development Agency Ltd.—for the development of the sugar industry in Uganda. India has a majority holding in the company, which will have its headquarters in New Delhi. It will consist of representatives of the Indian Government and five leading

sugar and sugar machinery manufacturers. It will be a coordinating agency concerned with all matters relating to the project so far as the Indian side is concerned. The project aims at expansion of the sugar manufacturing capacity of Uganda by 100,000 tons a year.

Birla Brothers Ltd. of New Delhi have signed an agreement—with the Northern Nigerian Development Corporation to take over the oil-seed processing industry and the groundnut crushing mill at Zaria in Northern Nigeria. They have been commissioned to examine the possibility of setting up an integrated oil mill in the Kabba province. The groundnut mill will be expanded to an initial input capacity of 30,000 tons of groundnut annually.

India has offered Tanzania small-scale assistance and a number of technical and managerial personnel for its development projects. This was announced at the conclusion of the visit of an official Indian trade delegation led by Mr. T. Swaminathan. The delegation also gave on-the-spot advice on a number of schemes Tanzania has in hand. India will help Tanzania build dams, railways, roads and hydro-electric stations.

Texmaco, a company of the Tata group, will supply railway wagons costing £ 1.4 million for the East African railways and harbours expansion programme. According to Mr. R.H. Mody, a representative of the group, the deal provides for the supply of more than 400 metre-gauge wagons, 50 petrol tankers and building material. The rolling stock will be supplied next year.

A new agreement on air rights between India and East Africa was signed in Nairobi on May 19 with the East African Common Services Organization by Mr. Nityanand Kanungo, Minister for Civil Aviation, for India and Mr. D. Myanjumba, Kenya Minister for Works and Communications, for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Expressing satisfaction at the success of the negotiations, Mr. Kanungo said Air-India had offered training facilities in India for East Africans.

Kenya : Offensive against communism

Communism suffered a series of blows at the hands of President Kenyatta on the eve of Chinese Premier Chou-En-lai's visit to Tanzania in June. The Kenya President reinforced his warning against Chinese interference in African affairs by administering a diplomatic rebuff to Mr. Chou. He refused to renew the invitation to Mr. Chou to visit Kenya. Mr. Chou was scheduled to visit Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika last year during his African tour but the army revolts in these countries had led them to cancel his visit. Uganda Premier Obote followed Mr. Kenyatta's example.

In the Kenya Parliament there was a cry for the resignation of the Vice-President, Mr. Odinga, leader of the pro-communist faction, who had questioned Mr. Kenyatta's policy of non-alignment. As Home Minister, he had last year absolved the communists of any blame for the military revolts. Mr. Kenyatta had reacted sharply and removed him from this key portfolio.

A sharp rejection of communism was contained in the White Paper on African socialism published on April 27. It said Kenya would steer

clear of both Western capitalism and Eastern communism. "African socialism rests on full, equal and unfettered democracy. African socialism differs politically from communism because it ensures every mature citizen equal political rights and from capitalism because it prevents the exercise of disproportionate political influence by economic power groups."

"This will be our Bible", declared Mr. Kenyatta, addressing a press conference at which he explained his Government's new policy statement. He warned against the "danger of imperialism from the East" and made a pointed reference to the foreign encouragement of the Shifta terrorists roaming the northern frontier district promoting a separatist movement among the Somalis there.

It is in this light that Mr. Kenyatta viewed the unauthorised transport of arms through Kenya, an issue which created great tension between Kenya and Uganda, for whom the arms were meant. The weapons were unloaded from a Chinese freighter at Tanzania port and were seized while being trucked without permission across Kenya. The drivers and the Uganda Army escort were arrested. Mr. Kenyatta branded the incident as "criminal folly and a serious violation of Kenya's territorial integrity". The bitterness of the arms wrangle was reflected in the sudden suspension of the Central Legislative Assembly, the three-nation Parliament which runs the East African Services Organisation. The crisis was happily resolved after Uganda had tendered an apology to Kenya but not before China had driven a wedge in African unity.

Mr. Kenyatta was set on checking equally firmly the Soviet blandishments to Africa. He rejected a shipload of Russian arms and imposed Government control on the Russian-run Lumumba Institute in Nairobi. During a heated debate in the Kenya Parliament, Mr. W. Kaman, himself a former student at the institute, said if the Government had not suggested the drastic step of taking control, it would not have been long before there was "fire and blood" in Kenya. The Lumumba Institute was a gift from Russia and was opened during the Kenya Republic celebrations last December. Mr. Tom Mboya said the institute was not doing the job for which it had been designed and that the students had departed from the policies of KANU, its manifesto and its leaders.

Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania was not much of a success. President Nyerere, disquieted by the Chinese influence in Zanzibar, told him that Tanzania was on its guard against subversion. During his visit Mr. Chou spared no effort to involve African countries in the cold war. Commenting on the communique issued at the end of his visit, the Kenya East African Standard said: "The communique contains the excellent notion of world talks on arms ban, but falls away into a morass of declarations, coloured by hatred of the U.S. and the American intervention in various parts of the world. Leaving aside the merits and demerits of communism and capitalism, imperialism and revolution (none of which is wanted here), the fact remains that this is a violent attack not at all in keeping with non-alignment. Chinese arms have found their way to the Shifta (bandits) disturbing the peace in Kenya. Mr. Chou's revolutionary edict can only mean the subversive suggestion of overthrowing popularly elected African peoples' Governments. The communique spoke of the struggle against the old and new colonialism. What if the new form should spring in disguise from a communist country?"

Activities of the Council

THE following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

The Council organised a visit to India by Mr. George Silundika, Publicity Secretary of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), with a view to acquainting Indian leaders and officials with the developments in Rhodesia. The visit lasted from May 1 to 8, a period during which India announced its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Rhodesia.

Mr. Silundika discussed his party's stand with office-bearers of the Council—Mr. Ravindra Varma and Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretaries, and Mr. Rameshwar Rao, Vice-President. He also met officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and Members of Parliament.

Mr. Silundika visited Ahmedabad, where he met the Home Minister of Gujarat. He spent some time at the Sabarmati Ashram and discussed labour problems during a visit to the INTUC headquarters. He addressed a meeting explaining the Rhodesian problem.

In a press interview in Delhi he said his party wanted to enlist the support of the Commonwealth countries on the Rhodesian question at the London Conference. There was a vast difference between British precept and practice on this question. The British Government's talk of economic sanctions against the white dictatorship in Rhodesia was just a balloon. It was trying to change the 1961 constitution with the help of white settlers in an effort to bluff the world. Africans would not accept anything less than "one-man one-vote" and majority rule.

Speaking at a reception held in his honour in Bombay by the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, Mr. Silundika said if the objective of the national movement in Rhodesia to liquidate the settlers' dictatorship could not be achieved peacefully it must be done painfully. The stage of persuasion had now come to an end and that of practical action begun. If the minority government declared itself independent, which it might do in July or August, the national movement would be obliged to set up a Government in exile. He appealed to India and other civilized nations to recognise such a Government. Mr. Silundika attacked the British Government for its policy towards Southern Rhodesia and said Britain was anxious to continue the settlers' dominance in that country. Britain was conniving at the minority Government declaring independence. Mr. Bhawanji A. Khimji, BPCC President, welcomed Mr. Silundika and Mr. Harish Mahindra, a member of the Council, proposed a vote of thanks.

In Bombay, Mr. Silundika visited the Mahindras' jeep factory where he saw the in-plant training scheme at work. He met African

Algiers Conference Put Off

The fate of the second Afro-Asian conference, which had hung in the balance for several days after the Algiers coup, was finally sealed on June 26. Preparations for the conference came to a whimpering end with the Preparatory Committee's announcement that it was not feasible to hold the conference at this stage. The decision to postpone the conference to November 5 was a big blow for China, Pakistan and Algeria, who had been asserting that the conference would be held whatever its size. The situation took a dramatic turn when OAU members bluntly told Algeria that they would not attend the conference. The game was up. The initiative for the postponement had come from the 13 Afro-Asian Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth. The African members viewed the violent overthrow of the Ben Bella Government with concern and did not want to do anything that would consolidate Col. Boumedienne's military regime. The Afro-Asian heads of Government, at that time gathered in London for the Commonwealth Conference, decided that the tense atmosphere in Algiers in the wake of the coup was not conducive to fruitful discussions. Pakistan, acting under strong Chinese pressure, made an attempt to get the Premiers' decision reversed but did not succeed. Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, Ceylon and Uganda announced that they would not participate in the Conference at any level if the new Algerian regime led by Col. Boumedienne persisted with its arrangements to hold the meeting. The Afro-Asian Commonwealth Premiers issued a statement reiterating their call for the postponement of the Conference and declaring that those Foreign Ministers who were in Algiers had no right to act on behalf of the Afro-Asian Conference.

On the eve of the Conference, India, China and Indonesia stepped up their diplomatic activities. The Chinese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cheng Peng-fli, toured North Africa with a message from Mr. Chou En-lai, who himself visited Tanzania and Algeria. The Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister toured several African countries. India sent out two high-level missions to Africa, one led by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, and the other by Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs and Vice-President of the Indian Council for Africa, toured South-east Asia.

On return from his tour of the Philippines, Japan, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, Mr. Dinesh Singh, who found that India's position and prestige were high in this part of the world, said that except for Cambodia, all these countries had supported India's move for Malaysia's participation in the Algiers Conference. Laos and Cambodia had supported Soviet participation in the Conference. Japan and Thailand had an open mind on the issue.

Mr. Swaran Singh came back with the impression that there would be a large measure of support from African countries for Soviet and Malaysian participation in the Algiers Conference. He said all the countries he had visited—Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and the U.A.R.—had supported India's move to invite Russia and Malaysia to Algiers. Mr. Swaran Singh had to cancel his visit to Tanzania because it coincided with that of Mr. Chou En-lai.

Activities of the Council

THE following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

The Council organised a visit to India by Mr. George Silundika, Publicity Secretary of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), with a view to acquainting Indian leaders and officials with the developments in Rhodesia. The visit lasted from May 1 to 8, a period during which India announced its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Rhodesia.

Mr. Silundika discussed his party's stand with office-bearers of the Council—Mr. Ravindra Varma and Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretaries, and Mr. Rameshwar Rao, Vice-President. He also met officials of the Ministry of External Affairs and Members of Parliament.

Mr. Silundika visited Ahmedabad, where he met the Home Minister of Gujerat. He spent some time at the Sabarmati Ashram and discussed labour problems during a visit to the INTUC headquarters. He addressed a meeting explaining the Rhodesian problem.

In a press interview in Delhi he said his party wanted to enlist the support of the Commonwealth countries on the Rhodesian question at the London Conference. There was a vast difference between British precept and practice on this question. The British Government's talk of economic sanctions against the white dictatorship in Rhodesia was just a balloon. It was trying to change the 1961 constitution with the help of white settlers in an effort to bluff the world. Africans would not accept anything less than "one-man one-vote" and majority rule.

Speaking at a reception held in his honour in Bombay by the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, Mr. Silundika said if the objective of the national movement in Rhodesia to liquidate the settlers' dictatorship could not be achieved peacefully it must be done painfully. The stage of persuasion had now come to an end and that of practical action begun. If the minority government declared itself independent, which it might do in July or August, the national movement would be obliged to set up a Government in exile. He appealed to India and other civilized nations to recognise such a Government. Mr. Silundika attacked the British Government for its policy towards Southern Rhodesia and said Britain was anxious to continue the settlers' dominance in that country. Britain was conniving at the minority Government declaring independence. Mr. Bhawanji A. Khimji, BPCC President, welcomed Mr. Silundika and Mr. Harish Mahindra, a member of the Council, proposed a vote of thanks.

In Bombay, Mr. Silundika visited the Mahindras' jeep factory where he saw the in-plant training scheme at work. He met African

students at the hostel run by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Mr. Mahindra gave a lunch for Mr. Silundika.

Congo Official's visit

The Council played host to Mr. Mavungo Philippe, a Congo (Leopoldville) Post and Telegraph Department official, during his two-week visit to India at the end of May. He was taken on a sightseeing tour of Delhi, Agra, Simla, Chandigarh, Bhakra Nangal and Bombay. He paid visits to posts and telegraph offices in Delhi and Bombay and the telephone factory in Bangalore.

Pamphlet on Algiers' meet

The Council brought about a pamphlet "Bandung to Algiers", reviewing a decade of India's foreign policy, for distribution at the Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers.

The Vice-President of the Council, Mr. Rameshwar Rao, the General Secretary, Mr. Ravindra Varma, and a member of the Council, Mr. V. C. Shukla, were included in the Indian delegation to the Algiers Conference as non-official members.

Booklets on African countries

The Council has drawn up a plan to publish a series of pamphlets on African countries. The first will deal with Nigeria and the second with the UAR.

Gift of books received

The Council received a gift of books from the Institute of Cultural Relations, Germany.

Human Rights Commission Session

Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, has been elected General Secretary of the Congress Party in Parliament. He led the Indian delegation to the 21st session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights held in Geneva from March 22 to April 15.

Alwaye Conference

The Office Secretary represented the Council at a national consultation called by the Committee on International Students Service at Alwaye, Kerala, from May 8 to 12. Several voluntary organizations participated in the conference which discussed ways and means of improving welfare services for foreign students in Indian universities and sharing of skills and information by voluntary organisations in this field. Four leaders of foreign students spoke at the conference. Mr. C. R. Hove, President of the African Students' Association, outlined some of the difficulties faced by foreign students in India. Among the speakers were students from Ceylon, Aden and Malaysia.

New Members

The following members have been taken on the Executive Committee of the Council : Mr. I. K. Gujral, Dr. Jitendra Singh, Mr. Lalit Sen and Mr. L. C. Jain.

The Council has enrolled the following as members : Dr. Jitendra Singh, Mr. Satguru Vaggit Singh and Maharaja Bir Singh.

Cairo Youth Conference

Mr. Lalit Sen, a member of the Executive Committee of the Council, will attend the Afro-Asian Youth Conference at Cairo as a member of the Indian delegation.

Reception for Uganda delegation

The Council held a reception in honour of an Uganda delegation which visited India in April on its way back to Kampala after a tour of China and other countries. The delegation included Mr William Wilberforce Kalema, Minister of Works and Communications, Mr Constantine Baranga Katiti, Deputy Minister of Regional Administrations, Mr M.T. Katuramu, Chief Minister of Bunyoro Kingdom, Mr Paulo Muwanga, a former member of Parliament, and Mr P. O. Etiang, an officer in the Uganda Foreign Service.

A Correction

In the April-June 1964 issue of this journal it was incorrectly stated that Mr Kariuki was among the African students for whom the Council had made arrangements to spend their holidays with Indian families in Himachal Pradesh. He had gone there on his own expense.

Selected bibliography on Africa

Compiled by MOHD. AHMAD

This feature is presented every quarter with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those who are specially interested in the study of African affairs.

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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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
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Africa Quarterly



Obituary

**Mr. Balvantray
G. Mehta**

Editor, Africa Quarterly



WE announce with regret the death of Mr. Balvantray G. Mehta, President of the Indian Council for Africa and Editor of Africa Quarterly. A valiant freedom fighter, he met a martyr's death when the civilian plane by which he was travelling was shot down by an enemy fighter aircraft during the recent Indo-Pakistan hostilities. To his last breath, Mr. Mehta, who was also Chief Minister of Gujarat, was engaged in mobilizing support for the war effort in his state and before taking off on that fateful day had addressed a rally of the National Cadet Corps.

Mr. Mehta took active interest in the freedom struggles in Africa. He mobilized public opinion in India in support of the Algerian war of independence, inspired the Council to organize a seminar on Portuguese colonialism and secured material help for the families of Zimbabwe nationalist leaders in detention. To keep himself abreast of developments in Africa, he toured the continent extensively.

A resolution mourning the death of Mr. Mehta was passed by the Executive Committee of the Indian Council for Africa on September 21. The following is the text of the resolution :

It is with profound grief and a deep sense of shock that we have learnt of the sad demise of our President, Mr. Balvantray G. Mehta, and his wife, Mrs. Sarojben Mehta, a companion in life and death. The brutal attack by an enemy plane on a small unarmed civilian plane in which he and his seven companions were travelling will go down in history as one of the most heinous acts of the undeclared war Pakistan is waging against India. This dastardly action is in utter disregard of all standards of decent human behaviour and all canons of international law.

Mr. Mehta met a martyr's death and his supreme sacrifice came as the climax to the life of a valiant freedom fighter and a dedicated servant of the people. It will strengthen the nation's resolve to face the enemy with firmness and faith.

As founder-President of the Indian Council for Africa, Mr. Balvantray Mehta took keen interest in the policies and programmes of the Council from its very inception. His manifold assistance helped us to tide over many difficulties. His inspiration and guidance enabled us to organise the seminar on Portuguese Colonialism. In his extensive travels in Africa he established personal contacts with the leaders of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Mauritius with a view to developing close relations with these countries. He took active interest in the freedom struggle of Algeria, particularly in mobilising public opinion in India in support of it. One of his last acts was to secure a donation of cloth for the families of Zimbabwe freedom fighters in detention.

As a member of the old guard of India's freedom movement, Mr. Balvantray Mehta's sincere and deep interest in the freedom struggle of Africa was natural. His most significant contribution to the freedom movement, which he joined at the age of 19, was the success he achieved in making the people of the then princely states politically conscious. For years he was Secretary and for some time President of the All India States People's Conference, an organisation which became the spearhead of the freedom movement in the princely States.

Mahatma Gandhi, on whom Mr. Balvantray Mehta made a deep impression, selected him for participation in the historic Bardoli satyagraha and later in the salt satyagraha at Dholera. An able parliamentarian, Mr. Balvantray Mehta played a distinguished role in the Constituent Assembly. His meticulous regard for detail was reflected, during his ten years in Parliament, in the reports he submitted as Chairman of the Estimates Committee. As Chairman of the Committee on Panchayati Raj he became the architect of democratic decentralisation. He served with equal distinction a term as General Secretary of the All India Congress Committee.


He was a staunch social reformer and has left an impact on many fields of constructive activity. He played a prominent role in spreading education among women, in Harijan uplift and labour welfare. He was a life member and President of the Servants of People Society and founder-President of the All India Panchayat Parishad.

Exactly two years ago he took over as Chief Minister of Gujarat in which capacity he served the State with great distinction.

A noble life has been brutally cut short and we have been deprived of a member of the old guard. The loss of the family and the nation is shared equally by us.

AFRICA QUARTERLY

A Journal Of African Affairs



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Note to Contributors

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The views expressed in the articles under the authors' names are not necessarily those held by the Council.

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Contributors to this issue

Mr. Mokwugo Okoye is an executive member of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens and Governor of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. He is the author of *African Responses*.

Mr. Jan Knappert is a Lecturer at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Dr. Mahendra Kumar is Lecturer in International Politics at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

Dr. Y. S. Brenner is Lecturer in Economics at the University College, Cape Coast, Ghana.

Dr. M. J. K. Thavaraj is Reader in Economic Policy and Administration at the Indian School of Public Administration, New Delhi.

The United Nations in Africa

by MAHENDRA KUMAR

THE significance of the role Africa has now come to play on the international scene can hardly be exaggerated. With the disintegration of colonialism and rise of new states in Africa, there has been a profound change in both the scope and the character of world politics. As such, a study of African problems is necessary not only for an understanding of the African continent but also for a correct appraisal of the changed scope and character of world politics itself. But as world politics today is closely related to international organization, no study of Africa can be meaningful without an assessment of its relationship with the United Nations, which is the most perfect possible manifestation of international organization so far. This relationship has two aspects. One is related to the contribution made by the United Nations to the economic development of Africa and to the solution of African problems, and the other to the impact made by African countries on the functioning and further evolution of the United Nations. This paper, concerned only with the first aspect, has a threefold purpose : to examine how far the responsibility of the United Nations for Africa is in conformity with the UN Charter ; to assess the nature and magnitude of UN activity, mainly economic and technical, in Africa ; and to analyse the problems impeding greater and faster growth of African development through the United Nations.

I

The UN Charter itself provides for a close relationship between the United Nations and Africa. Important among the purposes of the United Nations, as embodied in its Charter, are the development of friendly relations among nations, maintenance of universal peace, and the achievement of international cooperation¹. Of these international cooperation is of the most vital significance and covers all other purposes. That is why the United Nations decided to celebrate the year 1965 as International Cooperation Year. For the pursuit of these purposes, Africa provides sufficient ground for activity by the United Nations. Judged by past performance, there will be plenty for the United Nations to do in Africa for a long time to come. Some of the generally known problems in Africa which the United Nations has had to deal with so far include those of Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, South-West Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, the Ewe in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Togoland, the treatment of the people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa and lately the problem of the Congo. But there are many other African problems which are less known but which have occupied the attention of the United

1. Article 1 para 2 of the UN Charter says : "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace".

Nations, particularly that of its specialized agencies. In general, all organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, including the International Court of Justice, are concerned with questions arising in Africa. As such, the nature of the relationship these agencies have with Africa is determined by the functions they perform. Africa's relationship with the United Nations will be dealt with in this section of the paper and its relationship with the specialized agencies in the next section.

The organ which has the closest connection with Africa is the Trusteeship Council. It is through the Trusteeship Council that UN members come into direct contact with individual inhabitants of the trust territories. Visits to various institutions—political, economic and educational—enable it to assess in a realistic manner the progress of a territory towards the objectives of the trusteeship system. Further, a visiting mission, by its very presence in a trust territory, not only becomes a tangible part of the far-away United Nations but also gives many people encouragement by recognizing their work.

The international trusteeship system was established by the United Nations with the basic objective of helping the trust territories in their "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate".² The debates in the Trusteeship Council have generally created a climate favourable to the emergence of independent nations. Most of the new members joining the United Nations after 1959 have been African countries and it is clear that the majority of new members in future will be from Africa. The role played by the United Nations in the emergence of new nations has been mainly through the Trusteeship Council.

In its role of promoting the peaceful evolution of dependent peoples towards self-government and a place of equality in the world, the United Nations is brought into contact with a large segment of the African continent by reason of the functions derived from Chapter XI of its Charter. By this chapter, entitled "Declaration Regarding Non-self-governing Territories", the members responsible for the administration of territories which have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and thus accept the obligation to promote the attainment of certain objectives. These objectives are, "to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement"; to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and with the specialized agencies with a view to the practical achievement of social, economic, and scientific objectives. Furthermore, by Article 73e, the administering members undertake to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General information on the economic, social, and educational conditions in non-self-governing territories.

Chapter XI is one of the most noteworthy sections of the Charter. For the first time in history the so-called "colonial" powers placed on record in an international treaty the principles of policy which should govern the administration of their dependent territories. Thus the whole colonial

2. See Article 76(b) of the UN Charter.

system was made a subject for international consideration. Chapter XI is also a challenge to other member states. The annual transmission of information is in accordance with a standard form and consists of a wide range of most recent material from the territories, supplemented by the authority of the Secretary-General, with the consent of the member states concerned, to draw on other official information.

A characteristic of Chapter XI, and equally of the next chapter of the Charter, on the International Trusteeship System, is that they are what may be called "self-liquidating". The Committee on Information from Non-self-governing Territories is authorized to submit to the General Assembly substantive recommendations relating to economic, social, and educational matters.

Some matters, particularly those of a political nature and connected with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, are discussed in the first instance by a committee of the General Assembly, normally by its First Committee (Political and Security) or by its Ad hoc Political Committee.

In the United Nations there are two systems under which the nations responsible for the administration of dependent territories give the United Nations an account of how they treat the people. One of them is known as the trusteeship system under which the governing nations report to the Trusteeship Council. The trusteeship system has come to the United Nations from the League of Nations. The territories which were under the League mandate earlier passed on to the United Nations as trust territories. Of these the following were in Africa: Ruanda-Urundi, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Cameroons, and Togoland. The trust governments are required under the UN Charter to submit a report every year. The General Assembly discusses these reports and makes recommendations for the better administration of these territories.

The Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly take special interest in the protection of old customs of the trust territories. For example, Britain was asked to provide more schools and medical services and abolish corporal punishment in the trust territory of Togoland. This had a great impact on the improvement of public facilities there. In 1954 the UN General Assembly discussed the problem of Togoland and at that time Britain told the Assembly that as Togoland was being administered jointly with the adjoining Gold Coast territory and as Gold Coast was soon to become independent, the British wanted to drop the Togoland trusteeship. In 1956 the inhabitants of British Togoland were invited to vote whether they wanted to join Gold Coast in setting up the new State of Ghana or to continue under British administration. The people voted by a large majority in favour of joining the new State of Ghana.

On French Togoland, the UN Commission reported to the Trusteeship Council in 1957 that the relations between France and the trust territory had improved. As a result of the elections held in April 1958, the French and the Togolese Governments agreed that French Togoland should become independent on 27 April, 1960. The General Assembly unanimously

endorsed the plan for independence in November 1958. Another trust territory in Africa, the French Cameroons, also chose independence through a vote of its elected legislature in October 1958 with the consent of the French Government. Consequently, the General Assembly voted to end the trusteeship in the French Cameroons and also recommended that the new nations after independence should become members of the United Nations. There was however a great element of doubt about the wishes of the people of British Cameroons administered jointly with Nigeria which was to become independent in October 1960. There were differences of opinion in the northern and southern parts with regard to its future. In the northern section the people voted for postponing their decision about their political future rather than joining Nigeria. But in the southern section voting was deferred because the General Assembly felt convinced that the issues had not yet become clear enough to get a useful decision.

Yet another example of how the United Nations has been promoting independence in Africa is provided by Somalia, formerly Somaliland, an independent nation since July 1960. This Italian colony was taken by the British in the Second World War and its administration put under the supervision of the United Nations. Having decided in 1944 that the Somalis were not prepared for independence at least for 10 years, the General Assembly appointed Italy as the trustee of Somalia with a special advisory council. The population of Somalia consisted mainly of nomadic shepherds for whose settlement it was necessary to have ground water with an extensive system of wells. They were also facing a language problem as there was no written Somali language and the spoken language was divided into many dialects. However, Somalia made good progress in the ten-year training period for which facilities were provided by the United Nations. The General Assembly decided that Somalia should become independent by December 1960 but the Administration and the new Somali Government reported that the country could be ready for independence even in July 1960. Consequently the General Assembly voted to end the trusteeship of Somalia on 1 July, 1960.

The trust areas are the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter requires the powers controlling them to report on their progress every year. Quite a few of these territories have considerable freedom in local affairs. But their foreign relations are administered by the metropolitan powers. Information on the progress of non-self-governing territories is sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations who submits it to a special committee for study. Afterwards it goes to the General Assembly for recommending suitable action. If an administering power does not send information about the territory under its charge, the General Assembly can and does call for an explanation. The General Assembly has also passed resolutions from time to time advising the governing nations to apply the principles of the Declaration of Human Rights to the people of dependent areas. The Assembly also made it clear that the administering powers should take all possible steps for the progress of these territories towards self-government.

Libya, a former Italian colony, was judged to be politically ready for early independence, even though it needed technical and economic help. In November 1949 the General Assembly appointed an international

council to help the Libyans set up a government. Foreign help to Libya came from various quarters. Financial help came from Britain, France, Italy and Turkey but technical assistance was given under a cooperative programme of the United Nations and the United States Point-Four Programme. Meanwhile the World Health Organisation set up a programme of public health and the Libyan Government also made a contract with UNICEF for the vaccination of children against tuberculosis. In 1959 the world organization also sent a mission to Libya to survey the economic situation. The United Nations Special Fund agreed to contribute \$1 million for an Institute of Higher Technology.

South-West Africa also presents an example of how the United Nations has been trying to help it towards self-government. South-West Africa, a former German colony, was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations after the First World War. In 1946 South Africa refused to transfer it to the trusteeship system under the United Nations. In 1949, the General Assembly asked the International Court to give a ruling on the question of South-West Africa. Thereupon in 1950, the Court gave the ruling that South Africa still had international obligations in regard to South-West Africa. Although South Africa refused to accept the judgement, she showed willingness to hold discussions with the United Nations about some arrangement being made for reporting progress to the latter. In November 1953 the General Assembly set up a Committee on South-West Africa which was instructed to collect all possible information about political conditions in South-West Africa. Since then the Assembly has been trying to do its best in solving the problem of South-West Africa in spite of the intransigence of South Africa. It has so far adopted a number of resolutions criticising various aspects of the South African administration of South-West Africa.³

Tunisia had been a French protectorate under the agreement of 1883 but in later years Tunisians accused the French of exercising undue control over their affairs. In April 1952, a group of eleven Asian and African members of the United Nations urged the Security Council to consider the question of Tunisia. Later, two more states joined the group. France held that the United Nations Charter did not permit the General Assembly to discuss Tunisia which was an integral part of France. The French delegation boycotted the meetings of the General Assembly whenever Tunisia was discussed. Ultimately the thirteen states voted for a resolution proposed by eleven Latin American states, expressing the hope that France would help to develop free institutions in Tunisia and that the parties concerned would continue negotiations to bring about self-government in the protectorate. A resolution to this effect was passed by a great majority. However, some members agreed with France that Tunisia was a domestic affair of France. On this question there was a difference of opinion between the anti-colonial nations of Asia and Africa on the one hand and the colonial nations of Europe on the other. The Latin American nations on the whole took a middle position. From 1952 the General Assembly discussed the question of Tunisia off and on, and

3. See reports of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (General Assembly 1963-65). Also see Scott, *The Orphans' Heritage: The Story of the South-West African Mandate* (London, 1960); and "International Status of South-West Africa", International Court of Justice Reports (1950), pp. 128, 139.

France continued to claim that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in the matter. Negotiations, however, continued between France and representatives of Tunisia, and with the help of the United Nations ultimately resulted in an agreement signed on 20 March, 1956. Thereupon Tunisia became an independent nation and was admitted to the United Nations on 12 November the same year. France also resisted the inclusion of the Moroccan question in the UN General Assembly agenda when it was first put there in 1952. After two years of refusal to discuss the question, the Mendes-France Government began negotiations in 1954 and in 1955 the French brought Sultan Mohammed of Morocco back from exile and granted him virtual independence.⁴ The United Nations favoured by 63 to 8 votes with 27 abstentions independence for Algeria.⁵

II

WHATEVER the United Nations has been able to achieve in the political field in Africa cannot be stabilized without laying firm economic foundations for the viability of political independence. Therefore it has been doing a lot in that direction also. UN activity in the field of economic and technical assistance to Africa expanded on a large scale after the General Assembly adopted on 19 December, 1961, two resolutions calling for an intensified programme of international economic cooperation. One of the resolutions designated the 1960s as United Nations Development Decade with the objective attaining in all underdeveloped countries "a minimum annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of five per cent at the end of the decade". The other asked member states to raise the combined budgets of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund to \$150 million. The aid programmes and activities under the United Nations during the last twenty years have been uncertain and undertaken in an unplanned manner with the result that no definite pattern seems to have emerged. Technical assistance to Africa is provided not only through various UN programmes but also by most of the twelve specialized agencies and, since 1958, by the International Atomic Energy Agency. With the joining of sixteen new African members in 1960, United Nations opportunities and responsibilities in Africa were greatly enhanced.⁶ These responsibilities could be discharged only if the United Nations functioned as a multilateral aid agency. But the United Nations was itself faced with limitations caused by political instability in the new states and the simultaneous intensification of the ideological struggle in the Continent. As a matter of fact, the Congo crisis raised the fundamental question whether UN activities in Africa could survive at all.

For the first fifteen years the United Nations programme of technical assistance to Africa was on a rather small scale. It was even smaller than

4. For details of the manner in which the question was ultimately settled and Morocco became independent, see *General Assembly Resolutions* 611 (VII) (17 December 1952) and 812 (IX) (17 December 1954).

5. A detailed discussion of the implications of the Algerian war is available in Herbert Luethy, "The Crises of French Colonialism", *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1956, pp. 60-65; Lorna Hahn, "Algeria, the End of an Era", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, VII.

6. Total expenditure estimates for economic and social activities authorized by the United Nations during 1947-60 are available in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Five-Year Perspective*, 1960-64, E/3347/rev. 1, Geneva, 1960, p. 116.

the limited technical assistance programme of the United States in Africa totalling \$13 million in 1956. By the end of March 1952 the United Nations and its specialized agencies had recruited only 1,054 technicians for 1,500 million people in all the underdeveloped countries.⁷ In the early years the bulk of UN assistance went to the independent states of Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia. This was because these countries needed and asked for help and also because they had no colonial rulers to give them assistance. But later the coolness of the colonial powers towards UN assisted projects for their own territories began to diminish. Since the United Nations had been responsible for the advance of territories to self-government, most of its members felt it imperative on their part to provide material aid for the development of new nations. However, independent states continued to be the main recipients of aid throughout the decade 1950-60.⁸

The organisations participating in the technical assistance activities in Africa include the United Nations Technical Assistance (UNTA), which functions under the direction of the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, and seven out of the twelve specialised agencies of the United Nations. These are the International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), World Health Organisation (WHO), International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also a participating organisation. In addition, several other types of programmes have developed over the years. These include the Regular Programme, the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, established in August 1949, and the Special Fund, which went into operation on 1 January, 1959, and the OPEX Programme. The main distinction between the Regular Programme and Expanded Programme relates to budgetary considerations. But otherwise both concentrate on sending experts to advise, teach and work in underdeveloped countries and on granting fellowships to enable technicians in those countries to learn their trade. In 1960 the budget for the Regular Programme in Africa was about \$3 million while the budget for the Expanded Programme was more than \$4 million. Under these programmes the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance carries out a number of activities. It sent experts to establish Public Administration Institutes in Egypt in 1953 and in Ethiopia in 1956 and a School of Public Administration in Libya in 1954. The OPEX Programme provides UN operational, executive and administrative personnel to work in developing countries. Its budget has been increasing every year. In the beginning only a few countries benefited from this programme but it has a great potential for the future.

The Special Fund Programme was inaugurated in 1959 and it marked the beginning of a new, improved and expanded UN programme for

7. In order to have a correct idea of how slowly the technical assistance programme in Africa developed, see a table showing the increase of UN budgets during the early 1950s, vide United Nations Office of Public Information, *The United Nations and Africa*, New York, February 1962, p. 17.

8. Vernon McKay has prepared a table of the number of persons who visited African countries during 1950-1960 on the basis of various Annual Reports. See Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 53, Table 3.

African development. The objective of the Special Fund is to raise production and productivity through "pre-investment activities". The Fund carries out the work of technical assistance by laying down the foundations for the proper use of capital investments. The Special Fund Programme differs from the Expanded Programme in the sense that it concentrates on a smaller number of comparatively large projects and provides a larger amount of supplies and equipment. The Managing Director of the Special Fund has greater executive authority and is more independent of the Economic and Social Council. The total budget for the Special Fund has now been more than doubled. The Fund is used for establishing in Africa secondary school teacher training institutes and institutes for improving soil water resources and for undertaking other surveys. Most of the projects undertaken by the Special Fund are of several years' duration. The Secondary School Teachers Training Institute for the Republic of Cameroon is a six-year project. Cameroon needs more than 1,500 secondary school teachers during this decade to meet the expected increase in secondary school enrolment. The Special Fund is assisting teachers training institutes by providing teaching staff, fellowships, and equipment.⁹

The UNESCO provides technical assistance mainly through its programme of "special activities". These activities aim at meeting specific needs of member states in the field of free and compulsory education, resolution of tension in the racial, social and international spheres, mutual appreciation of cultural values of East and West and scientific research aimed at improving standards of living. In February 1962, the Parliament of Ghana voted a credit of about \$200,000 to build an office in Accra for a UNESCO Regional Centre for Africa. However, since 1958 the UNESCO programme has been in operation jointly with the Expanded Programme. Technical assistance is now planned as a whole without consideration of the budget to which they will ultimately be charged. The UNESCO held Africa Conferences at Addis Ababa in 1960 and 1961. The latter was held under the joint auspices of the UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. It stressed the need to relate educational development to economic growth and set the ambitious goal of universal primary education in Africa by 1980. The conference also projected the estimated cost of African educational programmes for the next twenty years. It is difficult to predict whether the educational programmes for Africa will be fully and successfully launched because this will ultimately depend on the external aid available for the implementation of the recommendations of the 1961 Conference.

The World Health Organisation has concentrated on the control of communicable diseases in Africa. It has a large regional office at Brazzaville from where its activities in Africa are managed. In 1962 the WHO shifted its emphasis to the strengthening of the National Health Programme in Africa and allocated 63 per cent of its funds for this purpose. The WHO has been able to achieve remarkable success in

9. By 31 March 1962, the Special Fund had approved commitments of more than \$170.3 million for 205 projects. For the allocation of these funds project-wise and country-wise, see United Nations Special Fund, Status of Projects Approved by the Governing Council as of 31 March, 1962, SF/Reports, Series A, No. 19, New York, 31 March 1962.

controlling various diseases in Africa, specially yaws, leprosy, tuberculosis and smallpox. The control of malaria and bilharziasis has proved very expensive and more difficult. The WHO has established a Malaria Eradication Special Account to help in the fight against these diseases. The Thirteenth World Health Assembly increased in 1961 the budget for newly independent and emerging nations. The total budget for all WHO activities in Africa in 1962 was estimated at \$4.3 million. This excluded Special Fund projects.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation, which has a regional office in Accra, does not have a separate programme for technical assistance. But many of its activities under the Expanded Programme relate to Africa. It has so far had several regional meetings in Africa, including the first FAO Regional Conference at Lagos in November 1960, which reviewed food and agriculture policies and programmes for Africa. Africa has benefited from a number of FAO Special Programmes such as the World Seed Campaign of 1957-61 and the Freedom From Hunger Campaign which began in 1960. A Special Africa Programme was undertaken in 1961 to assess the main problems and priorities for agricultural development in selected African countries.

The International Labour Organisation has a small regular budget for operational activities. It also has a field office in Lagos, established in 1959. Its first Regional African Conference, which was held in Lagos in December 1960, was attended by delegates from 36 African countries. The ILO began taking interest in Africa in 1926 when it appointed a Committee of Experts on Native Labour. The Committee was replaced by a Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan Territories in 1947. At present its place is occupied by the African Advisory Committee established in 1959. Until 1958 the technical assistance programme of the ILO was mainly confined to North Africa. But later it extended it to other parts of the African Continent. The programme now includes such projects as operation of industrial productivity centres, vocational training, rural cooperative work of industry, and assistance in the field of social security and labour administration. Unlike the other specialised agencies of the United Nations, the ILO has sometimes worked as a semi-political body. It is on record that during the struggles for Moroccan and Algerian independence French colonial policies were often discussed at ILO meetings. So much so that in June 1961 the ILO Conference adopted a Nigerian proposal to expel South Africa because of its racial policies. The resolution was passed by 163 votes to nil with 89 abstentions. It is possible that the ILO Conventions on the freedom of association will create friction with African countries where a dominant political party has sponsored a single national labour federation, such as Ghana, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation has also developed a regional plan for Africa which covers 117 airports, 130 established air routes, 200 radio circuits between stations on the ground for specific aeronautical purposes, 328 electronic aids for air navigation and 127 meteorological forecasting stations. In the main, the technical assistance programme of the ICAO concentrates on the training of technical and administrative personnel for various kinds of air facilities. In February 1961, there were 43 ICAO technical experts serving in six African countries.

The World Meteorological Organisation has also formulated technical assistance projects for more than twenty countries. For example, a Chief Meteorological Expert was appointed in August 1960 and he was joined by twelve other experts in a period of less than a year. The WMO has also drawn up a five-year plan for the training of Congolese nationals who could later take up professional functions in the meteorological and geophysical fields in their country. The technical assistance programme of the International Telecommunications Union began to expand in Africa in 1961-62. A radio and telecommunication school was founded in Tripoli (Libya) for training radio technicians, telephone technicians and radio and telephone mechanics. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which undertakes a large variety of projects connected with the mining, production and use of nuclear materials, has a small programme for Africa involving one fellowship and one expert in 1960. But a great deal of expansion is expected in future. In 1960 a special mission visited Africa and the Middle East to explore the possibilities of establishing a regional centre in the area.

The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund has not lagged behind in its programme of African development. By January 1961, it had allocated \$22.7 million for Africa and this amount has recently been matched by contributions from the recipient governments. The activities undertaken by the UNICEF include control or eradication of diseases, maternity and child welfare services, and nutrition. The UNICEF establishes and equips village and other health centres and helps in the local production of insecticides, antibiotics, vaccines and serums. It also distributes among school-children and pregnant and nursing mothers rations equivalent to a large cup of milk daily and sometimes even vitamin capsules. The UNICEF has made a great contribution to reducing the incidence of malaria, leprosy, trachoma, syphilis and yaws. It also makes emergency aid; for example it supplied blankets to Algerian and other refugees in Tunisia and Morocco in 1959.

Africa needs, in addition to technical assistance, capital. The major help in this field has been provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as the World Bank. The Bank established a new Department of Operations for Africa in April 1962. By 8 February 1962 it had made 41 loans to 16 African countries totalling \$92.9 million.¹⁰ This was about 15 per cent of the total money loaned by the World Bank. The loans are meant among other things for agricultural production, communications, electric power, general development, industry, mining, ports, irrigation, rail-roads and oil pipelines. Half of the amount lent to Africa has been spent on transportation projects. An impressive achievement made possible by the World Bank with a loan of \$80 million in 1956 is the Kariba Dam across the Zambezi River, a few hundred miles downstream Victoria Falls. The Dam, 420 feet high, has created the largest man-made lake in the world and its generators provide electricity to industries in Southern Rhodesia and to the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia. A loan of \$66 million was given by the World Bank for the development of high quality iron ore deposits in the desert

10. The details of the World Bank loans to various African countries can be found in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The World Bank in Africa*, Washington.

country of Mauritania. The World Bank also provides considerable technical assistance. Similar assistance is also given by the International Monetary Fund and the International Finance Corporation which invests directly in private enterprises without government guarantees. In 1960, an affiliate of the World Bank—International Development Association—came into existence to provide capital on easy terms. By the end of June 1961 it had given development credits of \$13 million to Africa for the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile in the Sudan. The credits made available by the International Development Association are repayable in 50 years without interest.

Special mention should be made here of the contribution made by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa which provides missions to enable Africans to play an effective role in programming UN technical assistance. It was established in 1958 with permanent headquarters at Addis Ababa. It corresponds to other UN Regional Economic Commissions established in Europe, Latin America and the Far East. In February 1962 it had 29 independent African states as members and five European powers still administering dependent areas in Africa. In 1961, at its third annual meeting, the view was expressed that since the Commission was an African organisation, its membership should be confined to African countries. A resolution sponsored by 14 independent countries was passed requesting that the non-self-governing territories in Africa should be allowed to participate in the work of the Commission as associate members but the last paragraph of the resolution seeking to end the membership of Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom was defeated.

At its third session in February 1961, the Economic Commission for Africa adopted a resolution for exploring the possibilities of establishing an African Development Bank. After more than two years of preliminary work, the agreement establishing the Bank was signed. It is hoped that the economic development of Africa will now proceed with greater intensity.

III

THE problem of African development has substantially changed in form since 1960 when 16 African states became independent and joined the United Nations. The impact of the United Nations on Africa during the first fifteen years after the Second World War was on the whole many-sided but often unchanging. Any evaluation of the United Nations' role in African development has to take into account the manifold pressures, tensions and demands fostered or encouraged by the United Nations. The United Nations proved to be more than a "mirror" and more than a "nuisance value". The discussions that have taken place in the United Nations have forced governments and peoples to recognise the fact that the form African development should take is a vital problem in international affairs. The United Nations encouraged speedy progress towards self-government against the policy of gradualism advocated by the colonial powers. It served as a useful school of diplomacy for future African leaders. However, the future of the United Nations' role in Africa will depend on its general effectiveness which seemed to be threatened in 1962 when 14 members refused to pay their share of the cost of UN operations in the Congo and many other

members were in arrears. The United Nations will also be affected by the future shape of race relations which are of crucial importance because they make the explosive tension in South Africa so dangerous for the rest of the world.

The new leaders in Africa do not yet have sufficient experience in the fields of domestic and foreign politics. They are often unable to take mature decisions. Therefore one main contribution of the United Nations to Africa is to provide facilities for the training of future African leaders in the field of administration. Africans have attempted to remedy their lack of training and experience in international relations with the help of the United Nations. The most important effort in this direction was made by Nigeria. Three years before its independence, it started a programme of training forty diplomats. The Nigerians received their training in Washington and acquired practical experience and instruction in important subjects, including diplomatic procedures, international relations and the French language. The success of the Nigerian programme attracted considerable attention in other African countries which also developed similar programmes with the help of the United Nations. The new states of Africa are also handicapped by weak economies. United Nations economic activities in Africa have attempted to overcome this handicap. With the advent of new African states there is a danger of irredentist movements gathering momentum and conflicts developing over international boundaries. The Somali unification movement, for example, has affected five territories. The United Nations has been trying to arrest the development of such movements by attempting honourable and peaceful solutions of the problems giving rise to them. However, the borders belonging to the colonial period have so far been preserved by the new states. But it is not unlikely that in the future new border problems will emerge. The only hope seems to be that the development of a wide variety of regional movements and organisations, in other words Pan-Africanism, may prevent the border problems from assuming serious dimensions.

Africa is emerging into a world in which no national sovereign state can exist in isolation, and in which political, economic, and social progress becomes more and more dependent on inter-group, inter-regional, and international co-operation and unity. The age of partition of Africa by outside powers is over. But if the latent resources of the continent are to be developed to the full, if the present balkanization is to be changed into wider groupings, the establishment of a co-ordinating body of an international character would seem to be called for.

It may well be that the most important role the United Nations can play with regard to Africa is to see that the progressive attainment of full self-government is not left to stagnate as an out-of-date national sovereignty. It could do this by providing the African peoples with encouragement and the opportunity to cooperate among themselves and join others in wider loyalties for their own benefit and for the benefit of the world at large.

Ultimately the impact of the UN on Africa will depend upon the interest taken in it by the Great Powers and their willingness to accept the fact that the growth of collective action has to proceed hand in hand

with the decline of Great Power action. Foreign aid and the strengthening of the executive capacity of the United Nations require a revolution in thought because they involve action by the state against the current concept of the nature of the state as a self-regulating and self-regarding entity. A peaceful state of affairs in Africa is not likely to be secured unless the urgent and extreme needs of the have-nots are alleviated by the haves and unless the precarious authority of the major powers is buttressed and replaced by the collective authority of the United Nations in the real sense.

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Africa and the West

by MOKWUGO OKOYE

SINCE the end of World War II, Africa has grown in importance in the reckoning of Western strategists, for with the loss of most of Asia by 1950 Africa has increasingly become, in the words of author John Gunther, the Last Frontier of the West. When Africa and Asia, after centuries of European domination, clasped hands in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 and established a new era of international solidarity between them—since 1960 they control more than half of the votes in the United Nations—the pride and strategy of the old imperialists have received a terrific shake-up, with the result that wistful eyes are now cast by many Western statesmen to the days when they or their ancestors ordered about the black and brown peoples like chattel slaves and the canons of international law protected one's colonial plunders and 'police actions' in which hundreds of thousands of colonials were sacrificed to the White Moloch.

What is the reason for this new interest in Africa?

From the days of the Roman Empire and even before, Africa has been a great centre of attraction for Europe, its granary in fact, and in time its legends of Prester John and 'dark beauties', its riches of gold, copper, palm oil, peanuts and human cattle, drew flotillas of missionaries, scholars, and merchant-adventurers to the continent. There was romance about Africa—everything new comes out of Africa, the Younger Pliny told his generation; but for long the continent remained 'dark' in the eyes of Europeans just because they knew little about the interior which was well protected by Africa's great deserts and the cataracts of her great rivers as well as by coastal swamps, mosquitoes and strong native hostility.

This age of romance ended when the knight-errants of the Age of Discovery turned from explorers to colonialists. No doubt some of them were motivated by the spirit of adventure, even by a feeling of humanitarianism, in seeking out the black man's country, but there were many who came simply to enrich themselves from the African El Dorado and to compensate themselves, according to a theory of Jung, for their innate inferiorities by lording it over 'lesser breeds without the law.' These economic and psychological motives have always been predominant and can be seen today in the new enthusiasm for Africa shown by Western businessmen, missionaries, scholars, military strategists and statesmen, in spite of her intense heat and 'primitive' creature comforts. "What is at stake," the British Prime Minister, Wilson, told the House of Commons in July 1965, "in all the dealings of the advanced industrial countries with

the newly emerging nations . . . and what is going to be of growing importance as year succeeds year, is the struggle for the soul of Africa"—of the uncommitted nations of the under-developed world. To win this 'soul,' and even more so the vital materials that sustain it, empires have clashed and plotted, and still do so today.

For, though war is becoming out of fashion nowadays, more than 50 minor wars are going on today in all parts of the world in spite of peace-keeping operations of the UN ; in any case, politics, to parody an expression of Clausewitz, is nothing but the continuation of war by other means, and it does help to get the 'uncommitted nations' committed to one's cause. Even colonialism is far from being dead ; it has merely changed its form—from direct occupation to 'free association' in a commonwealth, common market or community. From whatever point of view—markets or strategic bases—the Westerner looks at Africa, he finds it an ideal world. Because it has a great strategic importance in any global conflict, particularly in a conflict which throws America against Eurasia. A friendly southern Mediterranean shore has historically been important to Europe and during World War II, North Africa served as the crucial stepping-stone to the liberation of Europe from Nazi occupation.

It was Sir Halford Mackinder, the famous British geographer, who was the first to realise the importance of the position of the Eurasian land mass in any future plan of world conquest and postulated the theory that one who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, one who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, and one who rules the World-Island commands the World. Africa is included in the World-Island and so for world domination, which European militarists have dreamt of from the days of Alexander, command over Africa is essential. Conversely, in order to check such ambitions, control over the African continent is vital. Thus Africa becomes involved in a global conflict either way.

A territory acquires strategic importance or significance (a) if its geographical position predisposes it to exert effective pressure upon enemy positions or interests ; (b) if it has adequate material resources for waging war ; (c) if it has trained fighting forces and sources of fighting men ; (d) if it has enough harbours, airfields and transportation facilities that are defensible as well as facilities for developing military bases ; and (e) if it has a people and government that are favourably disposed towards the cause. For America Africa fulfils these conditions, and hence the determination to strengthen her position in Liberia, utilise her relations with Ethiopia, South Africa, Congo and Nigeria and through her NATO allies penetrate the other newly independent countries. The Axis strategy during World War II failed because the Germans did not take care to clear the North African coast of the British armies before attempting to strangle the Soviet Union, and American support there reinforced the British via the Red Sea and stopped the Italo-German drive, squeezing the invaders in Tunisia by two powerful thrusts from the east and west.

A US Foreign Policy Association Report states that "yesterday the interest of America was in Asia, but today it is in Africa. Applied to Africa, the American interest consists in the denial of the African continent to military and ideological conquest by the Soviet Union and giving herself access to Africa. For the westernmost part of Africa is the closest, jumping-off place for a military attack upon the western hemisphere, and

the safety of shipping lanes around the coast of Africa, connecting Europe and Asia, is vital and important if the Mediterranean itself should become impassable. Further, Africa is important as (a) an area of investment of US capital, (b) a potential consumer of US industrial products, and (c) a source of some very vital raw materials of strategic and critical importance to the US for her defence."

It is not often that men are so frank about their aims and ambitions. Every US move and counter-move in the post-war world has been guided by the imperatives of her strategic interests in the fight against World Communism. According to an analysis of the respective mineral resources of the US and the USSR, out of 27 important minerals the former is deficient in 12 and the latter in 14. Africa is very rich in some of these minerals and agricultural raw materials, with 99% of the world's supply of columbite and industrial diamonds, 80% of its cobalt and palm produce, 60% of its gold and cocoa, 44% of its water-power potential (against North America's 12% and Europe's 10%), and vast quantities of chrome, manganese, antimony, peanuts, dates, millet and serghum. Manganese, needed for steel, and cobalt and columbite, so essential for jet planes, as well as diamonds, chrome, copper, lead-zinc, bauxite and tin, so vital in modern industry and for purposes of war, are no longer in adequate supply in the West, and much of its deficiencies can be met from Africa. As the Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State, Mr. Julius C. Holmes, declared in 1958, "Sub-Sahara Africa is providing us with at least 20 essential, strategic raw materials."

But in dealing with Africa, US strategists face a dilemma : while they need Africa as a military base and as a source of strategic materials in the war against Communism, they find it difficult to please both their Western European allies, who have primary influence in these countries, and the African nationalists struggling for independence and economic development. As Chester Bowles put it, "Because these nations control the bulk of Africa, we have felt forced to soft-pedal our traditional anti-colonial instincts. In thus approaching Africa, through the capitals of European colonial powers, we have, in the eyes of many Africans, assumed the reactionary coloration of these capitals. And because our support for our NATO allies on colonial questions has been given self-consciously, grudgingly, and with a bad conscience, it has never been wholly satisfactory to them." Is it any wonder that US leaders occasionally suffer from qualms of conscience in their relations with their allies ? Only last year Senator Fullbright, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a reappraisal of US policy in relation to her two bugbears, Communist China and Cuba, while her recent armed intervention in the Dominican Republic has given ironic delight to the British and French whom she condemned in 1956 for their invasion of the Suez Canal. The current dialogue with the Soviet Union and the new countries of Asia and Africa, coupled with the determination of de Gaullist France and other neutralist-oriented West Europeans, is bound to hasten this process of reappraisal and lead to a better understanding among nations.

Soviet interest in Africa has so far been limited to ideological penetration, trade, cultural and diplomatic relations, and with China and the Peoples Democracies of Eastern Europe has given offers of economic aid for industrial development (on a lesser scale than the West) and of setting up institutes within her territory for the study of African languages,

arts, history and social patterns. The USSR has no military bases in Africa and has boasted that she has no need for them because, if the need arises, she can deliver her missiles at any target on the globe without any intervening base and, in any case, is bound to win in a peaceful competition with the capitalist world, for ever menaced by internal contradictions. This optimism has, unfortunately for Africa, led to Soviet reluctance to compete in the economic field in Africa with the Western capitalists; of course, the USSR is aware of the sustained anti-communist propaganda by the Western Powers in Africa and has often declared that she has no desire to 'interfere' in the internal affairs of any African country. The curious effect of this attitude of self-abnegation is that the USSR does not waste her resources on these countries who show but a lukewarm interest in her social system—a natural enough human reaction to a world that has suspected her every move to usher in a new social order.

The French, on the whole, see Africa as 'colonies d'exploration' and assimilation, although since her military disasters in Indo-China and North Africa between 1954 and 1962 she has come to accept that Afro-Asians can be French-inclined without necessarily being French-ruled even when they receive French aid to the tune of \$ 1,200 million each year; as for the British and other West European colonial powers, they regard Africa as the great base of defence against an enemy poised to the north of the Sahara desert and as a source of investment and raw materials. That is why they find it difficult to withdraw from their imperial vineyards without leaving 'reservations' behind them, enclaves of colonial extra-territoriality from which the newly independent countries can be kept in check.

Is it not distressing that the Western world, which spent over \$150,000 million on armaments in 1962 alone and in many places boasts of about \$3,000 per capita income (which is more than ten times the income in many developing countries), has consistently refused to contribute just 1% of its national income to a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development of the new countries? Although in a recent resolution the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (which includes Canada, USA, UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and 7 other nations) has called upon its members to step up their aid to the developing countries—this amounted to \$8,700 million in 1964—to the level envisaged by the UN and to reduce the debt burden suffered by these countries, the prospects for the developing countries are not bright; for it is *trade* (on equal terms) rather than *aid* (on humiliating conditions) that they ask for, and this the developed countries are not giving them, what with their tariff walls and proliferation of synthetic products which drive out the primary products of the developing countries from the world market. From the British Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme to its French equivalent, the FIDES, and the American Point-Four Programme, every aid to the developing countries has been geared only to increasing the production of primary products for the factories of the metropolitan countries (which the monopoly pricing system of the cartels are for ever depressing) when it is not, as in Vietnam, Congo and Malaya, to counter the ideological penetration of the Communists; in no case has the demand for the stabilisation of prices of primary products been accepted by the industrialised nations; in very few cases too is assistance extended to the people as people, for their own sake, rather than as an instrument in the cold war. It was left to President Leopold Senghor of Senegal to declare in 1964 that the two great powers, USA and USSR,

have increased their aid to Asia and Latin America but reduced their aid to Africa.

This discriminatory policy in regard to Africa may be due to the persisting influence of colour consciousness on the part of the White world, to Africa's instinctive rejection of the ethos of European paternalism and her determination to remain aloof from the East-West conflict, or to the cynically naive belief that massive aid to Africa is no use any way since nothing seems to change the ancient land and its people. The practical apartheid of South Africa and Portugal, like the new enfeebled jimerowism of America, is nothing but a hangover from the days of the Slave Trade when Euramerican divines satisfied themselves that Africans had no souls and therefore were fit objects of enslavement out of which the dukes, princes, and merchant sea-dogs of the two continents enriched themselves for 300 years. In spite of recent advances in social legislation and integration, many Americans still find it difficult to accept their 20 million Negro compatriots—the only component of the US population, as Booker T. Washington shrewdly remarked, that came on invitation passage paid—as equal citizens, and in many parts of Europe Africans are still regarded more or less as curiosities who are fit only to be seen from a distance and shunned.

Yet, as I have tried to show in a recent study*, Africa is the cradle and epicentre of world civilisation, the dominant continent of the ancient world and co-builder of the new. It is difficult to think of American civilisation without African labour that raised its homes and plantations, and the French Empire owed its survival from the Nazi holocaust as much to Anglo-American might as to the loyalty and support of its African territories, half a million Africans having fought in World War II, against 200,000 in the 1914-18 war. Nor is the wealth and opulence of the Western world generally thinkable without the capital accumulation, over four centuries, from the unequal exchange of her shoddy textiles and bangles, flint guns and rum with the manpower, gold, copper, ivory, rubber and cocoa of Africa.

Although western aid to Africa today can be seen as mere restitution for the centuries of depredation and exploitation inflicted on the latter, it is true to say that Africa can live, as she lived up to the 16th century when modern European Imperialism erupted into her plains, without such aid; for one thing, the people have a wonderful resilience and adaptability that before now has survived the greatest odds that ever beset any people; for another, it is a debatable question whether the unending accumulation of material wealth and the 'will to power' of the West have given stability and contentment to its society. What is the use of giant steel mills, machine tool complexes and any number of earth satellites and consumer goods if they do not lead to the raising of the morals and levels of living of all people in a given society, to a proper respect for the human personality?

Perhaps the pusillanimity of the West will have this salutary effect on Africa, that she will acquire self-reliance and respectability rather than barter her soul for a mess of pottage that is conditional bilateral aid (from the West) in which she often gives more—military bases and reserved

* AFRICAN RESPONSES, Stockwell Ltd. Devon, England, 1964.

markets, ideological support and profitable investment opportunities—than she receives. There is a growing belief that because of their poverty Africans can be bought cheap—a few thousands of dollars or worn-out equipment in exchange for strategic bases and ‘preferred’ markets of huge proportions ; unfortunately some African leaders give the impression that they and their people are there for easy purchase by the way they allow ‘a mere handful of silver’ or even bare flattery to lure them into betraying their people’s interests. This is not only a great disservice to Africa but a gross insult to the dignity of her nationalism. It is my firm belief that Africa has much to teach the world in sweet reasonableness and generosity, human brotherhood and artistic sensibility, and to do so effectively she must be herself and confront the world not in a spirit of street mendicancy but of dignity and responsive co-operation.

The political fragmentation of Africa has not only inhibited the easy mobility of resources, both human and material, but also resulted in low levels of income in the continent whose heterogeneous patchwork of political sovereignties has proved ineffective in bargaining with foreign cartels. The arbitrary division of the continent, with its accompaniment of multifarious passports, currencies, custom tariffs and transport systems, also limits markets for goods and consequently the increased production that is necessary to raise the people’s living standards. That is why the political union of Africa is a desideratum ; without it her many pocket states will remain but the catspaws of others on the international scene, her border wars and low prices for her primary products in the world market will never cease, and the African Personality her patriots so much wish to assert will remain but a disordered, shadowy personality.

Language Problems of the New Nations of Africa

by JAN KNAPPERT

AFRICA is three times larger than Europe, but it has only half the number of inhabitants.

The only African countries with more than 20 million inhabitants are Nigeria (55 million), Egypt (23 million) and Ethiopia (21 million). The only other countries with more than 10 million inhabitants are South Africa, Congo (Leopoldville), Morocco and Algeria. Note that three of the seven populous countries mentioned here are Arabic-speaking. Some African countries with an area larger than France have only one or two million inhabitants (Somalia, Bechuanaland). The fourteen republics that have arisen in former French Equatorial and West Africa together have less than 35 million inhabitants.

It is clear that the thin spread of population over such a vast continent seriously hampers communications. It also explains why there are over a thousand languages in Africa, as compared with 20 for the same number of people in Western Europe. The isolation of the numerous tribes nomadizing through the endless steppes and savannas, and of others separated by impenetrable forests accounts for the variety of languages. Another cause of the lack of homogeneity is the absence of lasting political unity and cultural similarity. Outside the Arabic world of North Africa there were few empires, none of long duration, except of course Ethiopia. Neighbouring tribes may have cultures of such diversity that they feel nothing but contempt for each other's way of living and are in a constant state of armed peace.

The low numbers of speakers are also responsible for the reluctance, in more modern times, of publishers to undertake the publication of books in African languages, apart from schoolbooks.

I give at the end of this article a list of all the African countries with the most prominent languages, and the number of speakers in each country. All the figures are approximate.

Arabic, Hausa, Swahili, Amharic, Yoruba and Ibo (in that order) are the only languages with more than five million speakers. Languages of between two and five million speakers are: Akan, Fula, Ganda, Kongo, Malagasy, Mande, Nyanja, Rundi, Rwanda, Xhosa, Zulu.

It is not generally recognized that the language problem is the most important problem for a developing country. Without language no

education, without education no development. However evident this may be to the linguist and teacher, it requires some explanation for the sociologist who is not aware of the acuteness of the language problem.

What people in the developing countries need in the first place is instruction, training. Even in the subject where instruction is most urgently required—agriculture—there are no words in most African languages for the modern equipment that will have to be used. Even in Swahili there are no words for plough, tractor, combine and many others. In which language are we going to train the men that will have to drive the tractors, as well as those that will have to repair them? "Teach them through the European language" is the answer of the European teacher. But the people who have learned a European language do not wish to stay on the land as peasants. They want to go to the cities and find a white collar job. In European countries drivers and mechanics do not normally speak foreign languages so that it would be wrong to expect such knowledge in Africa. The use of an African language for agricultural and technical instruction presents other difficulties. I have never yet seen a technical manual in any African language. The production of such books on Western standards has still to begin. Even in Swahili there are no words for the parts of a motorcar engine. The admirable work of creating a technical vocabulary that has been done for the major Asiatic languages (Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Indonesian, Persian) has yet to be done for African languages.

Technology is not the only problem of a developing country. In Africa we find the extraordinary situation that the laws on the basis of which justice has to be administered to the people are not available in the language of the people. The exception to this is of course Arabic with its ancient jurisprudential tradition.

In Northern Nigeria the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code have now been published in Hausa, and in Tanzania the Penal Code and parts of the Civil Code have been translated into Swahili. Ethiopia of course has its own tradition, yet the constitution was drafted in English. In no other country of Africa can the books of law be consulted by the people in their own language. This situation would be unthinkable in Europe. Each state there has its own body of laws laid down in the national language. In states where there are more than one official language, such as Belgium and Switzerland, new laws are published simultaneously in all the national languages.

How did this situation originate?

The function of a language is to create mutual understanding among the people within an ethnic unit. If the ethnic unit is disrupted through the force of circumstances (the necessity of migration, wars and invasions of hostile foreigners) and falls apart into separated units, the language that was inherited by the scattered fragments will also fall apart and grow into diverging dialects that may in course of time develop into separate languages. In Europe, the classical example is presented by the Romance languages which developed out of Latin after the collapse of the central administration of the Roman Empire.

The Ndebele were driven out of their habitat in the Transvaal in the mid-nineteenth century. They invaded what is now Rhodesia and settled on a large strip of land that runs roughly south-north. Until that time all the Rhodesian land was inhabited by the Shona people, who had their own king. As a consequence of the Ndebele invasion, the Kalanga, the western-most sub-tribe of the Shona, who until that time had occupied an area contiguous to that of the other Shona sub-tribes, were pushed away to the extreme west, to the Bechuanaland desert border. All the Shona-speaking people living between the Kalanga and the remaining body of the Shona nation in the east were either killed, driven away, or absorbed into the spreading wave of Ndebele settlers.

The Kalanga dialect has now become a language in its own right, isolated from subsequent developments in the Eastern dialects, developing independent sound changes, changes in vocabulary, etc.

Another example of linguistic separation is provided by the Southern Nilotic languages (Acholi, Alur, Lango, Luo, Padhola, Shilluk). They are still closely similar though no longer mutually comprehensible, except for Acholi-Lango and Luo-Padhola which can still be regarded as dialect-groups. In the course of history, the various Nilotic sub-tribes migrated from the Sudan into Kenya, Uganda and N. E. Congo. They lost their cohesion in the process and their dialects have begun to diverge to the point of mutual incomprehensibility.

Geographical and political separation was responsible for the origin of the Afrikaans language. Identical with Dutch until 1807 when South Africa became a British colony, the Cape Dutch dialect grew into a language in its own right, more adapted to the new environment.

Arabic is more fortunate in that none of its many dialects on the African continent has developed an orthography of its own, as Afrikaans has. The ideal is still the language of the Koran and the traditional literature. Radio-Arabic has a powerful influence, keeping the modern dialects in line with the foci of Arabic culture.

The same turbulent events of African history that scatter tribes over wide areas may also favour the unification of diverse peoples into great nations. At times, mighty rulers succeeded in moulding different tribes into one monarchy, making linguistic history with their exploits. They imposed their language on the conquered tribes by various political and administrative means. The Khalifs of "el Maghrib", North-Western Africa, assimilated large numbers of the subjected peoples. The Ethiopian Emperors did likewise. King Moshoeshe in the early nineteenth century in South Africa gathered together a nation out of the peoples that fled the Zulu conquests and welded them together into the kingdom of Basutoland. They have today one language, Soto (Sesoto).

At about the same time, a chief of Nyamwezi stock ruled a large area of what is now Western Tanzania and Katanga. People of the area are reported to have declared "Nyamwezi" as their language though it was spoken only in the extreme east of the area. It shows how important political allegiance is as a factor influencing linguistic behaviour.

The Ngoni are descendants of the Zulu who migrated north in the early nineteenth century. They settled in two areas, one now in Nyasaland,

(Malawi) and one in what is now Southern Tanzania. Both groups have adopted so many words and grammatical and phonetic features from the neighbouring languages that they now must be reckoned as belonging to the local type of Bantu language and no longer to the South African type.

Under European rule, the tribal allegiance was still kept up, though the first signs of the disintegration of tribal systems began to appear. Labour migration was one of the most important factors. People from different tribes were thrown together in the cities that sprang up where there had been nothing but savanna. In this new situation the people had no common laws and no common language. The European administration imposed its system of laws, but it did not impose its language on the native community.

In the first place, the "natives" were discouraged from speaking English in such countries as Southern Rhodesia and Kenya.

Secondly, in dealing with the people, the European administration made use of middlemen who had a particular background and rapidly grew into a class. They were Arabs (in the Sudan), Swahili speakers (in Kenya and Tanganyika) or Baganda (in Uganda). Naturally, their language acquired a status of prestige among the people for whom the European administrators were too remote and too rarely met.

Thirdly, in the new mining areas of the Transvaal, Northern Rhodesia and Katanga the mining engineers had to find an easy help-out language for their daily contacts with African labourers whose own languages were much too difficult.

Before the advent of the Europeans few African languages had been used for writing. Only Fulani, Hausa, Malagasy and Swahili had a literature, all in Arabic script. The Semitic languages of Ethiopia are here left outside the scope of our discussion.

The great work of reducing the African languages to writing was done by the missionaries, mostly during the nineteenth century. The one exception to this is the Congo language which was first used in writing by the Jesuits in the early seventeenth century but this pioneer work was not followed up. The influence of the Europeans on writing in Africa was so strong that even Hausa and Swahili have changed over and now use Roman script. Unfortunately the missionaries who settled in a given area often belonged to different denominations, and preferred to work independently. They invented orthographies of their own for the same language without reference to the work that was being done at other mission posts. Missionaries rarely made use of a literary idiom that existed in some regions, perhaps because they felt that it was too closely connected with Islamic thinking. They worked exclusively with the spoken dialects because their aim was to teach the gospel to the people. Each missionary began to translate portions of the Bible, catechisms and hymns into the dialect he was most familiar with, and to teach his converts to read it. In Swahili for instance no fewer than six dialects were used by Protestant missionaries alone (Mvita, Unguja, Mrima, Ngwana, Katanga, Ituri).

Once each mission group had established its tradition of writing and teaching, it became naturally reluctant to change anything in its orthography.

When the European administrations began to think of education, they found that apart from the Coranic schools, all the education in Africa was being carried out by the missionaries. The governments then gave the missionaries full responsibility for all education up to and including secondary level. That is how the number of languages taught at primary level rose to more than twenty in some countries and the governments encouraged diversity rather than unity.

This lack of combined effort seriously hampered education because it required the preparation of readers and textbooks in each of the curricular languages. It also impeded the careers of teachers who could otherwise have taught in schools throughout the country. Tanganyika was fortunate in that the British administration preserved the old German system of teaching only Swahili at primary level throughout the country. In Uganda the number of languages taught at primary level rose to twenty-four.

Education was slow to develop. Even today less than half the school-age population of Africa is receiving any regular education. On the plantations and in the mines a means of contact had to be found between the European manager and the African labourer. The labour force, recruited fresh from the bush, could not speak any European language. For Europeans, African languages are too difficult if they have not lived in the country since early childhood or are specialists in language such as the missionaries. The importance of this problem has not been generally recognized. This problem was solved by the creation of a new language, mostly by "breaking" an African language. In the Transvaal "Rand", this new language was "basic Bantu", also called Isikula, "Coolie language", or Kitchen-Kaffir, now mostly called Fanagalo. It is a simple language based on Zulu-Xhosa, with an admixture of Afrikaans and English words.

In Congo, the first language Europeans came into contact with was Ki-Kongo, out of which developed a language called "Kikongo vehiculaire", a drastic simplification of the rather complicated Kongo language. When the European traders and administrators extended their work into the Middle Congo region, another language was found necessary: Mangala, later called Lingala. It was the trade language of the riverine peoples and it has become the language of the city of Leopoldville; it has even ousted Congo-Swahili as the language of the army. After Kikongo in the west, Lingala in the centre and Congo-Swahili in the east, there is a fourth contact-language in the north of the vast republic of Congo: Sango, originally a Ngbandi dialect, has now spread over the whole of the Central-African Republic.

Besides simplicity of grammar, these contact-languages have another feature in common: their paucity of words. Lingala has only 1800 words, Sango 1200, Fanagalo 2000 and Congo Swahili 3000. Compare these figures with those of the dictionaries of "complete" Bantu languages: Zulu (30,000), Mongo (20,000), Swahili (50,000). These contact-languages are much more widely used than either the primary school

languages or the European languages. They are now commonly heard in all the market places in the areas where they are the only inter-tribal languages, especially in the big cities such as Leopoldville and Johannesburg (Fanagalo), Elizabethville (Swahili), Oubangui (Sango). Unfortunately, languages like Lingala, Sango and Fanagalo seem to have little prospect of becoming national languages in the future, precisely because of their limited vocabulary. Their status is transient and they may not outlast the social situation that evoked them.

Next to the language of the market and the language of the barracks, the language of the court of justice is of great importance. In pre-European times the tribes had their own local courts, consisting of the council of elders. In North and East Africa, Arabicized rulers appointed kadhi's to administer the sheri'a, the law of Islam. The written language of the court was Arabic, even though the spoken language was the language of the people. People seeking justice from far away districts had to bring their own interpreter, or they had to hire the services of the katib, the professional scribe, who would write a petition in beautiful Arabic characters and flowery style. This situation was found in many parts of Africa: in Morocco, in Hausaland, in the Sudan and in Zanzibar. The European authorities appointed Europeans in the highest positions of the judiciary, so that in a country like Tanganyika three systems of law were in force: "tribal" or "customary" law in the local courts, Islamic law in the courts where a kadhi resided, and the courts of appeal where English Common law as well as Tanganyika statutory law were administered (the situation is being revised now).

Modern society has created many aspects of daily life that did not exist in Africa 60 years ago. It demands uniformity of system throughout an organized state and the instrument required for that uniformity is an official language. Instances of this are a system of transport (railways, buses, riverboats, etc.), post and telegraph services, a system of accounts in a string of shops, supply stores or guest-houses. The colonial governments or private enterprises appointed managing staff that could speak the European language, and in this way made the European language the language of prestige. Railways had to be built in order to transport produce (crops, hides, ivory) to the coast for export. Labourers had to be brought in from various parts of the colonies, not only to build the railways but also to keep them in operable condition, keep the tracks clear of encroaching bush, etc. They were given land to build their houses and for their wives to plant maize and cassava, so that a community arose that had to resort to the contact-language for all its daily life. In East Africa and Congo the railways have favoured the spread of Swahili: from the Kenya coast into Uganda, from Katanga up to and across the borders into Angola. Near the stations, the churches built their centres and their language of intercourse with the people had to be the contact-language, which in this way became the language of church and school, as well as the language of the railways, the post office and the police.

As African officials were increasingly appointed in government and other services—a process that started years before independence—so the use that was made of the European language decreased and the indigeneous or contact language began to "move up" socially to take its place. In some colonies certain tribes have benefited more than others from the increasing possibilities in government service. Inevitably

their language became the language of the lower echelons of the administration, and sometimes even the middle class language of the whole country. Examples of this are the Igbo in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, the Luba in Kasai and Katanga, and the Baganda in Uganda. For their fellow-Africans it is always much easier to speak another African language than a European language, except for those Africans who have had a very thorough education. If the African official uses the European language in his dealings with the people he will be known as someone who wants to "show off" or assimilate with the ruling power. Those who wish to avoid this impression will drop the European language and only keep those European words for which there is no equivalent in their own language. This process of mixing languages is frowned upon by many experts. It is, however, a normal part of the evolution all languages have gone through when their speakers became aware of the changes of their time. In European languages, this process has been a slow evolution, but in times of accelerated cultural development, the linguistic development is also hastened. In course of time the foreign words will become so completely assimilated that they will no longer have a foreign ring, or else they will be replaced by "native" words. By that time, we shall be able to say that the language has reached a new level in its development. There is no reason to assume that any language would be unsuitable for this extension. The only thing that condemns a language is the dissatisfaction of the community that speaks it. They will either alter their language or begin to speak another language. But it is not so easy to adopt another language if one has not had a long training, the more so if that language has come from a distant country and has few speakers in one's own. Countries like Algeria and South Africa having a substantial European population will probably keep up their French and English respectively but in most other countries of Africa this will be difficult, especially outside the capitals. It will be hard to realize this for some teachers who have spent a lifetime in trying to plant their language in African minds. It is already noticeable that the people in many countries of Africa are becoming reluctant to speak a European language even to the innocent visitor.

In this chaotic world of languages the politicians began their work. The first generation of African politicians are scholars. They hold degrees of European and American universities. Their way of thinking is European. They have created their African nations without reference to the languages because they think in a European language. Their nations must be the equals of European nations and speak English or French. Independence for them is a vision, not a tool. During most of their lives, independence was a concept, not a reality. But the politician of the second generation, who is already a high trade union official, takes independence for granted. He may never have seen Europe or America. He does not speak a European language with ease. He owes his position not to the admiration of his European predecessors but to his eloquence. He rose to power as a trade union leader, he is therefore more connected with the people in the country and more subject to the judgment of the masses.

98% of the people of Africa are not familiar with a European language. Campaigning among them has to be done in the local language or in the inter-tribal contact-language wherever one is available. In the cities, politicians may use English or French, but in the country this would not be

possible. This explains why so many politicians even today are supported only in the constituencies which they can reach when speaking their own language. Building up a nation-wide system of democracy is seriously impeded by these language barriers. Far from unifying the country, the parliamentary system tends to divide it by accentuating tribal differences : politicians are elected largely by their own ethnic groups and therefore have to defend the rights and interests of these groups against those of other ethnic groups.

In many new African states only one language is permitted in parliament, e.g. French in Congo and all the ex-French colonies, English in Ghana, Uganda, etc. Obviously this does not reflect the real situation in the country and, moreover, it bars a number of otherwise capable men who are not familiar with the European language from taking an active part in the political life of their country. In Kenya and Tanzania, Swahili is now an alternative language alongside with English. In Tanzania, Swahili is preferred by most parliamentarians. In Northern Nigeria, Hausa is now an alternative language in the Northern region parliament. Other languages which may yet reach that stage but are not yet sufficiently accepted by the majority are : Ganda (Luganda) in Uganda, Akan (Twi-Fanti) in Ghana, Bemba in Zambia, Nyanja in Malawi, Yoruba in W. Nigeria. In Northern Africa, Arabic has, of course, no rivals.

When a colony becomes independent, more problems arise than is generally recognized. Adherence to the tribe, a virtue heretofore, becomes a political sin. All people have become members of a new nation. The tribes are now considered remnants of the colonial rule when the people were categorized for the sake of administration and taxation. Which way must loyalty go? In Europe it took centuries for the nations to grow and take political shape out of the many old princedoms.

What do the new nations speak? Some are lucky in having a nation-wide language, such as Malagasy; in other countries the national language has to be enforced, as for instance in the Sudan (Arabic) and in Ethiopia (Amharic). In most new African states the old metropolitan language was kept on as the only official language on national (as opposed to regional) level. But how many people speak it? In Kenya it is estimated that about 4% speak English, in Congo perhaps 2% speak French in some form. Language cannot be changed like clothes. However nationalistic the people may feel, they will not be able to start speaking the national language overnight. In countries where no section of the population habitually speaks the national language, the coming of independence will not favour its spread. Many expatriate teachers leave the country, European civil servants are replaced by Africans. There is no longer a necessity for the people to speak the European language for any official business.

It is sometimes assumed that teaching of the (foreign) national language will solve the problem in a matter of ten years. But the mere teaching of a language does not make the people speak it for daily use. It remains a playground language if there is no important section of the population that actually speaks it as their mother tongue. The depth of knowledge of a language that has only been learned in school is usually overestimated. It can be readily used by boys and girls when speaking about school subjects, but it bears little psychological relation to the daily

SURVEY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT LANGUAGES

<i>Name of country</i>	<i>No. of inhab. in mill.</i>	<i>Prominent European</i>	<i>Language Non European. If none, No. of languages is given.</i>	<i>No. of speakers of the latter in mill.</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Language of Capital</i>	<i>Total No. of languages in country</i>
1. Algeria	10.2	French	Arabic	10	Algiers	Arabic	4
2. Angola		Portug.	Umbundu	2	Loanda	Kimbundu	
3. Basutoland	0.6	Eng.	Soto	0.6	Maseru	Soto	2
4. Bechuanaland	0.5	Eng.	Tswana	0.5		Tswana	2
5. Burundi	2	French	Rundi	2	Usumbura	Rundi	2
6. Cameroun	3.4	French	—		Douala	Duala	50
7. Centr. Afr. Rep.	4.5	French	Sango	2.6	Oubangui	Sango	41
8. Congo (Leo)	14	French	Kongo, Lingala Luba, Swahili	2	Leopoldville	Lingala	61
			Lingala	2			
			Swahili	4			
9. Congo (Brazza)	1	French	Kongo	0.4	Brazzaville	Kongo	7
10. Dahomey	2	French	Fon	0.3	Porto Novo	Fon	15
11. Egypt	23	—	Arabic	23	Cairo	Arabic	3
12. Ethiopia	21	Eng.	Amharic	15	Addis	Amharic	63
13. Fernando Po	0.04	Spanish	Bube	0.02	Sta Isabella	Creole	2
14. Gabon	1	French	Fang	0.4	Libreville	Pongwe	15
15. Gambia	0.2	Eng.	Mandingo	0.2	Bathurst	Creole	2
16. Ghana	7	Eng.	Akan (Twi)	4	Accra	Gan	37
17. Guinea	3	French	Peul (Ful)	1	Conakry	Susu	22
18. Guine Portuguese	0.5	Portug.	Mandingo	0.1	Bissao	Creole	6
19. Ivory Coast	3.3	French	Agni	0.4	Abidjan		57
20. Kenya	8	Eng.	Swahili	2	Nairobi	Kikuyu	22
21. Liberia	0.8	Eng.	—		Monrovia	Eng.	29
22. Libya	1	Italian	Arabic	1	Tripolis	Arabic	2
23. Malagasy	5	French	Malagasy	5	Tananarive	Malagasy	1
24. Malawi	3	Eng.	Nyanja	2.5	Zomba	Nyanja	5
25. Mali	4.4	French	Bambara	1	Bamako	Bambara	15
26. Mauritania	0.8	French	Arabic	0.8	Nouakchott	Arabic	2
27. Morocco	12	French	Arabic	12	Rabat	Arabic	3
28. Mozambique	5	Portug.	—	—	Lourenco M.	Tsonga	11
29. Niger	3.1	French	Hausa	1	Niamey	Hausa	14
30. Nigeria	55	Eng.	Hausa	30	Lagos	Yoruba	125
W. Region	10	Eng.	Yoruba	8	Ibadan	Yoruba	
N. Region	34	Eng.	Hausa	30	Kaduna	Hausa	
E. Region	11	Eng.	Ibo	9	Enugu		
Rhodesia	3	Eng.	Shona	2	Salisbury	Shona	6
31. Rio de Oro	0.2	Spanish	Arabic				
32. Rwanda	2	French	Rwanda	2	Kigali	Rwanda	2
33. Senegal	2.5	French	Wolof	0.8	Dakar	Wolof	2
34. Sierra Leone	2.2	Eng.	Mende	0.7	Freetown	Creole	8
35. Somalia	2	Eng.	Somali	2	Mogadishu	Somali	2
36. South Africa	14	Eng.	Zulu	4	Pretoria	Afrikaans	9
Cape Prov.		Eng.	Xhosa	3	Cape Town	Eng.	4
Natal		Eng.	Zulu	4	Durban	Zulu	3
Orange Fr. St.		Afrikaans	Soto (S)	0.3	Bloemfontein	Afrikaans	4
Transvaal		Afrikaans	Soto (N)	0.2	Pretoria	Afrikaans	8
38. Sudan	10	Eng.	Arabic	6	Khartoum	Arabic	171
39. Swaziland	0.3	Eng.	Swazi	0.3	Mbabane	Swazi	3
40. Tanzania	9	Eng.	Swahili	8	Dar es Salaam	Swahili	56
41. Tchad	2.6	French	Arabic		Fort Lamey		22
42. Togo	1.4	French	Ewe	0.3	Lome	Ewe	16
43. Tunisia	3.8	French	Arabic	3.6	Tunis	Arabic	2
44. Uganda	6	Eng.	Ganda	2	Entebbe	Ganda	24
45. Upper Volta	4	French	Mossi	2	Ouagadougou	Mossi	27
Zambia	5	Eng.	Bemba	1	Lusaka	Bemba	69

life at home and in the field. It will be mixed with the local language to form a creole dialect. Of course the elders will tell their youngsters to speak their mother tongue properly. As they grow older and settle down, their school experience will fade away. When do they meet anybody with whom to speak the foreign language? Of the girls, only an estimated 2% receive any formal education in the whole of Africa. How will they teach the foreign language to their children?

The national language that is actually spoken in the country is in a more favourable position. Speaking it does not mean pretending to be a foreigner, it means only identification with a neighbouring people, whose culture already has many traits in common with one's own. One cannot make a people change its language without changing its culture.

The governments of all new African states have one task in common : to make the many ethnic groups in their country into one nation. A unified language would seem to be the ideal instrument for this purpose. In some countries, however, it cannot yet be used. Symptomatic of the diversity of a nation from the linguistic point of view is the number of languages that are used in broadcasting. Tanzania uses only two languages (English and Swahili), Congo five (French, Lingala, Luba, Kikongo and Swahili), Ghana uses seven : English, Gan, Twi, Fanti, Ewe, Dagbani, Nzima and Hausa. In Somalia, only one language is spoken by the whole nation. Unfortunately there is no orthography for this language so that it is for the time being unfit for official purposes such as education and administration. English or Arabic has to take its place.

The tendency is for the larger languages, i.e. the languages spoken over a larger area, to absorb the smaller languages, i.e. those with fewer speakers but at the same time, as we have seen, new languages are created. Pidgin English in West Africa (called Krio in Sierra Leone) is a form of English that tends to develop along its own lines into a new language. Sabir is an Algerian form of the French language that has already developed an identity of its own.

The rural populations in the immense savannalands of Africa are only superficially affected by the central governments and few are interested in politics which for them only means taxes and price control. They go on living very much as they have done for centuries. They will continue to speak their own languages for many years to come. From the capitals the new national languages may radiate over the neighbouring districts and gradually be accepted by large sections of the nations, very much in the same way as English and French have radiated from London and Paris respectively. And even those powerful languages have not yet penetrated to the far corners of their countries : local languages still linger on and are even spoken with vivacity at a few hours distance by train from the capitals. It is likely that the same will happen in Africa where many states are larger than France while the population is sparsely distributed and often divided by mutual hostility. It is possible that future governments will have a tighter control over the people and be able to impose a number of unifying measures, a national language being one of them. But it will never be easy to change linguistic habits.

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Problems of Under-employment in West Africa

by YEHOJACHIN BRENNER

UNEMPLOYMENT, or even partial unemployment, should never be confused with under-employment. The former describes a situation in which workers and other resources cannot find profitable utilization. The latter describes employment with low productivity. The former is concerned with the number of people who are unemployed; the latter with the productivity of their labour. Unemployment is the product of one social system; under-employment of another.

West African society is still to a great extent, though no longer entirely, in the grip of the so-called "extended family". This is a social structure, akin to the clan or tribe, which claims the individual member's loyalty and in exchange affords him some degree of social standing and economic security. Members claim, and normally receive, support from other members of the "extended family" and are expected to work and contribute to the advancement of its other members. In agriculture this germinates inefficiency, in industry and public administration nepotism and retardation.

No one can doubt the merits of the quasi-social security service provided by the extended family to its members in an economically backward world where no other adequate means of hunger relief are available. Yet, precisely in this lies the main difficulty. The dissolution of the "family" is a prerequisite for the termination of the old order with its inbuilt conditions for economic backwardness. It is only after this system is abolished that labour will be compelled to seek more productive employment and old safeguards will be replaced by new ones of a higher order. But a transition from the old to the modern system leaves a vacuum—a period during which the individual is deprived of the old means of protection before new ones become available to him.

By way of illustration let us assume that a "family" cultivating an area of land grows or is joined by members who had so far lived in another region or were differently employed. The "new" people will be expected to work for their upkeep. If the available land is already supplied with adequate labour it will be over-staffed. Not the optimum combination of land and labour but the moral obligation of the unemployed to work will be the guiding factor in their employment. Naturally the result must be diminishing productivity. Similarly, a member of the "family" who goes into public administration or starts some enterprise in town will hardly find it possible to recruit labour on the basis of maximum

efficiency. In most cases he achieves his position as "employer" only through the combined efforts of his "tribe-family" and is therefore morally obliged to look after "his own" people and use his position for their betterment.

The economist from the developed countries must therefore put aside his notions of "profit-maximisation" before he can engage upon the task of analysing West African labour efficiency.

Another cause of inefficiency and under-employment springs from the low level and structure of consumption. Here the economist is faced with what may well be a vicious circle. The low level of demand—rather the low level of cash demand—retards production and the resultant slender incentives for production restrict employment and demand. More than that, the low level of demand is reinforced by the poor productivity of under-employed labour which makes it relatively profitable to substitute human effort for almost anything. Hence the life and durability of manufactured goods is prolonged by frequent repairs making the process uneconomic. Empty cement bags, bottles, discarded tins, etc., supplement an income with an incredibly low marginal transfer cost.

If one turns to the export industries as a source of local market demand one will find little comfort. Employment in these industries cannot take the place of real cash demand-forming labour engagement. This is due to the prevalent conditions and nature of the West African export industries. Broadly, West African exports can be divided into two categories: agricultural—predominantly cocoa—which are reasonably labour-intensive; and minerals—predominantly gold and diamonds—in which a relatively small number of workers is engaged and which unfortunately lack favourable conditions for the development of local supplementary processing units.

If we take cocoa farming we may be inclined to think that it has all the necessary ingredients for stimulating market-demand; it is fairly labour-intensive; a cash crop; defies the notions of risk avoidance and lack of long-term foresight in investment decisions, which is a frequent cause of complaint in under-developed countries and yet does not really stimulate demand. The cause appears to be twofold; firstly, most of the staple foodstuffs can be grown close to or in between cocoa trees and, secondly, the social "family" system makes subsistence farming possible and providential savings not obviously necessary. The combination of these two not only narrows the scope of the food market but indirectly by keeping down wage-rates reduces the market for manufactured goods. Thus, with the exception of a small number of foodstuffs, such as fish, and some "semi-luxury" goods, mostly foreign-made, the numerically greatest labour employing export sector contributes but little to the demand which could stimulate the development of local market production.

The mineral-extracting industry is equally discouraging. Though employment here is "demand-forming" and wages relatively high, the number of consumers involved is not really big enough to have a significant impact on production. This is particularly true in West African mining where lack of skill and the very nature of the minerals extracted are severe handicaps to the development of secondary-processing industries which could increase the number of wage workers. Gold is not so

bulky a commodity that it may be locally reduced in size to save on transport costs nor is it a product upon which a local industry can be built. The same may also be true of diamonds.

Again the economist from the advanced countries may be too easily tempted to look for his "depression" models or inclined to try to stimulate demand by what is commonly referred to as the "demonstration effect". These approaches, however, pre-suppose unemployment rather than under-employment and the activation of a "multiplier effect" (which just isn't there) by the injection of new capital into the economy, and this can only be relevant where the multiplier effect can come into its own, i.e. where a cash economy has already reached a certain level of development. As for the demonstration effect it is more often than not the case that it generates a desire for conspicuous and spectacular spending, i.e. merely for imported goods.

It is therefore that in the spirit of the classical economists one would have to sum up the labour position by saying that only the destruction of the old social pattern of society can precipitate conditions for economic progress, and this may happen in one of two ways or by a combination of both. First, population pressure may become too strong for the "family" to support its members, who will have to go out in search of other employment. Secondly, the pull of employment, particularly in the towns, may be strong enough to create a population of wage workers in the modern sense of the term. Both are painful processes though the first may be more painful than the second. There are, however, powerful forces at work in present-day Africa which on both the political and the social level may bring forth other not easily foreseen long-term developments. As these forces and processes cannot be explained by "raw" economical incentives a great deal of sociological and psychological field work will have to be done before any sensible predictions can be attempted. For example, one cannot find in Ghana plantations of the kind one so often encounters in South-East Asia or South America. Nor does one find the "Latifundia" characteristic of the Middle East.

Most of the land in West Africa is divided into a great number of relatively small holdings and even the few and insignificant plantations which existed before independence have now been nationalised. In theory all land belongs to the paramount chief and is administered for him by minor "stools". In practice, however, land is bought and sold and wherever trees are planted the planter is for all practical purposes the owner of the land. True, a man may still be permitted to plant short-term crops, say, yams or cocoyams (which take the place of potatoes in the Africans' diet) on any unused land provided that after the harvest the land reverts to its original holder, but for long-term crops, such as cocoa trees, palm trees, etc., formal permission and a proper deed of transfer are necessary. As a result of this land situation and in contrast to conditions in other colonial or ex-colonial countries, West Africa is blessed with a powerful and relatively well-off peasant class which is far more conscious of its political and social significance than it appears to the merely casual observer.

Another fact which cannot be explained by the lack of cash-demand or similar "raw" economic forces alone is the reluctance of unemployed townspeople to take advantage of the often freely-available agricultural

land around their towns to grow foodstuffs on it. The hindrance appears to be psychological and sociological rather than economical. Partly it is due to inexperience but there are other causes as well. Many of the townspeople have illusions about the pace at which one ought to become rich and find agriculture a far too protracted a process. Others look upon agriculture as an "uncivilised" occupation and prefer to wait and hope for posts as drivers, messengers, mechanics, etc. These trends must be set against the West African background. West Africa is geographically divided into the tropical forest (i. e. bush) belt and the savannah. The first suffers from a surplus of water in the rainy seasons when the good soil is washed away unless proper steps are taken to prevent it as soon as the bush is cleared for agriculture. The latter, i. e. the savannah, suffers from a shortage of water. At a cost both bush and savannah can be put to use. Yet economic progress is retarded by inexperience, the low level of cash-demand, the shortage of long-term capital for irrigation and soil conservation, and the mutual distrust among the peasants which prevents the raising of funds for common improvement schemes.¹

Cattle could be raised on the Accra plains, and the flooding of some areas as a result of the construction of the Volta dam could provide ideal fish ponds. The Volta river scheme itself should provide the power required to make aluminium from the abundant bauxite and Nigerian tin could be used for the canning industries. But apart from the real, economic difficulties of financing such schemes and the lack of experience and "know-how", powerful social and political problems stand in the way of easy progress. To illustrate this, one has merely to ask who should raise, say, cattle in the Accra plain. Hired labour employed for this purpose by the government? The tribe which holds the land? Private enterprise? The answers to these questions in the West African environment are sown with social and political pitfalls. Hence one may repeat that inasmuch as long-term developments are to be considered, social, psychological and political questions have to be carefully and expertly examined together with the more normal economic problems of the attraction and direction of investment capital.

Turning to the short-term problems of capital, or rather to the lack thereof, one is faced with a situation very similar to the one we have seen regarding labour. Social complications and under-employment of resources appear to be among the major factors which hinder economic growth. This is why "depression remedies", i.e., the injection of foreign aid to stimulate demand, cannot solve the West African problem.

The fact that the mere influx of foreign money does not necessarily stimulate a process of economic development in countries with a low level

(1) For example, if one looks at the position of citrus in Ghana one finds that although it grows almost wild in a great part of the forest belt it does not play a significant part in the country's economy. The fruit is collected by market women who sell it to the Rose Lime Company. The company has the juice extracted and shipped in barrels to the U. K. There it is treated and bottled. This takes place while wood for wrapping-paper and boxes is easily available in West Africa. The lack of citrus fruit exports may therefore lie in the poor quality of the fruit. Yet it would merely need simple irrigation efforts to water the trees during the relatively short dry seasons and some grafting, etc. to improve the fruit to export standards. Similarly, tomatoes could be grown in the savannah land with the aid of some irrigation arrangements and transport improvements which should, at least initially, not be very costly.

of output and consumption per capita is amply illustrated by the fate of some oil and other primary-product-exporting areas. To apply depression remedies with beneficial results at least two conditions have to be satisfied. Social and political conditions must permit a wide distribution of the extra purchasing power and a potential market demand for locally producible goods must be in existence. Otherwise the new wealth will be spent on foreign luxury goods, whisked away into foreign bank accounts and hoarded. This means that the sequence of a demand and supply cycle has first to be broken on the demand side. Merely to bring down consumer goods prices artificially through outside subsidies on industrial production will not be a sufficiently strong incentive to break down the traditional pattern of demand. Experience shows that where new items entered the habitual structure they almost entirely consisted of commodities for the production of which West Africa lacks both raw materials and skills. Motor-cars and radios are two good examples. Similarly, the creation of a cash market for home products by attracting labour to the towns with the help of a heavily foreign subsidised "Japan-style" export industry must also remain a very dubious proposition because of the region's sad poverty in internationally-scarce industrial raw materials and skills.

Briefly, until domestic demand for locally producible goods is stimulated foreign aid cannot significantly and directly contribute to the process of growth. Once this kind of demand develops foreign aid will soon assume its most important role indeed in accelerating the process. Then, of course, the importation of free real capital will reduce production costs and consequently raise the per capita ratio of output and consumption. However, the first stimulus must come from the demand side and it is here that the difficult social and mental hindrances have to be overcome. Therefore it may be true that an untimely and not carefully channelled influx of real or other capital may do more harm than good. Indirectly, it may lead to an undesirable redistribution of wealth. Directly it may take the form of introducing, for example, labour-saving machinery in some sectors of, say, agriculture where there is already under-employment of labour.

All this is far from saying that an influx of foreign capital into West Africa under certain conditions and in some specific areas is undesirable even at the present stage of its development. No one could object to the importation of soil and plant improving chemicals or to long-term heavy capital-consuming investments in electrification, irrigation, drainage and construction programmes. Although such investments may help in generating demand through the employment of labour, one should know that they can neither replace the first phase of development, namely, the creation of effective consumers' demand, nor can they yield their truly beneficial results before this phase is over.

The major problem at this stage is how to overcome the lack of effective demand for home products. Sometimes a theory is put forward that some balance could be struck between assisted incomes and subsidised production which could set the process of a demand and supply cycle in motion. The idea behind this seems to be that if a lot of money is injected into the country, part of it would filter through to the general public and enable the "people" to buy things which could be cheaply produced and consequently cheaply sold, thanks to the concurrent influx of cheap real capital.

In fact the recent economic history of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, to name but a few countries, shows that there is no reason to believe that an influx of money will really penetrate to the general public unless, again, the social structure favours such a process. Nor is there reason to assume that the demanded goods will be those which can be produced locally. Well-established habits of consumption and traditions, economically harmful prestige symbols and the worst outgrowths of the "demonstration effect" are far more powerful factors in West African society than may be overcome by the mere working of the price mechanism. The predominance of prestige over comfort in the West African scale of preferences and values has very little in common with the same scale among the lower and middle income groups in the economically developed countries.

For example, in all but very few cases the West African family will own a radio set before they will even consider purchasing cups and saucers or other everyday utensils, not to speak of an indoor water tap or kitchen sink. Consequently, even assuming that political and social conditions would permit prosperity to penetrate deep enough to embrace the greater part of the population, as may be the case in Ghana, it need not automatically lead to industrial or agricultural progress. For, as long as prestige requirements hold sway over comfort demand the artificial prosperity may only disturb the export markets of cocoa, timber, etc. Moreover, if one was to examine the likely results of an artificially-created rise in the popular purchasing power on economic growth even in Ghana, the following aspects would have to be considered.

First, about two-thirds of the population is employed in agriculture¹ and not more than one person in five is dependent on a cash market for his foodstuffs. Consequently, the "new purchasing power" would contribute but little to the expansion of cash sales of locally-produced victuals. Experience does in fact indicate that a rise in real incomes in the agrarian sector usually results in a shift in the proportions of foreign and locally produced foodstuffs in favour of the former. The resultant higher standard of living is normally expressed in more imported corned-beef, tinned fish and sugar consumption. With the exception of these there seem to be very few alterations in the customary diet of the people. For this reason (and with the exception of the admittedly good potential possibilities for fisheries and meat and sugar production in West Africa) the stimulus for a greater money demand for agricultural products must come from more sophisticated developments than the mere injection of foreign aid.² The relative insignificance of the rural market for locally-producible industrial goods on the one hand, and the resultant insignificance of urban cash markets for agricultural products on the other,

1. Yearbook of Labour Statistics—ILO.

2. In theory it is of course conceivable that urbanisation, i.e., an increase in the number of people who cannot supply their own foodstuffs will stimulate the market for agricultural products. Consequently rising food prices would be followed by improvements in transport and marketing facilities, etc. This development, however, can only take place where and when conditions favour urbanisation. In other words, when industry grows and creates employment for the townspeople. But the growth of industry necessitates markets and these are unlikely to develop without far-reaching changes in the economic and psychological conditions in the rural sector which themselves are to no small extent the product of the lack of industrialised urban centres.

reinforce each other to cause a vicious circle which is unlikely to be broken by an artificial influx of money.

Secondly, amongst the relatively wealthy rural population an impressive Victorian house is almost the first desired status symbol. If possible a second house is also built for the wife, to be followed by more houses for more wives. Unfortunately, however, West Africa is poor in the necessary raw materials for building such houses. Labour, again, can be recruited on the spot from the "extended family" and can feed on victuals produced nearby, but cement and iron have to be imported from abroad and even stone is very hard to come by in the richer parts of West Africa. After the house the rich man will buy a motor-car, etc., also imported, and finally a good share of his money will be hidden away in cash hoards and held in foreign deposit accounts.

Again the processes reinforce each other. The lack of markets for locally producible industrial products directs the flow of money into economically sterile directions while the very nature of the predominant status symbols is relatively so highly capital-consuming and attracts so much of the savings as to leave but little money floating about in search of investment possibilities.

Thirdly, the mental legacy of colonial rule with regard to consumption and investment habits should not be underestimated. In this respect the harm done to the economy is manifold. The colonial administration was mainly interested in the production of raw materials, i.e., in cocoa, groundnuts and palm nuts, copra, gold and diamonds, etc. Consequently official encouragement was given to mineral extraction and to the development of export crops. As a result of this attitude whenever capital concentrated in the hands of Africans it usually did so in the agricultural sector. It is hardly surprising therefore that the "national capital" was neither inclined nor able to venture into industry. On the one hand this reality created an economic bond and dependency between the colonialists and the native "capitalists" who, owing to the nature of land tenure and traditions, were also the local aristocracy and, on the other, it deprived the African of the industrial experience now so badly needed. Similar reasons, in addition to the absence of international connections, account for the fact that trade and commerce in West Africa is almost entirely in foreign hands. The foreigners, however, for reasons connected with their insecure status as such preferred to hold their profits in the liquid form of stocks rather than experiment in industry.

This situation left but one way open to advancement for the enterprising African, who had no hope to inherit the leadership and assets of the tribe-family, namely, to seek his social and economic improvement through education and in the civil service.

This explains why the antagonism between the essentially pro-colonial agricultural sector and the anti-colonial industrial sector, which was the internal reflection of the struggle for national independence in a good many other newly-emerging countries, was substituted, in the case of West Africa, by a not dissimilar and highly complicated conflict between the traditional chiefs and the civil services' so-called "verandah boys".¹

1. The "verandah boys" were the people from the villages who assembled in Accra on the eve of the final struggle for independence. They were in effect the men behind the struggle who under African conditions could be assembled in the town where they slept on their leaders' verandahs.

Yet the partial victory of the "verandah boys" could not replace the nucleus of industry which elsewhere had supported the anti-colonial forces. More dangerously than that, it imposed upon the economy a civil service mentality which strongly reflected the worst side of the colonial branch of this organisation. By way of the "demonstration effect" the new social group which came into prominence imitates the habits of some rather unsavoury types of overpaid Europeans while it is also chained, to a greater or smaller extent, to the traditions of the extended family which encourages nepotism and other trends harmful for industrial development.

To sum up, it must be said that the new strata of independent West African society is administratively inefficient, lacks industrial experience and tries to imitate the economically useless old colonial consumption and spending habits, mistaking them for real values of civilisation. One may therefore be justified in deducing that it is the inability to find productive, reasonably secure and profitable employment for short-term capital in the private sector rather than the total lack of capital which seems to be the major trouble.

In the field of social capital this kind of under-employment of resources is even more evident. For example, a skeleton rail and road network was built by the colonial administrations. The roads and railway lines connect the major mining and other raw material centres with the international ports. Some of these roads have been greatly improved since independence and with a little effort can carry a much heavier traffic than they actually do. The mere rise in a cash demand for agricultural products would therefore be sufficient to stimulate the construction of some feeder roads by the villagers to link their villages to the nearby main veins of communication. The potential social capital embodied in these would be used and the values of the roads would increase manifold.

Another example of under-employed capital may be taken from the fishing industry. The supply of fresh fish could easily be increased in West Africa merely by improvements of organisation. But unless adequate storage, transport and conservation facilities are made available, there can be little incentive to increase the yield, for under the present conditions to do so may depress fish prices and harm fishermen. There is a severe shortage of capital where basic long-term development projects are concerned, which will be difficult to overcome without extreme hardship over a long period. Foreign aid will be extremely helpful to meet the requirements of long-term and heavy capital-consuming electrification, drainage and irrigation and mechanisation plans. These, under the present circumstances, can only be carried out by the national governments. For short-term capital the solution may lie in the concentration on those industries for which a real local demand already exists. Here canned fish and meat seem to play a predominant role. It seems that with fish, oil, and tomatoes easily available in West Africa and with silicone sand for glass and alum and tin not far off there should be no serious difficulties in the way of developing fish, meat and fruit canning industries. This would pave the way for the growth of secondary and tertiary industries around them, which in turn would increase the number of wage workers who would provide a cash market for agricultural products. There seem to be no good reasons why motor-cars should not be assembled, diamonds cut, oil refined and fruits canned in West Africa. Finally, the setting up of a stock market to absorb some of the idle local hoarded capital and to overcome the farmers' hesitation to lend their money may perhaps go some way towards the financing of short-term investment projects.

Development Administration

by M. J. K. THAVARAJ

THE term "Development Administration" or "Administration for Development" has gained wide currency in recent literature on Public Administration. Prof. Weidner merits special mention for projecting the concept of Development Administration as a distinct category. There are some who have some obvious misunderstanding of the concept and mix it up with Administrative Development. But there are others who raise their eyebrows with legitimate misgivings questioning the very basis of this categorisation. To them, if administration is not for development, what is it for? Is there a thing like non-developmental administration? Are there altogether new principles which distinguish one as qualitatively different from another to warrant a special designation? My contention is that the administrative goals, processes and instrumentalities associated with development administration are substantially different from other types of administration such as, for instance, 'subsistence administration'. I admit that the difference between them is one of degree. But it is significant enough to merit separate treatment.

The philosophy behind *laissez faire* was least government. According to the classical political economists, the best of all finances was that which was least in amount. The primary concern of the state was law and order and protection of individual rights to property, contracts etc. It is true that even these classical exponents of this doctrine envisaged that the states should assume certain common functions which are not profitable for the private entrepreneurs to undertake.

Similarly, maintenance of law and order, orderly assessment and collection of taxes, maintenance of land records, averting or dealing with crises and calamities etc. were the primary pre-occupations of the colonial governments. Expediency was the keynote of this administration. Subsistence or maintenance of the status quo was their immediate concern. There was no direction; no drive towards socio-economic change. Any change that occurred was incidental and not consciously sought after. True, there were some productive economic and social infrastructures created. Initially these undertakings were motivated by strategic and political considerations. There were commercial and economic benefits too. But in so far as they were harnessed as economic appendages of the metropolitan economies these benefits were not entirely internalised.

As against these, development administration refers to the structure, organisation, and organizational behaviour necessary for the implementation of schemes and programmes of social, economic and political change envisaged. The sole emphasis here is on directional change at a stable or accelerated rate. Sometimes the rate and pattern of change is spelt

out in detail. The detailed targets are *ex-ante* quantified. The processes of achieving them are clearly delineated. Government becomes a change-agent, a problem solver and an innovator. In this context, development administration needs a guiding philosophy having a mass appeal. There should be an aggressive and dramatic leadership which is action-oriented; which creates the institutional and organisational framework conducive to development; which could shape the attitudinal and behavioural complexes of the masses of the people and involve them in the process of development. At the same time, it calls for planners, programmers, organisers, operators and administrators who are firmly committed to a continuous process of fundamental change; who have penetrating understanding of the environment; who are familiar with the processes of change; who possess the requisite technical knowhow of field work; who could adapt and innovate. Here administration should pinpoint areas of change, translate the programmatic values into operational terms, shape the behavioural patterns in line with the functional contents of development, redraw the hierarchical arrangements, create and augment the requisite field operators, evolve suitable channels of communication, and mechanisms of control. Thus the whole emphasis of administration shifts to commitment to programmatic values and management of programmes.

This change in the content and accent of administration was due to recent developments in the capitalist and under-developed economies.

The market oriented western economies were subjected to periodic cyclical fluctuations of which the Great Depression of the thirties was one of the most devastating examples. Some feared that secular stagnation was engulfing the capitalist system. The diagnosis of eminent economists like Lord Keynes attributed these fluctuations to deficiency in demand caused by skewness or unevenness in income distribution. Alongside, the growth of democracy and socialism necessitated the removal of extreme inequalities in the distribution of income and property. Consequently, a whole series of policies ranging from a progressive tax structure, a comprehensive social security system, ever-expanding social services and welfare schemes, massive programmes of road building, housing, irrigation, soil conservation etc. were brought into the ambit of fiscal policy. Built-in stabilisers were developed as part of the compensatory fiscal and monetary policies to activate idle savings during slackened economic activity and to curb inflationary trends under booming conditions.

The post-war reconstruction programmes like the Marshall Plan introduced features of comprehensive socio-economic planning into the western systems. Some countries were wedded to a policy of progressive nationalisation of the means of production and distribution on grounds of efficiency and equity. Confronted with the impressive record of economic development of the Soviet bloc several western countries began to concern themselves with long-term strategies of economic development which resulted in the acceptance of projections and planning as crucial elements of their economic policy. Thus, counter-cyclical and growth programmes have enlarged the scope of the public sector involving comprehensive fiscal and programme management.

In the under-developed economies characterised by the notorious vicious circle of low income, low saving and low productivity, the major problem

is the creation of capital formation. This can be done by strengthening the ability or incentive to save of private individuals, by mobilisation through public saving (which can be done through taxation and by profits from public undertakings), by tapping external sources of finance, by creating the necessary financial institutions and above all by creating the legal and psychological climate suitable for a high rate of capital formation.

The political leadership and government have also to grapple with problems of integrating and participating capabilities.

The result of all these factors is the tremendous growth of public sector not only in social and economic overheads but also in directly productive capital. Indeed, public investment constitutes the dynamic element in the development programmes of the underdeveloped economies.

Consequently, governments have changed from one of neutralism to one of positive motive force. This change in the orientation has had two important results. Firstly, fiscal operations have far-reaching effects throughout the economy. Secondly, new and growing functions comprising innumerable programmes, activities and projects call for efficient management. Thus the accent is on management.

In short, whereas the primary concern of colonial or *laissez-faire* administrations is the maintenance of status quo, rapid economic development and social change are the primary concerns of development administration. This may be done through direct public investment, or creation of the requisite institutions or by setting up the necessary legal, social and financial framework. Government budgeting is to assist and accelerate economic and social changes. As such budgeting is the principal instrument for planning and implementing programmes for development. It is the fiscal expression of programming.

When development is *ex ante* quantified and the whole pattern of development is delineated in detail and comprehensively it will require specialised planning agencies either as part of each department or as part of the central machinery of government in development oriented economies.

In a restricted sense budgeting is planning. The primary concern of both the agencies is to facilitate the formulation and selection of policies and programmes which are most likely to achieve the goals of government. But they differ from one another in some important respects. For instance, planning in terms of the whole range of government policy requires a perspective of time and a broad perception of the inter-relationships between the various policies. On the other hand, budgeting is simply a matter of providing most economically for programmes already agreed upon.

In this regard budgeting may be said to take over where planning leaves off. Under a democratic set-up the hopes and aspiration of the citizens are reflected in the manifestoes of the ruling party. The political leaders identify and conceptualise the societal values. Top leaders in government spell out these goals and objectives in concrete terms. Ministers and senior officials formulate policies and programmes for achieving these

objectives. Administrative methods for executing the programmes will be the responsibility of the operating officials. Under this dispensation, budget officials take the goals and broad policies of the government as given data.

The job of the budget agency is (a) to ensure that the required resources are made available for implementing the programmes of the government; (b) to ensure that the most economical administrative methods are employed in programme execution thus minimising the resources required; (c) to advise the government as to whether the most effective (and efficient) combination of programmes is being employed for achieving the governmental objectives; (d) to assist the government in appraising alternative proposals for new programmes both in taxation and expenditure. The first two are intended to ensure economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The last two are meant to evaluate whether a different combination of programmes would subserve the short and long-term objectives of the government better. Evaluation of the programmes in relation to policies embodying the goals of the government is the meeting place of planning and budgeting.

Thus planning provides guides to budgeting decisions and opportunities to evaluate current budgeting policy in terms of its impact on the social and economic framework of a country. Budget administration provides data and analyses necessary in the formulation of programmes and provides the machinery for review, evaluation and control. This marriage of planning and budgeting must take place at the grass roots level in the respective departments and agencies.

Development and stability are the most important functions of budgeting. In a way these two are but two aspects of the same problem. The economy has a low volume of capital per head of population. But there are innumerable ends towards which these limited resources can be directed. This gives rise to an acute problem of choice. At the same time, care should be taken not to discourage private saving and investment; to avoid imbalance in external payments; to keep inflationary pressures under check.

Capital formation has two aspects, namely-mobilisation and allocation. Mobilisation involves saving or utilisation of surplus labour. Private saving can be increased either by increasing income, or reducing consumption or through a redistribution of national income in favour of the saving classes. Private saving may be induced directly into productive investment, or it may be diverted to the public sector through taxation or borrowing; or if private income is hoarded, bank credit may be expanded to neutralise the deflationary tendencies. Mobilisation through public saving requires that the marginal rate of taxation should be raised well above the average rate through a well designed tax structure which could curb conspicuous consumption and discourage speculative and unproductive investments. This may be combined judiciously with a system of subsidies and tax incentives.

The allocation of resources involves thorny problems of investment criteria. The question that is quite often raised is whether we should aim at maximum output or surplus or employment? The choice of technique and methods depends very much on the answers we get to

these questions. Another problem that faces planners is whether we should aim at a balanced development or allow unbalanced development and concentrate our efforts on closing the bottleneck. In any case the relative costs and benefits of the competing projects are to be carefully weighed against accepted order or priorities before their inclusion in the budget.

Development programmes contain several massive projects with long periods of gestation. This leads to a situation where money income is created without a corresponding increase in the supply of consumer goods. The result is an inflationary pressure accompanied by undesirable speculative activities and balance of payments difficulties. The fiscal system does not contain built-in stabilisers like the social security or income-elastic taxes. Nor are the public enterprises in a position to manipulate their price policy in such a way as to mop up the surplus purchasing power which is chasing the limited volume of supplies. The cost price squeeze may also push several export industries out of business thereby accentuating the deterioration in the payments situation.

Therefore, the task of mobilisation and allocation of resources is to be accomplished by maintaining reasonable stability which makes budgeting more difficult.

The essence of development budgeting is to translate developmental plans into programmes, projects and activities and to provide the organisation and instrumentalities for effective operation.

Fiscal and programme management calls for the creation of budget agencies at the centre as well as at the different levels of the various functional departments and operating agencies; synchronisation of authority and responsibility at every level of operation; establishment of unity of command; merging of fiscal and programme responsibilities; enforcement of responsibility; establishment of a smooth two-way channel of communication from top to bottom; maintenance of a steady and continuous flow of financial and management data for suitable decision-making, control and evaluation at appropriate levels of management.

The central budget agency may be made responsible for prescribing the nature, content and form of budget, for inviting estimates at a definite point in the budget cycle, for maintaining control over the allotment or apportionment of appropriations on a project or activity basis, for programme review of all governmental operations, for maintaining liaison with the planning and economic bodies, for reviewing plans for departmental personnel in budget administration and for providing special assistance to legislative bodies. When the estimates prepared at the lowest levels move upwards to the central budget office it may review and modify them in the light of resource availability and overall pattern of priorities after due consultations with the agencies concerned.

Advance planning is the crux of the matter in the preparation of budget estimates as well as in the implementation of the budget. Projects should be properly surveyed, data should be assessed, a preliminary project report should be prepared, the organisational structure, material inputs etc. should be carefully examined. Works should as far as possible be standardised. Methods study, work simplification, work measurement on a scientific basis and standards help better project estimation, prompt

allotment, easy assessment of progress of implementation and scope for improvement. Proper resource budget will help avoiding a scramble for resources in short supply.

There should be a clearly laid out order of priorities for the guidance of the central budget agency. In reviewing the departmental estimate the central budget agency should ascertain whether they are desirable, practicable and attainable. Whether the scale and size of operations envisaged are appropriate. Whether the methods to be employed are suitable. Whether the requisite resources will be available.

To be effective, there should be widespread participation of the operating officials at various levels in the formulation of the budget. Operating staff have intimate knowledge and have a special responsibility in administering segments of the programme.

The fusion of fiscal and programme responsibilities is a *sine qua non* for effective management. This implies that authority and responsibility should be delegated to the operating echelons where activities are performed and resources utilised. In other words, administration and responsibility should be 'on the spot'. The operating official should derive authority from one and only one higher level and should be answerable only to that level. When the responsibility at each level is clearly defined, officials can be held responsible for the performance of their assigned functions and for the utilisation of the resources for the intended purposes. The operating echelons should be encouraged to plan their activities in terms of anticipated costs over a definite period of time. They should be afforded adequate opportunity to defend their plans and their annual breakdowns. When in view of the limited resources and order of priorities the central budget agency finds it necessary to modify the programmes of the operating agencies, such decisions should be promptly conveyed to the concerned agencies accompanied by the reasons governing such decisions and the suggested ways and means of tailoring the programmes according to the available resources. This presupposes a well established channel of communication throwing up the requisite data and information for sound decision-making by the central budget agency and transmission of the central decisions along with their objectives and perspectives down through the operating echelons, facilitating quick and smooth assimilation and adjustment. The regional and local governments should also be involved in planning budget formulation and implementation.

The classification of the budget should be on a functional basis. Each function may be sub-divided into programmes, performance units, activities or end products. Costing on a programme basis would help rational choice and evaluation at top levels of administration. But internal programming, management and control should be based on a detailed data about past, current and proposed work and their respective costs. Such functional and performance breakdowns should be synchronised with the organisational sub-divisions the input of resources, unit costs etc., which are invaluable tools for review, evaluation and control at each echelon of operation. In other words, a budget built on the performance and organisational basis is one of the most effective instruments of management.

The Central Budget Office should confine itself to broader problems of coordination, appraisal and overseeing over the programmes of the

various departments and allow the functional departments and operating agencies to manage their affairs with the requisite freedom and insight. This will enable the central budget agency to direct its attention towards working out economic and budgetary projections and the improvement of the techniques and methods of organisation employed by the various agencies. Work study, O & M operations and research are some of the aids to improve efficiency and economy in administration. It may also pay attention to train the requisite personnel in programming, budgeting, accounting etc.

The freedom of the operating agencies could be strengthened by granting appropriations on the basis of each programme. The concerned department must have enough freedom to reappropriate funds between the different performance units or activities within each programme on justifiable grounds. Of course, they should be accountable for all their actions. But agency accountability should be based on accounting data relating to programmes and their costs, though the traditional aspects of accountability in terms of legal requirements, protection of cash and other assets etc. are still valid.

There should be a single set of accounts to support all phases of the budget cycle. Accounting data and other factual information gathered through inspection, investigation, and surveys form the basis for internal and external audit of the financial transactions and operational performance. Operational audit includes an appraisal of the utilisation of men, methods, materials and management techniques in relation to the results emanating from the various operations. Such data when reported on a performance basis will enable effective review and control at appropriate levels of operation.

Accrual accounting of the various transactions, inventory etc. of the public sector will help social accountants in tracing the intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral flows of physical and financial resources.

The programming, budgeting and operating agencies must work as a team to exercise continuing surveillance over their respective programmes which must be reviewed and evaluated at the departmental level in relation to the objectives of the department, not only in terms of the needs of today or next fiscal year but also in terms of the overall departmental goals at least for some years to come. Programmes established many years ago must be re-evaluated in the light of conditions of today and of situations that are likely to emerge. Evaluation must be made between 'desirable' programmes and 'essential' programmes. Non-essential programmes must be eliminated or curtailed. New techniques must be initiated to assure maximum return for every rupee of public money spent.

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DOCUMENTATION

African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya

We give below the first part of the Kenya Government's policy document, "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya", described as "Kenya's bible" by President Kenyatta at a press conference in Nairobi on April 27, 1965. The second part of the document will be published in the next issue of this journal.—*The Editor.*

WITH independence, Kenya intends to mobilize its resources to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit of its people. Under colonialism the people of Kenya had no voice in government; the nation's natural resources were organized and developed mainly for the benefit of non-Africans; and the nation's human resources remained largely uneducated, untrained, inexperienced and unbenefited by the growth of the economy.

Kenya is in a period of multiple transition set in motion by the attainment of Independence. We are in transition from a subsistence to a monetary economy, from an economic dependence on agriculture to a more balanced growth, from a development of natural resources for others to a development of human and natural resources for the benefit of the people of Kenya. The progress wanted cannot be easily won and it cannot be achieved by reverting to pre-colonial conditions. The best of Kenya's African social heritage and colonial economic legacy must be recognized and mobilized for a concerted, carefully planned attack on poverty, disease and the lack of education in order to achieve social justice, human dignity and economic welfare for all.

The major economic mobilization and reorganization of resources that these transitions imply cannot be realized without planning, direction, control and co-operation. But planning and direction imply objectives and mechanisms. We are bound to ask ourselves where we are going and how we will get there. It is in answering these questions that this paper has been prepared.

The ultimate objectives of all societies are remarkably similar and have a universal character suggesting that present conflicts need not be enduring. These objectives typically include—

- (i) political equality ;
- (ii) social justice ;
- (iii) human dignity including freedom of conscience ;
- (iv) freedom from want, disease, and exploitation ;
- (v) equal opportunities ; and
- (vi) high and growing *per capita* incomes, equitably distributed.

Different societies attach different weights and priorities to these objectives, but it is largely in the political and economic means adopted for achieving these ends that societies differ. These differences in means are, however,

of paramount importance because ultimate objectives are never fully attained. Every time one target is attained a new one becomes necessary. Indeed, we forever live in transition.

Kenya is already committed to these same objectives, and now must choose and put into working order the system or set of mechanisms that will advance the country as quickly as possible toward these goals, meeting at the same time the immediate and pressing needs of the country and its people.

PART I—AFRICAN SOCIALISM

The system adopted in Kenya is African Socialism, but the characteristics of the system and the economic mechanisms it implies have never been spelled out fully in an agreed form.

The Independence of African Socialism

In the phrase "African Socialism", the word "African" is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics. African Socialism is a term describing an African political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being a blueprint of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source. The principal conditions the system must satisfy are—

- (i) it must draw on the best of African traditions ;
- (ii) it must be adaptable to new and rapidly changing circumstances ;
and
- (iii) it must not rest for its success on a satellite relationship with any other country or group of countries.

African Traditions

There are two African traditions which form an essential basis for African Socialism—political democracy and mutual social responsibility. Political democracy implies that each member of society is equal in his political rights and that no individual or group will be permitted to exert undue influence on the policies of the State. The State, therefore, can never become the tool of special interests, catering to the desires of a minority at the expense of the needs of the majority. The State will represent all of the people and will do so impartially and without prejudice.

Political democracy in the African traditional sense provided a genuine hedge against the exercise of disproportionate political power by economic power groups. In African society a man was born politically free and equal and his voice and counsel were heard and respected regardless of the economic wealth he possessed. Even where traditional leaders appeared to have greater wealth and hold disproportionate political influence over their tribal or clan community, there were traditional checks and balances including sanctions against any possible abuse of such power. In fact traditional leaders were regarded as trustees whose

influence was circumscribed both in customary law and religion. In the traditional African society, an individual needed only to be a mature member of it to participate fully and equally in political affairs. Political rights did not derive from or relate to economic wealth or status. When this is translated into our modern state it means that to participate in political matters and party activities as an equal, the individual must prove nothing beyond age and citizenship and need take no oath beyond allegiance to the country.

Political democracy in the African tradition would not, therefore, countenance a party of the elite, stern tests or discriminatory criteria for party membership, degrees of party membership, or first and second class citizens. In African Socialism every member of society is important and equal; every mature citizen can belong to the party without restriction or discrimination; and the party will entertain and accommodate different points of view. African Socialism rests on full, equal and unfettered democracy. Thus African Socialism differs politically from communism because it ensures every mature citizen equal political rights and from capitalism because it prevents the exercise of disproportionate political influence by economic power groups. Another fundamental force in African traditional life was religion which provided a strict moral code for the community. This will be a prominent feature of African Socialism.

Mutual social responsibility is an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole, with the hope that ultimately the same spirit can be extended to even larger areas. It implies a mutual responsibility by society and its members to do their very best for each other with the full knowledge and understanding that if society prospers its members will share in that prosperity and that society cannot prosper without the full co-operation of its members. The State has an obligation to ensure equal opportunities to all its citizens, eliminate exploitation and discrimination and provide needed social services such as education, medical care and social security.

To ensure success in the endeavours of the Government, all citizens must contribute, to the degree they are able, to the rapid development of the economy and society. Every member of African traditional society had a duty to work. This duty was acknowledged and willingly accepted by members because the mechanism for sharing society's benefits, the reciprocal response of society to the individual's contribution, was definite, automatic and universally recognized. But the response of society was not simply a passive one. African society had the power and duty to impose sanctions on those who refused to contribute their fair share of hard work to the common endeavour.

Drawing on this background African Socialism expects the members of the modern State to contribute willingly and without stint to the development of the nation. Society, in turn, will reward these efforts and at the same time will take measures against those who refuse to participate in the nation's efforts to grow. Sending needed capital abroad, allowing land to lie idle and undeveloped, misusing the nation's limited resources, and conspicuous consumption when the nation needs savings are examples of anti-social behaviour that African Socialism will not countenance.

While the modern economy is more complex than traditional society, the principle remains that to be successful, society and its members must

each acknowledge fully and willingly its responsibility to the other. But the movement towards a modern, monetary economy changes the nature of these responsibilities and the mechanisms by which a member contributes to society and society shares benefits among its members. The people must be continually and carefully informed of what society expects of them and how these efforts will promote the welfare of all.

Adaptability

African Socialism must be flexible because the problems it will confront and the incomes and desires of the people will change over time, often quickly and substantially. A rigid, doctrinaire system will have little chance for survival. The system must—

- (i) make progress toward ultimate objectives; and
- (ii) solve more immediate problems with efficiency.

No matter how pressing immediate problems may be, progress toward ultimate objectives will be the major consideration. In particular, political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more material ends more quickly. Nor will these objectives be compromised today in the faint hope that by so doing they can be reinstated more fully in some unknown and far distant future.

Given the paramount importance of ultimate objectives, African Socialism must also confront and solve efficiently many immediate problems whose nature will change over time. In Kenya today, the pressing problems include the rapid development of agricultural land; laying a basis for accelerated growth of industry; attracting capital domestically and from abroad while ensuring that it is used in a socially desirable way; modifying the tax structure in the interests of equity and larger revenues; guarding foreign exchange reserves; providing for a fuller participation by Africans in an expanding economy; relieving unemployment; removing idleness; reconciling pressures for expanding welfare schemes with the need to grow rapidly; and conserving our natural resources of land, water and forests. As some of these problems are solved or alleviated others will rise to take their place and the circumstances in which solutions must be found will also have altered. African Socialism must be prepared to cope with a vast range of problems, some of which cannot even be visualized in the present. A rigid system, however appropriate to present circumstances, will quickly become absolute.

Indeed, we can learn much from history in this regard—both from the history of thought and from the history of practice. In particular ideologies and the theoretical systems on which they are based are rigid and uncompromising while the development over time of all viable practical systems has been marked by adaptability to change, frequently of substantial proportions. Marxian socialism and *laissez-faire* capitalism are both theoretical economic organizations designed to ensure the use of resources for the benefit of society. Both settled on the ownership of property as the critical factor in economic organization and advocated rigid systems based in the one case on State ownership and in the other on private ownership. But ownership is not an absolute, indivisible right subject only to complete control or none. Practical systems have demonstrated that the resources of society are best guided into

proper uses by a range of sensitive controls each specially designed for the task to be performed.

Marx's criticism of the society of his time and place was a valid one. Political equality and democracy did not exist in Europe and Great Britain before the middle of the nineteenth century when Marx was writing. The enclosure movement and the industrial revolution had created a landless proletariat that was ruthlessly exploited by those with economic power who had much the same absolute rights as those of the feudal lords. Sharp class distinctions had been commonplace for centuries; the close association of political and economic power was traditional; and the general welfare was identified with the welfare of the few. The Industrial Revolution brought out the worst elements of the situation—hours of work were dawn to dusk; few safety precautions existed; there was no job security or protection against injuries, illness and old age; children started work as early as the age of four; and no established avenues of political appeal existed. The situation was one of government by the few, sharp class distinctions, unfettered property rights, subsistence living standards for the masses, and exploitation of a large and growing proletariat.

Valid as Marx's description was, it bears little similarity to Kenya today. Under colonialism Kenyans did not have political equality or equal economic opportunities, and their property rights were not always respected. Even so, African traditions have no parallel to the European feudal society, its class distinctions, its unrestricted property rights, and its acceptance of exploitation. The historical setting that inspired Marx has no counterpart in independent Kenya.

As predictive models of what would happen to factory system societies, both Marxian socialism and *laissez-faire* capitalism have been failures. The economic systems in actual use throughout the world today bear little resemblance to either model. The Industrial Revolution quickly led to the social protest of which Marx was a part and this in turn resulted in sweeping political and economic changes as the systems of the world adapted to the new state of technological change. Political democracy was achieved; private property rights were diluted; the State accepted increasing responsibilities for social services, planning, guidance and control; taxes were made progressive to distribute benefits more widely. Capitalism did not evolve into Marxian socialism, as Marx predicted, but was indeed modified in directions that Marx might well have approved.

The adaptability of these systems has a parallel in those countries that have attempted to follow Marx. To become effective, these systems, too, have had to demonstrate an ability to adapt to changing circumstances. They have adopted wage differentials and management incentives, permitted various forms of ownership, and utilized interest rates or the equivalent in their planning procedures. All practical economic systems, regardless of their origin, have demonstrated adaptability. The problems of today are not the problems of a century ago. African Socialism is designed to be a working system in a modern setting, fully prepared to adapt itself to changing circumstances and new problems.

Relationships with other countries

The third conditioning factor is the need to avoid making development in Kenya dependent on a satellite relationship with any country or group

countries. Such a relationship is abhorrent and a violation of the political and economic independence so close to the hearts of people. Economic non-alignment does not mean a policy of isolation, any more than political non-alignment implies a refusal to participate in world affairs. On the contrary it means a willingness and a desire—

- (i) to borrow technical knowledge and proven economic methods from any country—without commitment;
- (ii) to seek and accept technical and financial assistance from any source—without strings; and
- (iii) to participate fully in world trade—without political domination.

The ability of Africa to borrow advanced technical knowledge, modern methods of industrial organization and economic techniques of control and guidance from more advanced countries provides the opportunity to leap over many of the hurdles that have restrained development in these modern societies in the past. It means also that African Socialism as a system can profit from the mistakes of others. Unlike many countries that have eliminated many successful economic mechanisms on narrow ideological grounds, Kenya is free to pick and choose those methods that have been proven in practice and are adaptable to Kenya conditions regardless of the ideologies that others may attach to them. Kenya, therefore, is free to choose among other things—

- (i) a wages and incomes policy that recognizes the need for differential incentives as well as an equitable distribution of income;
- (ii) techniques of production that combine efficiencies of scale with diffused ownership;
- (iii) various forms of ownership—State, co-operative, corporate and individual—that are efficient for different sectors or that compete with each other provided only that the form promotes the objectives of Government; and
- (iv) techniques of control that vary with the needs of society and its members.

Similarly, the fact that other countries are more advanced is not a matter of jealousy but of opportunity. Kenya's ability to borrow funds and trained personnel from other countries means that development here need not be limited quite so severely by the shortage of domestic savings and education. Growth can proceed while these domestic limitations are overcome. On the other hand, aid from abroad will not be welcomed if it is designed to promote the economic or political dominance of the aiding country. For this reason, Kenya would welcome any scheme that channelled more aid through world bodies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the United Nations, and provided for such aid to be distributed on the basis of the *per capita* incomes and domestic efforts of the receiving countries.

Finally, modern methods of production; distribution, transportation and communication mean that no country can progress rapidly in isolation. Means for promoting trade, ensuring fair and stable prices for primary products, and reducing market barriers must be sought and supported. Kenya places no ideological barriers on trade and expects that

trade relations should be conducted in general on the basis of economic considerations.

THE OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM

Use of Resources

To be consistent with the conditions specified, African Socialism must be politically democratic, socially responsible, adaptable and independent. The system itself is based on the further idea that the nation's productive assets must be used in the interest of society and its members.

There is some conflict of opinion with regard to the traditional attitude towards rights to land. Some allege that land was essentially communally or tribally owned; others claim that individual rights were the distinguishing feature; still others suggest that ownership did not really exist in any modern context in many African tribes. Undoubtedly these traditions differed substantially from one tribe to another. In every case, however, and in sharp contrast to the European tradition, ownership was not an absolute indivisible bundle of rights. The ultimate right of disposal outside the tribe was essentially tribal and in this land was tribally owned. It must be remembered, however, that the political arrangements within the tribe were such that every mature member of the tribe would have a say in such a decision. Short of this right, others were assigned or allocated to clans, families and individuals, including the right to transfer and reclaim property within the clan. Rights to use land were in effect assigned in perpetuity to various groups within the tribe, subject always, however, and this is significant to an understanding of African Socialism, to the condition that resources must be properly used and their benefits appropriately distributed, not merely held idle, abused or misused, or the benefits hoarded. The rights normally associated in Europe with ownership as such scarcely mattered.

What does emerge with clarity and force and as a single, unifying principle from these discussions of traditional property rights is that land and other productive assets, no matter who owned or managed them, were expected to be *used*, and used for the general welfare. No individual family or clan could treat productive assets as private property unless the uses to which those assets were put were regarded as consonant with the general welfare. Unlike the traditional European approach to ownership, no person could treat a piece of land as his own with the freedom to use it or not as he chose. It is worth noting that over the past century, the European tradition of absolute ownership has gradually been eroded so that today the right of the State to guide, plan, and even order the uses to which property will be put is universally recognized and unquestioned.

These African traditions cannot be carried over indiscriminately to a modern, monetary economy. The need to develop and invest requires credit and a credit economy rests heavily on a system of land titles and their registration. The ownership of land must, therefore, be made more definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully successful. It does not follow, however, that society will also give up its stake in how resources are used. Indeed, it is a fundamental characteristic of African Socialism that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the uses of all productive resources.

Control of Resource Use

Under African Socialism the power to control resource use resides with the State. To imagine, however, that the use of resources can only be controlled through their ownership or that the appropriate ownership will guarantee the proper use of productive assets are errors of great magnitude. Ownership can be abused, whether private or public, and ways must be found to control resource use in either case. African Socialism must rely on planning to determine the appropriate uses of productive resources on a range of controls to ensure that plans are carried out.

Economic activities are varied in function, importance and purpose. Some are directed towards satisfying the needs of society as a whole, others are undertaken by the individual for himself and many others serve both purposes in varying degrees. The measure of control needed for each of these many activities differs from that needed for others. In order to control effectively, sufficiently and not excessively in each case many types and degrees of control are needed ranging from none, through influence, guidance and the control of a few variables such as prices or quantities, to absolute control represented by State ownership and operation. Price, wage, rent and output controls, import duties, income taxes and subsidies can be used selectively and in combinations to direct the uses of private property, limit profits, and influence the distribution of gains.

The use of a range of controls also has as its counterpart the permission of varying degrees of private participation and initiative. The idea of mutual social responsibility pre-supposes a relation between society, its members and the State. It suggests that the State is a means by which people collectively impose on individual members behaviour that is more socially constructive than that which each would impose on himself. The State, therefore, has a continuing function to perform, not in subordinating the individual in society, but in enhancing the role of the individual in society. Individuals derive satisfaction not only from the goods they consume but also from those they accumulate. If human dignity and freedom are to be preserved, provision must be made for both activities by the individual—consumption and accumulation.

The use of a range of controls offers the great advantage of flexibility. Controls can be applied selectively and with sensitivity depending on where in the spectrum of economic activity the one to be controlled is located. Furthermore, the degree and nature of controls can be modified over time. Another feature of the range of controls is that it permits a variety of forms of private participation, each of which can be utilized where it performs best. It also gives a substantial degree of freedom in attracting both private and public capital whether internally or from abroad. And managerial talent of different kinds can be attracted in different ways and from various sources to ensure that the country has adequate supplies of experienced people. Variety is an important means of attraction whether it is customers, savings, capital or management that is wanted.

The purpose of a range of controls and of planning is to ensure that productive assets are used for the benefit of society. If an individual, a co-operative, a company or the State owns productive assets, society expects these assets to be used and used well. The holding of land for specula-

tive purposes, the charging of exorbitant or discriminatory prices, the abandonment of land and the production or sale of shoddy merchandise are all examples of violations of the principle of mutual social responsibility.

Class Problem

The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African Socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans. The class problem in Africa, therefore, is largely one of prevention, in particular—

- (i) to eliminate the risk of foreign economic domination; and
- (ii) to plan development so as to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes.

In addition, Kenya has the special problem of eliminating classes that have arisen largely on the basis of race. This matter of Africanization in Kenya is reserved for discussion in Part II.

The class divisions that Marx deplored in Europe a century ago were supported and strengthened by three factors—

- (i) a concentration of economic power;
- (ii) the treatment of private ownership as an absolute, unrestricted right; and
- (iii) the close relationship between economic power and political influence.

The concept of political equality in Africa rules out in principle the use of economic power as a political base. The vigorous implementation of traditional political democracy in the modern setting will eliminate, therefore, one of the critical factors promoting class divisions. The policy of African Socialism to control by various means how productive resources are used eliminates the second of the factors supporting a class system. Without its two supporting allies, the concentration of economic power cannot be the threat it once was, but African Socialism proposes to restrict and guard against this factor as well as with regard to both foreign and domestic concentrations.

I.—Foreign Investors

Foreigners have no vote and can only have a political voice now that independence has been achieved by enlisting the support of Kenya citizens. Nevertheless, the foreign ownership and management of productive assets could mean that economic decisions in Kenya might be dominated by foreign rather than domestic considerations. Foreign investors should therefore be prepared to accept the spirit of mutual social responsibility, for example—

- (i) by making shares in the company available to Africans who wish to buy them;
- (ii) by employing Africans at managerial levels as soon as qualified people can be found; and

(iii) by providing training facilities for Africans.

Foreign investors should be willing to sell an increasing number of shares and in some cases perhaps all to Africans as savings become available for buying them. It is accepted, however, that given the urgent need for domestic saving for new development, the amount available for the purchase of foreign investment is likely to be much smaller than the annual amounts of new foreign investment for some time to come. That is, foreign investment is likely to be a growing sector rather than a shrinking one. It is important, therefore, that new foreign investors should understand fully their other obligations to the society in which they are investing. The Government has a duty to take appropriate action to ensure that these obligations are appreciated.

The employment in management of qualified Africans is not a serious constraint on the foreign investor because the intimate knowledge of the country and its people that they can bring to bear on management problems, in addition to their professional skills, will in general improve the efficiency of the enterprise. The provision of training facilities is also in the long-term interest of foreign enterprises and the very real contribution these facilities will make to the development of the nation is a consideration that must be entertained by both foreign and domestic investors in the true spirit of mutual social responsibility.

II—Domestic Accumulation

The concentration of economic power in domestic hands carries with it the possible exercise of undue influence in political affairs and must be watched closely. The problem is a complex one because while it is desirable to ensure that the wealth of the country is distributed as widely as possible, it is also necessary for the development of the country to ensure that the steps taken do not—

- (i) inhibit the rapid accumulation of domestic savings;
- (ii) prohibit methods of large-scale production where they are necessary for efficiency; or
- (iii) discourage the inflow of private capital.

The principal long-term techniques for controlling the rate of individual accumulation while at the same time stimulating the rate of national accumulation will be progressive income, inheritance and capital gains taxes and death duties. These will make it progressively more difficult for the wealthy to become more wealthy and to pass on their wealth to members of succeeding generations. At the same time the collection of taxes will tend to translate private savings into public savings conserving them for the development of the nation. It is notable that the large individual accumulations of wealth in Western countries were largely achieved before progressive taxes were introduced or because of loopholes, such as permitting capital gains to go untaxed. Such loopholes will be rapidly closed under African Socialism.

It is recognized, however, that the mutual interdependence of national economies in the world today limits the independent action of each. Extreme tax rates may simply force capital abroad where rates are lower

and at the same time restrict the inflow of foreign capital needed for development.

Complementary to this approach will be the effort to ensure that where large amounts of productive assets must be assembled to achieve economies of scale, the ownership of these assets will be widely distributed. This effort will not apply, of course, to foreign investors because the nature of ownership abroad is of no significance in Kenya so long as foreign investors abide by the guidelines laid down in the preceding section.

The methods used to achieve a diffusion of ownership of large-scale enterprises include State ownership, joint ventures by the State with private investors, co-operatives, companies and partnerships. State ownership vests ownership in the people generally providing for the utmost in diffusion of ownership and permitting operation on a large scale. Joint ventures with private capital give the State a large measure of control and at the same time conserve the limited capital available to the State. State or joint ownership and operation is desirable where general services of major importance must be provided at low or subsidized cost to citizens, firms, or farms.

Co-operatives have direct roots in African traditions but their extensive use in the monetary sector of the economy will involve greater discipline and training than has heretofore been necessary. Those who share in the tasks of the co-operative or who use its services share also in its benefits as the co-operative belongs to them.

The company form of business organization is a departure from the direct individual ownership typical in Marx's day. By permitting many to contribute capital, a company can operate large economic collections of assets while their ownership remains diffused. The partnership form of organization permits a similar arrangement but on a smaller scale.

SUMMARY

The main features of African Socialism include—

- (i) political democracy;
- (ii) mutual social responsibility;
- (iii) various forms of ownership;
- (iv) a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society and its members;
- (v) diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic power;
- (vi) progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income.

Characteristics (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are based directly on African traditions and are emphasized time and again in our Constitution and the KANU Manifesto. Taking *political democracy* first, our Constitution states that, subject to the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, "every person in Kenya is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual whatever his race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connexions, political opinions, colour, creed or sex." (Page 32). The KANU Manifesto also states: "The KANU

Government will steadfastly uphold the rule of law and guarantee the position of every citizen according to the Bill of Rights." (Page 18)

In the case of *mutual social responsibility* generally and in the use of property, the following quotes from the KANU Manifesto show the KANU Government's commitment to preserve this most important African tradition :—

"We aim to build a country where men and women are motivated by a sense of service and not driven by a greedy desire for personal gain." (Page 1). "The traditional respect and care for the aged among our people must continue . . ." (Page 3). "The first aim of (seven years free education) will be to produce good citizens inspired with a desire to serve their fellowmen" (Page 4). "We are confident that the dynamic spirit of hard work and self-reliance which will motivate the Government will inspire the people throughout the land to great and still greater efforts for the betterment of their own communities" (Page 13). Moreover, "every individual has a duty to play his part in building national unity. Your duties are not limited to the political sphere. You must endeavour to support social advance." (Page 19).

With regard to the characteristics of *various forms of ownership* our Constitution says "no property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired," except in strictly defined cases where such action would be necessary "to promote the public benefit"—and in the latter case there is a guarantee for "prompt payment of full compensation" (Page 35). The KANU Manifesto also says "citizens will have the right to follow the profession and trade of their choosing and to own property according to the law." (Page 18) "We shall welcome both governmental and private investment in Kenya . . . we shall (also) encourage investors to participate jointly in projects with our own government." (Page 21). In connexion with land, the Manifesto says "every farmer must be sure of his land rights (and to this end) consolidation and the registration of title will be encouraged wherever people desire" (Page 6).

Both the Constitution and the KANU Manifesto also emphasize the fourth characteristic of African Socialism—that there must be *controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interest of the society and its members*. The KANU Manifesto clearly states that "we believe in a wide measure of governmental control of the economy in the national interest (and) there are many ways of participation without acquiring public ownership" (page 22). The KANU Government, while encouraging private investment, will ensure that "the undertaking is being directed according to our national policy and needs . . . while we intend following a liberal policy with regard to foreign capital, investment must be made in accordance with Kenya's interests . . . (and) special consideration will be given to local investors but we shall have no time for those who make large profits and then fail to invest them in the country." (Page 21). In connexion with land, the Manifesto says, "the KANU Government will not tolerate holding of large underdeveloped tracts of land by anyone." (Page 8).

Characteristics (v) and (vi) are additions made necessary in a modern, developing, monetary economy in which accumulation is both a necessary and important feature.

Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

DESPITE her own pressing economic problems India has always been more than willing to cooperate with African countries in the economic field. On July 27, the Executive Committee of the India-Africa Development Association, which met under the chairmanship of Mr. Bharat Ram, declared that 14 industries would be set up in Africa. Besides, the Government of India had approved the collaboration plan of an Indian company, M/s. Duncan Brothers, Calcutta, to set up a plastic processing unit in Ethiopia. The contribution from India will be in the form of plant and buildings. A significant aspect of the contract is that the management of the company will be in Indian hands for 15 years.

Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, visited India from August 2 to 5. Delhi University conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Law. What added significance to his visit was the fact that he had come here after paying a visit to the People's Republic of China. It is in this context that the communique issued after his visit is to be examined. Apart from the identity of views on issues like colonialism, apartheid, economic cooperation between the two countries and Vietnam; there are two points in the joint communique which merit special mention. They are :

- (i) "The two sides expressed their conviction that general and complete disarmament under effective international control was vital for the survival of mankind and the peace and progress of the world. They welcomed in this context the partial test ban treaty as an important step towards prohibition of nuclear tests and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. They urged all states to abide by its spirit and provisions and called upon all states which have not yet signed the treaty to do so without further delay. Both sides condemned all nuclear tests in environments prohibited by the test ban treaty."
- (ii) The two Prime Ministers "emphasised the vital role of the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation." On both these points China holds different, rather opposite, views. She has refused to sign the Moscow test ban treaty and has been constantly flouting the underlying principles and purposes of the U. N. Charter. Thus it was an indirect indictment of the Chinese position on the general issue of war and peace. It is also evident that on the vital issue of world peace India holds identical views with leading African countries like Uganda.

Indo-Arab relations reached yet another mile-stone on the road to friendship when on July 12, 1965, India became the first country, so far the only country outside the Arab world, to extend diplomatic recognition to the Arab League. This was fully in keeping with the sympathy and support India has always extended to the Arab cause. The significance of this event was brought out by the Indian Ambassador to Cairo when he said :

“.....The opening of an independent Arab League office in Delhi constitutes yet another step in reinforcing the close and intimate relations between the Arab world and India, relations which have extended since ancient timesIt is the expectation of my Government that the establishment of an Arab League office in India will not only facilitate but give a richer and more purposeful content to the historical relations between India and the Arab world.”

Africa and Vietnam

The Vietnamese problem has a two-fold importance for Africa. First, Vietnam is a part of the Afro-Asian world and the Afro-Asian community would be failing in its duty if it cannot find a solution to the problem. Second, due to the involvement of three Big Powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, the Vietnamese crisis poses a threat to world peace and security. An attempt was made by some African states to help solve the crisis. Thus the Commonwealth Conference (held in July) devoted a major portion of its time and attention to finding a solution honourable to all parties involved in the crisis. The participants from Africa played a leading role in it. The Conference set up a “Vietnam Peace Mission” under the chairmanship of Mr. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Britain. The other members of the Mission were Dr. Nkrumah, President of Ghana, Sir A. T. Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Mr. Eric Williams, Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, and Mr. Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon. The Mission was to visit five capitals of the world—Peking, Moscow, Itanvi, Saigon, Washington—and the U. N. Its primary purpose was to “make contact with the Governments principally concerned with the problem of Vietnam in order to ascertain how far there might be common ground in regard to the circumstances in which a conference might be held leading to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Vietnam”. The Mission could not make much headway primarily because of the Chinese refusal to receive it on the ground that it was headed by Premier Wilson who had supported the American policy in Vietnam. However, Dr. Nkrumah extended powerful support to the Mission and even attempted to persuade China and North Vietnam to receive it in their respective capitals. Defending the chairmanship of Premier Wilson, Dr. Nkrumah said : “I was originally doubtful whether it would be advisable for Mr. Wilson to serve but once we have made a decision to this effect, I am certain it is essential that we stick to it. Indeed, I think there are great advantages in his heading our team. He has an influence with the U. S. Government which no other member possesses and since he will be representing a consensus of Commonwealth opinion and not merely British policy, this can provide a means by which the Commonwealth view can be presented in a manner that would otherwise be impossible.”

Dr. Nkrumah made two significant observations on the problem of Vietnam, that the United States must halt its aerial attacks on North

Vietnam and that the Vietcong must be recognized as a party to the dispute and invited to the negotiations.

Not all African States agreed and endorsed "the Vietnam Peace Mission". Dr. Nyerere of Tanzania was unequivocal in his opposition to the Mission. He observed: "We feel that this is only a propaganda move and is bound to fail. How can you expect the Chairman, Mr. Wilson, who is committed to U. S. policy, to be acceptable to the Chinese? Tanzania is opposed to this mission which, we know, is going to fail."

Undeterred, Dr. Nkrumah took a bold and imaginative step by sending Mr. K. Armah, Ghana High Commissioner in London, on a special mission to Hanoi. He visited North Vietnam from July 27 to 30 and held discussions with the leaders there. But his visit did not make any significant contribution to facilitating the task of the Peace Mission. After his return from Hanoi he said: "Osagyefo's (Dr. Nkrumah's) special mission visited Hanoi from July 26 to July 30, 1965, and had discussions with Dr. Ho and others. The talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and were most useful. The mission was most impressed with the calm disposition, friendliness and warm hospitality of the Vietnamese people." It is evident that President Ho was willing to receive Dr. Nkrumah. But he expressed his inability to ensure his personal safety due to the incessant bombings by American planes. Dr. Nkrumah, in a message to President Johnson, made a request for the cessation of aerial attacks on North Vietnam so that he could visit Hanoi. President Johnson, while rejecting Dr. Nkrumah's request, assured him that he need not have any fear from American planes. Thus Dr. Nkrumah dropped the idea of visiting Hanoi.

Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, during his visit to China held discussions on the problem of Vietnam. He denied that his discussions had anything to do with the "Vietnam Peace Mission". In the joint communique issued after his visit on July 15, the portions relating to Vietnam read as follows: "The Governments held that the Vietnam question should be solved by the Vietnamese people themselves, free from any foreign interference and aggression and that the 1954 Geneva Agreement must be fully implemented and must not be violated."

South Rhodesia

South Rhodesia is one of the most serious problems facing the world today. For here the ruling minority appears to be determined to repeat the history of South Africa. Equally determined to prevent such repetition are the African nations. Both sides are prepared for a final showdown. What adds to the complexities of the situation is the pusillanimous approach of the British Government, which alone, if it acts decisively, can avert the bloodbath which appears imminent in South Rhodesia. The gravity of the situation was fully recognized by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London. Once again sharp differences between the British Government and the African members of the Commonwealth came to the fore. The African states demanded that Britain should hold a constitutional conference to decide the modalities of independence on the basis of majority rule. The British Government was not prepared to go to this extent. It still believed in its persuasive

power to win over the Smith Government. The communique issued after the Prime Ministers' Conference reflected these differences. It said: "The Prime Ministers welcomed the statement of the British Government that the principle of 'one man, one vote' was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this would be applied in Rhodesia.

"The British Government said that they were actively engaged in discussions with the Government of Rhodesia and they undertook to take full account, in relation to these discussions, of all the views which had been expressed during the meeting. In this process of seeking to reach agreement on Rhodesia's advance to independence a constitutional conference would, at the appropriate time, be a natural step.

"If this discussion did not develop satisfactorily in this direction in a reasonably speedy time, the British Government, having regard to the principle enunciated by the Commonwealth Secretary of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, would be ready to consider promoting such a conference in order to ensure Rhodesia's progress to independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."

This was evidently a compromise formula. Mr. Murumbi, Foreign Minister of Kenya, said that if Rhodesia seized unilateral independence, "we have to rescue and sustain our brother, even if it means military intervention or other forms of assistance. However, Tanzania disassociated itself from the communique. It explained its stand as follows: "We wanted only six words inserted in the paragraph on Rhodesia to ensure the objective of majority rule. We wanted to add the words 'on the basis of majority rule'. Without these six words we believed that the way would be left open for Britain to grant independence on some other terms short of majority rule."

However the clarion call of the Commonwealth Conference fell on the deaf ears of the minority Government in Rhodesia. On July 7, 1965, Mr. Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, said: "We have got in writing from Britain that she agrees that she has no power to interfere in our internal affairs." That the British Government was not prepared to use force to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence became clear during this period. Mr. Hughes, British, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, and Mr. Bottomley, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who visited Africa during July-August 1965, left the world in no doubt that the British Government would not use force if Mr. Smith seized independence unilaterally. But they made it clear that such seizure of independence would be "illegal" and as such the British Government would "impose economic sanctions". This timid attitude of the British could satisfy neither the minority Government of Rhodesia nor the African states. Mr. Smith declared in Salisbury on September 1: "We know where we are going. We are going to independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution. We believe this is imminent in the near future and nothing will stop us." This drew sharp reactions from a number of African states. They made it clear that they would even extend military help to the people of Rhodesia when the Smith Government seized independence unilaterally. Tanzania went a step further and declared: "If the United Kingdom grants independence to the White minority in Rhodesia either directly or through a 'manipulated constitution' we will seek a mandate from the people to withdraw Tanzania from the Commonwealth."

President Nasser's Tour

President Nasser paid official visits to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in August-September. In the Soviet Union he held talks with Government leaders on the world situation and the developments in West Asia. Some of the important points mentioned in the joint communique issued at the end of his visit were : call for cessation of American raids on North Vietnam and full implementation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 ; the need for general and complete disarmament ; demand for abolition of military bases in foreign countries ; the need for the creation of non-nuclear zones, extension of the test-ban treaty to ban underground testing and China's admission to the U.N.

The Soviet Union also extended support to the struggle of the Arab people "to destroy completely the remnants of imperialism and backwardness, and to the constructive efforts of the Organization of African Unity".

On September 1, the President went to Yugoslavia. His visit has a special significance as the UAR and Yugoslavia are two of the leading non-aligned countries. On September 3, President Nasser and President Tito appealed to the Governments of India and Pakistan to cease hostilities forthwith. They extended full support to the appeal sent by U Thant, U.N. Secretary General, to India and Pakistan for cessation of hostilities. They also expressed their willingness to offer their good offices to help solve the dispute.

Inter-African relations

In Africa today there are two simultaneous developments in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is a powerful movement towards continental unity. On the other, there are occasional clashes among different states. While the OAU is the embodiment of the trend towards continental unity, the armed clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Morocco and Algeria, are pointers to the trend towards disunity. The basic cause of these divergent developments is of course to be found in the colonial past of Africa. The border disputes are the product of colonialism. The borders in Africa were not drawn on any rational or ethnical basis, but only to suit the convenience of the colonial powers. Even today, primarily through economic means, they are trying to disrupt and discredit the movement towards continental unity by creating rifts among African states. In the period under review these developments were very much in evidence.

Some members of the OAU threatened to boycott the Accra Summit conference on the ground that Ghana was actively supporting subversive elements. The fifth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU met in Lagos on June 10. In a resolution it appealed to all member states of the OAU "effectively to participate in the next meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in accordance with the resolutions of June 11, 1964, adopted in Cairo. However, the conference was postponed at the request of the host Government on the ground of delay in the "completion of buildings and other facilities."

Haile Selassie's Tour

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia visited Kenya, Malawi and Zambia from July 28 to August 1. The main points that emerged from his talks in these countries were : the African states must not be involved in any ideological disputes ; the Organization of African Unity should be strengthened ; the African states should not interfere in each other's internal affairs ; Britain should be asked to convene a constitutional conference on Rhodesia.

Another important inter-African visit was that of President Sekou Toure of Guinea to the UAR. In a joint communique President Sekou Toure and President Nasser expressed their opposition to all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racialism. They also called for China's admission to the U.N. and condemned the "imperialist racist policy of Rhodesia's minority Government. They pledged all support to the liberation movements in Africa.

WHO assistance

During the year ending June 30, WHO assisted 35 countries and territories of Africa south of the Sahara to fight major diseases, train doctors, nurses, health workers, plan safe water supplies and reinforce their health services, including those for mothers and children and for better nutrition. In all 140 different projects were assisted by an international staff of over 200 doctors and specialized workers. In addition, a total of 237 fellowships were awarded to enable African health personnel to obtain specialized training outside their own countries. In all WHO spent about \$7 million on activities in the region. These facts are contained in the annual report which the Regional Director, Dr. Alfred Quenum, presented to the 15th session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa held in Lusaka (Zambia) from September 6 to 16. During this period two newly independent States, Malawi and Zambia, became full members of WHO.

The appointment has been announced of Dr. John Karefa-Smart, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, as Assistant Director-General of the World Health Organization. Born in 1915 in Sierra Leone, he studied medicine at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and public health at Harvard University, U. S.

Apartheid Debate

Mr. Achkar Marof, Guinean chairman of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, announced in New York in the last week of July that African countries at the United Nations would ask formally for the reconvening of the Security Council to debate apartheid. He criticized France for facilitating the military build-up in South Africa. South Africa, he said, had sought to buy patrol aircraft but the deal had been held up because of U. S. opposition.

According to a Paris report almost the entire South African military budget for overseas purchases goes to France and a relationship satisfactory to both countries has consequently been established. Apart from earning foreign exchange, France has a number of objectives in

South Africa. First, she is reasonably happy that the South African Government is hitting out against the Americans. Secondly, it pays Paris to establish friendly relations with the Afrikaaners who are traditionally hostile to Britain and were extremely pleased three years ago when General de Gaulle slammed the door of the European Community on the U. K. Thirdly, France hopes — as does Dr. Verwoerd — that some day Paris might provide a bridge between South Africa and some at least of the former French African countries.

Foreign capital flowed into South Africa on a larger scale than ever before after the U. N. called for an economic blockade of that country in 1962, says a recent report of the U. N. Special Committee on Apartheid. According to the report, significant economic expansion in the territory began in 1962 after its withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Foreign investors have been mainly attracted by a “very high rate of profits” on their investments.

Tanzania on June 15 accused the United States and West Germany of helping South Africa in an alleged “militarist build-up in South-West Africa.” He was addressing the 24-nation UN Special Committee on Colonialism. The Tanzanian delegate said: “My delegation has been very much disappointed by the role of West Germany and the U.S., especially with regard to the development of a nuclear plant in South-West Africa.” He said South Africa was using poison gas as a means of exterminating people in the same way that Nazi Germany used it during the Second World War.

The U.S. delegate, Mrs. Marietta Tree, immediately denied that the U.S. was involved in the development of a nuclear reactor based in South-West Africa or in any military build-up.

Mauritania Quits OCAM

Mauritania's decision to leave the Common Afro-Malagasy Organization (OCAM) in June came as little surprise to observers of the African scene. It had become obvious in April and May that President Ould Daddah had several differences with other OCAM heads of State, notably with those of the Ivory Coast and the other Entente countries. The differences came to a head over the holding of a special heads of State conference in May to discuss the question of OCAM members attending the OAU Conference in Accra in September and of admitting Congo (Leopoldville) to OCAM. President Ould Daddah wanted the meeting to be held towards the end of June while the Entente countries declared it would be held at the end of May. When it was held in May in Abidjan, Mauritania as well as Cameroon and Congo (Brazzaville) were not represented. Mauritania will however stay within Air Afrique, the West African Customs Union, and in the committee for the development of the Senegal river, none of which comes directly under OCAM.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

Lecture by Dr. Milton Obote

The Council arranged a talk by Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, at the Vithalbhai Patel House in New Delhi on August 4. The jam-packed hall was a measure of the popularity the visiting Premier had won during his brief stay in the country. Among the audience were cabinet ministers, diplomats, members of Parliament, students of African affairs and people from almost all walks of life. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Patron-in-Chief of the Council and Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting, presided. Mr. Asoka Mehta, Vice-President of the Council and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, welcomed Dr. Obote and his cabinet colleagues to the meeting.

In his 45-minute speech, Dr. Obote reviewed the situation in Africa and the problems facing emerging countries. He began by referring to the speculation abroad about the future of parliamentary democracy in Africa and condemnation of some African States which had chosen to become one-party States. He said throughout the period of European rule in Africa there was no talk of parliamentary democracy where Africa was concerned. When the national movement started and gained strength and urged for independence, then the idea of parliamentary democracy was introduced by the white man who assumed that the African had no form of Government of his own. When the white man went to Africa the African had a form of Government of his own. This form of Government basically consisted of elders and other leading personalities sitting in a council of State arguing issues together and deciding on what steps to take. There was no idea of opposition in the Western sense.

When the idea of parliamentary democracy was introduced on the eve of independence, he continued, Africans were supposed to know everything about it. They were given one-man-one-vote which was not in conflict with the old system in Africa. But when they accepted the idea of parliamentary democracy with one-man-one-vote they found that something else came out of it. The world had been attempting to plant on practically every State in Africa immediately before independence a government before granting it independence. Many African States had to go through a series of elections before independence was granted. The purpose of the elections was that the white man should leave in Africa a government that he could trust, a government that he knew would look to him. But he did not succeed in his aim. He looked at West Africa, he did not succeed ; he looked at East Africa, he did not succeed. His failure was a gain for Africa.

Another issue, Dr. Obote said, was how far those who had sold the idea of parliamentary democracy to Africa would like to go. In Southern Rhodesia there were white men, principally of British stock, who did not believe in one-man-one-vote. There were white men in South Africa, Angola, Portugal and Mozambique, who did not believe in it.

He said there was one important factor which should be taken into account when talking about parliamentary democracy with the idea of having opposition parties. This was that in India, in spite of its diversities, there was some basic unity ; it was one people, one country. In Europe it was the same. But in Africa it was not the same. "We are engaged in nation-building. Before we attain that nationhood it is terribly difficult to try to undermine the efforts which are now being put in building this structure". As soon as Africans established nationhood there would be a great opportunity to play about with political independence. The political independence Africa now enjoyed was essential to bring about nations in Africa and to unite these nations to bring about co-operation and understanding throughout Africa. "It must be used to develop our economy ; it must be used to enable us to regain our image ; it must be used to enable us to build our culture ; it must be used to enable us to frame a structure suitable to our nation now and in future". One of the objectives they must have in Africa was to move away from small entities to bigger units. Ultimately it would be possible to have even an African form of unity that would bring about co-operation throughout the independent parts of Africa. (*applause*).

Dr. Obote said the Congo situation was serious. There might be no outer trouble today but the sort of solution some nations thought they had found would not last. Mr. Tshombe had to leave Congo and live in Europe before he returned last year to become Prime Minister. There must have been some power behind him. The problem in Congo was a political one and could only be solved politically. They had tried to hold elections there but failed. They tried to recruit white men from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to suppress what they called a rebellion. The recruitment of mercenaries was a threat to the political stability of African nations. Moreover, because of the extension of the influence of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia up to the Congo river the Central African nations felt threatened. He attributed this to a political understanding between the Congolese and South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

He commended the formation of Tanzania. Tanganyika and Zanzibar had achieved something that many nations in the world had not achieved. He hoped that this would be the beginning of a new force of accession in Africa.

Dr. Obote did not rule out the possibility of an armed conflict to rid Africa of the remnants of colonialism. "We will try to do everything possible to drive away the Portuguese from Africa. (*applause*). We will try to do everything possible to see that there is freedom in Southern Rhodesia. (*applause*). We will try to do everything possible to ensure that there is no inequality and racial injustice in South Africa".

He concluded by saying that African independence was not for sale". "We have achieved it through effort. We will not give it to the West ; we will not give it to the East" (*applause*).

Welcoming Dr. Obote, Mr. Asoka Mehta said Uganda was inevitably facing all those difficult and troubled economic and social problems which developing countries had to contend with. India and Africa had found that they had a community of outlook and understanding so far as world problems were concerned. In tackling the problems of development each could learn from the other. Economic and technical co-operation between the two countries was growing fast. In trade, in development of various projects a certain amount of co-operation between the two countries was being developed. He expressed the hope that with this association the neighbourly ties between them would be strengthened.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi said gaining freedom was the easiest first step in the long struggle for getting better conditions of life for the people of Uganda as it was for India. Although colonialism, except in a few places, did not take the form of a tax or arms, it was taking the form of flattery or threats. This was a threat and a danger which all newly-freed countries were facing. The danger would be increasing for quite some time until we could really prove that we were strong enough to withstand it. She said it was only through co-operation that any kind of understanding could be reached. "We find that the lessons of history are being ignored. For the sake of social advance, future gains are being ignored and I think they are being ignored at the peril of the advanced nations. Because they will face the situation when it will be much more difficult for them to deal with it."

Speaking at a reception held in his honour at Bombay on August 6, Dr. Obote referred to the problem of immigrant races in Africa. The white minority group in fragmentation, he said, not only wished to enjoy their privileged position without change, but also feared that if any change were to come, the Africans would probably rule them worse than they were ruling the Africans. This fear was unfounded. The African was the most democratic man God ever made. There were contradictions prevailing in Africa today and these were fundamental ones. That was why he recommended the study of African problems most seriously. People in India should try to understand the Africans of today.

There was no question of improving the relations between India and Uganda because they had never been bad, he said. He hoped his visit would strengthen the bonds between them.

International Co-operation Year

The Council was among the voluntary organizations represented on the National Committee set up by the Government to chalk out a programme to celebrate the International Co-operation Year. On this occasion the Council will present books to the libraries of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization of African Unity, the Gandhi Centre at the Lagos University and the Lumumba Ideological University in Kenya.

Executive Committee Meeting

The Executive Committee of the Council at its meeting on September 18 reviewed the activities of the Council since its last meeting. It decided to defer some of its programmes in view of the emergency and to concentrate on bringing out publications. The plans submitted by the

Building Sub-Committee were approved and it was decided to begin work on the first phase of the programme. The half-yearly statement of accounts was examined. The Council considered the possibility of enlarging and improving its regional office in Bombay.

Publications Received

The Library of the Council received from **Scolma** a list of periodicals published in Africa covering the following countries : Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Reunion, Senegal, Somaliland (French), Togo, Upper Volta.

Of these, the publications in English will be circulated to libraries in Indian universities and other institutions studying African affairs.

Cloth for ZAPU

The Council sent two bales of cloth to the ZAPU office in Lusaka for distribution among families of political sufferers.

Publication on Kashmir

The Council brought out an illustrated 44-page booklet, "Pakistan's New Aggression in Kashmir : the Facts", to explain to readers at home and abroad India's stand on Kashmir and the genesis of the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict. The basic policies on which the Kashmir stand is based are outlined in excerpts from speeches and statements of Indian leaders. There are also extracts from reports of impartial foreign observers who have visited Kashmir and seen the progress it has achieved since its accession to India. The pictures give a graphic account of the fighting with Pakistan. Printed on art paper, with the cover in two colours, the publication is priced Rs. 3.25.

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Compiled by MOHD. AHMED

This feature is presented every quarter with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those who are specially interested in the study of African affairs.

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IN FRIENDSHIP Though continents apart, the peoples of Africa and India are steadily moving closer to each other sharing the same belief—a belief in freedom and a belief in the dignity of man. It is this, more than anything else, that is the basis of our friendship which is constantly being strengthened by a two-way commerce of ideas and people—a healthy commerce of mutual benefit to both.

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INDIAN AIRLINES



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
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


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
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
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
CMI-2975 A

People of account at The Bank of Baroda




Smart Businessman:

Mr. V. N. Das, director of a leading firm, has a Current Account at the Bank of Baroda. He issues any number of cheques he wants while the Bank sees to the payment of his monthly bills, insurance premia, rent etc. and thus saves a good deal of his time.



Lively teenager:

This lively teenager is a fine example to the others—she's got a Minor's Account with the Bank of Baroda. She really likes the Bank! It's teaching her how to handle money—how to save. And she feels so important.



Promising young man:


Young man of today—and of tomorrow, Sunil Mehta. Ambitious, conscious of prestige—he made sure he chose the right bank. That's why his first pay-cheque went straight to the Bank of Baroda.



Active house-wife:

Meet Mrs. Shanker—enterprising social worker with a practical mind. Keeps her valuables and jewellery in a Bank of Baroda Safe Deposit Locker. Tells other house-wives: "This way I needn't worry about them, for I know they are in safe hands."

All kinds of people—today's people—have come to rely on the many facilities offered by the Bank of Baroda. Maybe it is because of the courteous, helpful service they always get. Or the well-reasoned advice—advice that only a Bank with so much experience could give... Or the convenience of over 225 branches in India and 15 abroad. Or the interest on Savings Account which is as high as 4%! Perhaps it's all these things. Why not visit us and see for yourself!



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46 to 90 days	3 %

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For 6 months and over but less than 12 months	5½ %
For 12 months and over but less than 24 months	6 %
For 24 months and over but less than 36 months	6¼ %
For 36 months and over but less than 60 months	6½ %
For 60 months	7 %

STATE BANK for SERVICE

7 % ON FIXED DEPOSITS
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


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
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
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
TEXTILE MACHINERY DIVISION




K-2
Ring Spinning Frame




Doubling Frame



Texmaco Howa
Simplex Frame



Carding Engine



Texmaco-Howa
Drawing Frame


HEAVY ENGINEERING DIVISION




Box Wagon




C. R. Wagon




Tank Wagon



Lancashire Boiler




WaterTube Boiler




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



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
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
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
AT VUYYURU, Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh:
SUGAR, CONFECTIONERY and
DENATURED SPIRIT.

AT MACHERLA, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh:
PORTLAND CEMENT.



AFRICA QUARTERLY

A Journal Of African Affairs



Vol. V

October—December 1965

No. 3

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Note to Contributors

The Indian Council for Africa welcomes articles and contributions from all interested in African affairs, especially from those making particular studies of African problems and people. Remuneration may be paid for articles and contributions accepted for publication in the journal.

The views expressed in the articles under the authors' names are not necessarily those held by the Council.

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
Dr Joao Cabral is a member of the National Congress, Goa. He represented the Goa League, London, at the seminar on problems of Portuguese Colonies, organised by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi in 1961.

Dr K. P. Misra is Reader in International Affairs at the Rajasthan University, Jaipur.

Dr Satish Kumar is Lecturer in South Asian Studies at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

Dr G. S. Puri is Professor of Botany at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi.

Dr G. O. Olusanya is Lecturer in Commonwealth History at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Northern Nigeria.



Portuguese Colonial Policy-I (Angola and Mozambique)

by JOAO CABRAL

IT is almost an incredible fact that a small and backward country like Portugal should be able to hold on to an empire twenty-three times larger than herself and so widely scattered : from Macao in China, Timor in Indonesia to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea in Africa; and Sao Tome and Cape Verde Islands. The "winds of change" have of course blown off some small parts of this vast empire: Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 1954, the enclave fort of Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda (in Dahomey) and Goa, Daman and Diu in 1961. But the empire of over two million sq. miles with a population of over 12 million people still remains almost intact.

How does Portugal, or rather Dr. Salazar, manage it? The answer lies in Portuguese colonial policy. This was explained by Admiral Lopes Alves, former Minister of Colonies, in the following words: "To create the most fraternal, solid and proud union of peoples, with a fusion of races, creeds, languages and customs". No doubt Portugal has laboured to propagate this policy and to develop and sell the "spirit of Lusitanian (Portuguese) identity" at home and overseas.

And, at first sight, it would seem, by contrast with other colonial policies, that the idea of Africans, after meeting with some qualifications, acquiring the full rights of Portuguese citizenship has enticed them to remain always Portuguese. But "assimilation", "partnership" and other such elegant terms are all features of colonialist mythology elaborated to suit the political necessities of colonial powers. And the secret of Portugal's continued "presence" in Africa lies in her peculiar system of education, crude economic exploitation of African labour, highly centralised administration, refined police system, and ruthless suppression of nationalist movements.

There are some differences in the policies pursued by Portugal in her various colonies. But the sharp features of this policy may be seen in Angola and Mozambique. And since these two colonies have 97 per cent of the total area and 83 per cent of the total population of the entire Portuguese empire (including the colonies now free), the present study will be concentrated on Portuguese colonial policies in Angola and Mozambique.

EDUCATION

Catholic Missions

Being aware that the education of African masses is an implicit threat to the Portuguese interests in Africa, Portugal has been reluctant to adopt a mass education programme for Africans. But education well oriented can be very useful in the exploitation of the colonies. Hence, two objectives have been set out in the Overseas Organic Law for the education of Africans : their "perfect nationalization" (*i.e.* making them Portuguese in their manners, customs, habits, and way of thinking) and their "moral uplift".

Portuguese Catholic missionaries have to implement this educational policy under the Estatuto Missionario of 1941. Their "important national role" is duly acknowledged and stressed on almost every occasion. "Without their devotion we would have gravely jeopardized our national structure", said Dr. Adriano Moreira, former Minister of Colonies. "They will have to see that "the native education conforms to the doctrinal orientation established by the (Portuguese) Political Constitution". And for the "perfect nationalization" of the young natives they are introduced to the legendary glories of the Portuguese maritime discoveries, the miracles of Our Lady of Fatima, so that "their narration may produce in minds, necessarily uncultured, the light and patriotic fervour for Portugal". Moral uplift of the natives is defined by the Estatuto as "the abandonment of indolence and the preparation of future rural and industrial workers". In sum, Africans are educated to be good, loyal, peaceful and hard labourers.

With these two aims in mind, a programme of education, different from that adopted for the European children, has been devised exclusively for the indigenas. It is divided into three stages : *rudimentary education* which since 1956 is called "*ensino de adaptacao*", *elementary technical education*, and *normal education*. In the rudimentary schools children are supposed to learn the elements of Portuguese language and history and a few notions of agriculture and hygiene, a course lasting from three to five years. In these schools there is no place for African traditions and institutions, nor for the geography or history of the respective colonies. The children are taught the names of rivers, mountains and places of Portugal.

Native languages are strictly forbidden, except for the purpose of religious instruction. Most of the rudimentary schools are attached to the mission farms and the students spend a major portion of the day working in the fields. Many of these farms produce cash crops which are sold for the benefit of the church and the clergy. Since the age of these children is between 8 and 14, they are capable of picking coffee

above figures that in Mozambique the number of school children in the Catholic primary schools is about one per cent of their number in the rudimentary schools, while in the Protestant mission schools this percentage exceeds ten per cent. Another consequence of this Portuguese educational policy is that the nationalist movements of Angola and Mozambique are largely led by Africans educated in the few Protestant mission schools existing there. No wonder that the Portuguese Government does not allow Protestant missionaries to establish themselves in the Portuguese colonies, or to extend the activities of those established over 40 years ago and that since the Angolan rebellion they have come under the fire of Salazar's repressive machinery—eight Protestant missionaries were killed, over 50 arrested and some deported during the first eight months of the rebellion (February to September 1961).

It is not only Protestant missions which are debarred from the Portuguese colonies: even foreign Catholic missions do not fit in with this policy of nationalization of Africans. British Catholic missionaries in Mozambique will often tell their stories of harassment. It should not be imagined that foreign missionaries have freedom of education. They have to teach Portuguese language, history and other subjects with the text-books indicated by the authorities and under their close supervision.

ILLITERACY⁴

		<i>Whites</i>			<i>Non-Whites</i>		
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Illiteracy rate</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Illiterate</i>	<i>Illiteracy rate</i>
Angola	..	78,826	18,153	23.0%	4,066,440	4,001,681	98.4%
Mozambique	..	48,213	7,436	15.4%	5,690,698	5,607,617	98.5%

Under this policy of "perfect nationalization", big companies have to undertake for their African labourers cultural programmes of "love and dedication to the motherland and of patriotic exultation". The Angola Diamond Company has regular film shows for its 23,000 African workers. Portuguese documentary films of official ceremonies, military and other kinds of impressive parades, stately display of pageantry, sumptuous religious ceremonies are specially filmed by the Agencia Geral do Ultramar for African audiences. When the companies have no facilities for showing such films, the moving brigade of the Agencia do come to their assistance.

While in Portuguese colonies the Church is actively cooperating with the Portuguese Government, in other parts of Africa it is generally trying to harmonize its interests with the nationalist forces. In Congo,

(4) Anuario Estatístico de Ultramar, 1958.

a number of Jesuits and liberal Catholics had been pressing for change some years before independence. They had published nationalist tracts. And the curious fact is that in Portugal prominent Catholics are engaged in an anti-fascist struggle—the Bishop of Oporto is living in exile. But in the colonies they are instruments of Salazar's colonial policy.

Assimilados and Indigenas

Africans sufficiently "nationalized" are accepted as *assimilados*, and the rest remain *indigenas*. In fact, Article 2 of the *Estatuto dos Indigenas de Angola e Mozambique of 1954* states that "all persons of negro race are *indigenas*", that is, natives, without civic rights. And Article 56 enumerates the following conditions for them to become *assimilados*:

- (a) "to be over 18 years of age;
- (b) to speak Portuguese correctly;
- (c) to exercise a profession, craft or office that provides sufficient income for the support of themselves and their families or have sufficient property for this purpose;
- (d) to be of good conduct and to have adopted (Portuguese) customs;
- (e) to have not refused to do their military service and to have not been deserters".

These are the conditions for Africans to be considered sufficiently "nationalised" and become *assimilados*. But if such conditions for citizenship were demanded from the Portuguese people over fifty per cent of them could not be citizens. But it would be absurd for the Portuguese Government to consider its own people as *indigenas* and to demand from them "moral obligation to work." The policy of assimilation has several political objectives. It rewards Africans who attempt to identify themselves with the Portuguese, and provides a safety valve for their political resentments. It divides Africans, creating the class of *assimilados*, nearer to the Portuguese—a class that can be used to dominate the rest of Africans. It gives to the Portuguese a basis for justifying their "presence" in Africa. It bolsters the argument that the African is accepted without any racial prejudices.

Racialism

But the fact is that even the *assimilado* is not fully accepted in Portuguese social life. It is true "Europeans only" signs cannot be seen in Portuguese Africa, but there are separate drinking houses or different doors of the same house, one for the black and another for

the white. In the church, an early morning mass is for Africans. No "locations" have been established for the natives as in South Africa, but perfect residential segregation follows automatically from the zoning laws and high rents.

But the problem of racialism has become acute with the extraordinary increase of the white population during the last 15 years and now with the hysterical war propaganda based on racial hatred. Poverty and overpopulation in Portugal have driven more and more peasants and labourers to try their luck in Africa, with the financial incentive liberally given by the Government. The Portuguese peasant, being often as illiterate and backward as the African but conscious that he has come to exploit the estates inherited from his forefathers, asserts his racial superiority to demand from the Africans his due.

But assimilation is a sweet way of disguising racial segregation. After 450 years of Portuguese occupation of Angola and Mozambique, less than one per cent of their African population has been given the status of *assimilados*, the rest remain *indigenas*, that is, Africans living at the mercy of Portuguese authorities under their paternal tutelage.⁵ In fact, the percentage of *assimilados* in Angola is 0.4 and in Mozambique 0.7.

Need for *indigenas*

Portugal, even if she wanted to, cannot afford to carry out any large-scale programme of assimilation. It would mean the end of the steady flow of forced labour, so indispensable to work the plantations, fisheries and mines. And Portugal is a poor country, with the lowest per capita income in Western Europe—about Rs. 1000 a year—and with considerable portion of her people living at a subsistence level.

The Portuguese admit their desperate need for African labour. A former Minister of Colonies, Dr. Eduardo Marques, stated categorically in 1940:

"In our colonies (they had not yet been named, 'overseas provinces') the worker is and will always be the *indigena*. The European may control him, but he shall always have to turn to him for labour, specially because he does not have machines or capital to buy them"⁶.

Indeed, it has been very hard for Portugal to reconcile herself with the trends of African labour. In 1876 Portugal was compelled to abolish slavery. But in 1905 William Cadbury, Joseph Burt and

(5) Vide table facing this page.

(6) *Colonizacao Agricola em Africa e Auxilio da Mao de Obra Indigena*, by Eduardo Marques—vide *Antologia Colonial Portuguesa*, Vol I, 1946.

Henry Nevinston visited Portuguese African colonies and disclosed that "a system of forced labour which amounted to slavery" still existed there. In 1924, Professor Edward Ross and Dr. Melville Cramer went to Angola on sociological investigations and reported that "Government serfdom is more heartless than the old domestic slavery, which was cruel only when the master was of a cruel character."⁷ These and other reports led the Portuguese to publish the Native Labour Code of 1928. It abandoned the principle of the "moral and legal obligation to work" of previous native labour laws and substituted it by the "moral obligation to procure the means of subsistence by labour and thereby to promote the general interests of mankind". This was, in fact, a distinction without a difference and at least has been so interpreted by the Portuguese authorities in Africa.

Portugal had managed to ignore sporadic humanitarian protests. But now the protests are constant. At the United Nations, Portugal has been increasingly harassed by African and Asian delegates. In 1955 she was asked by the Secretary General of the United Nations to comment on charges of "forced labour in Portuguese colonies". She emphatically denied the charges. But added: "The Portuguese Government is unable to recognise the right of any able-bodied man, African or other, to live in idleness when his labour is essential to the country's progress."⁸ This kind of evasive answer has not helped her. The United States and England no longer give her the same enthusiastic support. Portugal's vulnerability to this attack has grown each year.

Abrogation of the Estatuto

Partly to silence this criticism and to remove the obvious target of attack, that her own laws, namely the Estatuto dos Indigenas, made a distinction between citizens and *indigenas*, Portugal abrogated the Estatuto in August 1961. But the abrogation has brought no improvement in the status of Africans. They are now officially designated as *autoctones*, instead of *indigenas*, and are subject to the same old massive legislation which implemented the system of *indigenato*.

No doubt the abolition of the Estatuto is a step in the right direction. And it is quite likely that Portugal may gradually grant citizenship rights to Africans. But it would be naive to think that the system of *indigenato*, which has taken deep roots in the traditional relationship

(7) Report on Employment of Native Labour in Portuguese Africa, by Edward A. Ross, New York, 1925.

(8) Reply of the Portuguese Government, dated December 15, 1955, vide Report Forced Labour, by the Secretary General of U.N. and the Director General of the ILO, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/2815, 15-12-55.

Territories	Area Sq. Km.	POPULATION						Revenue	Expenditure
		Europeans	Indians	Mixed	Africans	Timorenses	Chinese & others	in 1,000 escudos	in 1,000 escudos
		<i>Ass.</i>		<i>Ind.</i>	<i>Ass.</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	<i>Ass.</i>		
		<i>Ind.</i>							
Portugal ..	91,824	8441 . 321*	8,744,411	8,687,229
Cape Verde Islands ..	4,033	2,909	16	103,255	75	90,806	83,281
Guinea ..	36,125	2,263	11	4,568	..	502,457	1	144,386	150,857
S. Tome and Principe Islands ..	964	1,152	9	4,279	21	16,747	1	75,034	75,604
Angola ..	1,246,700	78,826	..	26,335	3,313	4,006,598	105	2,567,846	2,227,787
Mozambique ..	783,030	48,213	12,630	25,149	4,349	5,646,957	1,613*	3,466,478	3,798,882
Macao ..	16	2,719	122	1,785	10	..	183,134	129,604	144,962
Timor ..	14,925	568	48	2,022	54	434,907	3,238	68,504	69,137
TOTAL of colonies ..	2,085,793								
Colonies now free Goa, Daman & Diu	4,194	892	636,152	200	258		89	300,653	278,872

Fort of S. Joao Batista de Ajuda is so insignificant a colony that it is listed in the Anuario in a foot-note, as being part of the administration of S. Tome Island. It has only the area of the fort, hardly one sq. Km. and its population is one "Resident" and his retinue and their families.

Ass = Assimilados
Ind = Indígenas (natives)

(1) Figures of population, revenue and expenditure taken from *Anuario Estatístico*—Portugal, 1958, for Portugal and *Anuario Estatístico do Ultramar*, 1958, for the colonies.

(2) It includes all Portuguese nationals—from colonies and Portugal. The *Anuario* does not indicate racial composition of the population, but gives the number of foreigners in Portugal in 1958 as 20,236.

(3) All Chinese

FORCED LABOUR

Native Labour Code

By means of the passbook and the continuous duplicate record which is filed at the administrative centres, the administration keeps constant vigilance and supervision over the natives as well as regulates the flow of labour according to its economic needs. In fact, the issue and requirements of a *cartao* as well as penalties for an African not holding it are minutely indicated in the Native Labour Code. The code regulates "the recruitment and labour contracts of natives of the Portuguese colonies" in Africa (Art. 1). The natives, according to Article 2, are "persons of negro race who do not distinguish themselves by their education from the common man of that race".

The preamble of the code gives a very curious justification for forced labour. It says: "It is indispensable to take them (Africans) away from idleness, to prevent them exploiting their women and children". Of course, Portugal denies that there is forced labour. And the code itself was enacted in 1926 to silence strong international criticism of the labour system in Portuguese colonies. And thus its norms begin by emphatic prohibitions of forced labour, but end with provisos.

In fact, Article 5 of the code says:

"The Government of the Republic shall neither impose upon the natives of its colonies nor allow others to exact from them any kind of compulsory or forced labour for private purposes, without prejudice to the discharge by the natives of the normal-obligation incumbent upon them to procure the means of subsistence by labour, thereby to promote the general interests of mankind".

Article 4 re-states the general principle, ensuring the natives "full liberty to choose the work which suits them best, provided that the Government shall reserve to itself the right to encourage them to work and to exercise benevolent supervision and tutelage over their work".

The authorities can "encourage" Africans to take work by "mere advice and other benevolent persuasive methods" (Art. 329). They are "bound to facilitate the operations of all persons wishing to recruit workers" (Art. 36). They may "advise tribal chiefs and natives, either in the presence of the recruiting agents or otherwise, to obtain employment" and punish the people who spread "rumours and propaganda which in any way instil in the minds of the natives false statements tending to prejudice the honest work of the recruiting agents and employers". And they must give to them in any emergency all moral

and material assistance" (Art. 37). It is absolutely prohibited for the authorities or their subordinates to travel with the recruiting agents, but that does not apply to "cases in which the authorities or their subordinates travel by chance in the company of recruiting agents" (Art. 38). For public works "coercive measures" may be used to recruit natives (Art. 299).

The *ad hoc* Committee on Forced Labour set up by the United Nations in 1951 examined these Portuguese laws and concluded:

- (a) "that forced or compulsory labour is prohibited in principle by Portuguese legislation, but there are certain restrictions and exceptions in this legislation which permit the exaction of forced or compulsory labour.
- (b) "that the provisions protecting indigenous workers against unfair methods of recruitment do not, however, exclude a certain amount of compulsion, and it is possible that in practice certain pressure is brought to bear upon workers by responsible officials to induce them to conclude contracts of employment offered by recruiting agents".¹⁰

Government circulars are quite specific. In 1942 the Governor-General of Mozambique issued Circular 818/D-7, which said:

"The supply of labour in Africa cannot continue to depend upon the whim of the Negro, who is by temperament and natural circumstances inclined to expend only that minimum of effort which corresponds to his minimum necessities".

Method of Recruitment

The Governor-General's other circular, 566/D-7 (May 5, 1947), gives an indication of how the recruitment is carried out in practice.

"The recruiters", it says, "because of a deficient understanding of their duties have limited themselves to appearing at the administrative centres of the district where they have contracted workers, idle or not, who have been ordered to appear there by the administrative authorities".

These confidential circulars explain the system of forced labour that prevails in the Portuguese African colonies. Recruiting agents or employers apply for labourers to the Government. The district officer, *chefe do posto*, orders the tribal chiefs to gather the required number of labourers. A contract form is filled for them. They put their thumb impression on it, and are taken miles away from their homes to return, officially, after six months but normally after eighteen

(10) Report of the *ad hoc* Committee on Forced Labour, United Nations, E/2431, 1955

months or more or never. Some big companies are granted "concessions"—zones with exclusive rights for recruiting labour *at their own* discretion.

But the recruiting agent or company, to be sure of getting all the recruits it needs, usually has to pay off the *chefe do posto*. The normal "pay off" for each labourer is *his year's wages*. In 1958 the Angola Diamond Company paid to its 8,086 *contratados* from its concession zone of Songo Rs. 16 lakhs as wages and Rs. 12 lakhs for their recruitment, as given in its annual report for that year. The sum of Rs. 12 lakhs corresponds to more than a year's wages of the recruited labour since they work for 18 months or more.

Recruitment Policy

According to the Native Labour Code, all males between the ages of fourteen and sixty who are not sick or disabled may be recruited for forced labour for "public purposes" (Art. 301). But Circular 566/D-7 (May 5, 1947) of the Governor-General of Mozambique narrows these limits: only males between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five can be recruited.

Work on roads, railways, ports, sanitation brigades and docks is for "public purposes". But it is almost irrelevant whether the work is for "public" or private purposes: natives who offer any resistance to work for private purposes can always be recruited for public purposes. "Natives who fail to look for employment", said the British Consul in Mozambique in his report of 1952, "can be made to labour on public works under strict control and conditions established by statute and regulations, and this is the main sanction by which the authorities exercise their paternal discipline".¹¹

Women may also be compelled to work provided the work is inside "the area where they reside", says Article 301 of the Native Labour Code. They may be seen working on roads. Children too are recruited. After visiting Angola in 1955, Basil Davidson wrote:

"Since many men are absent on forced labour elsewhere the local chief or headman in whose hands responsibility for the road is left will frequently call up women and quite small girls, scraping at roads with primitive hoes and carrying cupfuls of earth in little bark containers on their heads, while their headman or his 'responsible' sits nearby, moodily hugging his knees. Quite small boys are rarely seen, because they are generally reckoned as 'contractable' labour outside their tribal areas."¹²

(11) Overseas Economic Surveys, Portuguese East Africa, H.M.S.O., 1952, p. 43.

(12) The African Awakening, by Basil Davidson, London, 1956, p. 209

The sight of women and small boys working on roads moved even the phlegmatic correspondent of The Times in 1960. He wrote:

"When male labourers are scarce, women and children are sometimes compelled to take their place, although they are officially exempt from forced labour. Your correspondent, travelling about the country, twice saw gangs of small children and once a gang of young women engaged on heavy road work."¹³

As Captain Galvao put it in his report, "Only the dead are really exempt from compulsory labour".¹⁴

Profits of Forced Labour

What this exploitation of the African labour means to the prosperity of the Portuguese people may be estimated from the annual reports of companies operating in the colonies. The reports of the Angola Diamond Company—DIAMANG—are somewhat explicit on certain points. In 1958 it paid to its chairman of the board of directors, living comfortably in Portugal, Rs. 3.5 lakhs in salary and bonus, besides allowing him luxurious tours in Angola and abroad, while its 23,549 contract labourers received in that year Rs. 48 lakhs, i.e., Rs. 200 each labourer. And they were not all unskilled labourers: 878 were, what the report calls, *especializados*, skilled labourers, such as electricians, mechanics, drivers.

But Rs. 200 a year for each labourer, or Rs. 17 a month, is a great improvement: in 1953 it was paying only Rs. 11 a month and yet boasting of its generosity. "We have been paying," says the report of 1953, "a monthly salary of 67 angolares (Rs. 11) during the entire period of 18 months contract despite the fact that the laws allow us to reduce it after the first 12 months".¹⁵

But the exploitation of the labourers does not end there. In its concession zone of Lunda the Company has exclusive rights of purchasing from the natives their cash crops. Being eager to increase these crops, it pays for the fares of native women and children who accompany the contract labourer. But the price paid for their crops reveals another form of exploitation of their labour. In fact, the Inspector of Internal Trade, giving a report of his tour in Lunda on April 15, 1948, wrote:

"While outside the zone of concession (of the Diamang) the purchase price of manioc is one angolar (17 n.p.) and of paddy 1.30 angolares (22 n.p.), the Diamang pays in Lunda only half an angolar for manioc and one angolar for paddy".¹⁶

(13) The Times, June 21, 1960

(14) The Observer, January 29, 1961.

(15) *Diario do Governo*, III Series, No. 163, of 13-7-1954

(16) *Coisas do Tempo Presente*, by Cunha Leal, Lisbon, 1959, p. 41

The Inspector's report also gives another side of Diamang's business: "In the shop of Diamang in Sabino, native cloth is sold with a profit margin of about 100 %, while it professes that it carries that trade only for the benefit of the natives". The extent of this highly profitable trade may be imagined from the 1957 report. The Diamang bought food and cloth worth Rs. 73 lakhs for sale "mostly to its native workers", as stated in the report. But its workers received in that year as their wages and for the sale of their crops only Rs. 64 lakhs, which means that their entire income was exchanged for food and clothes. No wonder that the natives come back after the expiry of their contract of 18 months or more only with a "few *panos* (pieces of cloth) and shirts".

It is not only African toil that is exploited for the benefit of Portugal: African trade too. Salazar in his speech of June 8, 1936, explained it:

"The economic structure of colonies must be complementary to that of the metropolis, so that together they should form a national polity. And a logical solution to it is this: the colonies should produce and sell to the metropolis the raw material and with their price they should buy Portuguese manufactured goods".¹⁷

Salazar's mercantilism goes even further. Foreign goods are imported into Portugal so that they become "nationalised" and pay less customs duties on their import into the colonies. It is good business for the colonial importers to pay full customs duties in Portugal in order to obtain reduction of duties in the colonial customs provided the goods are not too bulky to be enumbered with heavy shipping charges.

Administration

To implement a forced labour system a thorough administrative machinery is obviously essential. But the Portuguese have not failed to contrive an administration so as to rule the colonies with the rapacity of a merchant. The administration is a Portuguese affair with no Africans in the higher ranks of the civil service. A few people of mixed descent and *assimilados* are seen at the lower levels of the administration. The Africans are good for sepoys only.

Government means a complete network of bureaucracy. And thus for all these years Portugal has consistently pursued a policy of destroying whatever tribal organization there existed, so as to build a highly centralized administration with no kind of local self-government. Its nature is so inflexible and tyrannical that it does not have the

(17) Discursos e Notas Políticas, by Oliveira Salazar, Vol II.

adaptability of other colonial administrations which have changed under the pressures of African nationalism.

Portugal claims that her colonies are governed like any other province of Portugal—that they are “overseas provinces”; that the term “overseas provinces” was not coined in 1951 to deceive world opinion about their colonial regime, but it is a Portuguese traditional word for colonies, indicative of their colonial policy of national integration of the territories and of their people. How far is this true? No doubt that the Portuguese colonies are ruled, like Portugal, by authoritarian methods. But they are far from being “provinces”.

“Overseas Provinces”

Under the influence of liberal ideas of the French Revolution, the Portuguese King John VI, after granting independence to Brazil, gave to the people of Portugal and the colonies the Charter of Law of 1821. This Charter envisaged that different colonial matters, like those of Portugal, would be dealt with by his various Secretaries of State. And the Charter of Law of 1825 referred to the colonies as “overseas provinces”. But these Charters had no impact on the administration of colonies. In 1836 the Navy (*Ministerio de Marinha*) was specifically given the charge of all colonial affairs, and they remained under it until 1911, when a separate ministry was created.

In any case, of these sporadic historical references to colonies as “overseas provinces” Dr. Armindo Monteiro, Professor of Colonial Administration at the Lisbon University and Minister of Colonies in the 1930's, said: “We cannot help laughing at the norms of these Charters for some of them refer to the colonies as ‘overseas provinces’ but others as kingdoms of Angola and Mozambique or as establishments of Macao and Timor”.¹⁸

He means that the term “overseas province” did not have the present specific connotation. Indeed the pompous name of “overseas province” could hardly be applied to the Angola and Mozambique of 1821. They were small scattered settlements ruled by the Navy. Up to 1860 the Portuguese had occupied only two per cent of the present area of Angola—30,000 out of 1,246,000 sq. km. of Angola.

It is true that before the advent of Salazar's New State—the official name of his regime—Angola and Mozambique had a limited political financial autonomy and there were trends towards granting citizenship rights to Africans. This might have led to local self-government, as claimed today by some leaders of the Portuguese opposition to Salazar's regime. But if such autonomy had come it

(18) *Licoes de Administracao Colonial*, 1946/47, by Armindo Monteiro.

would not have been in the form of African self-government, but rather like the settlers' government of S. Rhodesia and S. Africa.

Indeed, Salazar's justification to reverse these trends in 1926 was that self-government did not protect the interests of Africans. But his intentions were different: he had to distract attention from the unrest at home; he had to assure popular support for the Government's position in Africa; he had to convince the growing number of Portuguese in Africa that the mother country had not forgotten them and stood ready to meet the emerging crisis; and, above all, he had to organize a national drive to exploit the wealth of colonies for bringing some improvement in the very low economic standard of the Portuguese people. To achieve these aims it was obviously necessary to bring the colonies under a firm central control. And to instill among Portuguese people the pride of possessing an empire and create an imperialist zeal he concocted the concept of the Third Empire, the Portuguese Colonial Empire. And in pursuance of these ideas he promulgated the Colonial Act of 1930.

But after the Second World War colonialism came under the general condemnation of world public opinion. And in 1949 Salazar's government announced its intention of incorporating the Colonial Act into the Portuguese Constitution and of changing the designation of colonies to "overseas provinces". This was debated in the press. And Dr. Armindo Monteiro and others said in the Corporative Chamber:

"The name 'overseas province' does not correspond to any historical reality, does not have tradition in our colonial administration and its supporters are moved more by enthusiasm than by reason of law. It may have traditions in the Spanish law, but it does not have any in ours. Province means a part of financial and administrative unit: it is not the unit itself, as the colonies are, for they have their own budget and constitute a complete administrative unit."¹⁹


But Salazar was not to be convinced by these arguments for, after all, his aim was to confuse world public opinion. And Portuguese legal texts were hurriedly changed, substituting the word colony by "overseas province".

Administrative Organization

From the early years of the century several attempts were made to set up an effective colonial administration, by dividing the colonies into various administrative units. But all these attempts did not go very

(19) *Diario das Sessoes*, 19-1-1951.

ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY



far as the First World War brought political instability in Portugal and a drifting colonial policy. It is with Salazar's Colonial Act of 1930, his Overseas Administrative Reform of 1933 and his subsequent legislation that a systematic hierarchy, from the Colonial Ministry in Lisbon down to the local authority in the colony, the *Chefe do Posto*, was created. The administration was unified and the functions of each department were minutely defined. This is the phase of "administrative occupation", as it is known in the Portuguese colonial books, to distinguish it from the previous period of "military occupation" or "pacification".

The Overseas Administrative Reform of 1933 is a comprehensive law, covering every aspect of local administration. It is so detailed that it has been criticised for it. But it paved the way for an effective "administrative occupation", and is still in force with some minor alterations of no relevance to the present study.

The basic rural administrative unit is *posto*, with a population of 15,000, under the control of a *chefe do posto*. The *postos* are grouped in *circumscricoes*, under the charge of an administrator. The *chefe do posto* and *administrator* are two important figures of the colonial administration in direct and immediate contact with the African population. They have wide discretionary powers. In fact, they are almost despots to the natives, with police, administrative, and judicial powers, but with no law to abide by, except general principles. The *chefes do posto* are assisted by African interpreters and sepoys.

In urban areas, or rather in areas economically developed and with a good percentage of "civilised" Africans and Europeans, their representatives are selected by the Government to form the *Concelho Municipal*, an advisory body to the Administrator. With the progress of the mission of civilising the African peoples it is intended to convert *circumscricoes* into *concelhos*. But the *concelhos* are also divided into *postos*.

A group of about six *circumscricoes* and *concelhos* forms a district under a district governor. Sometimes there is an intermediary division between the district and the *circumscricao*, called *intendencia*. It is an old administrative division which is still maintained to expedite native policy and development schemes.

District governors are subordinated to the Governor-General of the colony, who in turn receives orders from the Overseas Minister in Lisbon. The Overseas Ministry superintends, directs, orientates, coordinates and controls all overseas administration.

In this administrative set-up there is no place for the historical tribal structure. The territories of the great tribal chiefs have been divided among smaller, less powerful chiefs, the *regulos*, or *sobas*, none of them strong enough to threaten either his neighbour or the Portuguese

local authority. Any disrespect of Portuguese rule by them is pitilessly punished. The *Estatuto dos Indigenas* of 1954 had changed the name of *regulos* by that of *regedores*, giving them a tribe or group of tribes, *regedoria*, to rule under direct orders of the *Chefe do Posto*. Under the *regedores* there are one or more *chefes de grupos de povoacoes* or *chefes de povoacao* (chiefs or headmen). There may be one or more *regedorias* in each *posto*. The *regulos*, chiefs and headmen may be elected in "accordance with local custom", but their election has to be sanctioned by the authorities. But "the natives may not depose them nor may they restore those who have been legitimately dismissed (Art. 14). The *regedores*, chiefs and headmen are maintained as long as they "respect the principles and interests of the administration to the satisfaction of government" (Art. 10).

In fact, they are appointed by the government from among the Africans of the area of the *posto*. Those who are not enthusiastic in cooperating with the authorities are discarded and replaced by retired African sepoy soldiers—a reward for their loyal services. The *regulos*, chiefs and headmen are very useful to the *chefe do posto* for collecting native taxes and forced labourers. If they do not collect the estimated taxes or bring forward the necessary number of labourers they are punished and replaced by other more "efficient" men. They may be imprisoned or sentenced for up to "ten months of compulsory labour on public works" (Art. 16).

Local Government

Other colonial powers, content with a political domination that will give them access to African wealth, have allowed a large measure of local self-government. But Salazar's colonial administration, designed to establish an absolute administrative control over the life of Africans, has no scope for it. But in the 1950's, to give local residents a sense of participation in the administration and partly to reward the loyal supporters of his regime in the colonies, he set up Legislative Councils, but they are consultative bodies on purely local matters.

The Legislative Council of Angola has twenty-six members (eighteen "elected" and eight nominated) and that of Mozambique twenty-four (sixteen "elected" and eight nominated). Some of the nominated members are government officers. Of the "elected" members, seven are selected by municipal bodies, cultural and other kinds of organizations controlled by the Government, and the remaining eleven members in Angola and nine in Mozambique are elected not by all "civilised" adults, but only by a certain category of citizens. Even these restricted elections have to be manipulated by *Uniao Nacional*, Salazar's party, so as to bring into the Legislative Council persons faithful to the regime.

The Legislative Council may be dissolved by the Overseas Minister, as stated clearly in the Overseas Organic Law of June 27, 1953. The Central Government has not only legislative powers but also the powers of "control and supervision of the overseas administration directly or through the Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, Overseas Minister and other Ministers". The Council of Ministers appoints governors-general of colonies and governors of districts.

The Overseas Minister approves bye-laws of any "moral, cultural or economic association", as well as the organization of administrative services and their cadres of personnel. He is also the appointing and disciplinary authority of a large number of government servants in the colonies. He is also responsible for their transfer from one colony to another and their promotions.

Indeed, the powers given to him under the law are enormous and include "authorization of town planning or development schemes", "inspections and investigations of the public overseas services controlled by the state, by administrative bodies or public bodies", "supervision and control of enterprises of public interest". To keep complete control over the colonial administration he has, in addition to governors-general and other local officers, a corps of inspectors who regularly tour the colonies and report to him.

The Governor-General is "the principal agent and representative of the Portuguese Nation" in the colony. His authority is above all other civil and military authorities. He is appointed for four years, but may be dismissed before the completion of this period by the Council of Ministers. He appoints, promotes, dismisses and punishes all government servants outside the jurisdiction of the Overseas Minister. He makes regulations concerning entry and departure of nationals and foreigners—these regulations are often very stringent. He is assisted by a high-ranking civil servant, the Secretary General, to whom he may delegate some of his powers.

To advise the Governor-General in his executive duties is the Council of the Government, a sort of advisory cabinet that meets only when he summons it. This Council comprises the Secretary General, the provincial secretaries, the Military Commander, the Attorney General, the Director of the Treasury Department, and two "elected members" of the Legislative Council chosen by the Governor.

Fascist Regime

Salazar has completed the "administrative occupation" of colonies by extending to them his fascist organization. In other colonial empires political freedom has been occasionally curtailed,

but in the Portuguese empire a *fascist regime*, a kind of a permanent state of emergency, has existed since 1928.

For the last 35 years political parties and meetings have been banned and opposition ruthlessly suppressed, its members "rendered harmless" by taking them away to concentration camps or by cold-blooded murder. A rigid censorship has been imposed to carry on with absolute freedom the propaganda of fascist doctrines.

Instruments of fascist tyranny have been gradually introduced in the colonies after they had been tested and perfected in Portugal. The *Mocidade Portuguesa*, Portuguese Fascist Youth Movement, is meant to turn the youth into blind disciples of Salazar. It is a recruiting ground for the *Legiao Portuguesa*, the counterpart of Hitler's S S., a corps of fanatical followers well armed to serve not the state but Salazar's party, *Uniao Nacional*. But the fascist organization which is greatly responsible for the vicious repression of nationalists in Angola and Mozambique is the PIDE, the Portuguese Gestapo.

The PIDE, *Policia International e de Defesa do Estado*, was established in Portugal in the early 1930's but, only in 1936 it began to have personnel trained in "scientific methods" of torture. Some Portuguese ex-army officers were sent to Hitler's Germany for training with Gestapo and some of Mussolini's instructors were attached to it from 1937 to 1938. Its refined creation is the concentration camp of Tarrafal in the Cape Verde Islands, the "camp of slow death", as named by the few survivors of the ordeals of Tarrafal. When the horrors of Buchenwald and Auschwitz shocked world opinion and the Nuremberg trials were announced, Salazar closed it. But it has now been reopened for nationalists of Angola and other colonies.

The PIDE is organized in various departments and zones. It is, in fact, a vast system of espionage to watch the private life of every citizen. With its network of spies in every village, club, coffee house, restaurant and in every community of people, it can easily trace the "disseminators of damaging rumours". With this system no one feels secure: for any petty quarrel one may be taken to the PIDE on false accusation and landed in jail. Only an influential friend in Salazar's party may save him from the situation. Its power is such that even the Governors-General of colonies fear the PIDE's chief in the colony. Recently a Governor-General of Angola was removed on the basis of a report of the PIDE, which was never checked. Criminals are set free for the PIDE's work, which may be to murder someone whom it feels it cannot arrest. Drunkards and unemployed *assimilados* are also engaged for various types of work.

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sion it is assisted by the *Policia de Seguranca Publica*, PSP, in the towns, and *Guarda Nacional Republicans*, GNR, in the rural areas. Both are well armed with machine-guns, grenades, armoured cars and mounted units.

It is true that Africans have been at the mercy of the Portuguese authorities without the PIDE's tyranny. But *assimilados* and educated Africans who might have led the Africans in their struggle for freedom came under the PIDE's repression. Indeed, in the colonies this machinery of tyranny was put in good running order only after the second war when the dissolution of colonial empires in Asia and Africa began to take place. Salazar is now facing the crisis with an organization well designed for it.

(To be concluded)

The United Nations Committee of 24* : Its Origins and Work

By SATISH KUMAR

ONE of the essential purposes of the United Nations is to promote the welfare of dependent peoples and their advancement towards self-government as a means to the establishment of an enduring international peace based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. At the end of the Second World War, almost a quarter of the world's population lived in dependent territories.¹ For territories formerly held under the League of Nations mandates, or were taken from enemy states in the wake of the Second World War, or voluntarily placed under the trusteeship system, the U.N. Charter under Chapters XII and XIII established an international trusteeship system. Under this system, the U.N. General Assembly, with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council, was to administer and supervise territories placed under it by individual agreements. Such territories are called "trust territories". But, for expediting the advancement of all other dependent territories towards self-government, the Charter in a separate chapter (No. XI) made a very significant "Declaration Regarding Non-self-governing Territories". By this declaration, the Charter lays down the obligations of the members of the United Nations in regard to non-self-governing territories for whose administration they are responsible. Members of the U.N. administering territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the territories are paramount. They also accept as "a sacred trust" the obligation to promote the well-being and the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples concerned. Specifically, they accept the responsibility to develop self-government in the territories taking into account the political aspirations of the peoples (Article 73b). Besides, the member states

*A Special Committee of the United Nations appointed by the General Assembly to study and make recommendations about implementation of the General Assembly's "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", dated 14 December, 1960.

(1) For a list of such territories, see *Everyman's United Nations*, New York, United Nations, 1964, pp. 344-46.

administering non-self-governing territories undertake to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General statistical and other information on economic, social and educational conditions in these territories² (Article 73e).

Despite the provisions of Chapter XI, the first few years of United Nations activity with regard to dependent territories were marked by a controversy over the competence of the United Nations to examine conditions in these territories. Broadly speaking, the discussion took place in three phases. In the first phase, covering approximately the period 1946-49, the General Assembly adopted decisions defining the scope, nature and procedures relating to the transmission of information under Article 73e. In the second phase, covering approximately the period 1949-55, the Assembly established its competence to examine information transmitted by the administering members and to make recommendations on conditions in the territories. In the third phase, *i.e.*, up to 1960, the Assembly asserted its competence to determine when the obligation to transmit information could cease, and also when such an obligation existed. By the end of 1960 it could be said that the administering members, while making certain reservations about the competence of the Assembly, accepted the general principles laid down by the Assembly regarding Chapter XI of the Charter.

With the admission to the United Nations of seventeen new members in 1960—all of which had been former dependent territories—the movement for the liberation of colonial peoples received a further impetus. Recognizing this trend, the Assembly on 14 December, 1960, adopted, without a dissenting vote, a “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. The Declaration was adopted by 89 votes to nil, with 9 abstentions³. It had been sponsored by 43 African and Asian countries.

The adoption of the Declaration was a major step forward undertaken by the United Nations in fulfilment of one of its basic objectives, *i.e.*, restoration of faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of human beings. By this Declaration,⁴ the General

(2) Only those territories which were administered by members of the United Nations and for which the members concerned accepted the Charter principles and obligations contained in Chapter XI came within the purview of the United Nations as non-self-governing territories. Since Spain and Portugal were not members of the United Nations until 1955, the question of dependent territories, under them did not arise. Spain declared in 1960 that it would transmit information under Article 73e, and the General Assembly took note of it. In addition, the General Assembly on 15 December 1960 decided that the territories under Portugal at that time were non-self-governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI and asked Portugal to transmit information accordingly. Portugal, however, defied the General Assembly directive on the plea that the territories named were overseas provinces and an integral part of the Portuguese nation. See *ibid.*, p. 344.

(3) The abstaining countries were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

(4) For full text of the Declaration, see *Year Book of the United Nations* 1960, New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1961, pp. 49-50.

Assembly solemnly proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". To this end, the General Assembly declared that the subjection of peoples to alien domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and was an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. All armed action or repressive measures directed against dependent peoples should cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence. The integrity of their national territory should be respected. In trust and non-self-governing territories or other territories which had not yet attained independence, immediate steps should be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories without any distinction of race, creed or colour.

The implementation of the Declaration had thus become the legitimate concern of the members of the United Nations. A large number of African and Asian members and the Soviet Union were dissatisfied with the steps taken by the colonial powers in fulfilment of the Declaration. Consequently, in August 1961, the Soviet Union requested the inclusion in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples". In an explanatory memorandum⁵ accompanying its request, the Soviet Union stated that the Declaration of 14 December, 1960, remained unfulfilled. Over 60 million people were still under colonial rule and the colonial powers were resorting to armed force on an increasing scale to suppress the freedom movement in the colonies. After considering the item, the General Assembly on 27 November, 1961, adopted a resolution sponsored by thirty-eight African and Asian states. The resolution noted with regret that, with a few exceptions, the provisions of the Declaration had not been carried out and that armed action and repressive measures continued to be taken in certain areas "with increasing ruthlessness" against dependent peoples.

The General Assembly by this resolution called on all states concerned to "take action without further delay with a view to the faithful application and implementation of the Declaration". The most important contribution of the resolution was that it established a Special Committee of seventeen⁶ members of the United Nations to

(5) For details of the memorandum, see *Year Book of the United Nations* 1961, New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1963, p. 45.

(6) The members were Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. See *Everyman's United Nations*, n. 1, p. 386.

study the application of the Declaration and to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of its application. The Committee functioned for about a year when, by a resolution of the General Assembly dated 17 December, 1962, its membership was enlarged to twenty-four.⁷ Since then it has been referred to as the "Committee of 24".

During February and September 1962, the Special Committee (of 17 members) held 117 meetings at which it heard statements by petitioners, including representatives of political parties of the territories concerned and others from dependent territories. In response to invitations by the Governments of Morocco, Ethiopia and Tanganyika, meetings were held in Tangier, Addis Ababa and Dar-es-Salaam. In its examination of the application of the Declaration to dependent territories, the Committee decided to give priority to territories in Africa. The territories considered during the meetings in 1962 were Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, Zanzibar, Mozambique, British Guiana, South West Africa, Kenya, and Angola. In its report dated 20 September, 1962, to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the Special Committee gave a full account of its work during 1962 stating, among other things, that "through its observations and recommendations on each of the territories", it had "provided the administering powers with specific lines of action, based on the Declaration itself and the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, which will materially assist in hastening the end of colonial rule in the territories concerned".⁸

The General Assembly, after considering the report of the Special Committee, adopted on 17 December, 1962, a resolution expressing appreciation for the work of the Committee and reaffirmed the objectives and principles enshrined in the Declaration. The Assembly deplored the refusal of certain administering powers to cooperate in the implementation of the Declaration in territories under their administration. It urged them to cease all armed action and repressive measures against dependent peoples and to take immediate steps in order that all colonial territories might accede to independence without delay. Under the same resolution the General Assembly, besides providing for enlargement of membership of the Special Committee (as mentioned earlier), invited the enlarged Committee to (a) continue to seek the most suitable ways for a speedy and total application of the Declaration to all dependent territories; (b) propose specific measures for the complete application of the Declaration;

(7) The seven new members added to the Committee in 1962 were Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. See *Year Book of the United Nations* 1962, New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1964, p. 60.

(8) *Everyman's United Nations*, n. 1, p. 387.

(c) submit to the Assembly, in due course but not later than its eighteenth session, a full report containing its suggestions and recommendations on all territories which had not yet acquired independence; and (d) apprise the Security Council of any developments in these territories which might threaten international peace and security. The Assembly requested all member states, especially the administering powers, to afford the Special Committee, which now numbered twenty-four, their fullest cooperation.⁹

The Special Committee of 24 continued its work in 1963 in accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Assembly on 17 December, 1962. In its report to the General Assembly on its work during 1963, the Special Committee reported that it had followed the same methods of work and procedures as in 1962, *i.e.*, the establishment of sub-committees and working groups to study the problems of specific territories by hearing petitioners from those territories and to make recommendations to the Special Committee. Accordingly, on the recommendations of a Working Group established in the beginning of 1963, the Special Committee approved on 3 April, 1963, a preliminary list of territories to be considered by it. The list consisted of (a) Trust Territories; (b) South West Africa; (c) territories declared by the General Assembly as non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, but on which information under Article 73e was not transmitted by the administering powers; (d) non-self-governing territories on which information was transmitted by the administering powers. The Special Committee itself decided to give first priority to consideration of questions concerning territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. The order in which the Special Committee considered various other individual territories was: Aden, Malta, Fiji, British Guiana, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Zanzibar, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Gambia, Gibraltar, Fernando Poo, Ifno, Rio Muni and Spanish Sahara. The Committee also decided that the Sub-Committee on Petitions should resume its functions. On the recommendation of this Sub-Committee, the Special Committee heard 14 petitioners representing various sections of opinion from Aden, British Guiana, Gibraltar, Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa.¹⁰ On 19 September, 1963, the Special Committee, after considering the 1962 report of the Secretary-General on racial discrimination in non-self-governing territories, decided to inform the General Assembly that during its work it would continue to give special attention to the eradication of racial discrimination in the territories where such discrimination was prevalent.

(9) *Ibid.*, pp. 387-88.

(10) *Year Book of the United Nations* 1963, New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1965, p. 444.

As examples of the significant work done by the Special Committee in 1963, we may quote from some of the resolutions adopted by it. On 4 April, 1963, the Special Committee voted a resolution on Portuguese territories, condemning Portugal for its attitude towards these territories and drawing "immediate" attention of the Security Council to the situation in them with a view to its taking appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Accordingly the Security Council, in a resolution adopted on 31 July, 1963, affirmed that the policies of Portugal in claiming its "overseas territories" as integral parts of metropolitan Portugal were contrary to the principles of the Charter, and "determined" that the situation in Portuguese territories was seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa. In addition to the various steps which the Security Council asked Portugal to take in the direction of granting immediate independence to territories under its control, the Security Council requested all states to refrain from any assistance which would enable Portugal to continue its repression and to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for that purpose. The Security Council asked the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the conditions in Portuguese territories, including the question of arms supply, by 31 October, 1963.¹¹

Similarly, on 10 May, 1963, the Special Committee in a resolution on South West Africa recommended that the General Assembly establish an effective "United Nations presence" in South West Africa and consider any attempt by South Africa to annex the territory as "an act of aggression". The Committee also drew the attention of the Security Council to the "critical situation" in South West Africa as "a serious threat to international peace and security".¹² On 20 June, 1963, in a resolution on Southern Rhodesia, the Special Committee drew the attention of the Security Council to the deterioration of the "explosive situation" in the territory. It recommended that the situation be considered at a special session of the General Assembly "if developments necessitate and circumstances warrant it". The Committee called upon the United Kingdom to hold a constitutional conference and to declare that it would not transfer the powers of sovereignty to any government under the 1961 Constitution.¹³ On 16 July, 1963, in a resolution on Aden, the Special Committee deeply regretted the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to cooperate with the Sub-committee on Aden, particularly its refusal to let the Sub-committee go to the territory.

(11) For a brief report on the follow-up action on this question by the Secretary General, the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1963, see *Everyman's United Nations*, n. 1, p. 577.

(12) For follow-up action by the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, p. 578.

(13) For follow-up action by the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, p. 579.

Thus, on the recommendations of the Sub-committees and taking into account the statements of petitioners, the Special Committee adopted resolutions¹⁴ on all territories under its consideration, and the respective organs of the United Nations took appropriate action. The General Assembly considered the 1963 report of the Special Committee at plenary meetings held between 28 November and 11 December, 1963. In addition to taking action on the Special Committee's recommendations on specific territories, the Assembly also adopted on 11 December a general resolution concerning the Committee's work. By this resolution, the Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to seek the best ways and means of immediate and total application of the Declaration (of 14 December, 1960) to all the territories which had not yet attained independence. The Assembly approved the Special Committee's report and called on the administering powers to implement its conclusions and recommendations. The Assembly deeply regretted the refusal of certain administering powers to cooperate with the Special Committee and their disregard of the Assembly resolutions. The Assembly invited the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any of the territories examined by the Committee which might threaten international peace and security.¹⁵

The 1964 session of the Special Committee of 24 was opened on 25 February by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General observed that the Special Committee had rightly concerned itself with decolonization in Africa where the largest colonial territories and some of the most difficult colonial problems still existed. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that while the Committee during its work in 1964 would no doubt give special attention to recent developments in some of these African territories, it would also devote itself to the independence of small territories in many groups of islands in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹⁶ The Secretary-General reminded the Special Committee that because of the dissolution of the Committee on Information from Non-self-governing Territories following a General Assembly resolution passed at its 18th session, the Special Committee had become the only body other than the Trusteeship Council concerned with matters relating to dependent territories.

The Committee reconstituted its Working Group and Sub-committee on Petitions with the same membership as in the previous year.¹⁷

(14) For resolutions on other territories, see *ibid.*, pp. 578-81; and *Year Book of the United Nations* 1963, n. 10, pp. 447-54.

(15) For text of the resolution, see *Year Book of the United Nations* 1963, n. 10, pp. 446-47.

(16) *United Nations Review* (New York), (April 1964) p. 16.

(17) The Working Group which makes recommendations on the Committee's work schedule was composed of the Committee's officers and of representatives of Bulgaria, Iraq, Italy, and Sierra Leone.

The Sub-committee on Petitions was composed of representatives of Australia, Ethiopia, India, Madagascar, Poland, Tunisia, and Venezuela. See *ibid.*

After completing discussion of the organization of its work, the Committee decided to take up Southern Rhodesia as its first item, and Aden as its second item. While discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia during March 1964, the Committee had before it a report of the Secretary General and a working paper prepared by the Secretariat. The Secretary-General said that since he submitted a report on Southern Rhodesia to the General Assembly on 11 December, 1963, he had maintained continuous contact with the United Kingdom Government and with the Southern Rhodesian Government through the U.N. Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Information from Non-self governing Territories. On the basis of these contacts, he said he was not in a position to report any progress in the promotion of conciliation among the various sections of the population of the territory in the sense desired by the General Assembly.

During the debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia, which began on 6 March, all speakers shared the view that the United Kingdom should not grant independence to the territory under the present circumstances, and some called for the immediate abrogation of the 1961 Constitution. Support was also given to the suggestion of sending a sub-committee to London to discuss the situation with the United Kingdom Government. Some members also proposed that Security Council and General Assembly meetings should be held to consider the question. K. Natwar Singh, the Indian representative, pointed out that repressive legislation continued to darken the lives of the people of Southern Rhodesia and emphasized that the granting of independence should follow and not precede the granting of full and equal rights to all the inhabitants of the territory. M. Pachachi, the Iraqi representative, pointed out that with the dissolution of the Central African Federation at the beginning of the year, the minority government in Southern Rhodesia had received a substantial part of the armed forces and equipment which belonged to the Federal army. This had undoubtedly contributed to making the position of the Southern Rhodesian Government more intransigent and defiant. He said that the African majority in the territory was now thinking of resorting to violence "to achieve their just aspirations", and it would be naive to hope that the outbreak of violence in Southern Rhodesia would not have the most serious repercussions throughout the African continent.¹⁸ Ahmadou Baba Dicko, the representative of Mali, was of the view that the United Kingdom was playing a subtle but dangerous game when it proclaimed in the United Nations that it had no authority over the Southern Rhodesian Government while at the same time in London or Salisbury it dictated orders to officials of that Government.¹⁹

(18) See *ibid.*, p. 17.

(19) *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

After hearing the views of its members, the Special Committee adopted a 13-power resolution²⁰ drawing the attention of the Security Council to "the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security". The Committee also deplored the continued refusal of the United Kingdom to carry out United Nations resolutions and invited the Government of the United Kingdom "once more" to hold a constitutional conference for the independence of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The Committee, among other things, urged the United Kingdom to "warn emphatically the minority settler government" against the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. It called upon the United Kingdom to declare categorically that independence would not be granted to Southern Rhodesia until majority rule was established. The Committee requested further that all states refrain from supplying in any form arms and ammunition to the minority settler government of Southern Rhodesia.

During the rest of the year, the Special Committee vigorously pursued the question of Southern Rhodesia though with little success. Because of the excesses, including arrests of some African nationalist leaders, committed by the Smith Government, which had just replaced the Government headed by Field in Southern Rhodesia, the Special Committee again considered the problem between 24 and 27 April. In a resolution adopted on the last day, it requested the United Kingdom, among other things, to take steps to ensure the immediate release of Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, and other political prisoners.²¹ On 18 and 22 May, the Special Committee adopted resolutions by which it decided to send a five-member sub-committee to London to discuss with the U.K. Government the question of Southern Rhodesia, and authorized it to "visit such places in Africa as it may consider necessary" for the fulfilment of its objective.²² The sub-committee's visit to London was fruitless, as was clear from its report to the Special Committee which it presented on 22 June. The Special Committee adopted another resolution drawing the "immediate attention" of the Security Council to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.²³ In the light of a statement (read out to the Special Committee in October) made by the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson, in which he declared that any unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia would be "an open act of defiance and rebellion and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it",²⁴ and also referred to the

(20) *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

(21) *U. N. Monthly Chronicle* (New York), Vol. I, No. 1 (May 1964) p. 29.

(22) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 2 (June 1964) pp. 30-32.

(23) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 3 (July 1964) pp. 43-44.

(24) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 6 (November 1964) p. 17.

severance of political and economic relations with the Rhodesian Government if it took such a step, the Special Committee adopted a consensus on Southern Rhodesia on 27 October. By this consensus, the Special Committee took note of the declaration made by the United Kingdom Government, reaffirmed its previous views on the issue, and urged its sub-committee on Southern Rhodesia to continue to follow the developments in that country.²⁵

The second important territory the Special Committee of 24 considered in 1964 was Aden. The question of Aden was considered by the Special Committee from 25 March to 9 April. After considering a report of the Secretary-General on Aden and discussing the question, it adopted a resolution reaffirming the territory's right to self-determination and deplored the refusal of the United Kingdom to implement the 1960 Assembly resolution on ending colonialism. The resolution urged the United Kingdom to implement the 1963 Assembly resolution²⁶ on Aden, and to take certain measures, including repeal of laws restricting freedom, release of political prisoners, return of exiles and cessation of repressive measures, in particular, military expeditions and bombing of villages. The Special Committee also decided to establish a sub-committee to keep the situation under review, to contact the administering power with a view to implementing the two Assembly resolutions and to arrange for visits to the territory.²⁷ In view of the reinforcements sent by the United Kingdom to Aden and the military operations conducted against the people of the territory, the Special Committee on 7 May decided to reopen consideration of the question of Aden. After debating the question on 8 and 11 May, it adopted a resolution which deprecated the military action undertaken by the British authorities against the people of the territory. It urged the U.K. Government to cease forthwith all military measures against the people and called the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of recent British military actions against the people of the territory".²⁸

Besides Southern Rhodesia and Aden, the Special Committee during 1964 thoroughly discussed, and made appropriate recommendations about, the territories of Malta, South West Africa, British Guiana, Gibraltar, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, Fiji, and the Portuguese and Spanish territories. The Committee formally adopted its report to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly on 15 December, 1964.

(25) *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

(26) This resolution had called upon the United Kingdom Government, among other things, to withdraw its military base from Aden. See *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 1 (May 1964) p. 21.

(27) For text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 27.

(28) For text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 2 (June 1964) p. 30.

During 1965 also the questions of Southern Rhodesia and Aden dominated the proceedings of the Special Committee of 24. The question of Southern Rhodesia was first taken up by the Committee in April 1965 in the light of the decision of the Southern Rhodesian Government to hold fresh parliamentary elections on 7 May. The Committee had before it the report of its sub-committee on Southern Rhodesia. Francis Brown, the representative of the United Kingdom, made a statement reiterating the view that the United Nations had no competence to discuss Rhodesian affairs, and that Britain could not violate the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution and the established convention that Parliament at Westminster, except with the agreement of the Rhodesian Government, did not legislate on matters within the competence of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly. Further, Britain could not act unconstitutionally to change the present constitution of Southern Rhodesia. The decision of the Southern Rhodesian Government to hold fresh parliamentary elections on 7 May was entirely one for that Government. The United Kingdom would naturally follow the course of events during the election campaign with close attention.²⁹

In the course of the debate, Gershon B. O. Collier, the representative of Sierra Leone, said that the United Kingdom's statement had been a tedious repetition of well known British arguments. John W. S. Malecela, the delegate of the United Republic of Tanzania, pointed out that a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia would cause a break-up of the Commonwealth and lead to chaos and bloodshed in Southern Rhodesia. Mamadon M. Thiam, the representative of Mali, said that the negative position taken by the United Kingdom Government was disappointing and that there were contradictions in British colonial policy. The United Kingdom claimed that it was unable to act in an unconstitutional way to restore the rights of the majority while ignoring the fact that the constitution behind which it sought refuge had been rejected by that majority. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy, the Ethiopian delegate, suggested that the Committee might consider meeting in countries bordering Southern Rhodesia in next spring or summer. This suggestion was supported by Fedorenko, the U.S.S.R. delegate. B. N. Chakravarty, the Indian delegate, said that the United Kingdom had not only failed to discharge its responsibility for bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence, but it had afforded complete protection to the minority without regard for the rights of the majority. The United Kingdom would be on stronger moral grounds to resist a unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia by the use of force than it was when it tried to put down the revolt of the American colonies which was supported by the

(29) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 5 (May 1965) pp. 40-41.

majority of the colonists.³⁰ After hearing the various delegates, the Special Committee adopted on 22 April a 13-power joint resolution on Southern Rhodesia in which it called upon the United Kingdom Government to take urgent and immediate steps to cancel the elections to the Southern Rhodesian Parliament scheduled for 7 May, 1965, and drew the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia.³¹

Accepting the invitations received from the Governments of Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, the Special Committee decided to meet at the capitals of these countries. The Committee held nine meetings in Lusaka, Zambia, from 25 to 29 May, 1965. At these meetings, the Committee heard general statements from 22 delegations, a statement by an observer from the Organization of African Unity, and petitioners on Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Portuguese territories, and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. On 25 May, the Committee issued an appeal to the United Kingdom for the release of Joshua Nkomo, Ndabanini Sithole and other nationalist leaders detained in Southern Rhodesia so that they could appear before the Committee during its meetings in Africa. On 26 May, the Committee by a resolution requested the United Kingdom to use all its influence to save the lives of those condemned to death and to ensure the release of all political prisoners. On 27 May, the Committee adopted another resolution drawing the attention of the Security Council to the "extremely serious situation which would arise in Southern Rhodesia if authorities there were to execute the persons sentenced to death under the territory's amended Law and Order (Maintenance) Act". The resolution also drew the attention of the Security Council "to the threats made by the Southern Rhodesian authorities, in particular to the economic sabotage which the Southern Rhodesian authorities intend to carry out in regard to the independent African states adjoining the territory".³²

The Special Committee considered the Aden question on 27 April. It heard a statement by a representative of the administering power (United Kingdom) who referred to continued acts of terrorism which had occurred in Aden and other parts of the area and which were aimed at obstructing the progress of the Federation of South Arabia to full independence. He also referred to repeated attacks by armed bands from the Yemen, and to the recent serious situation resulting from attacks by artillery and aircraft in the Federal State of Beihan. The representative of Syria regretted the unusually provocative statement

(30) For details of the statements of various delegates, see *ibid.*, pp. 40-48.

(31) For text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 50.

(32) For further account of the meetings held in Lusaka, and text of the resolutions see *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 1965) pp. 63-68.

by the United Kingdom representative and said that neighbouring Arab countries could not be aggressors in Aden since the Arab world was one nation. The United Kingdom should demonstrate its sincerity, among other things, by withdrawing its armed forces from and dismantling its bases in South Arabia. After the Syrian representative, the Chairman of the Sub-committee on Aden in his report stressed the sub-committee's concern at the extremely serious situation in Aden and the Protectorates. The report, *inter alia*, said the United Kingdom should make a clear-cut statement accepting the resolutions of the United Nations on Aden, which would go a long way in reducing tension in the area, thus paving the way for the speedy accession of the territory to independence.³³ The Special Committee, after seven meetings on the question of Aden, adopted, on 17 May, 1965, a draft resolution sponsored by 11 powers. The resolution deplored the refusal of the United Kingdom to implement the previous United Nations recommendations on Aden and drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the territory. Further, the resolution urged the United Kingdom to abolish the state of emergency, repeal all laws restricting public freedoms, cease forthwith all repressive actions, particularly military operations, against the people of the territory, and release all political detainees. It called upon the United Kingdom Government to convene immediately a constitutional conference of representatives of all sectors of public opinion.³⁴

The Special Committee met in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, from 31 May to 10 June, and held 16 meetings at which it heard 20 groups of petitioners. It met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 11 to 18 June, and held 10 meetings at which it heard testimony from 3 petitioners. On 10 June, the Committee adopted a resolution on Portuguese territories. On 17 June, it adopted a resolution on South West Africa and another on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. These three resolutions recommended appropriate action to the General Assembly and the Security Council.³⁵ On 18 June, the Committee adopted a resolution recommending that positive steps be taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council to ensure respect for the rights of the African populations and put an end to the dangerous activities of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in central and southern Africa. On 30 August, the Committee adopted a resolution on the Cook Islands, expressing the hope that the General Assembly would recommend that the United Nations, in cooperation with the specialized agencies, would contribute in every possible way to the development and strengthening of the economy of the Cook Islands.

(33) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 5 (May 1965) p. 51.

(34) For text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 1965) pp. 62-63.

(35) For texts of the resolutions, see *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 7 (July 1965) pp. 49-55

The Special Committee of 24 continued its work during the rest of the year making a valuable contribution to the process of attainment of independence by dependent territories.³⁶

(36) Official records of the activities of the Special Committee during the rest of the year are not available.

India and Nigerian Nationalism

by G. O. OLUSANYA

JUST as Mazzini and his carbonari influenced the Irish nationalists and the Irish the Indians, so also did the Indian nationalist movement influence the growth of nationalism in Nigeria. The Indian struggle for independence was particularly significant for Nigeria because India was a coloured nation. The belief in England in the early years of this century was that the coloured races of the world were not destined to cast off the yoke of imperialism or that if this should eventually happen it would take the next millenium to come. This belief was partly responsible for the slowness of the British in preparing their tropical dependencies for the eventual goal of independence. This attitude was strengthened by the belief that the parliamentary system of government was not suited to the minds of tropical races.¹ Since the British had not evolved any other system to which her colonies could aspire, she was not sure about the goal to which she was leading her colonies. It was partly this and partly the full realization of India's key position in the defence of the Empire and its economic value to Britain that made British policy in India hesitant and uncertain until 1937. Being the oldest and consequently more matured of the tropical dependencies India led the way in the struggle for independence in the early years of this century. As national consciousness in Nigeria was just developing at the time when the Indian nationalist movement was reaching its most active phase, the latter acted as one of the catalysts in the growth of national consciousness in Nigeria and dictated to some extent the pace of events in the country. This is because Nigerian nationalists eagerly and anxiously watched developments in India for they believed that if that country could achieve independence by beating down the defensive walls of British imperialism then the road to that goal would have been paved for them. This belief was well expressed by the *West African Pilot* when it stated:

1. Lugard, speaking on the Government of India Act, states:

"Recently the decision has been taken to grant India progressive self-government on Western models. It is a new departure in world history—for Japan lies outside the tropics—and only the event can show how alien democratic systems are adapted to fit the government of tropical races." See F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1923, p. 46.

India has a special significance for the coloured members of the British Commonwealth as such, her fate in Imperial politics means a lot to the coloured world undergoing British tutelage. The significance to Nigeria cannot be over-estimated because this Dependency comes next to the Indian Empire in size and population. If the deadlock in India can be successfully resolved by the British Government after these many years, then a new era has dawned in British colonial policy.²

This apart, the Nigerian nationalists drew a great deal of inspiration from the activities of the Indian National Congress. Amongst the Indian leaders, Gandhi, Nehru and Bose in particular captured the imagination of the Nigerian nationalists. For instance, Chief Awolowo in his *Autobiography* stated that he was in the early thirties a fanatical admirer of the Indian National Congress and three of its illustrious leaders—Gandhi, Nehru and Bose³—and it is significant that India was the first country he visited when he became the leader of government in the Western Region of Nigeria in 1952. The language of the Nigerian nationalists in the early years of the movement was reminiscent of the language employed by the early nationalists leaders in India. The Nigerian nationalists also borrowed the tactics of the Indian National Congress. The boycott movement started in Nigeria by the late Mbonu Ojike reminds one of the *swadeshi* movement in India.

In addition, the Nigerian nationalists in their struggle for emancipation from British rule were never tired of pointing to the Indian example.

Indian freedom would still be a debatable question today if Gandhi had been only a patrician, Nehru just a scholar, Bose solely an orator and Patel merely a thinker. India became free because Gandhi had the WILL to become a Saint, Nehru the STAMINA to become a Hero, and Patel the GUTS to become a Fighter and Bose the COURAGE to become a Martyr.⁴

Perhaps the most important contribution made by India to the development of Nigerian nationalism began after her independence in 1947. India became the champion of the dependent peoples in the United Nations. An indication of this aspect of her policy was given by Nehru in his first statement on India's foreign policy as Prime Minister: "We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition of

2. *West African Pilot*, March 16, 1942.

3. O. Awolowo, *The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Cambridge, The University Press, 1960, p. 160.

4. A. Adelabu, *Africa in Ebullition*, Union Printing Press, Ibadan, 1952, p. 41.

the theory and practice of equal opportunities of all races.”⁵ In fulfilment of this policy India severed her diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1946 and has been an outspoken critic of Portuguese rule in Angola, a champion of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and an enthusiastic supporter of the Organisation of African Unity in all its activities against South Africa. This policy she also championed in the United Nations where she became an uncompromising opponent of colonialism and racial discrimination. The adoption of this policy by India is not surprising considering the fact that she herself had just emerged from the colonial bondage and consequently possessed fresh memories of the humiliation characteristic of that rule. This aspect of her policy has been given various interpretations by various scholars. Vernon McKay, for instance, ascribed it partly to the Indian desire to play a leading role in world affairs and partly because of her desire for the friendship of the African peoples⁶ while Professor Schoell saw in it an attempt to substitute Indian rule for the Western colonial rule which is fast disappearing.⁷ Professor Schoell’s view is plausible but not convincing while McKay’s point possesses some validity because India appeared on the international scene when the colonial problem provided the most convenient instrument, apart from the policy of non-alignment, by which she could easily make her presence felt in world affairs. Moreover, it is the only issue on which she could speak with experience and confidence for the obvious fact that she herself had just emerged from colonial bondage. However, it would not be altogether fair to attribute her attitude to this fact only. India’s passionate dislike for colonialism was an important factor. Whatever the motive, there is no doubt that the constant attack by the Indian representatives and those of Soviet Russia and other ex-colonial countries on colonialism helped to speed up the process of decolonization.

Part of the Indian contribution to the development of Africa and to the speeding up of her political and national consciousness was the scholarship scheme started by her for African students in 1955. This scheme has not, however, fully justified the hopes of its founders partly because many African students preferred to go to Europe, the United States of America, Canada and Russia instead of India owing to their belief that the educational standard in India was inferior to that in Europe and America and partly because the students who went to India possessed little or no gratitude for that country because of the

5. Indian Council for World Affairs, Foreign Affairs Report, Special Issue, Jawaharlal Nehru on World Affairs, 1946-64, Vol. XII, No. 6 (June 1964), p. 76. Cited in K.B. Rai, “India’s Stake in Africa”, *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3, (October-December 1964), p. 152.

6. V. McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, New York, Harper & Row, 1963, p. 185.

7. F. L. Schoell, *India’s Policy*, Kenya Weekly News, February 10, 1956, p. 3. See also Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 155

discrimination they suffered in that caste-ridden society. The scheme, nevertheless, produced a number of educated men who partly because of their experience became more self-conscious and consequently reacted not only against alien rule but also against the arrogance of any other race.

Nigeria's debt to India was well expressed by the *West African Pilot* on the death of Mahatma Gandhi when the paper stated: "We shall badly miss that tangible symbol of Indian nationalism, that fountain of fortitude and virtue, the inspirer of them that are on the thorny road to freedom."⁸

8. *West African Pilot*, February 2, 1948.

Science and Development of Natural Resources in Developing Nations*—I

by G. S. PURI

THE development of modern science and technology in the world during the last few decades has been very uneven. Europe and North America have made great strides in mechanical and electrical instrumentation which have helped them in rapid industrialisation. The development of systems of transport and communications, along with industry, has blessed them with material prosperity and a higher per capita income. Greater capital formation has been achieved. New land, sea and air routes have been opened by developed countries, offering greater opportunities for world cooperation in production and economic development.

Most of the countries with traditional and subsistence economies in the tropics have however remained underdeveloped and these are the very areas in which there has been a greater concentration of population and where science and technology have not developed to any extent. The main difference between the developed areas of the world and those that are developing is that science in the latter has not penetrated into society and the common man has taken only a superficial and rather unrealistic attitude towards scientific development.

Development and National Income

In terms of material prosperity, 67 per cent of world population in developing regions has only 15 per cent of world income, with an average per capita income of £19-20. The 33 per cent of world population in developed countries has 85 per cent of world wealth, with a national income of £219 per head per year. There are two types of developing regions in the world. The first are those which have ancient civilizations and a high population per unit area, as in most parts of South Asia. India and China are the problem countries of this type. India with a population of 436 million has 346 persons per

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square mile and a £22 per capita annual income. Pakistan with 93 million population has 257 persons per sq. mile and a national income of £19. Ceylon with a population of 8 million has 233 persons per square mile and an income of £41 per head per year. These figures keep on changing rapidly with increasing populations, migration of religious or linguistic minorities, falling standards of income and fluctuating trade balances.

The other type of developing lands are Africa, Oceania and Latin America, which have a low number and density of population. Most of the African countries gained political independence only recently but their economies are still very largely linked with those of the old colonial powers, notably Britain and France. Per capita annual incomes in African countries are : Ethiopia £10 ; Tanganyika £16 ; Uganda £20 ; Kenya £26 ; Nigeria £29 ; Egypt £39 ; Ghana £75 ; Algeria £79 ; Union of S. Africa £124. The United Kingdom with a population of 53 million has 567 persons per sq. mile and a per capita income of £424. The U.S. with 180 million population has 59 people per sq. mile and £774 national income. Canada and Australia have high national incomes but low populations. In short, developing regions are characterised by a variable, unstable and fluctuating type of economy, with low standards of literacy, poor communications, transport and undeveloped educational facilities in science at almost all levels.

Land and People

Africa occupies about 22 per cent of the world's land area and about eight per cent of the world's population. Of the 280 million inhabitants of Africa, about 21 per cent live in North Africa; 6 per cent in the Union of South Africa; Tropical Africa, including Malagasy and other islands, has 73 per cent of the total population of Africa. Africa differs from Oceania and Latin America in that 97 per cent of her total population is of local origin. In the other two continents, people of European origin predominate, whereas in Africa there are only about six million Europeans, 800,000 Asians and a small fraction of other nationalities.

Development Trends In Africa

Until after the Second World War the development of Africa was in the hands of colonial powers and the economy which is dependent on capital formation was mainly reflected in the balance of exports and imports. Africa was exporting her natural resources in the form of minerals and agricultural and forestry produce to mainly European countries. Capital formation therefore was not dependent on resource management, agricultural or other development, but mainly on an exchange economy and foreign investments. In addition to the export proceeds and governmental expenditure, there was

an inflow of foreign capital in some African countries. Since the bulk of the capital came from exports capital formation was dependent on foreign trade and market stability and on the economic and political conditions of the colonial powers. For example, 70 per cent of the foreign trade of the French African territories was with France till 1960, and since the French economy and political conditions were variable the African economy also wavered a good deal during this period.

The economic development programmes of African countries, as already stated, were mainly dependent on export proceeds and the value of imported materials; therefore there was a direct correlation between export earnings and private investment in development projects. On account of these factors, capital accumulation for development was very erratic. Development in most African countries during the last two decades has been in the building industry; for example, in Ghana in the period 1951-60, 58 per cent of the total investment was in this sector. On a per capita basis the net annual rate of growth during 1950-57 in Ghana was two per cent and in East Africa three per cent. In Nigeria, gross fixed capital formation was doubled between 1950 and 1957. Nigeria hopes to increase her national per capita income from £27 in 1962 to £64 in 1982 under planned development. This would involve the growth of gross national product at the rate of four per cent. She hopes to have her GNP increased from £24 million in 1956-57 to £64 million in 1981-82 in the industrial sector that includes mining, petroleum and manufactured goods. At the same time she hopes to increase her GNP in the agricultural sector from £502 million in 1956-57 to £1,336 million in 1981-82. The agricultural sector is 61.7 per cent of GNP whereas the total industrial sector is to remain 2.8 per cent only. All this will be determined partly by favourable trade balances in foreign markets and partly by success in industrialisation. However, with the devaluation of sterling in recent years, economic conditions in most of the African and Asian countries have suffered a setback vis-a-vis their purchasing power from hard currency areas, notably the U.S.

On account of the uneven and poor developmental pattern in different sectors of economy most of the export money is spent on imports of finished consumer or luxury goods and due to lack of technical skill and poor development of facilities for teaching science and technology, large-scale industries for the development of raw materials in Africa have so far not progressed to any extent. For example, in 1960 Nigeria exported £5 million worth of raw hides and skins and imported £5 million of footwear. £8 million worth of forestry materials were exported and £3 million worth of paper products imported. £9 million worth of fish and £4.3 million worth of sugar were imported in 1960. Nigeria suffered a £55 million

adverse trade balance. In Ghana, the fall in export prices of cocoa during 1957 and 1964-65 has seriously affected economic development.

Africa's major export commodities are agricultural and forestry produce which are dependent mostly on climatic and soil conditions. Only 36 per cent of Africa's land area has a moist climate; the remaining 64 per cent is to a great extent dry. Of the dry area, 16 per cent is desert ; 26 per cent arid and 22 per cent semi-arid. The water problem in Africa is related to rainfall and river systems. Most of the arid area is suited only for pastoral development. The number of cattle, sheep and goats is uneven and relatively high. On the whole, the number of cattle per 100 persons in Africa is 45 as compared to 26 in Europe, 56 in N. America and 125 in S. America. In Nigeria, it is 28 per 100 persons. In spite of the high number of cattle per capita milk production per year is only 46 lb in Africa, as compared to 661 lb in Europe, 789 in N. America and 5,874 lb in New Zealand. All this is directly or indirectly the result of poor development of science education.

African trade is limited to a few commodities; for example, in 1957 Africa's share of world trade was 76 per cent in groundnuts ; 71 per cent in cocoa ; 67 per cent in wine ; 64 per cent in palm oil ; 60 per cent in sisal and 32 per cent in oranges and citrus fruits. Some of these are natural crops or are pure plantations which are generally not managed on scientific lines and production suffers from climatic and other vagaries.

Africa has 750 million hectares of forest, about 21 per cent of the world total of forest area ; but 65 per cent of this is inaccessible. In 1957, 100 million cubic metres of round wood (6 per cent of the world output) was from Africa. Of this, 90 per cent was used as fuel and only 10 per cent for industry. The major forest producers were French Equatorial Africa, Ghana, Union of South Africa, Nigeria and Belgian Congo. Although Africa has large forest resources, it is an importer of forest products like paper and other finished goods of the value of 30-40 million U.S. dollars and the figure will be fourfold by 1975. Forty tree species are in use, of which only 15 are commonly used timbers.

Mineral output is almost entirely exported. Gold, diamonds, copper, tin, bauxite, iron ore, etc. are the chief minerals. In the export of minerals South Africa has one of the largest shares. Africa has a low quantity of energy. It possesses less than one per cent of the world's coal reserves ; less than two per cent of oil reserves but about 40 per cent of the world's hydro-electric potential. Nearly half of this hydro-electric potential is concentrated in Belgian Congo and the

greater part of the known oil reserves are in Algeria and Egypt. There are therefore large imports of fuel into many countries of Africa and in 1955-57 these accounted for 6·8 per cent of the total imports. The low production and consumption of energy limits agricultural productivity and manufacturing activity in Africa.

Planning for Development

This picture of the economic development of Africa, based on a traditional economy, has to be changed to one of modern economy based on the development of natural resources of land and economic utilization of human resources through science and technology. Ghana and other African countries in their development plans will be making concentrated efforts to remedy this situation. In her 7-year 1963-70 plan, Ghana has planned to increase her expenditure on agriculture, forestry and fishing from £8·2 million in 1964-65 to £8·7 million in 1969-70. In the field of industry and mining she plans big advances and an expenditure increase from £9·8 million in 1964-65 to £26·7 million in 1969-70. The physical limitations, for example, inadequate transport and limited knowledge of natural resources, are at present the main bottlenecks, but there is an increased effort to develop education in science and technology. In the field of social amenities, including transport, housing, electricity etc., Ghana plans to increase her expenditure from £12·27 million in 1963-64 to £130·05 in 1969-70. But about 1966-67 the Volta project is expected to pay back in electricity and irrigation.

One of the greatest shortages in Africa has always been that of technical skills at almost all levels. Development has so far been mainly on the village economy pattern of commercialization of peasant agricultural produce for export, with some foreign investment. The wage-earner is without any scientific or technological skill. The present economy is mostly an exchange economy, depending on capital provided by non-Africans; and mineral development through foreign settlers has helped foreign capital and foreign technical skill. This type of economy must change and this can only be done with the application of science through universal education. Therefore, the teaching of science in Africa today has a special significance in the development of the continent. Ghana plans to spend £64 million on educational development during 1963-70, as against £68 million in the agricultural sector and £109 million on mining and industrial development. Of the £64 million expenditure on education £8·7 million would go to universities. The bulk of £29 million is intended for secondary education. A ratio of 60:40 between science and arts students will be maintained and this, it is hoped, will make the development programme in natural resources possible.

Natural Resources

For the economic advancement of developing countries, especially those of Africa, the following major natural resources are of importance :

A. *Resources of inorganic origin*

- (1) Land surfaces
- (2) Rocks
- (3) Air

B. *Part inorganic, part organic*

- (4) Water
- (5) Soils

C. *Plants*

- (6) Wild plants
- (7) Forests
- (8) Agricultural and pasture plants

D. *Animals*

- (9) Wild animals
- (10) Domestic livestock
- (11) Insects (and other invertebrate animals)
- (12) Fish (inland waters)

E. *Man*

- (13) Human beings

These natural resources are inter-related and interdependent in the ecosystem for their individual and collective development. In this relationship man lies at the top of the pyramid and can, in a way, be considered the index of the development of the ecosystem. At their best the inorganic natural resources are responsible for the development of plants which are the primary producers of energy. Inorganic minerals not involved in plant nutrition help in the production of organic resources only indirectly by providing power and energy for resource management. Plant resources are developed and utilized under different systems of resource management, viz. agriculture, forestry and pasturing. Animal resources are directly dependent on plant resources and are utilized for the benefit of man in various ways. Wild animals, which are of scientific and bionesthetic value, are as well a source of food materials ; and in parts of Africa, notably in the eastern mountain region, wild life cropping has great potentialities for savanna regional development. Insects, viruses and some other poisonous and disease-causing organisms act as limiting factors in the development

of plant and animal resources. Tsetse fly and locust are prominent examples of environmental hurdles in African development. The ill-effects of these have, however, been minimised through the scientific management of resources.

From the point of view of the ecosystem productivity it follows that man is the most important natural resource for development of any region. This is more so because population is not dense in Africa as a whole, and in some regions, for example, Zambia and parts of the desert areas in North Africa, there may not be more than 10 to 15 persons per square mile. In parts of Nigeria, however, population density may be as high as 200 persons per square mile.

Although world population is increasing by about two per cent annually and almost 60 million people are being added every year, this will not be much of a problem for Africa for some time. Food production in the world during 1964 increased only by one per cent. The year 1965 started with a narrower food population ratio than 1964 and right now 1.5 billion human beings are either hungry or malnourished, which means that one man out of every two is not finding enough food. The world food review by FAO has shown that an increase in agricultural production appears to be the only realistic solution. The same applies to Africa also, although there are several other sectors of the African economy that need equally urgent attention.

The 1962-63 production of food crops in Africa, as compared to world figures given below, shows that there is great scope for increase.

<i>Food Crop</i>				<i>Area in million hectares</i>	
				<i>Africa</i>	<i>World</i>
Wheat	6.5	207.9	
Barley	4.3	64.9	
Oats	0.9	35.0	
Maize	12.8	105.3	
Millet & Sorghum	..		24.0	100.4	
Rice	2.96	124.4	

Use of fertilisers makes it possible to increase the area under production by more than 50 per cent in Africa.

In some parts of the continent there has been a small increase in food production. In Nigeria, total production of several articles of food increased during 1950-57. For example, the 1950:1957 ratio for yam was 6.63:6.69; cassava 3.61:4.6; Guinea corn 1.38:2.14; millet 0.92: 1.79; maize 0.47:0.66; rice 0.19:0.26 and beans 0.07: 0.23 million tons. The yield per acre in developing countries is indeed very low. For example, with a total production of 109 million tons the yield of maize in the U.S. in 1959 was 1.29 tons per acre whereas the yield in India was only 0.35 tons per acre with a total production of only 3.6 million tons. Production of rice was the best in China with 1.46 tons per acre, with a total production of 112.2 million tons. The U.S. produced 2.23 million tons; Japan 15.4; India 44.0 and Nigeria only 0.26 million tons of rice during the same period. The yield per acre in India for rice was 0.54 tons, whereas Japan and Spain showed 1.89 tons and 2.22 tons per acre, respectively. The natural resources development programmes will make proper utilisation of water and soil for increased production per acre.

Animal production in Africa as compared to world figures given below for 1962-63 is equally distressing, at the same time showing the potential for animal resources development :

<i>Livestock</i>			<i>Million Head</i>	
			<i>Africa</i>	<i>World</i>
Horses	3.2	64.7
Mules	1.6	16.0
Asses	10.2	40.5
Cattle	116.0	951.0
Pigs	4.8	550.6
Sheep	133.0	988.0
Goats	105.3	356.4
Buffaloes	1.9	..
Camels	7.2	..

The total production of meat in Africa in 1962 was 2.7 million metric tons against the world figure of 65.8. The annual yield of

meat per carcass in Africa is, however, miserably low, only 12 kgm against 70 kgm. of an average N. American-European animal.

Here also the potential is enormous if fodder production could be increased and diseases, such as rinderpest, controlled.

It seems clear that to meet the food and nutrition requirements of their increasing populations developing countries must plan for annual increases in food supplies by 3·8—4·3%. Manufacturing output must increase by 130% if an annual 5% growth of income is to be achieved.

Up to now development work in many tropical countries has been done through human and animal muscles. A bullock can do work only 4·5 times the work of a man. A one HP engine, however, increases output by 10-12 times that of a man. One kgm each of kerosene and bitumin produce energy equivalent to that produced by 8·5 kgm and 12 kgm of wood respectively. In 1910, 88 per cent of world energy was derived from coal. In 1961, however, coal provided only 51·1%; 32·5% was provided by oil; 14·4% by natural gas and 20% by hydro-power. For production of energy one ton of uranium is equivalent to 11,000 tons of coal.

Although Africa is not particularly rich in oil and natural gas, it has, as already mentioned, a hydro-electric potential of 40% of the total world water power. She is also rich in nuclear minerals and solar energy. It may, however, be mentioned that recent investigations in Nigeria, Congo, Senegal and other parts of Africa promise to yield abundant supplies of oil and natural gas.

The increase in agricultural and animal production and production of other types of natural resources from land and their utilization can be achieved only by human beings. It is here that science can help in placing at the disposal of man knowledge of natural resources and equipment and instruments for their proper investigation and development in order to bring about economic uplift of the countries of Africa.

In stressing the human aspect of the application of science and technology to economic development, M.S. Thacker, Chairman of the U.N. Geneva Conference, stated that "developing human resources, training of man, training of minds, has emerged as the most pivotal aspect. It is human resources, still largely untapped, which constitute man's real hope for the future. For all his inventions and machines, man remains the principal tool of economic development, as his welfare should be its only objective". Again at the closing session of the Geneva Conference, Thacker remarked that "the tremendous growth which we have witnessed in science and technology is the result of one thing—a better use by man of his mental capabilities. Education and science have a snowball characteristic—as it moves it grows in size." B. R. Sen of FAO suggested the establishment of a World Advisory

Panel and R. Maheu of UNESCO desired the establishment of international institutes for training technologists and technicians as education is true investment in people.

The Geneva Conference also suggested the promotion of a Development Decade—1961-1971—to aim at increasing food production, exploration of natural resources, promotion of industrial development and better housing, development of science and technology, etc. “High priority must accordingly be given to establishing educational systems well adapted to the economic and social needs of the developing countries. Development is not just economic growth, it is growth plus change”.

A new approach to the advancement of developing countries should consider the following:

- (1) The concept of national planning should include programmes of action and targets with factual studies of available natural resources.
- (2) Insight into the importance of the human factor in development.
- (3) Detailed knowledge of natural resources by pre-investment work and applied research must be gathered.
- (4) Two other factors concerned are the help of foreign skilled personnel and outside capital assistance to carry out the above programme.

The highest priority is, therefore, to be given to education and training in the study, utilisation and conservation of natural resources in Africa and other developing countries. Some information on educational planning has been made available by UNESCO through the Karachi and Tokyo Plans for Asia and the Addis Ababa and Tananarive Plans for Africa. The Lagos Plan for the development of natural resources has been prepared for Africa.

Education does not mean merely production of scientists and engineers, but also doctors, nurses and all types of technicians to make life worth living. There is a life expectancy of 27-40 years in developing countries against 63 in developed lands. Fifty per cent of people in developing countries are constantly ill and there is less than one doctor for 20,000 persons, against one for 10,000 persons in developed countries. The Geneva Conference considered that every developing country by 1970 should have one physician per 10,000 persons; one nurse per 5,000 persons; one technician per 5,000 persons; one health auxiliary person per 1,000 persons, etc. Of the 1,300 million people in developing countries one-half are illiterate; only 10% of children over 14-18 years are in school. Henri Langier, a former

Secretary General of UN, suggested the creation of international university centres and stated that these should not cling to the traditional and obsolete teaching methods of universities in the older countries. Science and technology are products of challenge and response—unlike art and literature, which are products of creative leisure and artistic instinct. “The scientific attitude can be acquired as a way of life in the same manner as socialism, capitalism, communism and the like are injected into society as a way of living.”

This brief survey of the present state of development of major natural resources indicates that developing regions must assign a high priority to the development, through science and technology, of natural resources.

(To be continued)

The Indo-Pakistan Conflict

by K. P. MISRA

THE fifty-day armed conflict between India and Pakistan during August and September 1965 had a multi-dimensional impact not only on the domestic and external situations of the two countries but also on some aspects of contemporary international policies. The episode has caused re-examination and reformulation of policies in many a chancery of the world. It would take some more time before its implications are fully deciphered.

For some people, particularly in other countries, it is not easy to appreciate India's problems and realize the extent of Pakistan's bellicose policies and actions. Being considerably smaller in size and weaker in power potential, Pakistan has the initial advantage of being judged more leniently than India. Thus in certain quarters the fact of Pakistan's aggression against India is not clearly understood. It will therefore be helpful if we begin with a brief account of the main events of the conflict in order to understand the motivations and determinants of Pakistan's action.

II

THE choice of time to do what Pakistan began on August 5 was made after an assessment of the domestic conditions in India on the one hand and careful planning and preparation on her own part on the other. Pakistan's internal developments were also of some relevance in this context. It was not for nothing that the military rulers of Pakistan did not decide upon armed action against India earlier.

The prophets of doom had predicted that the passing away of Jawaharlal Nehru would lead to the disintegration of India. To their disappointment, the change-over after his death was smooth. But such people, and they included the rulers of Pakistan, had serious misgivings about the new Prime Minister's ability to hold the nation together for any appreciable length of time.¹ Pakistan thought that the new leadership, when confronted with such formidable problems as shortage of food, the demand for a Punjabi Suba, factionalism

1. For instance, see Michael Edwards, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy", *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 41, p. 48 and pp. 54-55.

in the Congress Party and the Naga demand for a separate state, could be made an easy prey of her designs. The presence of a large Muslim population in India—in the State of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims are in a larger proportion—must have been a source of encouragement to Pakistan. The military-theocracy of Pakistan perhaps calculated that in the event of a conflict between the two countries, its co-religionists in India would be so unpatriotic and communal as to create disruption from within and thus weaken Indian polity. In Jammu and Kashmir they expected a large-scale revolt against the rest of the country under the guidance of Sheikh Abdullah's friends and followers. To the misfortune of Pakistan, her assessment of the situation turned out to be utterly wrong. It is not surprising that, having never known it herself, she was unaware of the vigour and vitality of a democratic-secular political system.

Being a member of military alliances, Pakistan has been the recipient of free arms aid from Western countries which made her feel stronger than India. The Rann of Kutch conflict, in which she was able to secure a slight edge over India, possibly confirmed her view about India's military weakness. Pakistan thought that by launching military action against India she would score an easy victory. A leading newspaper of Pakistan reflected this view when it wrote:

"Pakistan, with its present buoyant economy and high morale of the people, will be able to withstand the rigours of war. But India, in her current state of economic, political and moral bankruptcy, *will crumble at the first impact of violence...* India will be the *first country to lose its fight without firing a shot.*"² (Italics added).

Likewise, President Ayub Khan himself once said:

"We shall go all out and, smaller though we are than India, we shall *hurt India beyond repair.*"³ (Italics added).

It is also possible that Pakistan, which was getting impatient over the fuller integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union, never imagined that in the face of an armed action India would hit back instead of rushing to the United Nations with a complaint as she had done in 1947.

The People's Republic of China was an important determinant of the Pakistani action. As a considerable section of the Indian army is preoccupied with the protection of the country's northern frontier, Pakistan was under the illusion that India would not be able to use an adequate number of armed personnel to face her armies. She also hoped that China would enter the conflict and that the synchroniza-

2. See *Eastern Examiner*, Chittagong, June 10, 1965.

3. See *Dawn*, Karachi, June 20, 1965.

tion of two military onslaughts would break the backbone of India. More than two years before the conflict the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, had declared:

"In the event of war, Pakistan would not be alone. Pakistan would be helped by the most powerful nation in Asia. War between Pakistan and India involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia."⁴

This statement is evidence of the Chinese factor in the conflict; it also indicates that there was some sort of tacit alliance between the two countries. As subsequent events showed, China, by issuing an ultimatum to India, did try to help Pakistan though not to the same extent as the latter desired.

It is well known that because of Pakistan's involvement with China all was not well with U.S.-Pakistan relations and the U.S. had delayed sanctioning further aid to Pakistan. Pakistan figured out that by taking armed action against India, she would be able to precipitate a crisis in which the U.S. will have to side with the committed Pakistan against the non-aligned India. She was also hopeful of receiving substantial military aid from the countries belonging to the military alliances to which she was a party. Thus Pakistan attempted too clever a trick. She planned to use against India all the resources of the Western alliance which were designed against communism and at the same time use against her the resources of the most belligerent communist Power in the world. That such an unprincipled venture had no chance of success was not realised by Pakistan.

As her relations with the Soviet Union had somewhat improved, Pakistan had no fear that the former would come to the rescue of India in the event of a war.

Though President Ayub Khan had been able to get himself elected to the Presidency in the January 1965 elections held under the constitution of Basic Democracies proclaimed by him, he was doubtful of the real support of the people of Pakistan. During his regime economic inequalities had further increased and there was not enough voluntary public support for his government.⁵ An armed action against India was the most handy instrument to make the people of Pakistan rally round his regime.

Another internal factor was the pressure of extremists which President Ayub was unable to withstand as his position was not absolutely

4. See his speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on July 17, 1963, *Dawn*, July 18, 1963.

5. A Pakistani, who visited his country after eight years, on his return to the U.K. wrote: "When I was in Pakistan I found that the public and the Government acted as two different bodies . . . the political prospects are dim. The sort of prosperity in which people do not share equally may prove dangerous both for national values and for the coherence of society." See Asif Hussain, "Dangerous Trends in Pakistan", *The Times*, August 18, 1965, p. 9.

secure. The following report by Victor Anant sent from Pakistan confirms it:

“What is not much known abroad . . . is that there is tremendous internal pressure on President Ayub to start a *Jehad* against India, a holy war to liberate Kashmir.”⁶

It is also likely that after the elections, President Ayub acquired a kind of constitutional legitimacy which made his regime so power-drunk and aggressive that it decided upon taking military action against India.

III

THAT Pakistan's action was not a spontaneous outburst is hardly open to doubt. While her strategy remained the same as in 1947, she changed her tactics this time. In 1947, to begin with tribesmen were sent across the border to Kashmir but later on they were joined by regular men of her army, a fact which she could not hide subsequently. In the beginning of August 1965, the infiltrators who crossed the cease-fire line into Indian territory were armymen belonging to a regular unit of the Pakistan army. These men, known as *Mujahids*, had been imparted intensive training in guerilla warfare by her army officers.

Behind this action was preparation lasting several months. The leaders of Pakistan had talked of an “Algerian type of struggle” in Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Abdul Hamid Khan, President of Pakistan-held Kashmir, after talks with President Ayub, had said early in 1965 that the latter “would take more drastic measures to bring about the liberation of Kashmir”.

Many officers of the Pakistani army were sent to China for special training in guerilla warfare. In Pakistan-held Kashmir compulsory military training was introduced. In June 1965, the National Assembly of Pakistan approved a Presidential Ordinance setting up a Mujahid Force as a regular branch of the army. It was to consist of 150,000 men and officers. Under General Akhtar Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding of the 12th Division, a military headquarters was set up at Murree to direct six units, each consisting of five companies, each company having about 110 men equipped with light machine-guns, rifles, Sten-guns, hand-grenades, ammunition, time-bombs, explosives, detonators, etc.

Even while Pakistan was signing the agreement on Kutch, all these preparations for armed action against India were going on.

6. *New Statesman*, September 3, 1965. See the report entitled “The Kashmir Crisis”, p. 308.

7. See *Pakistan Times*, January 6, 1965.

IV

THE first phase of the conflict began on August 5 with extensive infiltration of armed men from Pakistan at several points all along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir State and at some points across the international frontier between Jammu and West Pakistan. The infiltrators, who were in civilian clothes, came in small groups of twos and threes, through the main gaps and trails that criss-cross the mountainous terrain. Dense woods and other favourable geographical features gave them excellent cover. The border being very long, some infiltrators managed to reach deep into the interior of the Indian side. As the Prime Minister of India said in a broadcast on August 13, these men indulged in "sabotage and destruction at a number of places" and "attacked strategic places such as bridges, police stations and petrol depots. . . ."⁸

These facts make it clear where the responsibility for beginning the conflict can be squarely laid. The U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, left no quarter for any doubt when he, in his report to the Security Council on September 3, said:

"General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the Cease-Fire Line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on Indian soil."⁹

Even the British Press, which has been quite unfair to India, could not suppress the hard facts. Immediately after the conflict began, *The Times* editorially wrote that "what emerges is that for the week or more armed irregulars have been crossing in much larger numbers than usual from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line intending to stir up trouble and especially to galvanise a listless people to act against India."¹⁰ Some weeks later when the facts of the conflict became clear it published a report which was more categorical. It said:

"The war between India and Pakistan began on the night of August 5 when guerillas, whom Pakistan had been training all this year with little attempt at secrecy, stole in handfuls—but it seems in thousands—across the cease-fire line into Indian Kashmir; it was realised in Delhi that Pakistan had launched an attack to take by force what India had refused to yield."¹¹

8. When all this had begun, our High Commissioner in Pakistan, Mr. Kewal Singh, was reminding his host country that "we are brothers in the sense that few other peoples in the world are." He said so while presenting his credentials on August 6, 1965.

9. See *The United Nations at Twenty*, New Delhi, 1965, p. 16.

10. See *The Times*, August 12, 1965, p. 7.

11. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1965, p. 11.

Similarly, the *Economist* wrote: "There is no doubt that armed bands have crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line from the Pakistan side."¹²

V

IN the face of such a thinly veiled aggression against its political unity and territorial integrity, India was left with no option but to try to defend herself with all the resources at her command. This was stated unambiguously by Prime Minister Shastri, who declared:

"If Pakistan has any idea of annexing any part of our territories by force, she should think afresh. I want to state categorically that force will be met with force and aggression against us will never be allowed to succeed."

He added : "When freedom is threatened and territorial integrity is endangered, there is only one duty, the duty to meet the challenge with all our might."¹³

To meet the situation, India took swift action. Her first concern was to locate the infiltrators and then capture or kill them. Considerable success was achieved in this effort which was actively supported by the local population. Most of the infiltrators fled into jungles and other obscure places without achieving the object for which they had been sent by Pakistan.

As the situation developed, India realised that her defence measures would not be really effective unless further infiltration of Pakistanis was checked. Thus she was forced to plug the vulnerable points along the cease-fire line and at some places even to cross it as a defensive measure. It was in this process that she occupied beyond the cease-fire line some places, including two posts in the Kargil sector on August 16, a post in the Tithwal sector on August 26, and the Haji Pir Pass, five miles south of the cease-fire line in the Uri sector on August 30.

All the time during the first phase of the conflict between August 5 and 31, India hoped that Pakistan would realise her folly and not persist in her aggressive actions. Therefore, the Indian response on the whole was mild. *The Times* testified that "the Indian reaction has been restrained"¹⁴ and the *Economist* pointed out that Indian retaliation "has been relatively mild."¹⁵

The facile assumption of Pakistan that the infiltrators would join the revolt which it expected would take place on their entry into Jammu and Kashmir was falsified. "There is no indication", wrote *The Times*,

12. See the *Economist*, September 3, 1965, p. 766.

13. The *Statesman*, August, 14, 1965.

14. See Editorial on August 12, 1965, p. 7.

15. September 3, 1965, p. 766.

"of any armed revolt by people on the Indian side, as announced by Pakistani Radio."¹⁶ *The Guardian* repudiated Pakistan's claim in these words:

"The events which have led to the Indo-Pakistan clash over Kashmir were not, as Pakistan claimed, an internal revolt against the tyranny of an illegitimate regime."¹⁷

By the end of August, Pakistan had grown desperate because her tactics had met with total failure. Among other things, she had hoped that a peaceful India, in the face of armed action, would agree to enter into negotiations on Kashmir and that diplomatic efforts from some quarters would also help her in achieving this aim. A foreign daily rightly said:

"In fact, however, the conception behind infiltrations appears to be more subtle. As the Rann of Kutch fighting confirmed, the seemingly unshakable Indian position might be changed by diplomatic intervention after the imminence of war."¹⁸

After having learnt a lesson a few months earlier, India refused to be coerced this time by any Power. She was now determined not to compromise the principles she had held so steadfastly since independence simply because of fear of use of force by Pakistan. India was now fully conscious of the paramount obligation she owed to herself and to the wider cause of freedom. But it is remarkable that at no time during the conflict did she adopt an arrogant attitude about her military strength.

Pakistan's failure in the first phase made her step up the military action, changing the character of the conflict into a full-scale *de facto* war between the two countries.

VI

SEPTEMBER 1 marked the beginning of the second phase of the conflict. On this day Pakistan crossed the Jammu-West Punjab international boundary in Chhamb with two tank regiments supported by artillery. "The objective was to wrest from India control of the vital road link between Kashmir and the rest of India, and thus isolate the Indian troops in the State along the cease-fire line with Pakistan as well as those guarding the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh."¹⁹ Simultaneously, Pakistan used her air force in the war for the first time. Thus she was responsible not only for starting the conflict but also for escalating it.

16. August 11, 1965, p. 7.

17. September 9, 1965, p. 1.

18. *The Times*, August 31, 1965, p. 8.

19. See *Who is the Aggressor?* Publications Division, New Delhi, 1965, p. 5.

Once again India was left with no choice but to take counter-measures to defend herself. Immediately after the Pakistani offensive, Indian Air Force planes went into action and destroyed several Pakistani tanks in the Chhamb sector. In other sectors also fierce battles were fought between the forces of the two countries. Some of the more crucial battles were fought in the air and before long India was able to establish her air superiority, which subsequently proved to be of decisive importance in shattering the military capability of Pakistan. Pakistan Air Force planes failed in their attempts to destroy key Indian radar installations. They bombed the *Dwarka* post in India on September 7 and used napalm bombs in some sectors.

The overwhelming force with which India was attacked in the Chhamb sector made her review her entire defence strategy. India could not afford to take the possible risk of her communication lines between Kashmir and the rest of the country being severed by Pakistan. Thus she was forced to open new fronts against Pakistan. To forestall fresh attacks by Pakistan and save Kashmir from being overrun by her, immediate action was called for. The marching of Indian troops from Amritsar to the Lahore sector in Pakistan on September 7 and later to other sectors and the raids Indian Air Force bombers made on major military targets in West Pakistan should be judged in this perspective.

During the next two weeks, till September 23, when the cease-fire agreement came into force, fierce battles were fought in many sectors of Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and in the border areas of Gujrat. Sialkot, Kasur, Chhamb, Kargil and Lahore were some of the major battle-fields. Though no formal war was declared by either side, there was a *de facto* war in existence all these days.

Whatever the claims of Pakistan, it is conceded even outside India that Indian troops and airmen gave an excellent account of themselves. They clearly demonstrated that the conclusions drawn by Pakistan about its military competence following the Indian reverses in NEFA in 1962 and the action in the Rann of Kutch were unwarranted. The military capability of Pakistan—her tanks, aeroplanes, bases and strategic places—was badly mauled by the effective Indian retaliation. During the conflict she became aware that in the event of a further escalation of the fighting it would not be possible for her to fight a prolonged war.²⁰ Pakistan was really in a difficult situation. Her adventurist policy had severely damaged her military strength built up by the West, particularly the United States, during the last decade. No foreign country, big or small, came forward to help her to the extent she wanted. Thus in spite of the Pakistan Foreign

20. In some measure India's superior military strength is testified by the fact that the area of Pakistan she is occupying is three times the area of India occupied by Pakistan.

Minister's threat to fight for a thousand years and the fact that none of those impossible conditions President Ayub Khan had put forward for ending the conflict had been fulfilled, Pakistan agreed, though somewhat belatedly, to the U.N. proposal for a cease-fire from September 23. Prime Minister Shastri was more than correct when he said on the day the cease-fire was ordered that Pakistan "wanted a cease-fire no doubt, indeed they needed it, but as is their practice they wanted to put up a show of resistance till the very last moment."²¹

VII

DURING the course of history States have, during peace as well as war, agreed to follow a certain code of civilised conduct. Many of the rules for such conduct are contained in the universally recognised principles of international law.

It was a matter of profound sorrow for India that Pakistan chose to utterly disregard such rules during the conflict. Apart from acts of loot and arson in civilian areas in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistan Air Force, perhaps irritated by its failure to cause any appreciable damage to militarily and politically strategic places in India, callously bombed several border towns of India, causing untold misery to innocent civilians. It bombed Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Ferozpur, Ambala, Jodhpur and some other Indian towns. Its attempts to bomb Delhi and other more important towns did not succeed. But the town of Amritsar was bombed in broad daylight a few hours after Pakistan had informed the Security Council of her acceptance of the cease-fire. It was no doubt an atrocious act.

During these operations Pakistan did not spare even churches, mosques, gurdwaras and other places of worship. Places like hospitals also became her target.

Perhaps the greatest act of Pakistani uncivility and treachery was the shooting down of a civilian plane flying over Indian territory carrying the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Mr. Balvantray G. Mehta, his wife, and a few other officers. The use of napalm bombs was against all universally accepted rules of conduct.

VIII

IT is on record that India's actions were of a diametrically opposite nature. The Indian Prime Minister's declaration that "we have no quarrel with the people of Pakistan and we wish them well,"²² was honoured in letter and in spirit, as demonstrated by the fact that Indian

21. See the *Statesman*, September 24, 1965.

22. *Ibid.*

acts of retaliation were essentially aimed at reducing the chances of further attack by Pakistan. She scrupulously avoided attacking civilian populations and places of worship. Even when the conflict reached a bitter stage and President Ayub Khan declared that Pakistan was at war with India, India's reaction was unusually calm and balanced. In reply, President Radhakrishnan said:

“But we in India do not regard ourselves as at war with Pakistan: we have friendly feelings for the people of Pakistan and have been careful to do precisely no more than what is required to safeguard our territorial integrity.”²³

At no time during the conflict was India in doubt about her objectives in relation to Pakistan. Nothing was farther from the truth than the entirely baseless propaganda that India wanted to destroy her. Prime Minister Shastri has repeatedly stated that India recognised Pakistan as a settled fact and that she does not want even an inch of Pakistani territory. How she practised these professions is best illustrated by the fact that her troops remained on the outskirts of Lahore and at no stage during the conflict did they try to capture the city.

In spite of some provocation, India avoided spreading the conflict on her border with East Pakistan because she had no quarrel with the people there who have always indicated their disagreement with official policy.

It may be restated that the Indian objective was to maul to the maximum possible extent the military capacity of Pakistan by damaging her tanks, airfields, radar stations, military bases, etc., so that she should cease to entertain the idea of attacking India again. In the past India had been generous to a fault in her relations with Pakistan and this had encouraged the latter to resort to armed action. In the performance of this painful duty India was able to achieve all that she wanted.

IX

DURING the conflict, the United Nations played an important role and brought about the cease-fire. At one stage it was feared that the escalation of the conflict would put the international organisation in jeopardy. The U.S. delegate, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, went to the extent of describing it as “the gravest problem”²⁴ the world body had ever faced. In the context of this study it would be instructive to briefly compare the attitudes and reactions of the two countries.

23. See his broadcast to the nation, *Ibid.* September 12, 1965.

24. See the *Times of India*, September 23, 1965.

In spite of her bitter experience with the U.N. in 1947-48, when she lodged a complaint of aggression against Pakistan, India, soon after the beginning of the present conflict, complained to the U.N. observers in Kashmir against the infiltrations of Pakistanis into Kashmir. On August 11, through her Permanent Representative, she asked the U.N. Secretary-General to persuade Pakistan not to continue her aggression.

The U.N. observers made investigations and General Nimmo submitted his report to U Thant. On the basis of this report, he promised to make a statement but owing to pressure from Pakistan, and maybe from other interested Powers also, he did not do so. In the meantime, the contents of General Nimmo's report had leaked out and it became widely known that he had clearly held Pakistan guilty of initiating the conflict.

India considered the General's report to be of crucial importance and in the last week of August made several requests to U Thant to publish it. But he did so when it was too late.

India has a legitimate grievance against U Thant because if the report had been published soon after its submission the aggressor would have been identified. A chorus of denunciation by world opinion would have followed and Pakistan might have been discouraged from escalating the conflict on September 1. Hence it is difficult to wholly absolve U Thant of the subsequent worsening of the situation. The omission helped Pakistan against India.

Later, when U Thant visited the two countries to make efforts to end the hostilities, their reactions were different. In Pakistan the official reception accorded to him was lukewarm and public reaction hostile. In contrast to this, the Government and people of India showed him all respect due to him "not only as a high dignitary, but also as a representative of the world organisation on which lies the heavy responsibility of preserving international peace."

Perhaps more important is the fact that on matters of substance the Pakistani attitude was most unhelpful. President Ayub Khan's three-point plan—immediate withdrawal of forces from Kashmir, creation of an Afro-Asian U.N. force for Kashmir pending a plebiscite, and the holding of the plebiscite within three months to end the conflict—was a clear rebuff to U Thant. To help ease the situation India, on the other hand, showed exemplary restraint. When asked to comment on the three-point plan, the Indian spokesman said: "We don't want to say anything to thwart the peace efforts of U Thant."²⁵ President Radhakrishnan's statement made on the eve of U Thant's visit to India is worth quoting:

25. See the *Times of India*, September 11, 1965.

"U Thant, the Secretary-General of the U.N., is trying to bring about a settlement in terms of the U.N. resolutions of September 4 and 6. I can assure him that India will always be prepared to give the fullest consideration to any suggestion that may result in the return of peace between India and Pakistan."²⁶

By putting forward impossible conditions, Pakistan, by implication, had rejected the cease-fire proposals. India accepted them unconditionally as was disclosed by Prime Minister Shastri in his letter to U Thant on September 14, 1965. He stated:

"In deference to the wishes of the Security Council and to the appeals which we have received from many friendly countries, we accept your proposal for an immediate cease-fire. We would, therefore, be prepared to order a cease-fire effective from 6:30 a.m. (IST) on Thursday, 16 September 1965, provided you confirm to me by 9 a.m. tomorrow that Pakistan is also agreeable to do so".²⁷

While accepting the cease-fire proposals, Mr. Shastri had restated his Government's position in regard to Kashmir. It is not often clearly understood that India's unconditional acceptance of the cease-fire proposals to end the conflict which Pakistan had begun on August 5 and escalated on September 1 was distinct from her steadfast adherence to the basic position she had held on Kashmir, a position which Pakistan was attempting to subvert by use of force. The two things were different and it would be wrong to treat the second as a condition or qualification for the acceptance of the first. Hence U Thant's view that

"both Governments have added to their replies to my request for an unconditional cease-fire conditions and qualifications upon which I have no right under the Security Council resolution to give undertakings."²⁸

was questionable. In attempting to equate the two countries, when they had taken different positions, was unwarranted by facts and was unfair to India.

As India was unequivocal in her reaction to the cease-fire proposals, Prime Minister Shastri corrected U Thant by replying: "You have said that you cannot give any undertakings. I fully appreciate and understand this and in fact I did not ask you for any."²⁹

26. For text see the *Hindustan Times*, September 12, 1965.

27. For the text of correspondence between Prime Minister Shastri and U Thant. See *Pakistan Frustrates U Thant Peace Mission*, New Delhi, 1965. The above lines are quoted from pp. 6-7.

28. See his letter dated September 14, 1965. *Ibid.* p. 8.

29. *Ibid.*

It is well known that the date of the cease-fire had to be changed because of Pakistan's tactics. After putting up a facade of stubbornness, she accepted the cease-fire, which she needed much more than India. Thus the hostilities ended on September 23, India having already accepted the cease-fire.

India showed dignity, forbearance and consideration to the United Nations while Pakistan's Foreign Minister not only indulged in histrionics but also threatened that his country would leave the world body if his designs were not allowed to succeed. "We have decided", he said, "to give the U.N. its last chance. . . . We will leave the U.N. and you will have one-third population of the world outside this organ. . . ."³⁰ What he was hinting at was more than clear. On the one hand he was trying to intimidate the U.N. so that it might serve as an instrument of his country's aggression against India and, on the other, he was giving notice of keeping company with the most belligerent Government in the world today.

In sum, it may be said that though from India's viewpoint some of the actions of the U.N. and its Secretary-General were unwarranted and even unfair, she did her utmost to uphold the dignity and authority of the world organisation. This was consistent with the general policy which Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister had formulated and implemented since independence.

Pakistan's threat to leave the U.N. continues. Even if she does not actually walk out of the world body, her action has already undermined its prestige and power which in turn is sure to weaken its competence to maintain peace. In history undemocratic regimes founded upon irresponsible military force have always been a source of obstruction in the growth of international law and organisation. Pakistan is the latest instance in point.

For a correct understanding of the conflict and for appreciation of India's stand, it is essential to keep in mind the date when the conflict was begun and the country responsible for doing so. The fact that it was on August 5 that Pakistan initiated the conflict has not been noticed in some quarters abroad. This has led some leaders to draw certain absolutely uncalled for conclusions and inferences.

If the events of August 5 are lost sight of then the other events flowing from them, which were linked to or dependent on them, cannot be understood. The starting point of the conflict provides the clue for the understanding of the subsequent actions and counter-actions taken by the two countries. It is a strange historical coincidence that a

³⁰. See the U.N. Security Council's proceedings, *the Times of India*, September 23, 1965.

similar situation had arisen in the case of Kashmir in 1947-48 and some countries, by ignorance or by design, had missed this starting point as some countries are doing in the present conflict also. Speaking in 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

"There has been aggression; and if it is called—as according to their own admission it must be called—aggression, then certain consequences ought to follow. There have been long discussions over the Kashmir issue and every aspect and phase and the past and present history have been considered, but what has been the major point? I repeat that because I think the fundamental factor is the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory; secondly, the denial of the fact of that aggression; thirdly, the present admission of the fact. These are the governing factors of that situation. And the argument has gone on for so long, because these governing factors were slurred over and were not emphasized. . . . And that has been the fundamental difficulty in this Kashmir business: *The fundamental issue has been slurred over and bypassed and passed over.*"³¹ (Italics added).

It is the same story in the present conflict. Pakistan committed aggression against India, first to deny it and later to accept it.

That Pakistan has committed an act of aggression against India should be clear beyond doubt. Without going into details it may be pointed out that Pakistan has been guilty of violating the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4) of which says: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. . . ."

Pakistan should know that, according to the rules of international law, aggression may result either from the action of a government in ordering an attack or from its failure to prevent "armed bands", "volunteers" or "infiltrators" from being organised for, and proceeding to, such an attack from its territory. How each of these elements of aggression is present in the action of Pakistan has been indicated earlier in this paper.

XI

PAKISTAN has been wanting to forcibly grab Kashmir and thus shatter the secular-democratic foundations of Indian polity. The determinants and motivations for realising this ambition in August-September 1965 have been indicated in the beginning of this study. With Pakistan choosing to attain her objectives on the battlefield,

31. See the collection of his speeches, *India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, 1961, p. 455.

India was left with no alternative but to retaliate in self-defence. It is good for the world, and good at least for future Indo-Pakistan relations, that many of the facile assumptions about the vitality of India's political system in general and her military competence in particular have been shattered.

DOCUMENTATION

African Socialism and its Application to Kenya-II

THE ultimate objectives of African Socialism are clear and have been set forth in Part I. The high priorities placed on political equality, social justice and human dignity mean that these principles will not be compromised in selecting policies designed to alleviate pressing and immediate problems. The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth. The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid growth. If growth is given up in order to reduce unemployment, a growing population will quickly demonstrate how false that policy is; if Africanization is undertaken at the expense of growth, our reward will be a falling standard of living; if free primary education is achieved by sacrificing growth, no jobs will be available for the school leavers. Growth, then, is the first concern of planning in Kenya, but the responsibility for the success of African Socialism in attaining this objective is a dual one. In addition to the efforts of Government, the people themselves must contribute zeal for exertion and efficiency, and high standards of personal and professional integrity in every walk of life.

Resource Limitations

The achievement of rapid growth requires careful planning and firm discipline in implementing plans to ensure that Kenya's limited resources are increased as rapidly as possible and used wisely in the promotion of growth. The critical shortages in Kenya at the present time are—

- (i) domestic capital;
- (ii) trained, educated and experienced manpower; and
- (iii) foreign exchange.

In addition there is the urgent need to conserve our natural resources through national land-use planning and to create the physical environment in which people can enjoy the fruits of their labour. We must also use more intensively and effectively not only our natural resources but our human resources as well.

Domestic Capital

The shortage of domestic capital stems from the low rate of domestic saving and the difficulties encountered in raising local and central government tax revenues. While several steps have been taken and other measures will be initiated to stimulate domestic saving and increase tax collections, the fundamental cause of the shortage of domestic capital is the low *per capita* incomes out of which people must finance a living before they can save and pay taxes. The real solution to this problem is to raise *per capita* incomes, that is, to grow. The dilemma we face is easy to state but much more difficult to solve—to grow faster we must save more but to save more we must grow faster.

It is unfortunate but true that if we had to depend solely on domestic saving and tax surpluses to grow, our growth might not even be rapid enough to keep pace with our burgeoning population. In order to compensate for our shortage of domestic capital, in order to grow rapidly so that our aspirations can be realized, we must borrow from foreign governments and international institutions and stimulate the inflow of private capital from abroad.

The policy of borrowing from abroad does not mean, however, that we can relax our efforts to promote domestic saving and tax surpluses. Indeed, it is only to the degree that we are successful in these efforts that we can—

- (i) in the near future attract more capital from abroad to raise our rate of growth; and
- (ii) ultimately succeed in reducing our reliance on foreign capital and increasing our share in the ownership of productive assets.

To attract more capital from abroad Kenya must be able to finance more of the local costs of development, to invest on an increasing scale in joint ventures with private capital, and to improve more rapidly our infrastructure. The more we can contribute to development, the more aid for development we can obtain from other sources. Indeed, it is estimated that for every pound Kenya can raise for development at least two pounds can be raised abroad. This enables us to grow three times as rapidly with foreign aid as we could grow without it.

In the longer term, however, it is our aim to maintain a rapid rate of growth with less dependence on foreign sources of capital. As incomes rise, therefore, our vigorous efforts to stimulate domestic saving and tax surpluses and to ensure their investment in Kenya must continue so that we can finance more and more of our own growth thus reducing our need for borrowing savings generated in other countries. In particular we must plan to raise the domestically

financed share of Government development expenditure from 25 per cent in 1965 to 33 per cent in 1970 by modifying the tax structure and restraining recurrent costs so that an increasing surplus can be generated for development; we must also stimulate savings by citizens so that more and more of our capital formation is financed and owned domestically; and we must also ensure that domestic savings are retained and invested in Kenya.

Skilled Manpower

Growth also requires ample supplies of skilled, trained and experienced manpower. Large numbers of high and middle level manpower are needed to teach in our rapidly expanding secondary school system, teachers' colleges and the university; to consolidate, survey and register land at a more rapid rate; to do agricultural research, provide extension services, train farm managers and operate National Farms, to manage private industrial and commercial establishments; to plan and implement forestry development, to expand water supplies, to man more hospital and health centres, to engineer and construct roads and irrigation schemes, to administer the affairs of Government, and even to prepare applications for foreign aid.

Kenya has ample numbers of unskilled manpower and every effort will be made to use their services wherever possible. But untrained people cannot be used as teachers, planners, engineers, surgeons, doctors, surveyors, architects, managers and administrators without turning growth into decline. As with capital, we can grow rapidly now only by supplementing our meagre supply of domestic, trained manpower with large numbers of skilled people borrowed from abroad. It is a choice between rapid growth and little or none, not between rapid growth and a little less. In order to grow rapidly and to replace expatriates with comparably qualified Kenya citizens as soon as possible, we must employ in the near future large numbers of foreign experts both to assist in planning and carrying out the work that needs to be done and also to educate and train in the schools and on the job the Kenyans who will ultimately make the foreign experts unnecessary.

The present situation can be indicated by noting that the Government now employs 25 highly trained surveyors, only two of whom are African, and has 11 vacancies; the Government has 22 hydraulics engineers, one of whom is an African, and has seven vacancies; of 811 doctors in Kenya, approximately 50 are African; of 1,569 secondary school teachers, 364 are African; and of 316 teachers in teachers' training colleges, 126 are African. The full significance of these figures cannot be realized unless it is appreciated that many more than are now employed will be needed if desired rates of growth of these ser-

vices are to be achieved. In order to provide secondary education for 50 per cent of the population of eligible age, for example, nearly ten times as many teachers would be required. The shortage of trained, educated and experienced manpower is now so great that even the preparation of applications for foreign aid becomes a major and slow moving process and our ability to implement major projects is being brought into question by several sources of foreign aid. Indeed, the danger exists that we will build through foreign aid and self-help, hospitals, health centres and school buildings with little or no hope of filling them with doctors, nurses and teachers.

Finally, the very long time it takes to train professional people means that shortages of high level manpower will be with us for several planning periods. The approximately 10,000 students now enrolled in Form I will be prepared to take jobs requiring a secondary level education only in 1969. Probably only 5,000 of these will pass their Cambridge School Certificate examinations and about 2,400 will continue into Form V. Perhaps 1,800 will continue with university work with about 1,600 receiving degrees in 1975. If 400 go on for advanced work, they cannot be counted as part of our manpower supply until 1976 or beyond. In the case of doctors, for which the need is so great, none of the students now in Form I will be available to us before 1978, and the numbers emerging will still leave us far short of the number we must have.

Our domestic supply of trained manpower must be augmented as quickly as possible and used efficiently and effectively. The expansion of educational facilities and apprenticeship and training programmes, the establishment of special purpose training centres, and the promotion of adult education will all help to meet immediate needs particularly for middle level manpower skills. Those people already trained and educated and in jobs must use their scarce skills fully, making every working hour a genuine contribution to development and willingly devoting extra hours to important tasks. The organization of work must be carefully arranged to ensure that scarce skills are not being wasted on more routine duties. In these ways maximum development effort will be obtained from our available domestic manpower.

Foreign Exchange

Payments for goods and services bought from abroad and repayments of foreign loans must be made in foreign currencies. We can acquire these currencies by selling goods and services abroad, promoting tourism, borrowing abroad and reducing Kenya's holdings of foreign assets. A foreign exchange problem arises when we cannot pay our bills abroad except by emergency borrowing or reducing our

holdings of foreign assets (and our own currency because many of these assets support our currency) to dangerously low levels.

Kenya does not now have a foreign exchange problem but great care must be exercised to ensure that the steps we take to promote development, including our foreign policy, do not create this problem. More rapid growth means buying more capital goods from abroad to generate growth and importing more consumer goods to satisfy the growing demands of people with higher incomes. As capital goods do not create immediately enough additional production to pay for themselves, the foreign exchange required to buy them must usually be obtained through borrowing or a surplus of current exports over imports. At the present time, Kenya is succeeding in borrowing enough from abroad to pay for its excess of imports over exports.

To avoid future foreign exchange problems, Kenya must use these borrowed funds and imported capital goods efficiently and in the production of more goods and services either for export or for import substitution. Then the money borrowed can be repaid out of the additional foreign exchange earned or saved. If, however, Kenya uses foreign funds for the transfer of existing assets or uses them inefficiently in new development efforts, their use will not generate the foreign exchange needed for repayment and development may have to be curtailed. Foreign exchange needed to buy goods and services for development can also be lost through capital flight and excessive imports of consumer goods. Capital flight is usually a sign of lack of confidence in the economy, fear of one's future in that economy, or a deliberate attempt to hamper national progress. The Government would prefer to limit capital flight by building confidence and stimulating cooperation rather than using quantitative controls but if exceptional circumstances require the latter, they will be used. If imports of consumer goods rise too rapidly, the Government must be prepared to take steps to control such imports or to make them more expensive through tariff increases, purchase taxes, or differential exchange rates.

While foreign exchange is not generally a problem in Kenya at the moment, bilateral trade and aid agreements can lead to specific currency problems. If we sell goods to a country whose currency is not convertible into the currency of other countries, that foreign exchange is valuable to us only if we can find useful goods to buy in that country at reasonable prices. If not, Kenya, a developing country, is simply advancing credit to the more developed country. Furthermore, as the currencies of these countries are not convertible, a serious difficulty arises in financing the local costs associated with the capital equipment these countries can supply in foreign aid. Finally, to facilitate repayment to such countries Kenya goods must be sold there or our supplies of convertible currencies seriously reduced. These

difficulties are not always insurmountable but must be carefully considered when bilateral arrangements are made in non-convertible currencies.

It will be seen from the foregoing that as a developing country we must scrutinize all aid offers in relation to our foreign exchange policies. We must avoid, for example, aid which requires us merely to advance credit to a developed country or to mortgage our future production to any given country or which makes us a mere dumping ground for products of a donor country. Aid terms must be related to the productivity of the project and its positive contribution to our economy. These are matters which must not be decided upon just on political or emotional considerations.

Proper Use of Domestic Resources

Much of our land, water and labour can be used more intensively and effectively without substantial aid from abroad. Opportunities of this kind must be quickly and fully developed. Many acres of idle land could be producing crops if farmers would put in more effort. If every person on the land cultivated one extra row, the output of the nation would be substantially larger. If people who are unemployed in the cities would return to their land, further increases in output could be achieved. Idleness, whether of land or labour, cannot be countenanced in a nation that needs every ear of maize, grain of wheat, and pound of cotton. Self-reliance and independence mean the ability and willingness to do things for ourselves.

While many of our domestic resources are not fully utilized, still others are being dissipated, wasted and in some cases destroyed. The use of outmoded farming techniques may result in erosion; the cutting of windbreaks and the burning of vegetation may turn fertile acres into desert; and the destruction of forests may eliminate important water supplies. Practices tending to harm rather than conserve our physical environment must be curbed through education and legislation.

Critical Issues and Choices

These limitations to growth are blunt, hard facts that force choices on us. We want to grow rapidly; to transform the economy from a subsistence to a market economy, to develop our land and introduce modern agricultural methods; to industrialize; to Africanize; to provide more employment opportunities; to have universal primary education; to expand secondary school enrolments; to build hospitals and health centres; and to relieve the housing shortage. To do all of these things quickly and simultaneously would require many more resources

than we have or can quickly acquire. We must, therefore, make choices in deciding how to use our limited resources. Some of the more crucial choices facing us now and on which decisions must be made are :

- (i) Under what circumstances and to what extent should we *nationalize* means of production?
- (ii) What means should be used to promote *Africanization*?
- (iii) In present circumstances, how much of our development budget should be devoted to expanding *welfare services*?
- (iv) What means should be used to promote *domestic saving* and retain it for investment in Kenya?
- (v) What should be the role of the *tax structure* in increasing revenue, establishing incentives, distributing income and diffusing economic power?
- (vi) What part should *self-help* play in development?
- (vii) What *agricultural and land tenure policies* should be decided to promote growth and prevent concentrations of economic power?
- (viii) What means should be used to reverse the trend in many parts of the country towards depleting *natural resources*—land degradation, destruction of watersheds and encroachment of desert?
- (ix) What priorities should be adopted in building *educational facilities* and providing training programmes?
- (x) How should *public utilities* be owned, regulated and managed?
- (xi) What methods should be used to develop *industry, commerce and tourism*?
- (xii) What should be the role of *trade unions* in promoting development?
- (xiii) What means should be used to protect the interests of *consumers*?
- (xiv) How much should be spent and for what purposes to help the *less developed parts* of the country?

Until policies on these matters are settled and agreed, development planning will remain an academic affair in Kenya—a paper exercise having little impact on reality.

Nationalization

Nationalization is a useful tool that has already been used in Kenya and will be used again when circumstances require. The pertinent questions are at what cost, for what purpose, and when.

The Constitution and the KANU Manifesto make it clear that African Socialism in Kenya does not imply a commitment to indiscriminate nationalization. These documents do commit the Government to prompt payment of full compensation whenever nationalization is used. Kenya's policy with respect to nationalization should be more clearly defined within these stipulations.

It should be recognized that if the nation's limited domestic capital is used to buy existing land, livestock, buildings, machinery and equipment, the nation has no more productive assets than before—only their ownership has changed. What may be lost are the new resources that could have been purchased instead—the new schools, hospitals, roads, water supplies, irrigation schemes, rolling stock, land surveys, housing, lodges, airports and harbour development—and the employment opportunities and added output that these new developments would create. Further, the money paid for nationalized resources and the people who managed them before nationalization would most likely leave the country increasing our foreign exchange and skilled manpower problems. There is also the firm likelihood that nationalization would discourage additional private investment, thus reducing further the rate of growth of the economy. It is also the case that the use of domestic capital to nationalize would reduce our ability to match foreign aid funds leading to an even greater reduction in development expenditure. Finally, some speak of nationalization as though it should be applicable only to non-African enterprises. If the policy were applied to an economic activity, such as bus transportation, it would affect everyone, African and otherwise, owning productive resources in the industry.

Though the cost is great there may be circumstances when nationalization will be needed—

- (i) when the assets in private hands threaten the security or undermine the integrity of the nation; or
- (ii) when productive resources are being wasted; or
- (iii) when the operation of an industry by private concerns has a serious detrimental effect on the public interest; *and*
- (iv) when other less costly means of control are not available or are not effective.

It must also be clear that in most cases when an industry is nationalized it must be operated efficiently, cover its costs and earn a profit at least equivalent to the taxes paid when operated privately. If taxes must be used year after year to subsidize its operation, the nation has gained little if anything by the act of nationalization.

Nationalization then will be considered if the need is urgent, if other less costly controls are ineffective, and if it is understood that

most industries nationalized will not be operated at a loss. Nationalization would also be desirable regardless of cost where a service is vital to the people and must be provided by Government as part of its responsibility to the nation.

Africanization, Asset Transfers and Citizenship

Africanization is an urgent problem but in any reasonable perspective is likely to be of short-term duration. That it will be achieved in the not too distant future is unquestionable. The problem is rather to reconcile the urgency of the matter *with* citizenship guarantees *and* the desire for rapid economic *growth*.

The Constitution provides for equal treatment of *all* citizens and the KANU Manifesto states that the KANU Government will "guarantee the position of every citizen according to the Bill of Rights...Citizens will have the right to follow the profession and trade of their choosing and to own property". Thus political equality and equality of opportunity are guaranteed for *all citizens* as a matter of right.

Nevertheless, imbalances have been inherited from the past and these imbalances must be corrected. The most direct way would be to use Government's limited development money to buy existing properties for Africans. Such purchases could be made on a willing buyer/willing seller basis without violating the Constitution. However, such purchases would have the same effect on development as indiscriminate nationalization; namely, to reduce substantially the amounts the Government can spend on new development. Further, the properties so transferred are likely to be the least efficient if only because it will be the owners of these properties who will be most willing to sell, placing the Africans at a disadvantage from the outset. If, in addition, such transfers are made to untrained, inexperienced people, they may go bankrupt making Africanization a temporary rather than a lasting phenomena. Moreover, as such transfers would reduce the rate of growth, more opportunities for Africanization might be destroyed than could be created.

Africanization in agriculture has taken the principal form of land settlement which is based primarily on the transfer, reorganization and development of some of the land formerly European-owned. This approach has been necessary for political reasons—to ensure that areas formerly closed to Africans were opened to them. These areas are now open to Africans; settlement policy should hereafter be based on its *economic* benefits and on Kenya's wishes and terms instead of those of the United Kingdom as has hitherto been the case.

We have to consider what emphasis should be given in future to settlement as against development in African areas. The same money

spent on land consolidation, survey, registration and development in the African areas would increase productivity and output on four to six times as many acres and benefit four to six times as many Africans. It, therefore, follows that if our resources must be used to achieve maximum growth we must give priority in the future to development in the former African areas.

From the foregoing discussion it follows that the principal policies for achieving Africanization should be those that are consistent with growth and development. In this regard the Government has already undertaken, and in its plans has provisions for various programmes for Africanizing the economy. These programmes include—

- (i) providing education, training and experience for Africans to equip them for the efficient exercise of entrepreneurial and farm-management functions;
- (ii) making capital available to Africans with small down payments and at low interest rates through such organizations as the Land Bank, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, and the marketing boards;
- (iii) following up provision of capital with extension services whether in agriculture, commerce or industry;
- (iv) helping African traders and businessmen directly through the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC);
- (v) stimulating large-scale investment through the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK) and the proposed Kenya Tourist Development Corporation which ensure that the Government has a direct interest in this investment;
- (vi) promoting producer, marketing and consumer cooperatives and training people to run them so that larger scale opportunities are opened to Africans with limited capital;
- (vii) promoting home ownership through tenant-purchase schemes, self-help housing projects, co-operative housing associations, and mortgage finance institutions;
- (viii) participating with private capital in many ventures such as the Kenya Power Company, East African Power and Lighting Company, Tana River Development Corporation, Chemilil Sugar Project, East African Pulp and Paper Company, and the Kenya Cannery;
- (ix) making direct investments through the Agricultural Development Corporation and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation.

- (x) setting up certain State enterprises such as the National Trading Company, the proposed Co-operative Bank, and the proposed State Construction Company; and
- (xi) Africanizing the Civil Service as rapidly as possible. This process is being accelerated through training of Africans, at home and abroad, to qualify them for new positions and promotions. Here it is important to realize that since the public sector will be expanding more rapidly than the other sectors, it will be an increasingly more important means for employing Africans.

The bulk of these efforts are directed toward establishing Africans in a firm position in the monetary sector by ensuring that a large share of the planned new expansion is African owned and managed. Thus the ICDC, for instance, will be encouraged to participate in the construction of shopping centres and industrial estates; and many enterprises financed with foreign capital will provide for increasing African ownership as domestic private savings permit. It might also be considered whether, to facilitate the Africanization process, licensing for certain types of trade and business should be restricted to citizens only with a deliberate bias in favour of African applicants. In any case, both foreign and domestic firms should be required to provide training facilities for Africans at all levels.

Welfare Services and Economic Development

The declared aim of the Government is to provide medical and hospital services, old age and disability benefits, free and universal primary education, benefits for the unemployed, and financial aid to all who need and merit it for university work. These are the objectives of African Socialism, but to provide them fully and freely now would bankrupt the nation and mortgage economic growth for generations. Greater expenditures by the Government on social services or on unproductive, as opposed to productive, unemployment relief projects reduce the amounts available for economic development, retard growth and postpone even longer the time when a full welfare programme can be implemented. Nevertheless, it is the clear intention of the Government to make steady and substantial progress towards the attainment of these objectives.

The Government's capacity to achieve its desired objectives is restricted by our limited resources, which restrain our ability to expand, and by our high rate of population growth, which rapidly increases the size of the task. With population growing in excess of 3 per cent per annum nearly seven million jobs will be needed by the year 2000 and over 230,000 adult males will at that time be added to the labour force each year. A more moderate rate of population growth of

1.7 per cent per annum, approximating the world rate, would mean a male labour force of 4.5 million growing at 60,000 per annum in the year 2000. The effect of slower growth on numbers of children of primary school age is even more pronounced. With present fertility rates universal education would require facilities for over six million children in the year 2000 at an annual recurrent cost of perhaps £49 million. More moderate growth would reduce this cost to £18 million because facilities would be needed for only 2.3 million children. A high rate of population growth means a large dependent population, reduces the money available for development, lowers the rate of growth and makes exceedingly difficult the task of increasing social services. A programme of family planning education will be given high priority.

The problem of providing welfare services on a large scale is not solely financial. The limitation of skilled manpower is of perhaps equal importance. It takes a long time to train doctors, teachers, nurses and social workers. Without supplies of such people many times greater than are now available, the offer of free services could not be supported. Financial and manpower limitations again combine to limit progress toward desired ends.

But progress is being made. Limited medical and hospital services are being made available to the destitute; primary education is being expanded more rapidly than population and some children from poor homes can be exempted from paying fees; bursaries are available to many in secondary schools and universities; employment opportunities are being created for some of the unemployed; and a National Provident Fund and a National Health Insurance Scheme will be starting soon. These efforts may seem meagre when compared with desires but they are generous indeed, given our limited resources. They form the basis for our future expansion of services.

Stimulating and Retaining Domestic Saving

No nation can grow without saving some of its income for investment in the development of the country. Domestic saving must not only be increased, but must also be retained and invested at home. The promotion of domestic saving must be encouraged in order to assist in both private and public development.

Compulsory saving should be accepted in principle and means worked out to implement it. The National Provident Fund will be, of course, a type of compulsory saving. In order to stimulate voluntary saving the variety of savings methods open to the public should be increased including a Unit Trust and savings bonds tailored to particular future needs of families such as education, housing, and durable consumer goods. The Government should take steps to

develop the nation's money markets and, in particular, to stimulate wider interest and participation in the stock exchange. Measures should also be adopted to encourage the retention and reinvestment of profits. The full taxation of dividends—i.e. without credit for company tax—would assist in this regard.

Monetary and investment policies must be designed to ensure that domestic savings are invested in Kenya and not abroad. In particular, insurance companies and other financial institutions that operate in Kenya should in future be required through appropriate legislation to invest in Kenya except for necessary external investments such as reinsurance. Many businessmen in Kenya, Asians in particular, have money that should be invested directly in their own enterprises or made available through loans to the Government or to such agencies for development as the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation and the Development Finance Company of Kenya.

The operation of commercial banks should be more closely supervised and controlled either by a central bank for East Africa or for Kenya. Enterprising Africans should be encouraged to develop indigenous commercial banks so that Kenya's dependence on monetary policies abroad can be reduced.

Tax Structure

The Government's tax structure performs several functions including—

- (i) supplying funds for recurrent costs and development;
- (ii) providing incentives and disincentives to influence the pattern and methods of production and consumption; and
- (iii) modifying the distribution of income and wealth.

The tax system should in fact be a major weapon for implementing African Socialism—in providing funds for development, in guiding and controlling activities in the private sector and in creating an equitable distribution of income and wealth.

The highest priority must be assigned to increasing tax collections by both the Central Government and Local Authorities in order to provide a substantial margin over recurrent costs for development. This requires positive action because the present tax system is not sufficiently responsive to changes in income. As more and more of our domestic demand is satisfied with domestic production, import duties will become less important as a source of revenue. Other sources must be found. The main ways that must be considered to increase tax collections in the future are—

- (i) *a full pay-as-you-earn system* of collecting income taxes;
- (ii) *reduction in personal tax allowances*;
- (iii) *progressive inheritance taxes* and review of death duties;
- (iv) *excise duties* on selected commodities;
- (v) *sales and entertainment taxes* that exclude basic necessities;
- (vi) extension of the list of commodities subject to *export duties* and revision of existing rates;
- (vii) *expansion of property taxes*;
- (viii) *a capital gains tax*;
- (ix) *elimination of foreign gambling pools* and the like from Kenya and collection by the Government of a larger share of such gains;
- (x) *full taxation of dividends* without credit for company taxes;
- (xi) *charging for some services* now rendered free by the Government, in particular charging tolls on major highways.

Finally, sources of revenue like school fees are really a form of tax that is relatively easy to collect. Until Kenya's tax base is substantially broadened and regular tax collections are substantially more in excess of recurrent costs than they are now, such fees must be retained. To reduce them in the near future would force a substantial reduction in planned development.

Other sources of Government revenue must also be more intensively used than in the past. Government assets held abroad should be invested in Kenya to the extent that this is legal; fiduciary issue should be more fully utilized; and more devices should be sought for channelling more domestic savings into Government hands. These matters are continuously under discussion in the Government with careful consideration given to the timing and administrative problems involved.

The relationship between the development and recurrent budgets is, of course, significant. Any economies on the recurrent side increase funds for development. Indeed, when development funds are matched with aid from abroad it is likely that every pound saved on recurrent means three pounds for development. Arbitrary cuts in recurrent costs, on the other hand, cannot be considered. In general, every four pounds spent on development increase recurrent costs by one pound. To force recurrent costs below what is necessary would mean that development projects could not be operated.

In modifying the tax structure, incentive efforts must be considered. Import duties have the effect of switching demand from imports

to domestic production; duty drawbacks stimulate domestic production also; excise taxes can modify the composition of output; and excessive taxation can force capital abroad and reduce the attractiveness of Kenya to outside investors. A particularly pressing problem is to modify incentives to industry. The present investment allowance does attract capital but it also stimulates the substitution of capital for labour. The incentives to industry should be modified so that employment of labour is encouraged as a means of alleviating unemployment over the years. While incentives to industry must be adequate to attract private investment, concessions and protection must be carefully co-ordinated and tailored to the needs of each industry to ensure that protection is not excessive in relation to the needs of the industry or its contribution to the economy. These matters should be investigated by the new Industrial Protection Committee. Idle resources and underdeveloped land should be taxed in ways designed to encourage efficient use and development. The present system of taxing land on its unimproved site values has this effect.

The tax structure must also be a major means for effecting a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Those with high incomes and wealth must accept a greater responsibility to pay the taxes needed for development and social services. The following policies would have the desired effects and will be considered:—

- (i) Exempting from direct taxes people making extremely low incomes. In particular, the objective should be to begin at once to eliminate for this group the graduated personal tax, substituting property taxes for it.
- (ii) Retaining the progressive income tax, lowering allowances. (Some of these allowances were designed during colonial times to serve expatriate civil servants and settlers who looked overseas for security, vacations, and education for their children).
- (iii) Adopting progressive inheritance taxes.
- (iv) Making any capital gains tax progressive.
- (v) Exempting basic necessities from sales and excise taxes.
- (vi) Taxing luxury items heavily.

The tax structure will not, however, be made prohibitive or confiscatory. Reasonable levels of profits, property accumulation and standards of living are necessary and desirable if a high rate of growth is to be achieved and enjoyed.

Self-help and Community Development

In a country short of resources every method that increases the allocation of resources to development must be utilized. Self-help

in Kenya has strong roots in African traditions and has therefore important potential for development. *But it, too, must be planned and controlled.*

Self-help cannot provide all of the resources needed to construct a project and keep it running. If the need for complementary resources, such as trained manpower and revenues to cover recurrent costs, are not forthcoming or are obtained at the expense of other planned developments, self-help can slow growth and frustrate participants rather than promote development and welfare. The development programme for secondary schools prepared by the Ministry of Education, for example, is tailored to the supply of domestic and foreign teachers and a vigorous foreign recruitment programme will be necessary to make the plan a success. If many "*Harambee*" secondary schools are constructed, they will either have no teachers, unqualified teachers or qualified teachers taken away from the planned programme. If "*Harambee*" schools cannot find teachers or the recurrent costs cannot be met, the resources of the country will have been wasted. Similar examples could be cited with regard to health centres and other projects. Self-help projects must be fitted into the plan and self-help efforts must be guided into useful channels. Self-help is an integral part of planned development and must be subject to the same discipline as other parts of the developed effort. Planning in this respect is very much like exchange controls—one significant hole in the dike can reduce all other efforts to nought.

Agriculture and Land Tenure

Agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, encompasses the whole country and provides a living for the majority of Kenya families. Our plans in agriculture provide perhaps the best example of African Socialism at work. Almost every form of organization will be utilized in this sector including national farms, co-operatives, companies, partnerships and individual farms. National farms will play their most important role in providing essential national services such as hybrid seeds and quality livestock. To conserve Kenya's limited development money, partnership with private capital will be considered provided that private participants will accept that Government policies will be dominant in the operation of the farms. Co-operatives and companies will be utilized where large-scale methods of production or marketing are needed. The bulk of individual ownership will be moderate size plots, but marketing for many individually owned farms will be arranged through co-operatives. The progressive Africanization of ownership will be provided for through settlement schemes and increasingly through schemes that permit the gradual substitution of African for foreign ownership as domestic savings increase. Some of

the tea factories are now organized in this way, and this example will be extended to selected other agricultural developments as well.

Development in agriculture will be given first priority in the African areas. The use of funds here will increase output, yields, employment and *per capita* incomes much more rapidly and effectively and on four to six times the acreage than the use of these funds for settlement. The present practice of spending a large proportion of the Government budget on the settlement and development of a limited acreage in former European areas should be phased out and future funds channelled to the development of the great potential of the African areas. What is now urgently needed is *development, not merely land transfer*. Consolidation and registration will make farm credit and modern methods of agriculture possible and should expand employment much more rapidly than settlement can, by bringing more land into productive use.

The settlement process was inherited from the British and was designed more to aid those Europeans who wanted to leave than the Africans who received the land. Our land problems should not be settled on terms decided in the United Kingdom. Instead, our policies and plans in agriculture should be determined by our need to develop, and financial support sought for these plans from several sources. However, there have been reasons for settlement. Many European farmers wished to leave and the United Kingdom Government was willing to give grants and loans to Kenya to enable them to go. Neither of these reasons takes into consideration the present need for development in Kenya. It is unlikely that Kenya, in accepting the debt burden, has obtained economic benefits of anywhere near the amount of the debt incurred.

There is need, however, to ensure a continuing market in land. Hitherto some of the financial institutions in Kenya, and certainly the Land Bank, have been designed and developed to facilitate transfers largely from non-Africans. There is therefore the need to remodel these institutions so that they can serve the country as a whole, not just a few individuals and areas.

The need for discipline in implementing agricultural development is apparent, and appropriate legislation and strict enforcement of existing legislation is necessary to ensure that—

- (i) loans for development are properly used;
- (ii) loans are repaid promptly and delinquents appropriately and promptly punished;
- (iii) those committing theft and deliberate damage to crops and stock are quickly and severely punished;

- (iv) the few in an area of land consolidation who refuse to co-operate in survey and registration work are made to comply;
- (v) those few who refuse to co-operate in a major cooperative farming scheme are made to do so or lose their land.

There is also urgent need for a land tenure policy to ensure that projected agricultural development is not concentrated in the hands of the few. Having regard to some of the problems of transition, a working party might be established to consider the need and practicability of establishing ceilings on individual ownership of property, and to advise on the machinery for making these effective. Here it must be pointed out that any ceilings decided upon must apply *throughout the country*. In order to put an end to the buying of land for speculative purposes by non-citizens, there should be a ban on future purchase of agricultural land by non-citizens unless approved by the Government.

It should be established that priority in future should be given to producer co-operatives formed by people such as workers and squatters already employed on the land. Such priority could be enforced by having credit facilities made available to such groups as against individuals wishing to buy the land.

The use of land will be closely controlled and legislation will be needed to make such control effective. Idle land and mismanaged farms will not be permitted whether such land is owned by Kenya citizens or foreigners. Licensing and quotas will be used to control the production of many major crops and the Government will establish prices in the joint interest of producers and consumers. Production and yields will also be influenced by Government extension services and research, and the readiness of the people to accept advice and adopt new methods.

The marketing boards will be used to promote a socialist organization of the country's economy. The growth of these boards in the past has been haphazard and in some cases intended to protect only one interest or group. There are too many boards leading to duplication of effort, waste of manpower and confusion in policy. It is therefore necessary to review and streamline the organization and operation of all marketing boards and to use them as a positive agency for promoting our socialist policies.

Conservation of Natural Resources

The heritage of future generations depends on the adoption and implementation of policies designed to conserve natural resources and create the physical environment in which progress can be enjoyed.

The thoughtless destruction of forests, vegetation, wildlife, and productive land threatens our future and must be brought under control. A national land-use policy must be created and physical planning must be extended from the towns and cities to districts and rural areas. The conservation of water supplies and productive land through the maintenance of forests and windbreaks, proper methods of land cultivation, and prevention of fire and flood must be actively promoted by the Government and the people must be fully informed and their co-operation ensured. The importance of wildlife to Kenya's future prosperity must be appreciated by everyone and national parks and reserves must be protected and preserved.

Education, Training and Experience

At Kenya's stage of development, education is much more an economic than a social service. It is our principal means for relieving the shortage of domestic skilled manpower and equalizing economic opportunities among all citizens. For that reason it is of the utmost importance that the construction of unaided schools should conform to the nation's needs and supply of teachers, and curricula should be required to meet Government specified standards. It is expected, of course, that all citizens will contribute to the development of education through self-help payment of school fees and taxes, and service as teachers. In addition to its economic benefits, widespread education should develop good citizens, promote national unity, and encourage proper use of leisure time.

The advances in education in recent years have been impressive. Enrolment in primary schools has risen from 891,553 in 1963 to 1,028,000 in 1965. This is an impressive advance towards the declared Government objective of universal primary education. It is now estimated that approximately 70 per cent of those in the age-group eligible for Standard I are now attending school. It is the Government's intention, after studying the Education Commission Report, to adopt a definite schedule and date for achieving universal primary education. Secondary schools of all kinds jumped in number from 141 in 1962 to 222 in 1964, and the Government itself has opened 56 new Form I classes in 1965. Kenyatta College at Kahawa is now operating six Form I classes, three Form V classes and a Teacher's Training College.

The immediate objectives in education are to expand secondary level facilities as rapidly as teacher supply and recurrent cost implications permit. This is, of course, important to the training of manpower, the acceleration of Africanization and increasing the proportion of K.P.E. candidates that can continue in education. In order to generate more teachers, teacher-training facilities must also be expanded rapidly. The work of the Education Commission will be an invaluable

aid to the Government in its planning in this field. Finally, the plans for Nairobi University College must be fully integrated with the Government Development Plan if the University College is to contribute effectively in solving our manpower problem.

The shortage of skilled manpower cannot be cured by general education alone. Trades must also be taught and firms must co-operate in providing in-service training and apprenticeship programmes on a growing scale both in commerce and in industry. The management training programme at Nakuru, Egerton College, the farm management work contemplated at Thomson's Falls, the U.N. Special Fund Management and Productivity Centre, are programmes sponsored by the Government to alleviate the shortage of managerial resources and to qualify more Africans for management tasks. In addition, there is an urgent need for a commercial training and apprenticeship programme and for a co-operative school to train personnel to run producer, marketing and consumer co-operatives. Capital and advice will be provided on an increasing scale through the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation and the Agricultural Finance Corporation to give Africans the useful experience necessary to become successful entrepreneurs.

Even with these programmes and educational efforts Kenya will not be able to meet from domestic sources the rapidly growing need for high and middle level manpower for many years to come. Therefore, every effort will be made to retain qualified expatriates, to use sources of technical assistance wisely, and to mount recruiting campaigns abroad for particularly critical shortages like teachers, doctors, water engineers, surveyors, etc. These efforts will not, however, be enough. The Government must also take steps to ensure that Kenyans aided in their education by the Government are guided into those studies and occupations where skilled manpower is most urgently needed.

Public Utilities

Information and broadcasting, railways and harbours, posts and telecommunications, secondary and trunk roads, irrigation facilities, airports, national parks, statistical services, water and sewage facilities, and forest plantations are responsibilities of the Government. They will all be expanded as a basis for development. The critical issues in this sector concern public utility services that continue to be run by private operators.

Surface transportation, outside of the railways, is privately owned and operated through many small enterprises. As such it is proving to be an excellent training ground for African entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, the services provided are varied in standard and quality

and frequently are wholly unsatisfactory. When funds are available, nationalization of many segments of surface transportation may be required, but the immediate need is to find solutions that will be less expensive in terms of Government money now urgently needed for development elsewhere. The most pressing problems are urban passenger transportation and cross-country, trunk road passenger transport.

The first step is regulatory legislation by the municipalities and the Government to provide the necessary powers to enforce high quality, uniform standards of services. If efforts to regulate turn out to have unsatisfactory results, partnerships with private capital and management could be explored, preferably with large, experienced firms operating in municipalities or cross-country roads. The Government or municipality would buy a minority equity interest in the firm and the private company would provide the balance of the necessary capital in equity and loans with the provision that when the loans are repaid, the company created would become wholly owned by the Government or municipality. Thus capital and qualified management would be obtained at little initial cost to the Government and the participation of the Government would ensure operation in the public interest. It is, however, possible that the public transport in Nairobi and Mombasa could be operated by these local authorities. In the not very distant future these municipalities may need to plan for the provision of underground transportation and parking facilities.

The Kenya Government owns $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the equity in the East African Power and Lighting Company, $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the Kenya Power Company, and 25 per cent of the Tana River Development Company. The latter two companies will become wholly Kenya owned when present indebtedness is repaid. The Electric Power Act provides that the Government can revoke, with consent of the licensee and on just terms, any power licence including any held by the East African Power and Lighting Company. Because of the strong Government interest and participation in power, no major decision is taken in Kenya without the concurrence of the Government. The method is effective and inexpensive.

Industry, Commerce and Tourism

The Government expects the private sector to play a large role in development, subject, however, to firm guidance, and explicit controls when necessary. This approach will permit Kenya to attract private capital and management which could not otherwise be obtained for development. Some basic industries regarded as fundamental to industrial development will have Government participation. This is because many of the beneficial effects of important industries, such as

their contribution to foreign exchange, labour training, and the relief of unemployment, are not given full weight in purely commercial considerations. Examples of this approach include the Chemilil Sugar Factory and the pulp mill planned for Broderick Falls. Partnerships with private capital will also be instituted by the DFCK and ICDC.

The main lines of industrial development will be determined by Government planning. A survey of possible new industries for Kenya has just been completed and more comprehensive surveys will follow. The industries listed have been ranked according to their probable contribution to development and this ranking will influence Government decisions on support, protection and preferential status. An Industrial Protection Committee has recently been established with the function of advising on the appropriate treatment to be accorded to the various industries now in Kenya or likely to be attracted here. Scheduling of industry will ensure that total output is not restricted but that the number of firms in an industry is controlled so that each can operate at an efficient scale of production. Industrial development in Kenya, therefore, will not be haphazard in nature but rather planned and guided.

The use of industrial assets will be subject to safeguards designed to ensure that their use is in the public interest. The rights of workers will be guaranteed and means for controlling the quality of output, monopoly profits and unfair market practices will be embodied in legislation.

In commerce, at the wholesale level, the National Trading Company will be a growing State enterprise designed to ensure that this vital avenue for the flow of goods is not stifled by private monopoly. The precise mode of operation of the firm will be determined by a working party established by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. At the retail level, private stores and co-operatives will compete. A chain of consumer co-operatives will be organized relying in part on the National Trading Company for supplies of goods. The ICDC will provide capital and advice to Africans interested in entering commerce and will assist in financing modern shopping centres. A commercial training and apprentice programme is urgently needed and the Chambers of Commerce have expressed interest in co-operating in this endeavour. The use of commercial property will be closely supervised through such means as price and rent controls on basic commodities, traders' licensing and control of standards of service.

The development of tourism is of special interest to the Government because it requires little or no subsidy, is an important source of foreign exchange, itself needed for development, and has a vast potential for growth. Present indications are that a growth of 15 per cent

per annum over the next several years is well within reach. This potential must be realized and the Government will do all in its power to see that this happens. Because of the Government's interest, much of the development in this field will involve close co-operation and participation with private interests. The immediate aims in tourism are to expand the capacity of lodges, to develop tourist circuits within Kenya and East Africa, and to encourage tourists to combine the pleasure of fishing, beaches and mountain climbing with game viewing—Kenya's main attraction. The long-term future of tourism in Kenya depends very much on conservation and management of wild life according to scientific principles.

A Department of Tourism will be created to establish policies for the development of tourism, including the establishment of standards of service and, if necessary, prices, the regulation and inspection of the industry, the attraction of more tourists to the country, and the co-ordination of tourism development with neighbouring countries. Within the policies laid down by the Department, the Kenya Tourist Development Company to be established will undertake a major role in financing, constructing and, in many cases, managing hotels, motels, lodges, tours and transportation. Parks, tourist roads and wild life management are Government functions.

Trade Unions

The rights of industrial workers must be fully protected as development takes place and much of this work can be left to responsible unions. But the unions now represent only a small minority of Kenya's adult population and they cannot be permitted to benefit these few at the expense of large numbers of less fortunate brothers. Experience in all developing countries has shown that in the interests of stability and good industrial relations the Government cannot permit the existence of more than one central organization for trade unions in the country. It is also desirable to have one central organization for employers.

The first responsibility of the unions must be to develop a disciplined, skilled and responsible labour force. The nation's welfare and that of the workers depend much more on hard, productive work than on strikes and walkouts. Unions must concern themselves with training programmes, apprentice programmes, and workers' discipline and productivity. In addition, trade unions assisted by the Government should take an active role in organizing consumer co-operatives, generating savings for development, promoting co-operative housing development, initiating producer co-operatives and making workers aware of their contribution to the development of the nation.

Strikes cost the nation output, the workers wages, the companies profits and the Government taxes. Wages in excess of those warranted by productivity increase unemployment, encourage the substitution of capital for labour, and lead to bankruptcies. In order to avoid these drags on development, legislation will be needed providing for the compulsory arbitration of major issues not resolved through the regular bargaining process. Special legislation may be needed in sensitive industries and the Government to avoid the economic paralysis that could result from work stoppages in these areas.

The Government will assume the responsibility for holding down the prices of basic commodities so that workers, farmers and the unemployed are not confronted with a rising cost of living. It is notable that since Independence the Wage Earners' Index has remained fairly stable. The Government will also ensure that workers are not exploited, that safety conditions are enforced, and that minimum wages are reasonable. An important new provision for workers will be the National Provident Fund.

Consumers

In African Socialism, the Government has the duty of protecting the interests not only of workers but also of consumers, for these could be exploited by producers and importers. The Government will not permit producers to make monopoly profits through monopolistic and unfair marketing practices such as sale of shoddy merchandise. Standards of quality and quantity must therefore be enforced. Consumer co-operatives should also be encouraged, and there seems to be a clear need for such co-operatives in the major towns. Another measure which the Government should not hesitate to use in case of need is price controls on basic commodities, and rent controls in urban areas. The importance of this lies in the fact that if the country is going to save enough for the investment required, the cost of living must be held down. It is also necessary to hold down prices of basic commodities and rents in order to ensure that increases in *per capita* incomes lead to higher living standards instead of being dissipated through higher prices of basic commodities and rents charged by a small proportion of the population.

Special attention should be given to the marketing boards operating in the field of agricultural commodities. Hitherto, these boards have concentrated on safeguarding the interests of the producers. Policies should be implemented without delay to ensure that in their operations these boards do not ignore the interests of the consumers.

The consumers, on the other hand, have the responsibility of aiding development by avoiding conspicuous consumption and extravagance. The country needs all the savings it can get for development.

It has therefore to be recognized that we cannot raise our consumption levels to the maximum and yet develop as rapidly as we desire. Higher consumption levels can only be maintained in a framework of increasing productivity, and to achieve this productivity we have to raise the level and volume of our investment.

Provincial Balance and Social Inertia

One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in net output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities, and people receptive to and active in development. A million pounds invested in one area may raise net output by £20,000 while its use in another may yield an increase of £100,000. This is a clear case in which investment in the second area is the wise decision because the country is £80,000 per annum better off by so doing and is therefore in a position to aid the first area by making grants or subsidized loans.

The purpose of development is not to develop an *area*, but to develop and make better off the *people* of the area. If an area is deficient in resources, this can best be done by—

- (i) investing in the education and training of the *people* whether in the area or elsewhere;
- (ii) investing in the health of the *people*; and
- (iii) encouraging some of the *people* to move to areas richer in resources; and of course
- (iv) developing those limited resources that are economic.

With education and training and some capital, the people of a province can make the best of limited resources. If the potential for expansion is small, medical services, education and training will qualify the people to find employment elsewhere.

If these ends are to be achieved, however, it is necessary for the Government to develop a formula for grants-in-aid and educational and health allocations that take into account the needs and incomes of each province and district. Thus the Government must ensure that all the people of the country have minimum provision for the essential welfare services. A policy of making education, training and health facilities available to all provinces on the same financial terms means that the people of the less developed provinces are penalized simply because they are already poor.

Today some of the provinces and districts that have genuine economic potential remain underdeveloped simply because the people will not accept new ways and the necessary discipline of planned and co-ordinated development. In these areas a concerted and prolonged effort to overcome prejudices and suspicions is needed before development can take place. Such efforts must be carefully organized and planned, and implemented through Government and Party machinery.

Strategy for Development

The policies outlined above pervade the plans constructed and now being revised for every sector of the economy. The plans and policies for each of the sectors must, however, fit into an overall pattern that represents Kenya's strategy for development. The main lines of this strategy can be summarized as follows :—

- (i) To attack directly the two principal limitations on growth, *i.e.*, shortages of domestic capital and skilled manpower, in order to increase the growth potential of the nation.
- (ii) To revolutionize agriculture in Kenya by developing unused and under-utilized land through consolidation, development credit, extension services and training and the introduction of modern methods of farming and marketing. Higher incomes in agriculture will stimulate the development of commerce and industry by—
 - (a) increasing the domestic demand for consumer goods and services and agricultural supplies, and
 - (b) providing raw materials for agricultural processing industries.
- (iii) To develop industry as rapidly as opportunities are created—first, the processing of agricultural, livestock and forestry products and natural resources for domestic use and export; second, production for domestic demand in a progressively more fully integrated manner. Tourism is our means of “processing” our wild life resources and must have a high priority.
- (iv) To develop transport, power and marketing facilities and other infrastructure in order to draw the entire nation into the market economy and to lay the basis for a rapid acceleration of industrial growth.
- (v) To provide for a more equitable distribution of the benefits achieved.

The construction of plans for the several sectors have been drawn up with this overall pattern in mind. As time passes, of course, the order of priorities will change. In particular, as the agricultural and infrastructure base grows, increasing emphasis and capital will be directed toward industrial development.

Planning and Control

There are two themes running through this paper—the need to plan and control how resources are used. The power to plan and the power to implement are central features of African Socialism. Planning is a comprehensive exercise designed to find the best way in which the nation's limited resources—land, skilled manpower, capital and foreign exchange—can be used to promote the objectivities of every individual, every firm, every farm, and every agency of Government, both central and local. Any activity that uses resources is a proper subject of planning.

The important aspects of planning include physical, social, financial and economic. Physical planning deals with land use and layout, and locational, transport and design problems in both rural and urban areas; social planning is concerned with welfare and social services, cultural development, the modification of traditional attitudes, the alleviation of social problems, self-help and community development, financial planning involves the determination of government revenues, recurrent expenditures and capital budgeting; economic planning has the task of organizing all of the nation's real and monetary resources into a concerted and co-ordinated development effort. None of these aspects of planning can be carried out without close co-ordination with the others even on apparently routine matters. The currently pressing problems of self-help schemes being initiated and promoted without co-ordination with the development plan is an example of planning failure; many municipal and even district projects are not incorporated in the development plan; and the independent solicitation of external funds by various ministries may simply reduce the total foreign aid Kenya receives. No organization can operate efficiently so long as its right hand does not know what its left hand is doing. Planning cannot be done effectively unless every important activity is accounted for and every important decision-maker involved.

The implementation process must be equally pervasive. That is why so much of this paper has dealt with the kinds and varieties of controls needed to make sure that plans are carried out in every sector. Once controls are designed and procedures devised for administering them, every economic decision-making unit in the country—farm, company, co-operative, local authority, ministry, department, union and

worker—should be aware of planning and its place of preparing and implementing plans.

The discipline of planning is not something to be accepted lightly or shrugged off as unnecessary. If planning itself is not to be a waste of resources, discipline must be firm and enforced. And discipline is not simply something that the Government imposes on the private sector. It is also a discipline that the Government imposes on itself at every level and in every ministry. With planning, no ministry is free to act as an undisciplined, unrestricted entrepreneur promoting funds and projects to maximize the status of the ministry. Instead all must accept the discipline of planning and join in maximizing the resources available for development, determining the best use for these resources, and ensuring that resources are in fact used as planned. If DISCIPLINE is rejected, so is planning and with it—African Socialism.

(Concluded)



Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

A high-powered trade delegation led by Mr. Manubhai Shah, India's Minister for International Trade, visited East African countries in November with a view to promoting industrial and technical collaboration and development of commerce and trade with these countries. Mr. Shah during his talks with African leaders assured them that India's technological experience and managerial skill were at their disposal in their efforts to develop their economies.

The visits resulted in the signing of a number of agreements with Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The agreements with Uganda covered trade, a sugar project, friendship and technical cooperation and a protocol on cotton exchange. One of them provided for scholarships for Ugandans for training in managerial skills in India. Besides, India promised to send technicians and professors to Uganda to help her build up a technological base.

The overall trade between the two countries was approximately £(sterling) 6 million (Rs. 8 crores) in 1964. The trade agreement aims at expanding and increasing the overall flow of trade between the two countries and increasing the items of export and import. For facilitating Indo-Uganda trade a provision exists for meetings in either country as and when required. Such reviews would provide the necessary mechanism to see that difficulties in the flow of expanding trade are removed and that business organisations of both sides are continuously geared to increase the volume of trade between the two countries.

The Agreement on Friendship, Technical and Economic and Scientific Cooperation contemplates the exchange of personnel for training purposes in technical schools, scientific institutes, factories and production centres, grant of scholarships, loan of services of experts, exchange of technical information, cooperation in scientific research work between institutions in the two countries, and the setting up of joint industrial ventures by both countries. The agreement also provides for training facilities for young scholars and technical ex-

perts in universities, technical institutes, construction projects and industrial ventures in both countries. Last year about 40 Ugandans came to India for technical training. Under the new agreement, there will be a systematic and large exchange of personnel between the two countries for purposes of training in science, technology and other fields.

It has been agreed between the two Governments that at the site selected around Kinyala a sugar project be set up with a manufacturing capacity of 50,000 tons of refined sugar per year. The sugar project will have a plantation of sugarcane extending for about 25,000 acres. The project will cost about £5.5 million pounds sterling. Out of the total capital investment, a portion will be in equity shares and the balance as loan from the Government of India and its financial agencies, and from the Government of Uganda and its financial agencies; some third countries may also be approached for part of supplier's credit. 45% of the equity shares will be held by the Ugandan Government; 45% shares will be held by India-Uganda Development Agency, a company to be set up by the Indian Government and some sugar industrialists of India for this project. The balance of 10% will be subscribed by private Ugandan entrepreneurs. India will supply sugar machinery incorporating the latest technological improvements.

India purchased about 1,00,000 bales of Uganda lint in 1964 and she has purchased 65,000 bales in the current year. To purchase an additional quantity of about 35,000 bales, a separate financing account has been agreed to between the Uganda Lint Marketing Board and the State Trading Corporation of India by which an equal value of Uganda cotton and Indian goods are expected to be purchased and sold by the two countries. The total value of this arrangement is expected to be about £3.4 million (Rs. 4.5 crores). The arrangement will be reviewed again in June 1966.

Mr. Shah visited Tanzania on November 19. A joint communique issued at the end of his talks in Dar-es-Salaam said that under a draft aid programme a \$ 2m. long-term loan would be extended to Tanzania by India primarily to promote joint industrial ventures in both the public and private sectors. India would also give Tanzania Rs. 5 lakhs to begin setting up a 25-unit industrial training and production complex. The Indian Government's National Industrial Development Corporation would also establish a consultancy bureau to assist the development of the project under the proposed technical cooperation programme. India would train Tanzanis in its technical institutes and universities. An agreement was also reached for India to purchase Rs. 14 lakhs worth of Zanzibar cloves under a barter arrangement with the Zanzibar Trading Corporation.

To Kenya, India offered a loan of Rs. 25m. for buying railway equipment. A trade agreement will also be signed between India and Kenya. Mr. Shah expressed the hope that the volume of trade between the two countries would increase to about Rs. 10m. each way. India also agreed to consider Kenya's desire for exporting soda ash and diatomite to India to make up for the markets it lost through the boycott of trade with South Africa. Kenya would also increase imports of a variety of Indian goods, including textiles, engineering goods, electrical equipment, industrial machinery and pharmaceutical products.

India made an offer to help set up three industrial estates in Kenya. The first will have about 25 factory sites. India will make a gift of machinery and tools worth Rs. 1m. to equip a training centre. The other two estates will be set up on the basis of experience gained from the first.

The two countries also discussed the scope for cooperation in economic, technical and scientific fields. Such cooperation will facilitate the exchange of technical personnel, provide training facilities for Kenya nationals in Indian technical centres, scientific institutes and include in-plant training facilities in Indian factories and productive centres. Cooperation in the field of education will cover the grant of scholarships and deputation of experts. Exchange of technical information is another aspect envisaged under the proposed agreement.

Businessmen's mission

There is no reason to take a melancholy view of the decline in India's exports to Africa which dropped from Rs. 56.3 crores in 1961-62 to Rs. 46.36 crores in 1963-64 and improved slightly to Rs. 49.32 crores in 1964-65. The country has already taken some corrective steps to enlarge and diversify its trade with the countries of Africa. A number of trade and goodwill missions have visited these countries to gain an intimate knowledge of African needs and explore the possibilities of collaboration in the industrialization of that continent. Export of Indian capital for joint ventures is gaining momentum with about 15 such projects either completed or coming up in Eastern, Central and West Africa. These account for about Rs. 15 million worth of Indian machinery equipment.

Valuable suggestions to improve India's economic and trade relations with African countries have been made by the Indian businessmen's goodwill mission which toured parts of Africa in September. In its report the mission has said that it found considerable goodwill for India in all the countries it visited. While this goodwill made

its task easier, the mission also realised that this had its counterpart in an equally deep trust and confidence in India's capacity and willingness to give honest and disinterested advice in the many complex tasks of socio-economic development. Conscious that our own resources and capacity to be of real assistance and guidance were limited by a number of circumstances, the mission has expressed the opinion that whatever little we can give should be given readily, promptly and in a well organised and continuous manner.

India's trade with Kenya and Ethiopia has tended to be rather one-sided inasmuch as it does not import from these countries to a significant extent. Cameroon has a similar adverse balance of trade with India. Noting these facts, the businessmen's delegation has observed that while it is difficult to so arrange our trade as to reach bilateral balances all the time, it would appear that some serious consideration will have to be given to increasing our imports from African countries of raw materials and minerals which we now obtain from alternate sources. We could also consider goods like hides and skins for which demand is bound to increase in India.

The delegation has drawn attention to the existence of some development financing institutions in Kenya and said the Indian Government should consider the question of acquiring interest in such bodies not only in Kenya but in other countries where they have come up.

The following are some of the more important observations of the mission:

(1) The mission feels that there is considerable scope for individual traders and industrialists to work in the new African countries as yet generally unexplored. Matters however may be facilitated when diplomatic relations are established with West and Central African countries as yet unrepresented in by India. An accelerated programme also needs to be undertaken for the conclusion of trade and economic cooperation agreements including terms somewhat larger than those which cover only the exchange of goods.

(2) It will also be necessary for missions of African nationals to come and visit India on well planned itineraries. The mission emphasised the need for the nationals of each country to come and see industrial development in India for themselves so as to be able to better decide what might or what might not be suitable for their specific needs.

(3) It may also be desirable to send out individuals or groups from India to study and report on specific aspects of the new African countries. We suggest a working party to look into the establishment of an Indian bonded warehouse on the West Coast of Africa. The mission could visit only one harbour, viz. Douala, and was impressed

by its efficiency and handling capacity. Matadi is also an important seaport connected by railway with the riverine traffic of Central Africa.

(4) Lines of communication, both commercial and others, will have to be developed. Apart from the usual commercial missions it might be useful to send out important members of other liberal professions and the arts in order to reflect India's varied history, achievements and aspirations. Exhibitions to display the variety of production in the Indian economy should be held in African capitals and other major cities.

(5) A regular liner service by an Indian shipping company should be set up in order to support the effort of Indian businessmen to sell our goods in that part of the world. The inauguration of such a service might take the form of a floating exhibition on a scale and range suited to India. Our air link with Africa should be extended beyond Nairobi to Leopoldville and onwards to Western and Central Africa.

(6) It is no secret that both trade and industry as well as certain echelons of administration in many African countries are manned or influenced by the nationals of ex-metropolitan countries. Our aim should be that both the Indian Government as well as Indian businessmen and industrialists should deal with the nationals of the country. It might also be noted that where entrepreneurship has not developed African national Governments have taken on themselves some of these functions. Considerable dealings, therefore, may initially have to be made with Ministries and trade organisations of government both for the promotion of trade as well as industrial collaboration.

(7) Our economic relationship with the new countries in Africa are to be viewed within the larger perspective of solidarity and co-operation among countries at various stages of underdevelopment. India at present provides, through a variety of institutions and agencies, considerable technical assistance to African countries in such diverse fields as education, medicine, agriculture, civil aviation, railways, etc. Most of these schemes are operated on an *ad hoc* basis and some form of inter-ministry consultation seems to have been adopted. These schemes seem to be working very well in terms of the type and quality of personnel being selected. But the time lag between request for a certain type of personnel and its provision and placement seems to appear too long. In all the countries which the mission visited it announced the system of in-plant training scholarships evolved by the India-Africa Development Association and this news was received with considerable interest and enthusiasm; even the limited experience of this scheme indicates that procedures need to be speeded up. It is perhaps time to coordinate some of these functions under one agency which would specialise in economic co-operation and development. This would naturally have to be a government agency but its

the human touch. Inasmuch as this kind of collaboration is bound to increase and is likely to reach a peak in the next few years, Government might examine this question with the seriousness it deserves.

The mission comprised Dr Bharat Ram, leader, Mr B. C. Biyani, Mr H. P. Nanda, Mr I. H. Padamsree, Mr B. P. Poddar, Mr Maddi Sudarshan, and Mr Sudarshan V. Desai, member-secretary, who is also a member of the Indian Council for Africa. It toured Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (Leopoldville), Republic of Congo, (Brazzaville), Central African Republic and Federal Republic of Cameroon. It was the second mission to Africa sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the India-Africa Development Association. It broke new ground by visiting French-speaking countries, hitherto not covered by any Indian business group.

Parliamentary Goodwill Mission

India's image in the West African countries of Guinea and Mali has brightened in recent months, according to an Indian parliamentary goodwill mission which visited these countries recently. This is largely due to the valour India displayed on the battle-field during the fighting with Pakistan and China's failure to carry out its ultimatum to attack India with a view to helping its hard-pressed ally, Pakistan. India has also gained from the inability of China to keep its promises of giving aid to African countries.

India's policy of non-alignment has paid dividends in Guinea and Mali which though under a great deal of Chinese influence have maintained neutrality in the India-China border dispute. Their faith in non-alignment has made them adopt a similar attitude to India's dispute with Pakistan. They hold India in high esteem and regard it as a peaceful nation—the land of Buddha, Gandhi and Nehru. In contrast, Pakistan is dubbed as a reactionary state believing in theocracy and practising a feudal system. Islam in these countries is not the fanaticism it is in Pakistan and some other countries. This is despite the fact that Muslims are in a majority in Guinea and Mali.

The delegation feels that India is not exploiting all the opportunities that exist in these countries to project a truer image of its culture and social order. Indian films being very popular in these countries we should take advantage of this medium to establish closer ties with them. Indian centres depicting social and cultural life in India should be opened wherever possible. Press relations with African countries should be improved and direct links established by encouraging

UN in maintaining international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation”.

South Rhodesia

With the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority Government in Rhodesia on November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian crisis assumed a new dimension. Serious attempts had been made to avert the crisis but they proved to be of no avail. Mr Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, visited England from October 4 to 9 in an obvious effort to secure independence from the latter. The positions taken by the two Governments were irreconcilable and therefore no agreement could be reached. The British stand was based on the following points :

(1) The principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, should be maintained and guaranteed.

(2) There should be an immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(3) There should be a guarantee against any progressive amendments to the Constitution.

(4) There should be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government will have to be satisfied that any basis for independence will be accepted.

The major points in the stand taken by the Smith Government were :

(1) The 1961 Constitution provides, in the qualifications governing franchise, for an increasing number of Africans to be entitled to vote and the question of guarantees against retrogression is essentially a matter of providing suitable mechanisms.

(2) The Government of Rhodesia has proposed the addition of a Senate (to be composed of 12 chiefs elected by the chiefs' council which will vote with the Assembly at the third reading of any bill affecting the future of Africans. This will replace the referendum procedure under the 1961 Constitution.

(3) The Government of Rhodesia claimed that its proposal for a Senate represented a major advance for Africans. It could not contemplate an increased representation for Africans in the Assembly when so many Africans rejected the opportunities under the present

constitution, but it was prepared to consider an extension of the B Roll franchise, for example, by admitting to it all tax-payers.

(4) The Government of Rhodesia stated that it wished to see an end being put to racial discrimination by an evolutionary process, but if could not agree to the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.

(5) The Government of Rhodesia claimed that it had already demonstrated that the majority of the people of Rhodesia desired independence on the basis of the present Constitution. This was shown by the result of the referendum.

Thus there was no meeting ground between the two sides and the talks failed. The British Government, however, did not give up its efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the crisis. To that end, Premier Wilson visited Salisbury from December 25 to 31. The primary objectives of his visit were:

(1) To dispel any remaining African illusions about the British use of force in the event of a UDI;

(2) To make the Smith Government understand that the British Government considered no settlement possible which did not in some way secure the agreement and cooperation of African nationalists. The visit ended on October 30 with the declaration that "Britain and Rhodesia have agreed to set up a Royal Commission to determine whether the people want independence under the present constitution." Subsequently, however, both Governments differed on the nature and scope of the work to be entrusted to such a commission and thus the proposal to set up the commission did not materialise. When on November 11 the Smith Government unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent, the British Government immediately suspended the Smith Government and took a number of emergency measures. They were:

(1) The British High Commissioner in Salisbury was withdrawn and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London was asked to leave the Capital.

(2) Export of arms from Britain was stopped and all other kinds of aid suspended.

(3) Rhodesia was removed from the sterling area.

(4) Export of British capital to Rhodesia was banned.

(5) The United Kingdom Export Credit Guarantee Department stopped giving further cover to Rhodesia.

(6) The Ottawa Agreement of 1932 governing British trade relations with Rhodesia was suspended.

(7) Rhodesia was suspended from the Commonwealth preference area and its goods would no longer receive special treatment on entering the U.K.

(8) Passports issued or renewed by the illegal Rhodesian regime would not be recognised by Britain.

India, true to her policy of opposing racial discrimination, was in the forefront of countries who condemned the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia. In March 1965 India was the first country to close its diplomatic mission at Salisbury. On November 11, on the day of the UDI, Prime Minister Shastri told the Congress Parliamentary Party that it was a serious development. He added; "So far as India is concerned, we have made it quite clear that we will not recognise the Smith Government." India immediately broke off her economic relations with South Rhodesia. The next day, Mr. Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister, told the Indian Parliament that India would recognise any "provisional government set up by the four million African people of Rhodesia with the support of the OAU". He described the illegal seizure of power by the White minority Government "as an outrageous act" which posed a serious threat to international peace and security. He was critical of the British Government for its failure to act decisively in the Rhodesian crisis. He held her responsible for what was happening in Rhodesia. He called upon Britain "to use force if necessary to nullify and checkmate the illegal seizure of power by the white minority". He assured Parliament that India would extend all support and cooperation to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Organisation of African Unity in whatever steps they might propose to deal with the situation."

Except for Portugal and South Africa all other nations withheld recognition from Rhodesia. However, the racist Government of Rhodesia was undeterred. The unilateral declaration of independence was a challenge to the African nations which had given the impression that they were united on colonial problems. All of them urged Britain to use force to bring down the racist regime of South Rhodesia. The British Government, while reiterating its determination to bring down the Smith Government, ruled out the possibility of using force to that end. The Council of Ministers of the OAU, in the first week of December, passed a resolution to the effect that if Britain failed to bring down the rebel regime of South Rhodesia by December 15, 1965, all African States would break off diplomatic relations with it. The British Government has refused to comply and so far only 9 African States have broken off diplomatic ties with it.

The unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith Government has thrown a challenge to the world community in general and the African community in particular. Will they rise to the occasion?

The Congo Problem

Ever since its independence on June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo has been a problem-child of the world community in general and the African community in particular. Despite the tremendous efforts made by the United Nations, achievement of internal stability has remained a dream for the Congolese people. Sudden changes have become a common feature of the Congo scene. On October 13, President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe from the office of Prime Ministership and asked Mr Kimba to form a new Government. This was a struggle for power, devoid of all constitutional niceties, between Premier Tshombe and President Kasavubu. Tshombe had taken over the premiership in July 1964 after crushing the rebellion mainly with the help of foreign mercenaries. In May 1965, general elections were held in which Tshombe's Party, Conaco, won a majority of votes. This led to a struggle for power between President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombe. The root of the rivalry lay in the upgrading of the office of Presidentship. Under the new constitution, the President was to be more powerful. Tshombe was an aspirant for this office. Thus President Kasavubu saw a danger to his position and this prompted him to dismiss Tshombe. Another reason for the dismissal could be found in Kasavubu's attempt to woo African nations. Tshombe had been considered a stooge of Western imperialists and his dismissal was bound to enhance the Congo's prestige in Africa. Subsequently, however, the Congolese Parliament refused to invest the Kimba Government with power. The President made another attempt to allay the fears of African States when at the Accra Summit Conference he promised to "solve the problem of mercenaries once and for all in the higher interests of the Congo and of Africa as a whole." This step, however, proved fatal for him. It threatened the position of the Congolese army led by Col. Mobutu, who took over the administration in his hands on November 27. Although he did not dissolve Parliament, he made it clear that he would be President for five years. Surprisingly enough, Mobutu has received support from both Tshombe and Kasavubu.

What of the future? One thing is clear: no faction in the Congo is capable of ruling it on its own. The need of the hour is national unity and non-interference from outside. Whether or not these two requirements for bringing Congo to the path of peace and progress will be fulfilled is anybody's guess.

The OAU Summit

The third summit conference of the Organisation of African Unity was held from October 21 to 24 in Accra, Ghana. The summit con-

ference was significant for two reasons: it was held in face of a boycott by the African states and it was faced with the problem of the impending UDI by the Smith Government of South Rhodesia. That the conference was held was no mean achievement. Ever since its inception in May 1963, the OAU has been subjected to serious challenges, both from within and from without. It goes to the credit of the African states that they met these challenges successfully. The need for continental unity in an institutionalised form has come to be felt widely. The African states differ only in regard to the strategy and pace of achieving continental unity. At the Accra conference the majority of African states favoured a go-slow method. This became evident when Nkrumah's proposal for the formation of an executive committee was rejected by a majority vote. However, the conference agreed to make a detailed study of the problem which would be given due consideration at the next summit conference. A factor that has caused considerable damage to the cause of continental unity is the alleged subversive activities of some African states. This was the most important reason given by the eight members of the OAU who boycotted the Accra conference. The conference passed a resolution on this subject which said:

(1) "We pledge ourselves to opposing collectively and firmly by every means at the disposal of Africa, every form of subversion conceived, organised or financed by foreign powers, against Africa, the OAU or against its members individually."

(2) While reaffirming their determination to render every possible assistance to refugees in any member-state on a humanitarian and fraternal basis, they pledged "to prevent refugees living on their territories from carrying out by any means whatsoever any acts harmful to the member-states of the OAU."

On South Africa, the conference in a resolution said it "urgently calls on all states to initiate a strict embargo on the supply of arms, ammunition and other materials for use only by military and police forces in South Africa; in particular, calls upon the Government of France to stop the supply of military equipment to South Africa; and calls on other States which announced arms embargoes to implement them strictly without exception or restrictive interpretation; pledges moral and material support to the liberation movements in South Africa; asks all the members of the UN to take appropriate measures to secure effective action by the UN."

Postponement of Afro-Asian Summit

The postponement of the Second Bandung Conference had a touch of irony in it. China and Indonesia, which strongly favoured

postponement, had earlier vociferously pleaded for the holding of the conference. The conference, originally scheduled to be held in March-April, was put off at the initiative of the host country, Algeria. It was again postponed in June, 1965, when there was a change of regime in Algeria. At that time China had pleaded for the holding of the conference as originally scheduled. But the Chinese made a *volte face* and started working for the postponement of the conference scheduled for November 5. The main reasons for the change in the Chinese stand, as given by the People's Daily, were:

- (1) "Marked differences exist as to whether or not the conference should oppose U.S. imperialism."
- (2) "The so-called invitation extended to UN Secretary General Thant has not been cancelled."
- (3) "The question of the Soviet Union's participation has again been brought up".
- (4) "Recently new tensions and conflicts have come to the fore among certain Asian and African countries."


The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou-En-lai, in his letter of October 26 addressed to the Afro-Asian Heads of State, made it clear that "if the conference should be forcibly convened as scheduled in violation of the principle of consensus through consultation in spite of the opposition of China, the Kingdom of Cambodia and other countries, the Chinese Government would be compelled to absent itself from such a conference."

Ignoring the Chinese threat, the Foreign Ministers of 45 Afro-Asian countries met on October 31.

India sponsored a resolution for the admission of the Soviet Union, Malaysia and Singapore. Mr C.S. Jha, the Indian delegate, told the Foreign Ministers' meeting: "Not to admit the Soviet Union would mean a great void in Russian representation at the Afro-Asian conference. The Soviet Union has demonstrated genuine fraternity with the peoples of Africa and Asia and firm adherence to the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity by its contribution to the lessening of international tension, and protection and encouragement for peoples fighting for independence and national liberation. In the last 11 years there has been a transformation in the policies and outlook and attitudes of the Soviet Union. It has identified itself more and more with the Afro-Asian freedom movement and orientated its policies towards Asia and Africa."

The consensus was in favour of the Soviet Union's participation. The Algerian Foreign Minister, Mr Bouteflika, chairman of the conference, said in his closing speech that there was a "clear consensus

for the participation of the Soviet Union, following our aim of uniting the forces of liberty and peace." True, the resolution did not mention that the Soviet Union would be invited to Afro-Asian conferences in the future. But, as Mr Jha pointed out, Boudeflika's remarks were a "clear mandate for the invitation of Russia to any future Afro-Asian conference." This was a significant achievement for India though she had failed to get the conference convened as scheduled. The resolution stated that any future Afro-Asian conference, if and when held, should meet in Algeria. It was left to the preparatory committee of 15 ambassadors to convene an Afro-Asian summit "in consultation with the host country and other member-States."



Activities of the Council

THE following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

Tour of Tarikhet Development Block

The Council organized a tour of the Tarikhet Community Development Block, five miles south-west of Ranikhet in U.P., for a small group of African students studying in the country to show them the changing face of rural India under the programme of Community Development. The group comprised Mr. Marcos T. Wandawassan (Ethiopia), Mr. Wagdi Abdel Hamid (U.A.R.), Mr. M. M. Magoola Kivejinja (Uganda) and Mr. Job K. Sewanaku (Uganda). An Indian student, Mr. Somnath Mukherjee, accompanied them.

The party, escorted by the Office Secretary of the Council, left Delhi by train for Rampur, where they spent a day as guests of the Rotary Club. From there they travelled by car to the Rudrapur Agricultural University. They were shown round the university and attended a variety programme organized by the students. The party left Rudrapur by car for Ranikhet, their headquarters. In Ranikhet they attended the Kumaon Regiment's annual dinner and witnessed a Ramlila performance in a nearby village. Mrs. Lila Dayal showed them her Himalayan museum containing a large number of rare collections. Followed a visit to the Havalbagh Agricultural Institute, which also trains village level workers and youth leaders. From there they proceeded to Almora, where they were the guests of Mr. Boshi Sen, the renowned botanist and pupil of the late Dr. Jagdish Chandra Bose, who showed them round his experimental farm. On their return journey they stopped at Naini Tal, where they were the guests of the Rotary Club and the Naini Tal Club. They also attended a reception given by the Governor in honour of King Mahendra of Nepal.

The students visited 11 villages in the Community Block and made an intensive study of the social and economic life in five of them. One of the things which impressed them was the high degree of social consciousness which the villagers had acquired. They were conversant

with the problems facing the country and showed keen interest in current affairs. In Seoni village they found that there was no problem of sanitation. Every house was clean. Malaria and smallpox had been eradicated. Cases of cholera were very few, especially after pure drinking water was provided for the village. Of the Rs. 14,000 spent on the water project, Rs. 6,000 was contributed by the villagers in the form of labour. In Daurab village, the students came across some very enterprising farmers receptive to new ideas. What impressed them most in Kapina village, which is inhabited by a majority of scheduled castes members, was youth and community activity. The village has a community building constructed by the Gaon Sabha. 40 per cent of the money was granted by the Government while the villagers contributed 60 per cent in cash plus their labour.

In their report, which will be published soon, the students have pointed out that the villagers' greatest problems are inadequate facilities for irrigation and marketing and transport. These are beyond the scope of individual farmers. If the recent drive towards self-sufficiency is to have any meaning these problems have to be tackled seriously by the Block authorities.

Reception for Zambia Minister

The Council held a reception on December 19 in honour of Mr. A. B. Mutemba, Resident Minister for the Western Province of Zambia. Among the distinguished guests present were Mr. K. L. Rao, Minister for Irrigation and Power, Mr. C. R. Pattabhi Raman, Deputy Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Dr. H.K. Mahatab, Dr. Gaitonde, a former Member of Parliament and leader of the Goa Congress. Several diplomats and representatives of the Arab League, including Mr. Clovis Maksoud, also attended the reception.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr. Mutemba said his country would rather suffer than sacrifice its principles and allow the Rhodesian whites to get away with "independence." But Zambia believed that it was possible for people of different races to live in harmony. So it would still ask Britain to take action against the Ian Smith Government before it was too late.

Mr. Mutemba said he was yet to see that economic sanctions had worked anywhere in the world. It was perhaps all right for Britain to shelter Mr. Smith because the white Rhodesians were kith and kin of the British. But, unless Britain acted soon, it would lose "a lot of prestige and face." He spoke appreciatively of the "lovely, peaceful" India and described Mahatma Gandhi as not only India's leader, but "my own leader also."

He noted that half of Zambia's Ministers had been trained in India and the "good work that India had done for us will not be forgotten."

Welcoming him, Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, reaffirmed India's support for the African people of Southern Rhodesia, for Zambia and for the Organization of African Unity. He expressed the hope that Britain would heed world opinion and take effective steps for the establishment of a lawful Government in Southern Rhodesia based on universal adult franchise.

Mr. Pant said in the past year the Council had been honoured by the visits of Mr. U. T. Simango, Vice-President of FRELIMO, Dar-es-Salaam, and Mr. T.G. Silundika, Publicity and Information Secretary of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, Lusaka. Subsequently, it donated to FRELIMO 12 boxes of medicine; two bales of khaki drill, two Usha industrial sewing machines and a set of books on India for its library. The Council also despatched two bales of cloth for the families of those in detention and was now arranging to send them a jeep. He hoped that next year it would send more material assistance as a gesture of its solidarity and friendship with them.

Mr. Asoka Mehta, Vice-President of the Council and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, who presided, presented to Mr. Mutemba on behalf of the Council two sets of books on India.

Mr. Pant handed to Mr. Mutemba a copy of the Council's resolution condemning the UDI in Rhodesia and urging Britain to help establish a lawful Government there. Mr. Mutemba said he would pass it on to President Kaunda.

The General Secretary and the Office Secretary attended a dinner given in honour of Mr. Mutemba by Mr. S. N. Sinha, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.

Mr. K. C. Pant's visit to the UN

Mr K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, attended the 20th session of the United Nations General Assembly as a member of the Indian delegation. Giving his impressions of the UN session at a meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs on December 30, he said the firm stand on Kashmir taken by India had paid rich dividends. The biggest gain of the session for India was that the idea of a plebiscite to solve the Kashmir question was now dead. Even countries friendly to Pakistan realised that the problem was

far too complicated for a cut-and-dried solution. India had removed doubts about Kashmir's status and had prevented Pakistan from gaining what it had failed to achieve on the battle-field. The main reason for India's success was the good showing on the battle-field. The firmness of India's attitude had made Russia's own position on the Kashmir issue easier and released India from her psychological dependence on the Russian veto, which he felt had the same influence as PL 480. The United States was now far less biased in favour of Pakistan than before. He complimented Malaysia on the excellent manner in which it supported India's case. Jordan's performance was however disappointing.

Turning to Asia and the world at large, Mr Pant observed that India must become stronger if she was not to be bullied by China. China had added to its prestige and power by exploding an atom bomb. China's bomb was not directed at the U.S., or the Soviet Union, but at India. It was in this context that we had to revise our attitude on the question of the atom bomb. India, he suggested, should be technologically prepared to make the bomb in a short time when the need for it arose though she must ceaselessly work for its non-proliferation and peaceful uses of atomic energy. He suggested that India pay China in the same coin for its stand on Kashmir by abstaining from a U.N. vote on the expulsion of Formosa from the Security Council. It should seriously consider taking a seat in the Council because China was bound to come in in the near future.

Referring to his talks with some delegates from African countries, Mr Pant said he realised that secularism to them often meant a sort of anti-religious attitude. When we talked of the ideals of secularism and democracy as opposed to the religious fanaticism and military regime in Pakistan, we tended to see something as self-evident, but this was not so with African countries. In Africa even the concept of democracy was undergoing a change and there was the theory of one-party democracy. The Chinese threat, on the other hand, was recognized by many African countries. They were also beginning to see that self-determination for constituent states would lead to fragmentation. African countries were facing a similar problem and were in a position to understand us.

Trainees from Africa

The first batch of candidates selected for in-plant training under the India-Africa Development Association's scholarship scheme for Africans have arrived in India. Two of them, Mr. James Wardia and Mr. James Warike Warilway, both from Kenya, are receiving

training in sugar technology at the Mawana Sugar Works, Mawana. The third candidate, Mr. Binzanza from Uganda, has been attached to the sugar factory at Vuyyuru in Andhra Pradesh, which is managed by Messrs. K.C.P. Ltd.

Aid for Zimbabwe

The Council has sent a sum of £100 to the Zimbabwe African People's Union for the welfare of those of its members who are in detention. Earlier the Council had despatched two bales of cotton and a jeep.

Books for libraries

As part of its contribution to the celebration of International Cooperation year, the Council sent sets of books to the OAU Library, Addis Ababa, the Zambia University, Lusaka, and the Lumumba Ideological University, Kenya. It also wanted to send books to the libraries of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Gandhi Centre at Lagos but could not do so because of lack of funds.

Publications

The Council's publication, "Nehru and Africa", has been translated into Arabic and distributed in the UAR. It has recently brought out a pamphlet on Rhodesia outlining the African case for majority rule in that colony. Another book, "India and Africa: Perspectives of Co-operation," is expected to be published soon.

Greetings

The President, General Secretary, the Associate Editor and the staff of the Council sent New Year greetings to Heads of State of the OAU, ECA, African Missions in India and institutions and individuals at home and abroad.

Mr. Stephen Nkomo

Mr. Stephen Nkomo, who was a guest of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Association's annual conference, was presented with a set of the Council's literature.

RESOLUTION ON RHODESIA

THE Indian Council for Africa has in a resolution expressed deep concern over the situation that has developed in Southern Rhodesia following the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith and his coterie. Along with all the freedom-loving peoples of the world it considers this an outrageous act fraught with the gravest danger to peace not only in Africa but in the whole world.

The resolution says:

“It is evident that Smith has received encouragement and support from other racist regimes, notably the Governments of South Africa and Portugal. We strongly condemn these forces endangering world peace.

“We strongly urge and appeal to the Government of the United Kingdom to use all measures to establish a lawful government based on universal adult franchise which will give an opportunity for growth and development to the African people of Rhodesia.

“We welcome the forthright and prompt steps taken by the Government of India on this issue and are confident that it will be prepared to extend full support and assistance to the brave freedom fighters of Rhodesia, and the Government of Zambia and the Organisation of African Unity in the measures they are taking to deal with the situation in Rhodesia.”

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4. Industries Processing Agricultural Products other than Food.
5. Development of Forest Industries.
6. Fisheries Industries.
7. FAO's Relations with Industry through the Freedom from Hunger Campaign.
8. Regional Symposium on Industrial Development in Africa.
9. Design in Industry for a Developing Nation.
10. Report on Small and Medium Industries Operating in Bechuanaland.
11. Blast Furnace Experience and Practice in UAR.
12. Technical Assistance for Industrial Development: The African Experience.
13. Prospects of Development in the UAR Cotton Textile Industries.
14. Regional Symposium on Industrial Development in Africa.

Economic Commission for Africa and Centre for Industrial Development.

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Ref : E/CN.14/AS/III/3.

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Compiled by MOHD. AHMED

This feature is presented every quarter with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those specially interested in the study of African affairs.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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Contributors to this issue

O. Ohonbamu is Lecturer in Law at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. He is the author of "The Army and the People's Cause" and "The Nigerian Constitution and its Review".

Joao Cabral is a member of the National Congress, Goa. He represented the Goa League, London, at the Seminar on Problems of Portuguese Colonies organised by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi in 1961.

S. C. Gangal is Lecturer in Commonwealth Studies at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

V. Maya Krishnan is the author of a number of articles on International Law.

Ulli Beier is a Nigerian writer.

G. S. Puri is Professor of Botany at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi.

The Rise and Fall of Nigerian Federalism

O. OHONBAMU

WHILE in South Africa separate development, in its worst form, is called apartheid, in Nigeria the 'need' for separate development of the various religious and tribal groups at their own pace and in their own ways gave rise to the now-discredited federalism. It was Lugard who sowed this seed of dissension between the North and the South. To enable him to successfully perpetuate his system of indirect rule over the people of the North and carry through his 'apartheid', he forbade Christianity and western education from the North. According to him, "the preaching of equality of Europeans and natives, however true from a doctrinal point of view, is apt to be misapplied by people in a low stage of development and interpreted as an abolition of class distinction" and "the premature teaching of English inevitably leads to utter disrespect for British and native ideals alike and to a denationalised and disorganised population."¹

So it was that after years of dilly-dallying Lugard announced his over-all educational scheme for the North which included four types of schools: (1) Schools to train Kuranic teachers as clerks to replace southerners in the Northern services and also to serve as teachers in all primary schools; (2) schools for the instruction of the sons of the chiefs; (3) schools to teach the children of the ordinary people primary education in the vernacular language; and (4) schools to educate the sons of southern clerks who, as Christians, were kept separate from the Northern children so as not, perhaps, to 'contaminate' the latter.

It was this Lugardian policy of separating the North from the South, for the good of the imperialist, that some Northern leaders were perfecting and pushing ahead zealously with the ultimate aim of achieving their *jihad*, when the rifle clicked on Saturday the 15th January, 1966, extinguishing the lights of the first Nigerian Republic. Before looking into the fall of Nigerian federalism and the future, let us examine the case for the need for federalism in the Nigeria of the first Republic.

The rising tide of Federation

A genuine federal system as distinct from a bogus one is a system consisting of smaller states or regions so closely connected by locality or what some have called geographical contiguity, history and race as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of its inhabitants the impression of common nationality as well as the inconsistent or contradictory sentiment, on the one hand, of national unity and, on the other, of maintaining independence or autonomy. They must in the language of Wheare desire to be united, but not to be unitary.² They desire to be united so as collectively to afford themselves military security from external attack as well as some economic advantages. About economic advantage, this is what the late Sardauna of Sokoto said: "Big units may be successful if you want to own, say an air force—what borough council could do that?"³ But the big economic consideration that kept the North within the Federation was stated by the Sardauna as follows: "There were agitations in favour of secession; we should set up on our own. We should cease to have anything more to do with the Southern people. We should take our own way. I must say it looked tempting. We were certainly 'viable' to use the current phrase; we could run our own show . . . There were, however, two things of the most vital importance in our way. The first was that the greater part of the revenue of Nigeria comes from customs duties collected on the coast on all goods brought over the wharves. Obviously we would have to collect our own duty at our own borders. This would be more difficult than collecting at the waterside, but it was not impossible. But would an unfriendly South permit the free passage of our goods across their lands and the transit of our vehicles to carry those that were not moved by train?

"The second difficulty was similar to it. Would it be possible to send our goods down to the coast for shipment by rail or road, and what guarantee would there be that they would get there at all? We depend on the railway for the greater part of our transport and that is federally-owned and operated; we would have to use the Southern roads and they are built and maintained from southern funds . . . we therefore had to take a modified line. We must aim at a looser structure for Nigeria while preserving its general pattern—a structure which would give the Regions the greatest possible freedom of movement and action; *a structure which would reduce the power of the Centre to the absolute minimum and yet retain sufficient national unity for practical and international purposes.*"⁴

But why did the North adopt this secessionist outlook? It stems from, firstly, the structure of Nigerian politics, which is basically tribalistic and consequently engenders hatred and mutual suspicion,

Secondly, this outlook was a left-over of the nefarious divide-and-rule policies of the colonialists as stated above. Before the advent of party politics all the Nigerian tribes lived in harmony with one another but on the death of Herbert Macaulay, the first president of the NCNC, and the assumption of that office by Dr. Azikiwe, an Ibo man, and his idolization, adulation and the 'blind' following of his tribesmen, the Yorubas became afraid that should the NCNC idea of a unitary government for Nigeria take root it would mean Ibo hegemony, Ibo reign, Ibo rule and Ibo domination of Nigeria. "The implicit and unshaken loyalty which the Ibos had shown to Dr. Azikiwe," wrote Chief Obafemi Awolowo, "during the Ikoli-Akinsanya crisis did not arise in my view from ideological faith but rather from linguistic affinity and ethnic self-assertion. This, I warned, was an ominous pointer to the future. Nigeria under a unitary constitution might be dominated by those, whatever their number, who owed allegiance to ethnic affinity than to principles and ideals."⁵

So it was that when it came to drafting a constitution for Nigeria Chief Awolowo and his Action Group stuck to a Federal system. Under a true Federal constitution, he wrote, "each group, however small, is entitled to the same treatment as any other group, however large. Opportunities must be afforded to each to evolve its own peculiar political institutions. Each group must be autonomous in regard to its internal affairs. In dividing Nigeria into regions... it is therefore necessary to group together only people who, through affinity or general experience, are known to be capable of working together harmoniously. The guiding principles in the dividing of the country into regions must therefore be: ethnic classification, cultural affinity, common problems and, perhaps, administrative convenience."⁶

It was perhaps because of this Ibo fear that, though the NCNC under Zik won the western election in 1952 by 48 seats compared to the Action Group's 32, the Yoruba leaders of the AG were able, before the first meeting of the newly-elected House, to get 25 NCNC elected members to join them. This was to keep the West for the Yorubas and restrict the Ibos to the East. It was shortly after this that a crisis of 'sit tight Ministers' took place in the East and Zik went there triumphantly as premier in place of Professor Eyo Ita of Calabar.

Between the North and the South the question was one of ignorance, illiteracy, late development and an inculcated fear of southern domination. While the South was educated and Christian and looked towards Britain and America and, recently, Israel, the North was illiterate, Islamic and looked towards Mecca. It was not until 1949 when the Sardauna visited Lagos for the first time that he saw politicians

of the calibre of Zik and from thenceforth he decided that they in the North had to take politics seriously if they were not to be left behind in future Nigerian political development. When in 1952 a ministerial system of government was imposed on the Northerners they felt reluctant for fear they might not get qualified personnel to fill the jobs.

"You will see", the Sardauna wrote, that we were never militant 'nationalists' as some were. We were sure that in God's good time we would get the power. *The British had promised this frequently and we were content to rest on these promises.*"⁷

Continuing his plea for a 'hasten slowly' policy to his more militant Southern politicians, he said: "We from the Northern Region never intended, nor do we intend, to retard the progress of any region. Nor do we say that those who demand self-government, if it is for their region alone, are wrong. Far from it. For, after all, every community is the best judge of its own situation. In this regard, Mr. President, the people of the North are the best judges of their own situation and we feel that in our present situation we cannot commit ourselves to fixing a date for the attainment of self-government . . . With things in their present state in Nigeria, the Northern Region does not intend to accept the invitation to commit suicide."⁸

The West feared Ibo domination, the North was scared of Southern domination and possible collapse of a government manned by inexperienced and illiterate ministers. A unitary constitution under such circumstances, it was argued, would only result in frustration of the more dynamic groups while the fragmentation of the country into regions would enable all ethnic groups at different social levels to develop at their own pace and in the light of their peculiar cultures.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is evident to every student of Nigeria's constitutional development that the seeds of federalism in Nigeria were sown by the British and championed and perfected by our leaders who saw in the parcelling out of the country into three a sure individual empire for themselves. The British have always emphasised and exaggerated the points of difference among the Nigerian tribes and one of the three objects of the Richards' constitution was to give expression to Nigerians' INHERENT DIVERSITY. But did they forget that the English, the Welsh and the Scots were also different from one another? Today, the last two are still clamouring for separate states and independence. Though Britain has always advocated a federal system for its colonies, its bias towards federalism for others, in the language of Professor Smith, "however corrects itself north of the English Channel."

During the negotiations for a union between England and Scotland, while the Scots wanted a federal union that would enable them to retain their Parliament, the English delegates overruled any such plan arguing that in it they saw a planned intrigue between the Stuarts and the French against England. But it was the same argument the British used to convince the Northerners that unless they pressed for a federal union they would be dominated by the Southerners when the British left. Seeking to rationalise this British policy of 'what is good for the goose is not good for the gander', Professor Wheare said that during the discussion between Scotland and England for a union there was no model of Federal Government to imitate or copy from. Is this an admission that the English are a race of imitators? When did they begin to be original and resourceful?

But castigating the South American imitation of the American federal system, which he regretted the British were unable to copy because it did not exist then, the Professor wrote: "In central and south America the force of imitation is even more clear. For there, where many of the factors which might be expected to produce a desire for federal union were absent . . . a desire to introduce federalism did arise. And this was largely due to the imitation of the constitution of the United States. It was almost as if they said: 'We have attained our Independence from European control just as did the American colonies. They adopted the federal form of government, so must we.'"⁹

Today we have a partially suspended Federal Constitution for Nigeria and though we did all agree that it was the ideal thing for us, could we not have avoided it? From all we have said so far, all the ingredients of federalism would appear to exist in Nigeria but even so we could have overcome it through the instrumentality of a non-sectional and effective leadership and formed a unitary state with satisfactory decentralization of administration. When Britain left Ghana they left it with a similar federal constitution so as to prevent the building of a strong Ghanaian nation and continue to pull its disruptive strings from London through local stooges but within months of independence Nkrumah dismantled all the divisive structure so that today the Ashantis, the Cape-coasters and others look on themselves, call, and regard, themselves only as Ghanaians.

But let the Nigerians not despair—all we need to do is to try as best as we can to continually modify our present system to suit our growing stages of mental and political development.

Nature of the Constitution

As we have seen, our constitution is a federal one, by which is meant the following: it is a union of a number of Regions which, while

retaining their autonomy, have decided to come together for a common purpose. This is an essential feature of a federal system but "the capacity of states", wrote Professor Wheare, "to work a federal union is also greatly influenced by their size. It is undesirable that one or two units should be so powerful that they can over-rule the others and bend the will of the Federal Government to themselves. There should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ, everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals. The size of the units concerned—in wealth, assets and population—is therefore of prime importance."¹⁰ Our Federal system has failed this test.¹¹

Another characteristic of our Constitution is that there is, as in all Federal set-ups, a clear division of legislative powers between the Federal or General Government and the Regional Governments. A division that is governed by the rule that the Federal Government is a Government of enumerated powers while the Regions are Governments of residual powers—in such a way that the Federal and Regional Governments are within their spheres co-ordinate with and independent of each other. What this means is that as long as they confine themselves to making laws in regard to subjects that are within their respective competence, each remains a master in its own house.

Both the Federal and Regional Governments are provided with the complete apparatus of law enforcement, both executive and judicial, and directly operate upon all persons and properties within their respective spheres of jurisdiction: s. 69(1-3) and (5). In addition to the exclusive legislative lists, the Federal Government is given power to legislate on 11 special items outside any legislative list. Then there is the Concurrent List which contains subjects on which both the Federal and Regional Governments can legislate, e.g. the Census. Anything outside the exclusive, concurrent and the special lists referred to above is within the competence only of the Regional Governments. That is why they are called Governments of residual powers.

Where, as in every Federal system of Government, there exist two sets of Governments, Federal and Regional, operating in the same territorial area, each with the desire to extend its area of authority, there is bound to be conflict as each may inevitably impinge upon the competence of the other. The only means of resolving this conflict is what is known as the doctrine of national supremacy spelled out in s. 69(4) of the Federal Constitution 1963. The section provides that "Any law enacted by the legislature of a Region is inconsistent with

any law validly made by Parliament, the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the Regional law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." This is further re-inforced by s. 86 which states that the executive authority of a Region shall not be so exercised as to impede or prejudice the exercise of the Federal Executive Authority or to endanger the continuance of the Federal Government in Nigeria.

The sum total of the foregoing is that if, for example, a Regional Government and the Federal Government pass laws on matters on the Concurrent List and the Regional law is in any way inconsistent with the Federal law, the Federal law prevails while the Regional law will be void as inconsistent with the supreme Federal law. It is the duty of the court, whenever such a case of conflict arises, to give effect to the supremacy clause as contained in s. 69(4), for this clause constitutes the focal point of the Constitution and without it the whole system will fall to bits. In this way the court assures that the National Authority is not frustrated, in the language of Justice Frankfurter,¹² by "a crazy-quilt of conflicting local laws." Realising that no constitution can be perfect and be expected to cater for all developing circumstances, our Federal constitution provides for its own improvement and alteration.¹³

Pre-January 1966 Trends

Like the American constitution, after which our constitution is to a large extent fashioned, it was thought that Nigerian Federalism would grow from its present state of dual federalism¹⁴ to that in which the magnification of the Federal or national power would be a natural phenomenon. It will be recalled that under the alliance agreement between the NCNC and the Action Group in 1953, the assignment of residual powers to the Regions was to be a temporary measure only and it is not therefore unlikely that if these two parties were to constitute the Federal Government there would have been a conscious re-allocation of functions between the Regional and the national Governments to the greater glorification of the latter. The NPC had tasted Federal power and with it firmly entrenched in Lagos, it was to be expected that it would gradually utilise constitutional powers to further and demonstrate the superior powers of the Federal Government over the Regions.

Take, for instance, the Federal Government's power to make grants and loans to the Regions.¹⁵ The rule here is: he who pays the piper calls the tune. It is competent for the Federal Government to prescribe conditions with which the Regional Governments must comply before getting grants and how the loans and grants, once obtained, must be utilized. In this way, Federal control over Regional legislation and administration is achieved through the instrumentality of Federal grants

and loans. Before the army take-over we read of the Mid-west Government praying for £2,000,000 from the Federal Government. This the Federal Government was not bound to grant but if it decided to do so it could have dictated its terms to the Regional Government which had to either accept them or reject them as well as the loans.¹⁶

Section 77 empowers Parliament to make laws for Nigeria or any part of it with respect to trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries on the one hand and among the Nigerian territories on the other. This includes exports and imports of commodities from and into Nigeria, establishment and enforcement of grades and standards of quality for commodities. In addition to this, the Federal Government is empowered by s. 76 of the Constitution to make tax laws for the nation or any part of it. The judicious use of similar powers by the American Congress and the corresponding progressive shift in the jurisprudence¹⁷ of the United States Supreme Court have brought about the aggrandisement of the Government in Washington and, more, national unity.

It is not unlikely that when confronted with the general problems of unemployment and with the need for all the Regions to move forward progressively as one trained and loyal national army, the Federal Government would have been compelled to utilize its powers. "The power and initiative that are available to the Federal Government require to be taken up by the latter. Their use presupposes that the Federal Government has a life of its own much more than it has shown up to now—distinct from mere regional pressures. Up to the present in a number of spheres the centre has tended to be an adding together of Regional interests rather than an organic and pervasive power that transcended regionalism . . . There is no hope of fostering a genuine sense of overall nationhood in this state of great and small ethnic communities unless the Federal Government assumes the predominance in the Federation that is its right."¹⁸

The conclusion we can draw from the foregoing is that the powers to foster the unity and solidarity of the Republic were within the grip of the Federal Government but whether it used this power to promote unity or to foster disintegration had, until its demise, depended on the private interests of the shifting alliances at the seat of power in Lagos.

The Fall of Federalism

One outstanding defect of Nigerian Federalism which made its fall inevitable was the British built-in quantitative superiority of one Region—the North. In size and population that Region was larger than

the other three southern regions put together. What made this worse was that the North was 'educationally' backward, politically immature and economically most under-developed. It was Islamic and mentally conservative and feudalistic in contrast to the South which was at least theoretically Christian and 'professional' radical.

Because of Lugard's policy of separate development of the North, which he preserved for ignorance and illiteracy, and the South, which he forfeited to western education and Christianity, Sir Hugh Clifford, the then Governor, was able to lament in his address to the Nigerian Council in 1920 that "after two decades of British occupation, the Northern Provinces have not yet produced a single native of these provinces who is sufficiently educated to enable him to fill the most minor clerical post in the office of any government department!" In 1960 the educational achievement of the North was not appreciably better in comparison to the South, yet under the so-called democratic system of Government in which quantity is preferred to quality this same 'under-developed' North found itself in the saddle of power in Lagos and in the position of lording it over the more 'able' South.

The result that flowed from this was as follows: Being quantitatively and therefore politically superior, the Northern leaders thought, perhaps rightly, that their numbers had also to be reflected in the country's Federal Civil Service and in other organs of the Federal Government. To achieve this, they started promoting inferior and inexperienced Northern people over the head of their Southern superiors into positions of power in the civil service. They removed Southern officers from Government quarters in some parts of Lagos so as to make way for their brothers from the North. The same process went on in other organs of government. This produced a wave of unmeasurable tension between the various tribes in Government service. It did not stop there.

The late Sardauna of Sokoto, mindful of the numerical majority of the North, boasted that his party, the NPC, would rule Nigeria for ever. As a result of the acrimonious Federal elections of 1964¹⁹ there arose a crisis. To settle the crisis it was agreed that the Federal Constitution should be reviewed with a view, in the minds of Southern politicians, of cutting the North down to size. This, it was known, would be resisted by the North. In the minds of the Northern leaders there was still the *jihad* (holy war) to be completed. This, in the words of the late Balewa, would have been achieved long ago but for the interruption of the British.

Another point in the six-point Zik-Balewa accord that brought the 1965 constitutional crisis to an end was that the Western Region

Government was to be dissolved and the people of the Region were to be given the opportunity of expressing their will as to who should govern them. The elections were duly held but they were so badly rigged that the results gave rise to an unprecedented wave of terror. Despite petitions to the Prime Minister and the gross discontent which was noticeable everywhere in the country, both the late Balewa and the late Premier of Western Nigeria, Chief S. L. Akintola, adopted an ostrich-like attitude. They buried their heads in the sands as if nothing was happening. The Prime Minister refused either to institute an inquiry into the widespread allegation of rigging the Western election or to declare an emergency in Western Nigeria. On his part, the Prime Minister had to stick to Akintola in the hope of using him for achieving the notorious *jihad*. Akintola himself had to stick to the NPC in order to maintain himself in office while keeping the AG and the NCNC out.

Things were fast degenerating and it was widely rumoured that the Army was going to be used not only to suppress the righteous revolt in the West but to bring the entire nation under the NPC fold. But before this could be done, Major Nzeogu and four other progressives in the Army struck and brought the first Nigerian Republic to an end. Today in Nigeria there is widespread demand for a unitary system of Government.²⁰

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7. Ahmadu Bello, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
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11. O. Ohonbamu, *The Nigerian Constitution and Its Review: A Guide*, p. 12.
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13. As to the supremacy of our constitution and the process of altering it, see O. Ohonbamu, *The Constitution and its Review: A Guide*, pp. 14-17 and pp. 47-52.
14. See the characteristics of our Constitution: Regional and Federal Government are independent, co-ordinate and equal within their respective spheres.
15. Federal Constitution, s. 73.
16. See the Internal and External Loan Acts, 1962, which provide that loans to Regional Govts. must be on terms approved by the Federal Minister of Finance. See also s. 78 of the Federal Constitution.
17. See the *American Constitutional Law* by Bernard Schwartz, pp. 42-48 & 163-186.
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19. O. Ohonbamu, *The Nigerian Constitution and its Review: A Guide*, Chapter. 2.
20. A study group of Nigerians has been set up to study the details of a peoples constitution which before its acceptance has to be submitted to a referendum.

Portuguese Colonial Policy-II

JOAO CABRAL

DESPITE Salazar's skill and care in setting up a system that will prevent nationalist ideas from ever reaching the shores of the Portuguese colonies, they have flowed in there. He has not failed, but he has made extremely harsh and frightful the struggle for freedom.

The forced labour conditions in Angola and Mozambique had led many Africans to seek work in neighbouring territories. They were coming and going. It was extremely difficult for the Portuguese authorities to control this movement of Africans especially from the frontier regions. They brought and spread the "subversive" ideas of freedom. Besides, entire tribes left Angola and Mozambique to settle across the border.

Before 1960 about 200,000 Angolans were living in Congo and Rhodesias and an equal number of Mozambicans in Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Rhodesias. During the last three years of fierce repression these figures have swollen considerably with thousands of refugees, specially from Angola. They are now soldiers of the liberation war.

Inside the colonies, Africans who were fortunate to have some education began to organize themselves into associations, camouflaged as regional civic and mutual aid organizations. From time to time these groups demanded rights that had been lost to the white man, and each time they were ruthlessly slapped down by the Portuguese Government. However, Salazar allowed a few African organizations to function. But he purged them of nationalist minded leaders and planted his own stooges as leaders, so as to bring these associations under his control. They are now simply bourgeois social clubs, often called upon to shout, in the name of Africans, allegiance to Portugal. Other forms of nationalistic groups have been organized from time to time in the past, but mostly on a regional or linguistic basis. Since the beginning of the pan-African movement, however, these have either died away or given way to secret nationalist organizations inside the colonies.

Mozambique Liberation Front

With the independence of Tanganyika the nationalist movement of Mozambique has received a new impetus and a struggle similar to that of Angola is in preparation. The Mozambique Liberation Front, also known as FRELIMO (from *Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique*), is a new political organization formed in June 1963 out of the merger of several political parties, some of them in exile, others still functioning underground within Mozambique.

The most important of the exiled political parties now fused into FRELIMO are: the *Mozambique African National Union* (MANU), *Uniao Nacional Democratica de Mozambique* (UDENAMO) and *Mozambique National Independence Party*.

The *Mozambique African National Union* had been organized originally by Mozambicans working in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Some of its leaders were associated with the political parties of those countries in their formative period. When it became clear that the political power in East Africa was to be handed over to the African majority these Mozambicans left those parties to prepare their own people for independence.

Some Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were in constant contact with their friends and fellow Africans from Mozambique. They set up the UDENAMO, with its temporary headquarters in Salisbury. So long as the Rhodesian Africans were allowed to form parties, Mozambicans continued to carry out their work unhampered. Later they transferred their headquarters to Dar-es-Salaam. The *Mozambique National Independence Party* was organized by a group of Mozambicans living in Nyasaland.

The FRELIMO is an attempt to prevent the division of nationalist forces which is having such tragic consequences in Angola. Soon after the formation of the Mozambique Liberation Front, it was decided to hold a national conference in order to formulate the main lines of the policy of the new organization and elect a group of officers to carry out its work. The conference met in Dar-es-Salaam in September 1962, and was attended by 80 delegates representing the various political groups of Mozambique exiled in East Africa, and by a few nationalist leaders working inside Mozambique, as well as by about 500 observers from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, Lindi, Morogoro, Songea, etc. There were also observers from Zanzibar, where over 50,000 Mozambicans work in shipping and on clove farms and plantations. From Mombasa and Kenya came several people representing the Mozambican community of over 20,000 workers in the dockyards and a few came from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

Mozambicans have suffered more than Angolans and this may give a much more violent turn to their struggle. With almost no natural barriers along the frontiers of Mozambique with Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Nyasaland, the war operations are likely to be more efficient than in Angola. But since Nyasaland has no outlet other than rail and road connections through Mozambique, its Government will be in a difficult situation to give effective assistance to Mozambicans.

Angolan Nationalism

Fascist tyranny in Angola has not prevented the urge of its people for freedom and independence. But it has made impossible a large and efficient nationalist organisation. Several nationalist groups and religious movements with political aims sprang up in Angola soon after World War II. The most important of such movements is *Tocoism*. It was founded by Simao Toco, who was born in Maquela de Zombo some time between 1914 and 1918. In 1926 he began his education in the Baptist Mission of Kibocolo. Having shown his "quite an extraordinary degree of intelligence" he was sent in 1933 to the Lyceum of Luanda for his secondary education. In 1937 he came back to Kibocolo as a teacher and later he was sent to the Baptist Mission of Bembe. In 1943 he went to Leopoldville to teach and direct a choral group of a Baptist mission there. At this time he came in contact with three other religions: Watch Tower, Armee du Salut and the religion of Simon Kimbangu. Some time in 1946 he began to hold meetings in Leopoldville with his own adepts. By 1949 the Belgian authorities had noticed the growth of his religion and handed him over to the Portuguese authorities together with about 100 of his adepts.

The Portuguese authorities discovered that he had "qualities of persuasion in a very high degree" and in January 1950 they placed him under "police vigilance" and fixed his residence in Bembe. But soon they found that he had organized a large group and sent him to Luanda and in November 1950 to Caconda. After two years the police discovered that he was continuing to gain new adepts and maintaining contacts with his adepts in Bembe and other places, and in 1952 removed him to Jau, and from there to Cassinga in June 1954. But his activities continued and in 1960 he was finally deported to Ponta Albina, a light-house in the desert of Kalaheri, 30 miles south of Porto Alexandre, where he was brain-washed and released in 1962.

Simao Toco's aim was to establish an Angolan national religion. It seems that Tocoism has had a great impact on Africans due to its prophetic-messianic nature and elaborate ceremonies. In 1959 a Portu-

guese mission led by Professor Silva Cunha went to Angola to investigate the extent of Tocoism and found that it was well organized and spread to places where Toco had stayed and also in Uíge (Carmona), Malange, Benguela, Mossamede, Porto Alexandre, and that Simao Toco was regarded not only as a religious leader but also as a political leader.

Several other religious movements, such as Cambande, Chimpambule, Mayange, Touch, Os Santos, Lassismo and Dieudonne have made their impact on the nationalist struggle in Angola. A native may be Protestant or Catholic and yet he will belong to any of these native religions which have a stronger hold on him than any western religion.

Associations and organizations of economic and social character have also been set up by *assimilados* with the intention of using them for their political objectives. Organizations of this kind are: LNA, *Liga Nacional Africana* (African National League); ANANGOLA, *Associacao Regional dos Nativos de Angola* (Regional Association of Angolan Natives); and AASA, *Associacao Africana do Sul de Angola* (African Association of Southern Angola). They are legally set up associations aiming to pursue and defend the legitimate interests of their members. Though they have sometimes come out to protect the interests of Africans in general, their impact on Africans is very limited. The authorities intervene in their management to select members of their managing committees. Some of them have now turned out into organs of Portuguese propaganda.

MPLA and other parties

Innumerable clandestine nationalist groups had appeared on the Angolan political scene. They were crushed and disappeared. But in December 1956, several Angolan nationalist groups in Luanda, Catete and Malange merged into *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*, MPLA. The two leaders who are known to have taken a leading part in this merger are Ilidio Machado, now in the military gaol of Luanda, and Viriato Cruz, now in exile. Angolan African intelligentsia supports MPLA.

It has published a detailed programme divided into two parts: a programme for the liberation of Angola and a programme for independent Angola. In the programme for liberation it urges the formation of an Angolan liberation front which would include all political parties, people's organizations, armed forces, eminent personalities, ethnic groups, and religious organizations as well as all African social classes and Angolans resident abroad, regardless of their political belief, wealth, sex or age. Such a front would put the interests of the peasants and

workers of Angola first and foremost as the two most important sections of the population and would fight for "immediate and complete independence by every means". For an independent Angola, the MPLA advocates a coalition government to establish a democratic regime and the immediate formation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. It promises adult franchise and regional autonomy for minorities to develop their own language, script and cultural heritage. It will undertake "the transformation of Angola into a modern industrial country" on the basis of a planned economy and agrarian reform.

Besides MPLA there are several other smaller nationalist groups still functioning inside and outside Angola. The *Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola* (UNTA) is an underground trade union of Angola. It has members in Luanda and other towns and also among the Angolan emigrants in Congo. The *Movimento Separatista Lusitano* is led by a Portuguese maintaining close relations with a group of the Portuguese opposition in Brazil and with some Portuguese businessmen in Rhodesia and Angola. Portuguese Government servants in Angola seem to support it. Brazzaville Radio in its Portuguese programme reports on its activities. The *Movimento Separatista Angolano* is led by an African.

In the enclave of Cabinda, north of the river Congo, there are three nationalist organizations: *Amicale des Originaire de l'enclave de Cabinda*, *Association des Ressortissants de l'enclave de Cabinda* and *Movimento de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda* (MLEC). The most important is MLEC, which has offices both in Brazzaville and in Leopoldville.

About 1958, African students from Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies in Africa had set up in Portugal a clandestine organization, the *Movimento Anti-Colonialista* (MAC). It had connections with African students and others in the colonies and was responsible for awakening the nationalist conscience of the students, and for establishing contacts with nationalist organizations from other parts of Africa. They were arrested and persecuted in 1960 and left Portugal and MAC came to an end. But many of these students are now in the forefront of the nationalist struggle.

In June, 1961, some Portuguese liberals and *assimilados* handed over to the Governor General of Angola, in the name of *Frente Unida Anti-Facista* (United Anti-Fascist Front), a memorandum demanding autonomy for Angola. They were promptly arrested.

Government-in-exile

Originally the UPA, *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola*, was a tribal organization of Bakongos and was known until 1958 as *Uniao das*

Populacoes de Norte de Angola (Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola). Its main support continues to come from the Bakongos.

Its programme is rather vague. In a brochure, *The struggle for the independence of Angola*, distributed as its programme, UPA says that liberation is to be achieved by "peaceful and democratic means." But it does not seem to have adhered to it—such means can only be pious hopes under a fascist regime. As to the future policy of independent Angola UPA promises a democratic and socialist regime, with distribution of land to the tillers.

The Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo (ALIAZO) is an organization of Angolan emigrants in Congo (Leopoldville) and very influential in the Maquela do Zomo area, a town in Northern Angola. The UPA and the ALIAZO have now merged to form the Angolan Government-in-exile, headed by Mr. Holden Roberto, and recognized by 26 African countries and Iraq.

It would be wrong to assume that the Angolan war is led by the Government-in-exile. All kinds of political groups and organizations, known and unknown, are fighting it in their own way. Of course, the Government-in-exile as well as MPLA have a major share in the conduct of the war. But it can be rightly said that the Angolan war is a national uprising.

Angolan War

The true extent of the Angolan tragedy is yet to be revealed. The cruelty used to persecute and exterminate Africans has been unique in colonial history. Newspapers and journalists, friendly to Salazar's Government, have admitted with reluctance some of the facts of the "indiscriminate slaughter" by the "revenge-seeking Europeans shooting Africans on sight and burning their huts" and described how "mobile columns and air-strikes are used to obliterate village after village". But the list of atrocities is enormous: pouring petrol over innocent Africans and setting them alight; cutting the throats of Africans. Even the Africans who have always cooperated with the Portuguese have been robbed and shot by settlers.

It is not only in the war area of the North that Africans have been massacred and their villages burnt down: African quarters around Luanda were also set on fire. In Gabela, 210 miles south of Luanda, over 200 Africans were buried in a common ditch—some dead, but others still screaming *mata-me, mata-me* (kill me, kill me).

This slaughter was absolved by Cardinal Cerejeira, head of the Portuguese Catholic Church, who wrote a special prayer, the "soldier's

workers of Angola first and foremost as the two most important sections of the population and would fight for “immediate and complete independence by every means”. For an independent Angola, the MPLA advocates a coalition government to establish a democratic regime and the immediate formation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. It promises adult franchise and regional autonomy for minorities to develop their own language, script and cultural heritage. It will undertake “the transformation of Angola into a modern industrial country” on the basis of a planned economy and agrarian reform.

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This slaughter was absolved by Cardinal Cerejeira, head of the Portuguese Catholic Church, who wrote a special prayer, the "soldier's

prayer", to be said at the prayer meetings of the troops in Angola. It was legalized by the Decree-Law No 43.568 of March 28, 1961. Articles 24 and 25 state: "It shall be regarded as a legitimate defence any act of a volunteer (i.e., settler), preventing or stopping an aggression against the prestige of any institution or person and he shall be excused of and not be punished for any excessive behaviour (read: misbehaviour) due to his exaltation".

As if this law were not enough the Portuguese Minister of the War began exhorting the soldiers going to Angola:

"I cannot help repeating my words to the previous detachments... We are fighting savages. We are fighting wild beasts. Wild beasts who are not Portuguese for they are under orders of international Communism. We are going to face terrorists who have to be slaughtered like wild beasts".¹

This exhortation is constantly repeated in one form or another in the Portuguese press, where the word *abatido* (slaughtered) is used whenever a nationalist is killed. The *Jornal do Congo*, July 15, 1961, wrote:

"Let us go to repression in form.....It is necessary to start the 'thing' now: tomorrow may be late....Let us have peacebut peace in our own good old fifteenth century way".

Despite the ferocious repression, Angolan nationalists have managed to stand up to the Portuguese army, navy, air force, police, settlers' militia, *Legiao Portuguesa* and PIDE—all "hunting the bandits and terrorists". With only *catanas* (pangas) and *canhangulos* (muzzle loading guns made of water pipes) and some modern arms that were seized or stolen from the Portuguese army or taken away by the deserting African soldiers from the Portuguese army, the nationalists defied jets, napalm bombs and modern artillery. They are now receiving modern weapons and some help from other countries.

The Portuguese navy can control the coastal strip up to 50 miles inland, and the regions bordering navigable rivers. But the army has failed to regain control of Northern Angola. Many administrative posts are in the hands of nationalists; others that have been reoccupied by the army are not very secure. Bengo, a small town 60 miles from Luanda and not surrounded by jungles, was lost twice.

However small may be the military achievements of the nationalists, the fact is that they have disrupted the Angolan economy. It is estimated

that about a fourth of Angola, some 100,000 sq. miles of its richest region, cannot carry on with its normal agricultural activity. The nationalists deliberately set fire to the plantations, but the Portuguese army does it inadvertently while trying to smoke out the "rebels" by setting fire to the grass.

Labour is scarce and unreliable. The settlers need troops beside them to work on the plantations. With the mass exodus of Africans from the north of Angola to Congo about 7,000 African labourers have been brought from Southern Angola and Mozambique to harvest coffee and other crops under the 'protection' of armed settlers and troops. Censored Portuguese press reports estimate a reduction of 80 to 90 per cent in the agricultural production of this region. The rebellion is not confined to jungle areas: open fields and the cotton growing areas around Cassaneca (50 miles from Luanda), have suffered devastation and attacks by nationalists. Portugal is now switching from a plantation economy to mining, which is less vulnerable to guerrilla warfare.

The policy now is to settle the soldiers and to arm the settlers: soldiers-settlers and settlers-soldiers policy. The soldiers have been offered land and plantations that have been abandoned and a free passage to their families, as well as farm equipment and a salary. The settlers are being appeased by meeting some of their old demands: the export boards (*juntas de exportacao*) for cereals, coffee and cotton have been shifted from Lisbon to Luanda—which also increases the number of Portuguese civil servants in Angola.

CONCLUSION

Assimilation and Apartheid

The ruthlessness of Portuguese colonial policy can best be illustrated by comparing it with another cruel policy for the oppression of Africans with which the world is more familiar, *apartheid*. It may seem that they are totally different policies, one based on segregation and the other on assimilation of Africans. But the Portuguese policy also segregates Africans who remain Africans, the *indigenas*, accepting as *assimilados* only a few who discard their African personality. Under the guise of assimilation, Portugal has implemented an oppressive policy no less cruel than *apartheid*. And the abrogation of *Estatuto de Indigenas* in 1961 has made little impact on the traditional reality. No doubt Portugal has shown greater foresight in pursuing her policy. In fact, measures taken by Portugal long ago to prevent the growth of nationalism were almost unknown in South Africa until about 1950.

In Portuguese Africa the education of Africans has been under complete control of the authorities. Schools are considered dangerous places unless they are in trusted hands to mould the minds of Africans. As a result, in South Africa the illiteracy rate is 58 per cent; in Portuguese Africa it is 98 per cent (whites and non-whites taken together). There are nine universities in South Africa—though mostly for the whites. But in any of the eight Portuguese colonies of Africa and Asia there is none. While South Africa may be considered well provided with colleges, professional institutes, technical and commercial schools, Portuguese Africa is almost destitute in them.

But the perverse side of the Portuguese educational policy is that Africans are “educated” to be good, loyal and hard workers by Catholic mission schools and other educational agencies of the Portuguese Government. The South African Government does not interfere with the freedom of education, and missionaries of many religious denominations have their schools and colleges for Africans.

Portuguese censorship and police have seen to it that no dangerous literature is published or received from abroad which may disturb the minds of Africans. Even South African newspapers, magazines and books are censored by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique. Sometimes their circulation is banned.²

On the other hand newspapers and journals have to publish specially prepared notes and articles by the two propaganda agencies, *Agencia Geral do Ultramar*, and *Secretariado Nacional de Informacao*, for the “edification” of Africans. Of course, since the illiteracy rate is very high, literature of any kind has a very limited impact on Africans. But Africans, mainly in towns, who were fortunate to possess wireless sets, were deprived of them to prevent them from listening to Radio Brazzaville and other foreign stations. South African authorities have not yet gone to that extent. But even if they have done so now, it is too late: the “germ” of nationalism has already spread. The Portuguese began their prophylactic treatment in 1928.

In that year a fascist regime was introduced in Portugal and gradually in her empire. And all associations, organizations, and meetings, except those patronized by the Government were banned. For any group of persons to meet came under the suspicion of PIDE, Portuguese Gestapo, which could arrest anyone for alleged subversive activities. Such conditions may prevail in South Africa now, but still non-political organizations can function and meetings held. The life of Africans has not been so regimented in South Africa as it has been in Angola or Mozambique by the highly centralized Portuguese administration, supplemented by fascist organizations and movements, such as the *Mocidade Portuguesa*, the Portuguese Fascist Youth.

Being aware that economic development gives rise to industrial working classes which can be dangerous to the "peace and harmony" of her empire, Portugal has pursued the deliberate policy of holding back the industrialization of colonies. South Africa has strived for rapid industrialization and is today economically the most advanced country of Africa, with a large number of industrial workers, conscious of their political rights.

These preventive measures adopted by Portugal long ago explain the somewhat late nationalist uprising. But they do not give an answer to the fact that Angola and Mozambique still continue under Portuguese rule, while in territories of other colonial powers Africans have achieved their independence with less struggle. The answer lies in the fundamental difference that exists between the systems of government of these colonial powers and that of Portugal. All of them had a democratic government at home, which gradually responded to the internal and external pressures. They were at the helm of industrially advanced countries with worldwide interests, and had national interests and prestige at heart. Portugal is ruled by the dictatorial government of Salazar who, like Hitler, cares very little about the interests of either Portugal or its colonies. That the interests of Portugal lie in a settlement of the colonial question is the general opinion of the Portuguese intelligentsia.

Even Salazar's intimate supporters have been dissuading him from his colonial war policy and advising him to seek a political solution of the colonial problem. On April 13, 1961, soon after the war had begun in Angola, General Botelho Moniz, Defence Minister, and Salazar's close associate since the 1920's, wrote to Dr. Salazar that colonial war is a "mission of suicide" and that a "new policy should be devised to find a solution to the problem". He added that this was the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Council for Defence, of the Minister for War and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. And he warned him that the present policy would lead the nation to "chaos and irresponsibility". But Salazar found it convenient to dismiss them immediately and part company with the main architects of his regime. *Apres moi, le deluge* is his way of thinking.

Challenge to U.N.

This policy is a challenge to the United Nations. Its Charter recognises the principle of "self-determination of peoples" and demands "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms". It also entrusts the member nations with the obligation "to ensure the political advancement of non-self-governing peoples", and "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the

peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of free political institutions according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people”.

Portugal, as a member of the United Nations, should have implemented these principles, as many other countries with colonies have done. But her contempt for the United Nations is unique. While every colonial power, including Spain, is giving to the United Nations information on its colonies, Portugal has refused to do so.

The United Nations has no remedy to meet this situation. Soon after the slaughter of 50,000 Angolans, from April to September 1961, the United Nations decided to send a committee to investigate conditions in Angola. But Portugal refused entry to the committee.

The decision of 47 non-aligned nations summit conference at Cairo in October 1964 seems to be the right answer to this Portuguese colonial policy. The participating countries were urged to “afford all necessary and material support—financial and military—to freedom fighters” in Portuguese colonies and called upon to “break off diplomatic and consular relations” with Portugal and to “sever all trade and economic relations” with her.

This decision to give financial and military assistance to freedom-fighters has vindicated the actions taken by the Governments of Dahomey and India in 1961. On July 25, 1961, the Dahomey President asked Portugal to evacuate the enclave Fort of São Batista de Ajuda by July 31—the date of the first anniversary of independence. On that date the Portuguese Resident set fire to the fort and the Portuguese Overseas Minister jubilantly announced: “They have done their duty”. And on August 1, Dahomey police expelled the Resident and his retinue from the fort and escorted him towards the Nigerian border.

In the case of Goa, Daman and Diu, the Government of India wasted 14 years in trying to persuade Portugal to grant self-determination to Goans, and allowed her under its own eyes to carry out brutal repression of Goan nationalists. This forbearance on the part of India had encouraged Salazar to think that his policy could be challenged by no one. In this he counted on Britain, the United States and Brazil—countries that came to his aid on the eve of Goa’s liberation, but failed since he was adamant on denying the right of self-determination to Goans.

This became obvious on December 17, 1961, when India acceded to the U.N. Secretary General’s request to settle the Goa problem by negotiations with Portugal in accordance with U.N. resolutions, and Portugal refused. The Portuguese Government was determined to destroy Goa as it had done the Fort of S. Joao Batista de Ajuda. In fact,

after the liberation of Goa several secret letters and cables from Salazar to the Governor General of Goa were found, instructing him to "fight as heroes" and "reduce Goa to ashes". This correspondence is available with the Government of India and in the archives of the Goa Government. By sending her armed forces in support of the Goan struggle for freedom, India saved Goa and the world from another massacre by Salazar.

The use of force by Dahomey and India was clear evidence that Afro-Asian countries were prepared to use arms to liquidate Portuguese colonialism. And this might have convinced Salazar to change his colonial policy, discouraging him from continuing his slaughter in Angola. But Western condemnation of India's action neutralized the effect of the blow to the Portuguese Government. As the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in Lisbon wrote on December 20: "The only good that the Portuguese can see coming out of Goa's collapse is a swing in their favour in the councils of the West."

However, Goa's collapse destroyed the myth of the impregnability of the Portuguese empire, or, in the words of the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent, "the myth that Portugal, though militarily and economically weak, possesses a peculiar spiritual strength to enable her, alone among European nations, to remain in Asia and Africa in furtherance of a non-racial, Christian civilizing mission".³ It also gave encouragement to nationalists in Angola and other Portuguese colonies to continue their struggle for freedom with hopes that Afro-Asian countries will come to their assistance.

The actions taken by Dahomey and India paved the way for that historical declaration of the non-aligned summit conference at Cairo in October 1964. Those 47 non-aligned nations did not hesitate to promise openly "military and financial assistance" to the nationalist organizations of Portuguese colonies; previous wavering and secrecy in doing it had come to an end.

This attitude of the non-aligned world has made it difficult for the Western powers to continue to give their wholehearted support to Portuguese colonial policy. Their hesitation in doing so has angered Salazar, but it has made no impact on his belligerent colonial policy since he continues to receive all the arms he requires to pursue it.

Salazar may defy the mounting international and internal pressure to change his policy. But the Portuguese people cannot ignore it. They have left him almost alone; prominent members of his regime have abandoned him, and Dr. Marcelo Caetano and Dr. Adriano Moreira, who were expected to succeed Salazar, are now leading the Portuguese opposition movement. And it looks that the end of Salazar's regime and/his colonial rule is not far off.

(Concluded)

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A Political Analysis of the UDI in Rhodesia

S. C. GANGAL

THE Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the racist Smith regime in Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia) on 11 November 1965 constitutes the gravest crisis in British overseas affairs since the Suez episode of 1956. The present crisis is even more ominous than the Suez affair inasmuch as it is running a protracted course. The UDI is an issue affecting not only the Rhodesians and the British Government but the whole world, especially Africa and Asia. It cannot be passed over lightly as a sudden or isolated development—a mere quirk of history. It is the climax of events and decisions dating back to 1923.

Founded in 1889 by British merchant-adventurer Cecil Rhodes and named after him, Rhodesias were governed by the British South Africa Company under a charter for over 30 years. In 1923, the British granted self-government to Southern Rhodesia following a referendum in which the white Rhodesians voted against the proposed alternative of merging it with South Africa. Under the new dispensation, the British retained the powers to appoint a Governor and veto legislation. But they took no practical steps to implement effective British rule. Unlike in most other British colonies, there were no British troops and civil service in Southern Rhodesia. The British veto over legislation became obsolete because it was never exercised in practice.¹ Hence “this (1923) was the real moment when control passed from London to Salisbury....For all practical purposes power had been handed over to them (white Rhodesians) long before Sandys, Home or Wilson arrived on the scene.”²

Southern Rhodesia was governed by the 1923 Constitution for about 40 years. During this period franchise could in theory be exercised by Africans and Europeans on the same terms. But in practice the educational and property qualifications prescribed for it excluded vast masses of Africans from the electoral roll. In fact no African was elected to the legislature until 1962 when the new Constitution

made some provision for African representation. And until 1953 there were less than 1,500 coloured and African voters in Southern Rhodesia.³

In 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed. But it did not improve matters for Africans who had little opportunity to express their views. The veteran African leader Joshua Nkomo, then a trade unionist, was strongly opposed to the Federation. In 1960, during the period of the Federation, Sir Edgar Whitehead introduced his notorious Law and Order Maintenance Bill which, *inter alia*, prescribed savage sentences even for such legitimate and harmless political activities as organising boycotts and ventilating grievances through newspapers. It is important to note that while this "evil" Bill provoked the Federal Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, to resign his high office, the British Government, taking cover under the fiction of Southern Rhodesia's internal autonomy, refused to veto it. Thus, while Britain was legally sovereign, she had in fact "abdicated any true exercise of metropolitan power... In this way Britain rejected the role of final arbiter between the White Settlers and the African masses, which she played in Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and most other colonies."⁴ In 1961, when the new Constitution came into force, the British Government altogether surrendered its power to disallow Rhodesian legislation affecting the rights of Africans. The Constitution provided for a Declaration of Rights and a Constitutional Council to examine new laws and decide whether they were in accordance with the Declaration of Rights. The Declaration of Rights provided for fundamental freedoms and other rights irrespective of race, colour or creed. But its provisions were subject to two severe, almost nullifying, conditions: first, under Section 1 (b) of the Constitution, laws which were passed before the Constitution came into operation and which continued to be in force could not be deemed to be inconsistent with the Declaration. Thus, a whole range of discriminatory and repressive legislation, including the invidious Land Apportionment Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Bill, remained unaffected by the solemn provisions of the Declaration. Secondly, the Constitutional Council's decisions could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, or (in many cases) with the lapse of six months' time after an objection was first raised. Thus it was that despite the high-sounding Declaration of Rights, all African political parties worth the name were banned and death penalty was prescribed even for minor offences, such as throwing explosives on residential buildings. Moreover, states of emergency had been constantly in force in different parts of the country, so that it was always possible to order detentions without trial. As to property rights, the Land Apportionment Act, as pointed out earlier, was outside the purview of the Declaration of Rights. Indeed, 37 per cent of all land, including the entire urban land, was reserved exclusively for whites

who constitute only about 5 per cent of the population. There was also racial segregation in education. The Land Apportionment Act was interpreted in such a way as to prevent the establishment of non-racial secondary schools.

The first election under the 1961 Constitution—with its dual franchise⁵—was held in December 1962. The ultra-Rightist Rhodesian Front, founded just eight months before the election, won it with an overall majority of five in the legislature. It came to be known as the “legs election” because of a Rhodesian Front campaign poster showing the legs of white and black girls walking together, presumably to school.⁶ The campaign slogan declared: “Rhodesia is not ready for this!” The two most important election promises were to secure independence and save white civilisation. So, when the first Rhodesian Front government took office early in 1963, the die was already cast and “the dispositions for disaster were already made”.⁷ The new Premier, Mr. Winston Field, lost no time in asking for a written assurance from the British Government that Rhodesia would be granted independence not later than Zambia and Malawi.

There were talks between the British Government and Rhodesian leaders in March and May-June in London, followed by further negotiations at Victoria Falls (Southern Rhodesia) late in June 1963. But no agreement was reached. The matter also figured in the British House of Commons on 11 July 1963 during a discussion on the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Bill. Both Conservative and Labour members, including the present Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, strongly pleaded for not granting independence to Southern Rhodesia until the establishment of majority rule there.⁸

About this time member-states of the Commonwealth began to play a significant part in Rhodesian affairs. Mr. Field did not expect or seek support from Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth. But he had been told that he could not expect the support of even Australia, Canada and New Zealand for his demand for independence under a white minority regime.⁹ Mr. Duncan Sandys, the new Commonwealth Relations Secretary, unmistakably emphasised the point in a statement in the House of Commons on 15 November 1963: “If we were to give independence to Southern Rhodesia on terms which were unacceptable to our fellow members, we would be likely to cause grievous injury to the unity of the Commonwealth and to the image it represents to the world.”¹⁰

These developments tended to aggravate the sense of impatience in Salisbury and Southern Rhodesia seemed to be heading for a unilateral declaration of independence. In his New Year's Day broadcast, Mr. Field reiterated the independence demand. He stressed the

importance of reaching a negotiated settlement. But added significantly: "If we cannot, *then we have to think again.*"¹¹ From that time extremist pressures on Mr. Field began to mount so that on 13 April 1964 he had to resign. In a prepared statement after his resignation, Mr. Field openly declared that "serious disagreements had arisen between my party, the House and myself in relation to policy, and I have been requested to retire in order to make way for someone else".¹² His successor, the extremist Mr. Ian Smith, made it clear that he could "visualise circumstances which might drive us to do something else",¹³ if he did not succeed in achieving independence through negotiations. From this time the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence began to loom large on the Rhodesian horizon.

It was against this background that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in July 1964 (at which Mr. Smith was refused representation), discussed the Southern Rhodesian problem. The following statement was eventually incorporated on Southern Rhodesia in the conference communique: "The Prime Minister of Britain told his colleagues that he was endeavouring to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to discuss the question of independence for that territory."

"Other Prime Ministers expressed the view that an independence conference should be convened which the leaders of all parties in Southern Rhodesia should be free to attend."

"The object would be to seek agreement on the steps by which Southern Rhodesia might proceed to independence within the Commonwealth. *They urged the Prime Minister of Britain to take the necessary initiatives in this regard.*"¹⁴

Apparently the statement was mildly worded. There was no specific reference to majority rule. Nevertheless, it led to great bitterness in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Smith ruled out a constitutional conference and described the Prime Ministers' discussions as "interference" to be treated "with the contempt it deserves."¹⁵

Later (in September 1964) Mr. Smith visited London for talks with the British Government. The British Government told Mr. Smith that independence under the 1961 Constitution as demanded by the latter could be granted only if he could demonstrate that a majority of Rhodesians supported his demand. However, the official communique on the talks (dated 11 September) added the significant rider: "The British Prime Minister said that the British Government would take account of any views which might be *freely expressed* by the population on the issue involved; but he must make it plain that *the British Government reserved their position.*"¹⁶

Back in Rhodesia, Mr. Smith hit upon an extraordinary method of testing African majority opinion on the question. He called 622 African Chiefs and headmen, between 20 and 26 October 1964, to Domboshawa, near Salisbury, and got their unanimous support at an *Indaba* for the demand for Rhodesian independence under the 1961 Constitution. However, this was rejected by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Prime Minister, on his last day in office. The Labour Government, on assuming office, confirmed the rejection.

Early in 1965 the new Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, and Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, visited Rhodesia and met Mr. Smith and other Rhodesian leaders, including the African leader Joshua Nkomo. But the stalemate continued. This tended to exhaust the patience of the African members of the Commonwealth. When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference opened in London in June 1965, they reportedly put their feet down on the Southern Rhodesian question. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Sierra Leone, especially the first, refused to sign the conference communique unless an assurance on Southern Rhodesia was included in it. They strongly pleaded that a constitutional conference should be held within three months.¹⁷ Dr. Milton Obote of Uganda went so far as to say, "We will come out with our own communique" unless African wishes were met. Eventually, the final communique, issued on 25 June 1965, contained the following statement on Southern Rhodesia:

The Prime Ministers "welcomed the statement of the British Government that the principle of 'one man, one vote' was regarded as the very basis of democracy, and this should be applied to Rhodesia. ... The British Government said that they were actively engaged with the Government of Rhodesia and it undertook to take account, in relation to these discussions, of all the views which had been expressed during the meeting. In this process of seeking to reach agreement on Rhodesia's advance to independence a constitutional conference would, at the appropriate time, be a natural step. If the discussions did not develop satisfactorily in this direction in a reasonably speedy time, the British Government, having regard to the principle enunciated by the Commonwealth Secretary of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, would be ready to consider promoting such a conference in order to ensure Rhodesia's progress to independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."¹⁸

The 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference marked a definite advance over the previous year's conference. It succeeded in securing British acceptance of the principle of 'one man, one vote' in relation to Rhodesia. The Afro-Asian Prime Ministers urged Britain to secure the release of all African leaders in detention in Rhodesia and convene a constitutional conference at an early date.

This was followed by an intensification of efforts towards a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, Britain's Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, visited Rhodesia in July and later the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Bottomley, visited West Africa. A Rhodesian delegation, headed by Mr Smith, visited London for talks with the British Government early in October. The following five principles formed the basis of its discussions:

- (i) The principle of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and granted.
- (ii) There would also have to be guarantees against any retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
- (iii) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (iv) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (v) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

These principles (especially (i), (iii) and (iv)) were vague enough to give Mr Smith room for bargaining and manoeuvring. The fifth principle proved to be the major hurdle to agreement. After the failure of the talks, a unilateral declaration of independence seemed imminent. On 18 October 1965 Mr Wilson thought it necessary to appeal to the Rhodesian Premier not to seize independence unilaterally "for the sake of your country, and for the sake of Africa".¹⁹ This was followed by a further exchange of messages between the two sides; but the impasse continued.

Mr. Wilson visited Salisbury on 25 October "to avert what I am certain would be a tragedy." To this end and presumably to gain time, he proposed the establishment of a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Hugh Beadle, Chief Justice of Rhodesia, to look into the question of independence. The terms of reference of the proposed commission and related matters were subsequently negotiated and the British Government went a long way in meeting Rhodesian demands.²⁰ In his last talk on the telephone with the Rhodesian Premier, Mr. Wilson made the following offer: "... We are prepared to commend to the House of Commons, to Parliament, subject always to their sovereign rights, of course, acceptance of a unanimous report of the commission which says that the people of Rhodesia want independence

under the 1961 Constitution, in return for a statement by you that you drop your claim to independence under that Constitution if there is a unanimous report saying that the people of Rhodesia do not want that."²¹ The conversation ended on a note of formal diplomatic propriety and courtesy, each Prime Minister thanking the other, and Mr. Smith making the non-committal remark: "I have got the position quite clear." But it was only the proverbial lull before the storm. For, in spite of Mr. Wilson's last-minute conciliatory moves (*The Ghana Times*, reflecting African reaction, called these a betrayal of the 4 million Africans of Rhodesia), the dreaded UDI was proclaimed in Salisbury on 11 November 1965 in utter disregard of world opinion.

The UDI came as a shock in London and elsewhere.²² The British Government's initial reaction was sharp and unequivocal. In a statement to the House of Commons on 11 November 1965, Mr. Wilson said: "The British Government condemns the declaration of independence by the former Government of Rhodesia as an illegal act and one ineffective in law. *This is an act of rebellion against the Crown, and against the Constitution as by law established. Actions taken to give effect to it will be treasonable . . . We shall have no dealings with the rebel regime.*"²³ He also announced the British Government's immediate reprisals against Rhodesia, namely, the suspension of the rebel government from formal authority, stopping of exports of arms (including spares), removal of Rhodesia from the Sterling Area, suspension of Commonwealth Preference for Rhodesia, suspension of capital exports, banning of tobacco imports from Rhodesia and suspension of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in relation to Rhodesia.

These initial sanctions were highly selective. They did not cover export of oil, a crucial item in Britain's trade with Rhodesia, and some other items. Moreover, the use of force was then (as now) ruled out. The British Government also asked for an early meeting of the U.N. Security Council, not with a view to seeking its intervention in Rhodesia (Britain has always opposed it on the plea of domestic jurisdiction) but, as Mr. Wilson himself put it, "to keep control of the situation",²⁴ in other words, to bar U.N. action, or action by other States either individually or collectively. Since then, additional sanctions and financial measures have been enforced. On 1 December 1965, trade embargoes on chromium, iron and steel, copper and various foodstuffs were announced. Simultaneously, curbs on all current payments and remittances were applied. On 3 December, the British Government assumed control of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, apparently with a view to wresting control of Rhodesian funds abroad. Rhodesia retaliated by repudiating its foreign debt. Application of an oil embargo was held up until 17 December 1965. Some trade with Rhodesia conti-

nued even after the oil ban. A total trade embargo against Rhodesia came into effect on 2 February 1966.

Apparently the application of sanctions has proceeded in a halting and piecemeal manner. The reasons are not far to seek. The Labour Government, with its narrow majority, could not but move cautiously on such a highly explosive issue as Rhodesia. There was reportedly an influential 'kith and kin' lobby (in the ranks of the Conservative Party) in the British Parliament who wanted the Government to soft-pedal the Rhodesian challenge.²⁵ The Conservatives opposed from the start adoption of drastic measures against the Rhodesian whites. In a nationwide broadcast on 3 December 1965 (following the enforcement of fresh trade and financial curbs), Mr. Edward Heath, Leader of the Conservative Opposition, warned the Government against further economic measures. He said: "I am quite sure that to go the whole hog (with sanctions) would produce a feeling of injustice and leave behind a legacy of bitterness which will make conciliation infinitely more difficult in the future."²⁶ The oil sanctions were delayed until the British Government (apparently seeking to protect British oil interests) had assured itself that other leading oil supplying countries like the United States, France, Iran and the Netherlands would also observe them. Arrangements for airlifting oil to Zambia had also to be completed before the announcement of the embargo. Perhaps the timing of the decision was also influenced by the move on the part of several African States (including two Commonwealth members, Ghana and Tanzania) to snap diplomatic ties with Britain, following an ultimatum by the 36-nation Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its Addis Ababa conference early in December 1965.²⁷ The oil sanctions have not so far proved quite as effective as the British Government had expected. One of the reasons is that they were applied rather late—over a month after the UDI. This allowed the Rhodesians to build up oil reserves and to effect economies.²⁸ Moreover in Rhodesia oil is not vital to industry which is run, chiefly, on power or coal; it affects only transport. Finally, and this poses a serious problem, oil has been flowing into Rhodesia from South Africa and, presumably, from the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The precise extent of the oil flow into Rhodesia is not known. Some reports put it as high as 70,000 gallons a day, while Whitehall estimates it at not more than 8,000 gallons a day. According to *The Guardian* (17 February 1966), "there is no reason to doubt a report . . . that 35,000 gallons of petrol a day is coming in road tankers across the South African border into Rhodesia at Beit Bridge . . . Rumours are rife among garage men that the petrol ration is soon to go back to the original level." The British Government have reportedly protested to South Africa about it.²⁹ But, indeed, these loopholes can only be plugged with a naval blockade of the South African and Mozambique ports. However, a blockade

is the one thing that the British Government is not prepared to risk. Not all the African appeals in the UN year after year for economic sanctions against South Africa could force Britain into a quarrel with Dr. Verwoerd's Government. Pretoria, therefore, will not be troubled by the formal representation Britain is reported to have made about the flow of oil into Rhodesia."³⁰

The trade embargo has also been applied haltingly and in dribblets. The major Rhodesian exports affected are tobacco, sugar and chrome. True, a large number of African and Asian countries—in addition to the United States, Canada, France and the Benelux countries—have also applied trade and oil sanctions. But as early as November-December it was reported from Salisbury that "mysterious foreign agents are seen in the Salisbury hotels negotiating to buy tobacco cheap, and sell Rhodesia the things it needs."³¹ Lest it should be dismissed as a mere hunch by a newspaperman, it may be pointed out that recently this phenomenon was recalled in the House of Lords. Speaking in a debate on Southern Rhodesia on 16 February 1966, Lord Coleraine said, "... Salisbury today is swarming with businessmen from Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and, yes, from the United States, picking up the threads of the business we have rejected..."³² As for chrome, it has been reported that in spite of the embargo "90,000 tons of high-grade metallurgical chrome ore—enough to keep Britain's ferro-alloy industry in supply for six months—has been shipped from Rhodesia under a special authorisation of the British Government exempting both Rhodesian exporters and British importers from the order-in-council."³³

The British Government emphatically ruled out the use of force in Rhodesia except in the event of a breakdown of law and order. In spite of all the pressure the Commonwealth States brought to bear on Britain at Lagos in January, Mr. Wilson, who was also under heavy Tory pressure at home, did not budge on this point. The British Government has maintained that troops can enter Rhodesia only if the Governor makes an appeal to restore law and order. However, as *The Guardian* (26 November 1965) put it, "an appeal by the Governor should certainly not be the only criterion. He might be unable to communicate with London. A breakdown of law and order is in any case hard to define. *The law has already broken down in that Mr. Smith is governing illegally. How many demonstrators have to be shot before order has broken down too?*"³⁴ British reluctance to use force in Rhodesia will inevitably prolong the crisis which, apart from other consequences, will seriously affect Zambia. "In the first place, any lengthy copper shortage (caused by the shortage of power) would inevitably lead manufacturers to substitute other materials—aluminium, say, or plastics—for copper, and history suggests that once substitutes

are used the original material is unlikely to regain all the lost ground. For Zambia, so dependent on copper for public revenues and export earnings, any damage done to the copper industry would virtually halt all development prospects. Secondly, it would be difficult for President Kaunda to stay in power and to keep extremists in check, if Zambia had to accept foreign charity — and an idle copper industry — for a period of months.”³⁵ It is a queer paradox that a sovereign should refuse to use force against its own territory in a state of rebellion. Indeed, “the measures that the (British) Government have proclaimed against Rhodesia are all precisely the kind of actions that one sovereign State takes against another... The action that the Government have declined to take—sending troops—is one action that characterises a sovereign power in relation to its own territory.”³⁶ It may also be added that British refusal to use force against the rebellious Rhodesian white minority is a case of flagrant inconsistency and duplicity, “for they are using force. . . in Aden against Arabs; and they can get away with that because they can be sure that, on their home front, only a negligible number of voices will be raised in protest against white troops being sent into action against non-white British subjects.”³⁷

By July this year, the British Government must report on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the sanctions to its Commonwealth partners in terms of the Lagos decision. Present indications are that the sanctions are unlikely to bite sufficiently to have a decisive impact on the Rhodesian economy in the near future. The use of force is also ruled out by Mr. Wilson.³⁸ What, then, are the possible alternatives open to the British Government? The Government is opposed to opening negotiations with the present regime in Rhodesia. But the Conservatives, following Mr. Selwyn Lloyd’s visit to Rhodesia (February 1966), are already calling for negotiations with Mr. Smith without any preconditions.³⁹ As it is, the Tory plea is unlikely to be accepted by the Government without a *volte face*. The next significant British moves on Rhodesia, if any, must wait until after the end of the general election scheduled for 31 March. Meanwhile Britain must be aware that the patience of the African peoples is being fast eroded and that it may well lead to an explosion.⁴⁰ Moreover, the British people themselves are, as the latest developments suggest, getting sharply divided on the Rhodesian issue, so that a tardy approach will only further harden the cleavage and render a final settlement more difficult. Indeed, the time has come for Britain to come out with a bold and imaginative policy on Rhodesia. A great responsibility devolves on the next Government in power.

REFERENCES

1. Thus even the notorious Land Apportionment Acts, 1930 and 1941, were passed without interference from London.
2. *The Sunday Times* (London): 14 November, 1965.
3. Jane Symonds, *Southern Rhodesia: Background to Crisis*, London (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, p. 18.
4. 'The Break That Had to Come', *The Sunday Times*: 14 November, 1965.
5. There were the "A" Roll and "B" Roll seats. The "A" Roll electorate, predominated by Europeans, returned 50 members, while "B" Roll Africans returned only 15.
6. *The Sunday Times*: 14 November 1965.
7. *Ibid.*, 14 November 1965.
8. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 680 (H.M. S.O., London). Said Mr. Bottomley: "... I want independence for all the people of South Rhodesia, not to hand over power to a few vested interests." *Ibid.*, Col. 1457. The plea for majority rule was even more emphatically advanced by Lord Balniel (Conservative, Hertford): "... *We should make it absolutely clear that the condition for independence is the establishment of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.* ... Her Majesty's Government should not be prepared to depart an iota from this pre-condition and in fairness to the Southern Rhodesians we should make this absolutely clear to them." *Ibid.*, Cols. 1480-81 (*Italics added*): He was strongly supported by another member from the ruling Conservative Party, Mr. Humphry Berkeley (Lancaster). Said Mr. Berkeley: "I do not believe that the British public would be prepared to stomach our handing over independence unconditionally ... to a minority in Southern Rhodesia which is outnumbered by sixteen to one ... I should like to make it quite clear that *I endorse very nearly all that was said by my noble friend the Member for Hertford (Lord Balniel).*" *Ibid.*, Cols. 1517, 1520 (*Italics added*).
9. Jane Symonds, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.
10. *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, Fifth series, Vol. 684, Col. 586.
11. *The Rhodesia Herald* (Salisbury): 3 January 1964. *Italics added*.
12. *Ibid.*, 14 April 1964.
13. "Mr. Smith's Illegal Declaration" (Africa Research, Exeter, England), p. 1.
14. *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi): 17 July 1964. *Italics added*.
15. *The Rhodesia Herald*: 17 July 1964.
16. *The Guardian* (Manchester): 12 September 1964. *Italics added*.
17. *The Hindustan Times*: 27 June 1965.
18. *The Times of India* (Delhi): 28 June 1965.
19. *The Times* (London): 19 October 1965.
20. Thus, on 11 November 1965, Mr. Wilson himself, in his telephonic conversation with Premier Ian Smith, said: "On every point you have pressed since I left Salisbury, we have met you—on the terms of reference, the narrower terms of reference; on the fact that it should be a Rhodesian paper only, if we could not agree on this; and on the interim report—on all these things ..." *The Guardian*, 15 November 1965.
21. *Ibid.*, 15 November 1965.
22. Thus, in New Delhi, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Swaran Singh, in a statement to Parliament on 12 November, announced India's decision to sever all economic relations with the rebel regime in Rhodesia—diplomatic relations had already been terminated. Mr. Swaran Singh regretted Britain's "shilly-shallying" and its inadequate and belated measures to deal with the mounting crisis. *The Hindustan*

Times: 13 November 1965. Suffice it to add that the reaction in Africa was even sharper because of Africans' direct emotional involvement.

23. *The Times*: 12 November 1965. Italics added.
24. *The Times*: 12 November 1965.
25. *The Guardian*: 3 December 1965.
26. *The Guardian*: 4 December 1965.
27. *The Hindustan Times*: 20 December 1965.
28. Thus, according to Ian Aitken, the Salisbury correspondent of *The Guardian*, Rhodesian stocks of oil on the eve of the oil embargo were "as large as six months' normal consumption," *The Guardian*: 10 December 1965.
29. *The Times of India* (Delhi): 21 February 1966.
30. *The Hindustan Times* (editorial): 22 February 1966.
31. *The Economist* (London): 4-10 December 1965.
32. *The Guardian*: 17 February 1966.
33. *The Times of India* (Delhi): 24 February 1966.
34. Italics added.
35. *The Times*: 26 November 1965.
36. George Cunningham, senior Labour Party official, reported in *The Guardian*: 6 December 1965.
37. Arnold Toynbee, "Kith, Kin and Consequences", *The Hindustan Times*: 2 January 1966.
38. It may however be mentioned (if only for the record) that the use of force in Rhodesia has been advocated not only by Africans but also, reportedly, by the left wing of the ruling Labour Party in Britain, and by a responsible section of the British Press, including *The Guardian* (26 November 1965) and *New Statesman* (3 December 1965). It is therefore possible that Mr. Wilson (assuming that he will be returned to power after the general election) might be forced to reconsider his attitude by the logic of events after July.
39. *The Guardian*: 22 February 1966.
40. In fact it has been reported that already "joint military action is being contemplated by African countries to bring down Mr. Smith's illegal white minority regime in Rhodesia." *The Times of India*: 23 February 1966. Maybe these reports are somewhat exaggerated but they certainly point to the high pitch of African sentiment on Rhodesia. It would be unstatesmanlike not to see the writing on the wall.

African Contribution to the Development of the Principle of Self-determination

V. MAYA KRISHNAN

AFRICAN nations which have in recent years emerged as independent countries have become members of the United Nations. Their delegates to the UN have taken their seats by the side of delegates of their erstwhile colonial masters. The African nations' role at the UN has become very significant. They have on most occasions given expression to their dissatisfaction with the rules of customary International Law. The Egyptian delegate has said that these nations were "the victims of the traditional doctrines of International Law which had been constituted for the purpose of serving the interests of the colonial powers and justifying their conquests and unequal treaties."¹ All African delegates at the UN have been seeking revision of the traditional International Law by purging it of those rules which permitted the exploitation of a weaker power by a stronger one. They have time and again emphasized that colonialism is a permanent aggression committed by the Western European nations against the weaker nations of Africa and Asia. They have elaborated the theory that colonialism is a permanent aggression and that the reconquering of the colonized territories whose administering powers did not recognize the people's right to self-determination far from being an act of aggression is a legitimate act of 'self-defence'. The case of Goa is a significant example of the proposition, generally accepted by all African nations, that all colonialism is illegitimate and that the use of force to overthrow it is justified as an act of 'self-defence'. Because of these and other similar views expressed by the African delegates, they have been criticised at the UN and outside for making attempts at the politicization of International Law.

The African struggle against colonial regimes is not a recent affair. During the proceedings of the UN Conference on International Organisation, the Egyptian delegation took upon itself the task of liberating African nations living under the colonial yoke. Against the argument of the United Kingdom delegate, Professor

Awad of Egypt contended that imperialism was an evil which should be terminated with speed: Egypt wanted that the trusts assigned should be transferred and terminated by way of action on the part of the General Assembly and the territories under the mandate system included in the new system by virtue of definition rather than by voluntary submission. It was also in favour of there being the least number of strategic territories. The Egyptian delegation wanted the rights of the existing mandatory States to be weakened and the privileges of the indigenous population enhanced. Of course, the original members of the UN from Africa who participated in the San Francisco proceedings were not able to score a decisive victory against colonialism. Since the inception of the U.N. Charter, the African delegates have been pressing for the early independence of all dependent peoples living in Africa and Asia and in other parts of the world. To the African nations, "the central universal value in the search of parochial independence has been, of course, the principle of self-determination."² This article will examine how the efforts of the African nations³ at the UN have brought about a change in the rules of Customary International Law under which States alone are the subjects of International Law and not 'people' or the individuals, a change to the effect that 'people' are also capable of enjoying rights under International Law. A new chapter on 'International Law' has been ushered in, by which the 'peoples' are also the subjects of International Law.

The term 'self-determination' finds expression in two places in the UN Charter, viz., in the Chapter on Purposes and Principles (Article 1, paragraph 2) and in the Chapter on Economic and Social Co-operation (Article 55). The wording is practically identical in both places and it refers to the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of people.

Though the expression 'self-determination' is of Western origin, it assumed African importance during the course of World War II and in the period following it. The prime reason for the popularity of the principle among African nationalists was the Atlantic Charter which President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed on August 14, 1940. The term 'self-determination' as such was not used in the Atlantic Charter. The UN Charter, which came into existence in 1945, effectively replaced it. The Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 1955 declared its full support for the principle of 'self-determination' of peoples and nations as set forth in the UN Charter. The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity sets forth, in the first place, the principle of self-determination of peoples in the following words ".....it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny. What does the expression 'self-determination' connote?

It is here necessary to refer to the proceedings of the UN. At its fifth session, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421 D(v), calling upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to 'self-determination' and to prepare recommendations on the subject. When the commission failed to take up the question due to lack of time, the General-Assembly again took it up at its sixth session and adopted two resolutions, Resolution 545(vi), and Resolution 549 (vi). Under the first, the General Assembly decided to include in the covenant or covenants on human rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination and requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations concerning international respect for the self-determination of people and to submit them to the Assembly at its seventh session. In the second resolution, the Assembly asked the Council to instruct the commission to give priority to the question of self-determination. As regards the article which was to appear in the covenant or covenants on human rights, Resolution 545 (vi) stated that it was to be drafted in the following terms:

"All peoples shall have the right of self-determination" and it was also to stipulate that all States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-self-governing Territories, should promote the realization of the exercise of that right in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN and that States having responsibility for the administration of Non-self-governing Territories should promote the realization of this right in relation to the peoples of such territories.

Article 1 of both draft covenants is as follows:⁴

1. "All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.
2. "All States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-self-governing and Trust territories and those controlling in whatever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the maintenance of that right in other States in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
3. "The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their national wealth and resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its own

means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other States.”

During the consideration⁵ of this article, a preliminary question was raised, namely, whether ‘self-determination’ was a political principle or a legal right. One school of thought maintained that ‘self-determination’ was a political principle of the highest importance, but not a right in the strict legal sense. Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter, it was pointed out, spoke of the “principle” not of the “right” of self-determination. It was argued that ‘self-determination’ was a nebulous term. As commonly used, the expression “the right of self-determination” meant different things to different persons; it might mean the right to “local autonomy”, ‘self-government’, “secession or association” or “independent and sovereign statehood.” Further, the concepts of a “people” and a “nation” were also extremely vague. There were no scientific definitions of such terms. Until such concepts were agreed upon, it would be premature to write into an international instrument an article on the right of “peoples” and “nations” to “self-determination.”

The African delegates maintained that self-determination was a right as well as a principle and that it was indeed the most fundamental of all human rights. It was stated that as a right self-determination was a collective right appertaining to all peoples and all nations and that, if denied this right, no peoples or nations, let alone individual members of these peoples or nations, were free. According to them, the term ‘self-determination’ is not a vague term. The right of peoples to self-determination is the legal right conferred by the positive International Law on legal entities, members of any political group, to form themselves into a political entity selecting their own Governors, to join any organized political community which they may choose.”⁶ It is a right by virtue of which persons grouped themselves together under certain conditions in order to form national communities. The principle of the peoples’ right, according to the African delegates, had become an accepted feature of the international community after it found its place in the Lansing Note of 5 November 1918 and in various other peace treaties after World War I. Further, the idea of plebiscite was inherent in that of the peoples’ right to self-determination. They also pointed out instances wherein the peoples’ right to self-determination had been exercised through internationally supervised plebiscites in Schleswig, Poland, Upper Silesia, the Saar, the Tyrol, the Aaland Islands and Vilna.”⁷ After its repeated invocation during World War II and its proclamation in the Atlantic Charter, “finally it has been endorsed in Article 1, paragraph 2, and in Articles 55, 73 and 76 of the United Nations Charter, which was the culmination of a long process of evolution.”⁸ The right of self-determination

enshrined in the Charter was not a relic of the 19th century but was a real right.⁹ The African delegates claimed that the term had been given a definition, though a vague one. It is "the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status" and it includes "permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources."

The African delegates refused to accept the argument that the expression "self-determination" in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter should be loosely identified with the expression "self-government" in Article 736 and "self-government or independence" in Article 766. Despite the fact of the difference in wording, the African delegates maintained, in the context the principle of self-determination and the right of self-government or independence were not different in essence. How could the UN promote the principle of self-determination of peoples in accordance with Articles 1 and 55 without promoting the right of peoples of Non-self-governing Territories to self-government or independence in accordance with Articles 736 and 766 or vice versa? The right of self-determination is a universal right and it is a right of all peoples and all nations. The African delegates made efforts to have the interpretation of the expression 'self-determination' laid down in the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv) to the effect that all peoples have the right to self-determination and by virtue of that right they determined their political status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development.¹⁰ The African delegates and their governments consider this resolution of the General Assembly, adopted on 14 December 1960, as the 'Second Charter' and not a mere resolution. It is a "charter of freedom for all enslaved peoples, a charter which most felicitously supplies the serious omissions in the charter drawn up at San Francisco. In many respects, the Declaration of 14 December 1960 will in time be seen as the second political charter of the United Nations, drawn up for the subjugated peoples of Africa and Asia whom the colonial powers for centuries and even at the San Francisco Conference continued to keep on the fringe of international life".¹¹

Portugal, a colonial power, did not accept the African concept of self-determination of the peoples. "To Portugal, self-determination meant the consent of the people to a certain structure and political organization. It came about by participation in administration and by participation in political life. Portugal submitted that when in any given country the population participated in administrative matters at all levels and in political life at all levels, then the population was participating in decisions regulating the country's affairs and in decisions affecting its life. That was what was happening in Portuguese territories...."¹²

During the conversations held through the good offices of the Secretary-General between African representatives and representatives of the Portuguese Government, the former made it clear that all they asked for was that Portugal should recognize the right of the peoples under the Portuguese Administration to determine their future for themselves. The Portuguese Government refused to yield. Since there was a divergence of opinion between Portugal and African States concerning the interpretation of the concept of self-determination a draft resolution,¹³ co-sponsored by Morocco and Ghana and having the support of the four African Foreign Ministers present, was introduced at the 1082nd meeting of the Security Council. Its operative paragraph ran like this. "The Security Council.

Reaffirms the interpretation of self-determination as laid down in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv) as follows: All peoples have the right to self-determination. By reason of that right they freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

The resolution was adopted by the Security Council. The African delegates from Ghana and Liberia claimed that once and for all a United Nations definition of 'self-determination' had been laid down and said that it would no longer be a source of conflict between the African States and Portugal.¹⁴

It may be asked at this stage as to what value one should attach to the draft article, the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv) and the Security Council resolution confirming the same. Whatever value one might attach to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, it is submitted here that these resolutions and the draft article are evidence of the State practice of the international community. It may be easier to criticise the African attitude as an instance of politization of International Law. But the concrete facts of state practice speak for themselves. Delegates of the various governments to the United Nations have recognized the right of the peoples to self-determination. Even the Portuguese and the Spanish Governments have on principle recognized the existence of such a right, but the strained construction placed by them on the expression 'self-determination' has in fact resulted in the deprivation of the rights of the people living in the Non-self-governing Territories which are under their administration. It is true that they are keeping the people under their control by force of arms. The only two territories in Africa in which the people were allowed to exercise their right of self-determination by a plebiscite were British Togoland and the British Cameroons. This fact should not be taken to mean that the colonial powers merely stopped short of recognizing the peoples' right to self-

determination. In a number of colonies, elections and other forms of popular consultation were held prior to independence which gave them an opportunity to express their opinions, but these were organized and supervised by the responsible colonial governments.¹⁵ This right of the peoples to self-determination is of universal application. The word "peoples" means the "peoples" in all countries and territories whether independent, Trust or Non-self-governing Territories. This right also belongs to peoples who, though independent now, might lose their right of self-determination. The Liberian delegate said that when drafting the article referring to the self-determination of peoples, the authors of the Charter had meant to draw attention to the fact that some communities were still denied the right to choose their own form of government.¹⁶ But the State practice has widened the scope of this right, so that it could be exercised by dependent peoples living in any part of the world. Could this right be so exercised as to allow the minorities in each State to opt out from the existing territorial States? Will it not result in the balkanization of the territories of the various States? As the Liberian delegate said, while proclaiming the right of peoples to self-determination the authors of the Charter were not thinking of the minorities living in the existing States. This much is clear from the records of the San Francisco Conference. The principle of self-determination conformed to the purposes of the Charter "only in so far as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession."¹⁷

A special problem for the newly independent African nations arose when some of the African leaders claimed that the principle of self-determination should be so applied as to bring about the ethnical grouping of States. It should be noted here that in 1885, 13 European States met in Berlin to delimit their territorial claims in Africa. The Congress of Berlin used vertical lines to divide the African continent. The result was a horizontal distribution of African tribes in various territorial units. It was intended to help in administration and it had no ethnic, tribal or even linguistic basis. "The magnitude of the dangers which may be involved in the further application of the principle of self-determination to peoples within the emerged states can be sensed in the facts that the Lunda, Chokwe, Bakonga and Azande tribes extend far beyond the borders of the Congo into Northern Rhodesia, Angola, the Congo (Brazaville), the Central African Republic and the Sudan, respectively; the Somalis lay claim to one-third of Ethiopia as well as to a substantial portion of Kenya"¹⁸ The Conference of the Independent African States, which met in Accra in 1958, demanded respect for the territorial integrity and independence of African States and disapproved in entirety the revolutionary implications of self-determination. The 20 African States which met at Monrovia in May 1961 rejected this new doctrine and made it clear that self-

determination was acceptable only for territories as a whole and not for ethnic pieces of them. At the United Nations also African delegates affirmed this principle. "In our opinion, the problem of self-determination raises several awkward problems. We consider that we could never agree to the right of self-determination being exercised otherwise than for the whole body of the Algerian people and for the whole of the Algerian territory."¹⁹⁻²⁰ This doctrine which sought to apply the principle of self-determination to peoples inhabiting territorially organized nations in Africa began to lose its significance from the time of the OAU Charter. The authors of the OAU Charter wisely incorporated the principle of self-determination only in the preamble of the Charter.

The document²¹ of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained a provisional list of 64 territories where the Declaration had not been implemented. Most of these territories are tiny little islands under the control of Britain. All the territories listed in the document, excluding territories which have become independent, belong to the western colonial powers. The Chinese delegate said, "A colony is a colony, whether it is the product of overseas expansion or the product of overland expansion."²² It is obvious that none of the territories listed in the document mentioned any territory within the orbit of the Soviet bloc. Because of this Committee's action²³ the African approach to the principle of self-determination has been termed as a 'salt water myth'. It means that the principle of self-determination is applicable to the overseas territories of the Western colonial Powers and not to the dependent peoples in the Russian satellite countries. Is this criticism, which seeks the universal application of the peoples' right to self-determination, justified? The African nations are equally in favour of the universal applicability of the right of self-determination. This is evident from the statement of the African spokesman, who said :

"We have fought on the African continent for the principle of self-determination and it is logical that we should seek its application throughout the world without accepting any compromise or restriction. Viet-Nameese, Koreans and Berliners all have the same right to decide their own destiny."²⁴

What are the pre-requisites that should be complied with before a people could exercise their right to self-determination? There need not be any shadow of doubt regarding the universal recognition of the right of self-determination. The General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv) concerning the granting of independence to colonial territories and

peoples was adopted without dissent. The resolution was based on a draft sponsored by 43 Afro-Asian member states of the United Nations. The first requisite for the exercise of the right is that the 'people' should inhabit a non-self-governing territory. There is no controversy regarding the inclusion of 64 territories as non-self-governing territories by the Special Committee. The question is whether it is open to the Special Committee and the General Assembly to include a part of the territory of a member of the United Nations in the category of non-self-governing territories? It is submitted here that unless the member concerned voluntarily recognizes that it has under its jurisdiction a non-self-governing territory, the General Assembly and the Special Committee are incompetent to include such a territory in this category. The General Assembly is incompetent because its resolution is not binding on a member state who votes against the inclusion of a part of its territory in the category of non-self-governing territories. Any action by the General Assembly in this direction, despite the protest of a member state, would amount to a violation of the UN Charter because, as pointed out earlier, the *travaux préparatoires* is clearly against the exercise of the right of self-determination which might bring about the secession of a member's territory. The second condition precedent for the exercise of such a right is that the people should have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes.²⁵ If these two conditions are properly complied with, the talk of 'salt-water colonialism' and 'overland colonialism' would become less pinching. Here it is pertinent to make it clear that the 'people' exercising the right of self-determination need not necessarily become an independent state, in disregard of economic viability. The case of Malaysia has demonstrated that self-determination can be an instrument of integration and unification. In a plebiscite held on 11 February 1961 the Southern Cameroons under the British administration voted "to achieve independence" by joining the Republic of Cameroon and was subsequently incorporated into that Republic. A plebiscite was held in the Northern Cameroons on 11 and 12 February 1961 in which the people were asked whether they wished to 'achieve independence' by joining the Republic of Cameroon or the Federation of Nigeria. The vote was to join the Federation of Nigeria.

What is the contribution of African nations to the development of International Law? "The crystal ball available to even the best informed in 1945 did not disclose that the UN was shortly to fall into the hands of the ex-dependent peoples and that the authority to 'meddle' in colonial affairs would not only be asserted but exercised on a grand scale."²⁶ The African nations have properly utilized the enhanced position they have acquired at the United Nations. The customary International Law did not recognize the people's right to self-determi-

nation. The Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League, referring to self-determination, observed, "The recognition of this principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the law of nations."²⁷ Because of the persistent efforts of African delegates at the UN and the African Governments' action, a great change has been brought about in the rules of traditional International Law which recognized States only as subjects of International Law, capable of exercising international rights. Now it is well settled that the 'people' have the right of self-determination. A people who have international rights have thus become subjects of International Law. The principle of self-determination represents an important movement away from the old legal view under which International Law pertains only to states and governments, not to groups or individuals."²⁸ The positive International Law has thus recognized the right of the people living in Non-self-governing Territories to decide their own destiny. It should be noted that the right of the people to self-determination is not a principle of International Law²⁹ because the principle is an abstraction from the rules of International Law.

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Saving a Language

ULLI BEIER

WHEN we speak of modern African literature, we usually take it for granted that this literature is written in European languages — English, French, Portuguese and Spanish. Purely practical considerations have made it necessary for the emergent nations to retain the colonisers' language as a *lingua franca*, a language of instruction and a language of creative writing. Nigeria alone has more than 50 languages; to impose one of these as a kind of national language would cause considerable political opposition among the minority groups. After Independence English has become a *neutral* language that does not give undue advantage to any one of the ethnic groups.

In such a situation the prospects for many indigenous African languages are poor. Particularly among the smaller language groups there is a danger that these languages will become slum languages, which are considered handy for daily small talk but which will not be used as an educational or creative vehicle. The Ministries of Education in various regions have attempted to fight this through language committees whose purpose was to encourage indigenous literature and publish it. But in many cases the only literature that emerged were primary school textbooks.

Probably the most creative language in West Africa today is Yoruba, which is spoken by some five million people in Western Nigeria and parts of Dahomey. More contemporary writing is produced in Yoruba than in any other Nigerian (and probably West African) language, and it is the only language that has produced its own literary "Little Magazine" ("OLOKUN"—published from Ibadan.)

It is of course impossible to say why this particular language should show more vigour than others. The following suggestion will explain the phenomenon at least in part: Yoruba culture in general has great richness and complexity and has proved more tenacious in the battle for survival in the New World than any other African culture. Of all the religions which the slaves brought to Brazil, Yoruba *orisha*

worship is the most widely practised there today. Of all the African languages that survived in Cuba, Yoruba is the most widely spoken. (To the extent that Lydia Cabrera could produce a Yoruba-Spanish dictionary in Cuba.) Furthermore the Yoruba system of *divination* is inseparably linked with a vast body of ritual poetry and so the *Babalawos* or diviners (literally "fathers of secrets") have become custodians of the language even in times when most of their clients are Muslims or Christians. Finally, Yoruba music is inseparably linked with the Yoruba language. Because of the tonal structure of the language, drumming is almost inevitably also *talking*. At every marriage, funeral or naming ceremony the "mother drum" will recite poetry on top of the polyphonic rhythm structure. (Only some *very* orthodox Muslims have managed to replace Yoruba drumming with some monotonous, humdrum cymbal beating in their ceremonies). But on the whole the "talking drum" has survived into modern Yoruba society; it is used extensively by politicians and is just about finding its way into the Church ritual. The talking drum, therefore, is another important factor in the survival of the Yoruba language.

In a sense, modern Yoruba literature begins with the popular novelist D.O. FAGUNWA. No Nigerian author writing in English has ever had such a large number of editions. For example, Fagunwa's second novel, "Igbo Olodumare", which appeared in 1949, has already had sixteen editions, and Fagunwa's total sales must be calculated in hundred thousands, rather than in thousands. Such incredible sales are partly due to the fact that Fagunwa's books appeared at a time when there was not much literature available in Yoruba and also because he is a very moralistic writer whose books were found to be acceptable even in the most Christian of schools. On the surface, in fact, his books are adventure stories for children. In *Igbo Olodumare* we hear of a hunter who decides to venture into the dangerous "Forest of the Almighty." On his way he is challenged by a ghost whom he defeats in battle. When he reaches the entrance of the forest, the gatekeeper asks him to swear by a huge book containing a list of all the sins in the world. Olowo-Aiye the hunter is unable to do so and again fights the spirit gatekeeper. There is a longish transformation flight, but in the end the hunter who at that stage has assumed the form of an elephant is trampling to death the gatekeeper who is in the form of a snake. The hunter continues on his way, meets and marries a beautiful young witch; loses his way in the forest, stumbles on the hut of the Father-of-the-long-beard, a wise old man, who introduces him to his terrible friend "Death" and who teaches him wisdom by telling him a number of moralistic tales (some of which are of European origin). The hunter is shown the way home, but before he safely reaches it is trapped by the king of snakes and must extricate himself with ingenuity.

The plot of these "novels" and their stock characters can hardly account for their popularity even among adults. (It is a common sight to see school-children reading Fagunwa to their illiterate grandparents). What is attractive and exciting about these books is Fagunwa's use of language. He was probably the first Yoruba writer who exploited the richness and quaintness of Yoruba idiom and metaphor to the full; who was never satisfied with using traditional proverbs and images and who invented his own proverbs in the traditional manner. Practically on every page of Fagunwa one comes across images like these:

He hung his hand like a banana leaf

My bottom changed to water (I was afraid)

God had placed salt on his lips (he was a good speaker)

Love spread across his face like palm wine overflowing its calabash.

Even the most unlikely phrases are turned into imagery by Fagunwa; thus "the animals were afraid to reply to the lion's questions" becomes: "When the lion finished his speech the question killed the reply and ate it." And instead of saying: "the hunter fired a shot" he says: "the hunter called his gun—the gun answered."

Fagunwa invents proverbs that have since become part of the Yoruba language:

When the pepper and the onion meet on the bush fowl—everything will become possible.

The liar gets up in the morning and he is fresh like a green banana tree; but in the afternoon he is like dry wood and in the evening he will be burnt out completely!

Every day is for the thieves—but one day is for the owner of property.

A matter which is soft like a red banana does not require an answer as hard as the stone in the water.

The moralistic twist Fagunwa gives to every event could easily become nauseating, but once again it is the language that saves him. When the brave hunter wants to venture forth into the "forest of the Almighty" everybody tries to dissuade him from this dangerous enterprise. But the hunter tells them that people who do not aim high will never achieve anything, for even if you do not achieve great things you might achieve nearly great things. This is how he puts it:

"The man who prays for ten embroidered gowns—even if he does not get ten, he will surely get eight. The man who prays for six pairs of trousers—even if he does not get six he surely gets five. But the one who asked God for only one pair of trousers—he will have to be thankful even for two!"

To understand the humour of Fagunwa, however, his rhetoric, his circumlocution, it is necessary to look at a slightly longer passage. In the following, the hunter Olowo-Aiye is caught on the top of a tree from which he cannot descend. He prays to all the animals to help him down but none of them want to have a hand in the matter and they quickly hurry on, without bothering about him. At last the rat passes and the hunter finally persuades it to help him with this splendid piece of round-about flattery:

"After a little while I saw a rat passing by. I could hardly recognise it was a rat, because I was sitting perched so high from the ground. I shouted to it and said: "You rat!" He answered and said: "Who is calling me rat? Me who dwells in the forest, who dwells in the bush, who is living among trees and creepers?" And I replied again and said: "It was me, Olowo-Aiye, calling you. The son of Akowediran. I the elephant hunter. The husband of Ajediran who came to hunt in this forest and whom you see squatting on this tree. Please help me, you rat, playing about. Nobody is small in the eyes of God. The only one small in the eyes of God is the dishonest man who invited the thief to steal on the farm and then went to ask the farmer to watch his farm. The farmer thanks him, and the thief also thanks him—but his judgement will take place in heaven, from where the rain falls. You rat of the Almighty, some people may think you are little, and yet you are bigger than the rabbits in other places! There is only one thing I want you to know: you are not little in the eyes of God, the king. You are not like the dishonest man who has blood in his belly and spits out white salvia! My dear rat; let me tell you a little story:

"One day I sat in the same meeting with a dishonest man. Only later we realised that the man wanted to ruin our society. On that day we all agreed together that a certain man was to be banned from our meeting. But when we had dispersed, this dishonest fellow secretly went to the man to tell him that he had no hand in our decision. Yet, finally we all heard about the matter and he was put to shame. When we queried him, he answered like a stammerer. He looked as if we were about to cut off his head. My dear rat: you are not like one of these, and I beg you not to leave me today without showing your truth. I want you to let me see the truth you have in your belly. Therefore tell me frankly now which way I can take to escape from this prison into which I got through my own foolishness."

Fagunwa's impact on Yoruba literature was enormous because it was he who created a reading public almost overnight. Though none of his later novels achieved quite the popularity of his first two, he remained Nigeria's most popular author until his untimely death in a car crash in December 1963. Fagunwa stimulated the growth of the Yoruba novel in two ways. On the one hand he had a large number of imitators, none of whom however succeeded in equalling him in the realm of the fantastic novel.¹

On the other hand, many of the more intellectual writers dissociated themselves from Fagunwa. While giving credit to him for his mastery of the language, they objected strongly to his subject matter, which they considered childish and irrelevant and they set out to create realistic novels in Yoruba. Such writers as I. Delano, S.A. Babalola and A. Faletti write about modern Nigeria and modern people. They represent the new trend in the Yoruba novel, but they have not achieved the wide popular appeal of Fagunwa, partly because their books are not suitable for school reading and partly, because many of the less educated readers are more interested in the sparkle of Fagunwa's language than in the character development and analysis of more modern writers.

Next to Fagunwa it is probably the *Yoruba theatre movement* that has helped to keep the language alive. To speak of a theatre movement is not quite correct because really one finds a number of companies and playwrights working independently and they have not produced a "program". Although a distinctive pattern has evolved, this is not deliberate but rather accidental.

The Yoruba theatre started, probably in the thirties, in the churches. Some of the African sects, the "Seraphim and Cherubim" and the "Apostolic Church" in particular introduced dramatisations of biblical stories as a means of spreading the gospel and of raising funds for the church. "Adam and Eve", "Joseph and his brethren" and the "Nativity" have been the most popular themes in church plays. All the plays were sung in Yoruba. The music was derived from Yoruba hymns and there was usually a somewhat feeble drumming accompaniment. These religious plays are still performed by amateurs and in churches all over Yorubaland. But it was Hubert Ogunde, an enterprising policeman, who first ventured into professional theatre in 1944. It is important to note that English speaking theatre in Nigeria has so far failed to become professional. This is so in spite of excellent Nigerian playwrights (Soyinka and Clark) and producers because English speaking audiences are still rather limited in Nigeria, and English speaking actors would require too high a living standard.

1. Only Amos Tutuola, writing in English ("The Palm Wine Drinkard" etc.) could be compared to Fagunwa. But Tutuola, though influenced by Fagunwa, developed this type of literature on quite new lines.

Ogunde, on the other hand, speaking Yoruba, can play in at least twenty Yoruba towns within a radius of 150 miles from Lagos. He can draw his actors from primary school leavers and from the growing class of unemployed. His major problem, in the early days, was to find and keep actresses. Acting is not a very respectable profession in Nigeria and parents are reluctant to allow their daughters to go on the stage. Even when he succeeded in getting girls to act, they soon got married and left the company. In the end he solved his problem gallantly by marrying all his actresses. Ogunde secularised the Yoruba theatre. Not only did he move from biblical themes to social satire, but he jazzed up the whole show, opened his performances with a crazy number called "opening glee" in which lightly dressed girls go wild on saxophones. For his appeal Ogunde relies largely on horse-play, sex appeal and topical satire. He has produced some forty plays during the last twenty years. These plays, however, have no full script. They are planned in broad outline and some of the choruses are written, composed and rehearsed. But most of the dialogue is improvised. Lack of polish in performance is compensated for by vigour and an experienced and clever response to audience reactions. Ogunde is the first of a long line of author-composer-producer-principal actor figures in the Yoruba theatre. Ogunde is a performer rather than a writer. But he has the great merit of having created a ready theatre audience in Yoruba country for other companies to build on. For years now he has never failed to get a full house anywhere. Recently he produced a political satire called YORUBA RONU ("Yorubas Think!"). On the surface this is just the common story of a man betrayed by his best friend, of the king who is overthrown by his chief minister. But the public was quick to realise that the play referred to the political crisis in Western Nigeria. Ogunde in this play appeals to his fellow Yorubas *to think* about the loss of prestige and respect that was one of the results of the crisis among their leaders:

*Yorubas undo themselves because of money,
Yorubas conspire against each other because of jobs,
They turn the guilty into the innocent
And the innocent into the guilty.
They call the thief to break the house
And they call the owner of the house to catch him.
Once wisdom carried them to a high place of honour,
Now they lie flat on the ground.
Those who were once the masters
Are now people to be pushed around.
Yò ! Yo ! Yo !*

Yoruba as bright as fire in the evening
Yoruba rising high like waves of the sea—
Yo Yo Yo
Yorubas think!
Yorubas have turned themselves into a football.
They kick you up,
They kick you down!
A tribe already small,
But now reduced to nothing.
Lazily you squat on your haunches,
Patient like goats led to the slaughter.
Yo Yo Yo!
Yorubas think!

The Government of Western Nigeria took offence at the play and banned Ogunde's theatre company from the Western region. Ogunde continues to play in the federal territory of Lagos, however, and has already produced another topical play on the recent general strike.

Ogunde may not be a great musician or a great artist, but he made the theatre a commercial proposition in Nigeria. One of his colleagues, a former school teacher, E.K. Ogunmola, had artistic ambitions as well. Ogunmola cut out the sex appeal, the clowning, and the saxophones and tried to substitute all these with serious acting. Ogunmola's plots are not always interesting. Some of his plays are still biblical, others have a Fagunwa type of fairy tale plot. He is at his best in social satire.

Typical is the simple story of his play "Love of Money" that tells the downfall of a happy man through foolish ambition. The opening of the play shows Adeleke the happy husband of a pretty wife and proud father of two children. He is well-to-do and content—but already his friends have sounded a warning note about the evils and pitfalls of this world:

Wealth is not for one man alone.
Fear your fellow men.
People look for the innocent bird,
When they are cooking soup.
The hen is annoyed
When the earthworm crawls.
Men dont like their friends
When they are too rich.
Fear your fellow men—

*Dont be too happy.
Girls of nowadays are bad:
They are deceivers,
They are sweepers
They sweep away your wealth—
Then they leave you alone.*

Adeleke listens to the warning—but does not recognise how near danger is. When Mopelola, a young girl, appears and tells him she wants to marry him, Adeleke does not recognise the sweeper in her and he feels greatly flattered. His wife, Morolayo, does not object; she even encourages him:

*It is good to marry a good girl,
An orange that does not drop
For a good person,
Will be sucked by the birds.*

In spite of her goodwill, things don't work out. Soon after the marriage, the new wife picks quarrels with the senior one. Adeleke continues to side with Mopelola and eventually drives out his first wife and her two children. Morolayo leaves with a final warning to Adeleke:

*Before you find an elephant
You must go to the forest;
Before you find a buffalo
You must go to the bush;
But before you can find somebody like me again
You must go to heaven.*

Adeleke pays no heed and continues to confide in the new wife. Mopelola is now ready for the big catch. She introduces her friends to him, the "money doublers" who trick Adeleke out of his entire fortune. In the final scene Adeleke discovers how he has been robbed. While he is still lamenting his own foolishness, Mopelola packs her belongings. And she deserts him with the words:

*My father was a rich man,
My mother was a rich woman,
A goat can never become a sheep!*

Such a simple tale can be made extremely moving by Ogunmola's superb acting. He is probably the greatest actor in the Yoruba theatre today and he would undoubtedly rank as a fine and subtle

actor in even the most sophisticated and polished Western theatre. Ogunmola's recent success was his adaptation of the *Palm Wine Drinkard*, Amos Tutuola's world famous novel. One of the greatest pleasures I have ever experienced in any theatre was Ogunmola's opening song in praise of palm wine. This simple praise song in Ogunmola's superb rendering gave him complete control of his audience within the first few minutes of performance:

*Let us drink palm wine,
Until we are satisfied.
If you have cloth—it will wear.
If you have a wife—she will divorce you.
Then let us drink palm wine,
Until we are satisfied.
I have slaves and servants
I have money and a house
Six storeys high.
All that is vanity !
Palm wine, palm wine,
Let us drink palm wine,
Until we are satisfied.
When we die,
Others will enjoy it.
Palm wine is my cloth,
Palm wine is my wife,
Palm wine is my house,
Palm wine is my child.
Let us drink, then,
Until we are satisfied.
Palm wine owns the world,
Palm wine owns the land,
Let us drink.
When palm wine reaches the brain—
Our eyes become bright!
When palm wine reaches the stomach,
What is poverty?
Palm wine could be sour—
But when it reaches the stomach
Who cares for food?
Palm wine is the owner of the world,
Let us drink !*

Ogunmola's language, as can be seen even from this small example, has the typical Yoruba humour that we have already found in Fagunwa and Ogunde and he has the same delight in dwelling on his subject matter and in finding ever new images to describe it.

To European ears the language of these three authors may not sound very contemporary. It is very far removed from *slang* in its slow, ponderous rhythm. Yet Fagunwa's original success rested partly on the fact that he was able to capture people's conversational tone in Yoruba. Even though modern slang is rapidly developing in Lagos and among intellectuals (speech has become twice as fast among these people, goes straight to the point and is studded with English words) yet one can hear farmers or lorry drivers or junior clerks talking in this manner in their everyday conversation further up country. These three authors have done much to revitalise the Yoruba language, but they have not in fact made much use of what one might call "classical" Yoruba, that is to say, the ritual language of the Yoruba gods, the sacred verse of the oracle or the poetry of the drum. It was a third playwright, Duro Ladipo, who first exploited these possibilities. Like Ogunmola, Ladipo lives in Oshogbo, a Yoruba town of some 120,000 inhabitants that has rapidly become the centre of Yoruba theatre activities. Ladipo is one of the founders of the *Mbari Mbayo Club*, a small organisation in Oshogbo that has not only done a great deal to further Yoruba drama but has also produced some of Nigeria's leading artists. Unlike Ogunde who started twenty years ago and Ogunmola who has been in the theatre for fifteen years, Ladipo started serious theatre work only three years ago. All his early work was in the manner of Ogunmola but recently he broke new ground with a fascinating play called "OBA KOSO", which deals with the tragedy of the Yoruba divine king SHANGO. Shango was an historical figure—he was the fourth king of OYO, the ancient capital of the Yoruba kingdom and may have ruled in the fifteenth century. Shango is also the Yoruba god of thunder and Ladipo's play explores one of the myths that explain Shango's transition from man to God. Ladipo took his job seriously. He spent months learning the praise names of this god from worshippers and teaching his cast the steps of Shango dancing and of Shango drumming, for this god uses his own special drum, the *Bata*, which has a fierce, hard rhythm. Thus, with this play, Yoruba drama moved from topical satire and moralistic fairy tale to the realm of tragedy and an entirely different language was used in this play, different from anything that had been heard in the Yoruba theatre before. The play opens with a bang. The *Oloris*, the king's spirited wives, literally *hurl* the sacred praise names of the king at the audience:

*Father of mankind, of divine power,
Second only to God.*

To conquer Timi, the king sends out another general, Gbonka, to fight him. Gbonka goes to the witches at night in order to learn a spell with which to conquer Timi. His appeal to the witches (the "mothers") is again very poetic:

*Nobody will kill a dog because it barks,
 Nobody will kill a ram because it butts,
 Nobody will kill a he-goat, because it makes love to its mother!
 But if potsherds lie near the building site,
 They'll end up as part of the wall.
 O my mothers, forgive me!
 Have compassion on me,
 As the palm tree has compassion on the parasite
 That feeds on him.
 O my mothers, let me conquer Timi!*

The witches teach Gbonka an incantation, with which he puts Timi to sleep, when the fight comes and he beheads him. The people of Oyo are frightened by the magic powers of Gbonka and they desert their king. Shango is furious at their treachery and ingratitude. In a rage he kills many of his people. But when he realises what he has done, he decides he can no longer be king and he hangs himself. The town is thrown into utter confusion. Then the friends of Shango band together and they declare that the king is not really dead, that if people will pay homage to the king all will be well with the town:

*This news we hear is strange to our ears:
 Shango is the leopard who killed the sheep and bathed in its blood.
 Shango is the one who shaved the child's head with thunder
 Shango was killed in the house and woke up in the market.
 Shango is the banana by the river—
 When you cut it down,
 It will sprout again to bear another fruit.
 Shango is not dead—he merely went to look for food.
 What has caused the vulture to become bald?
 What has caused the hornbill to go in rags?
 They were betrayed by their friends.
 You deserted Shango when he was fighting for you!
 Shango hangs from the Ayan tree:
 But when the bata drum will sound—he will be speaking to you.
 When he Dundun drum trembles—he will be dancing for you.*

*You are a bigger morsel than any of us can chew!
 If anybody will try to swallow you—
 You come out of his anus at once!*

*Your eyes are white like bitter kola nut
 Your cheeks are round like red kola nut
 You are a masquerader spitting fire.
 You frighten the big cat,
 Husband of the kola nut seller.*

*You wake up in a gentle mood
 But anybody who looks down on you
 Will be swept away.*

*You think the worm is dancing,
 But that is merely the way it walks.
 You think Shango is fighting you,
 But that is merely the way he is!*

From such beginnings the play moves on to unfold the tragedy of the warrior king who is persuaded by his people to make peace—but who discovers too late that he can no longer control his generals who have acquired too much power while fighting his own wars. In an attempt to get rid of Timi, the fiercest of them, he sends him to the frontier town of Ede, hoping he might be killed there. But, instead, Timi has crowned himself an independent king in Ede. There is a beautiful passage when the warrior arrives in the strange territory and utters an incantation with which he wants to capture the minds of the people of Ede:

*I come gently like rain in the evening,
 I come swiftly like rain in the morning,
 I come suddenly like rain in bright sunlight.
 Spirits of the place,
 Asarewa, Arintona, Atuyanya,
 Bring these towards me,
 I am throwing my net into the sea,
 Let me catch all the fish in the shallow waters.
 I am coming to Ede,
 I know nobody,
 Nobody knows me,
 Asarewa, Arintona, Atuyanya,
 Let me catch all the fish in the shallow waters.*

Finally Shango's voice is heard from the sky, promising them protection. The cult of the thunder god is born and the people, in a final chorus of the play, pay homage to the god who was once their king:

*Fire in your eyes,
 Fire in your mouth,
 Fire on the roofs!
 The kite was lost in the sky
 But returned to its nest.
 The banana was cut down,
 But bears a new fruit.
 You will speak to us
 Through the Bata drum,
 You will dance for us
 With the Dundun drum.
 Two hundred glowing embers
 Must bow down to the fire;
 One thousand warriors,
 Must succumb to death;
 Two hundred stars,
 Must worship the sun.
 The king does not hang!*

To date, Ladipo has produced three historical plays (in which he explores the language and poetry of classical Yoruba. (An English adaptation of these by Ulli Beier has been published by Mbari Ibadan under the title "Three Yoruba Tragedies"). Ladipo has already sparked off similar experiments. O. Ijimere's "Imprisonment of Obatala", as yet unpublished and unperformed, is based on an ancient Yoruba religious ritual play in which the creator god Obatala is imprisoned and later released. The play may be too unwieldy to perform but it is an interesting attempt to analyse Yoruba philosophy. Suffering has been ordained for the creator because when he was drunk on palm wine, he made cripples, albinos and other misfits. This suffering is prophesied to him when he sets out to visit his friend Shango, the king of Oyo. But Obatala has decided to go through with his plan to see his friend and is willing to suffer the consequences. Promptly Eshu, the god of fate, appears on the scene to bring misfortunes on Obatala's head. Eshu is a jester who likes to play tricks and who says of himself :

*When I am angry, I sit on the skin of an ant.
 When I am angry, I hit a stone until it bleeds.
 Having thrown a stone today, I killed a bird yesterday.*

Obatala bears all the ordeals patiently and does not retaliate as advised by the oracle. As he comes near the kingdom of Shango, he sees his friend's horse that has escaped and he catches it. Just at that moment the king's servants appear and arrest him as a thief. Shango, quick tempered as usual, sends his best friend to prison. Shango is warned by his wife not to be quick tempered:

*Shango who rides fire like a horse!
The man who thinks of nothing but the irritation of the itch,
Could easily scratch himself to the bone!
Beware of rashness!
The knife that thinks it is only destroying an old sheath,
Is in fact destroying its own house!*

But the king is not to be swayed. Contemptuously he says:

*It must have been the wisdom of the elders
That prevented Obatala from being a fool.
What madness to steal a horse he cannot ride,
Like an impotent old chief
Who marries a moist young wife
And hides the shrivelled fruit between his legs!*

No sooner Obatala, the creator and the god of peace, is imprisoned, however, his counterpart and opponent, Ogun, the god of iron and war, breaks forth from the forest where he had been forced to hide. War breaks out, blood flows and Shango revels in fight and conquest:

*And the vulture at last shall be rewarded:
He will forget the bald patch on his head
As he will stalk with feathered feet
Through intestines
And feeds on the eyes of fallen warriors.*

For ten years, the world is steeped in blood. But the injustice of the imprisonment of Obatala must be paid for. Crops fail, women miscarry, a curse has fallen on Shango's city. In the end, the oracle who is questioned commands the release of Obatala. The old god of creation, the "father of laughter", is released amidst great pomp and circumstance. Ogun must retire to his forest and the people celebrate the return of peace. In the final scene, however, Eshu remains alone on the stage to issue a final warning. He accuses the people of complacency: The wars are hardly over, and yet;

*Little do they remember the rule of Ogun.
 The stench of smouldering houses
 And rotting bodies has left their noses.
 Red to them means oil, not blood;
 Coldness to them is fish, not corpse.
 Stench to them is merely shit, not putrefaction.*

And he points out that even the god of peace uses the iron of Ogun for circumcision and sacrifice. That one day the iron will demand its due, and the Almighty will have to send Eshu back to "confuse the heads of men." Then the rule of Ogun will return,

*For if Obatala is the right arm of the owner of heaven
 Ogun is his left arm.
 If Obatala's love is the right eye of the owner of the sun,
 Ogun's iron is his left eye.
 For the owner of the world has interlocked creation and death
 Inseparably like mating dogs.*

One cannot make too many claims for this popular Yoruba literature and theatre. If the language will one day produce a masterpiece that will find its way into world literature it might come from an entirely different quarter. But in the meantime this handful of Yoruba writers are among those whose efforts are keeping the language alive. This essay does not attempt to be a comprehensive study of contemporary Yoruba writing. That would be beyond the scope of this article and beyond the competence of this writer. But it is hoped that these examples will show that this African language has retained its creativity and vitality in an age when all the odds are against it.

Science in Development of Natural Resources-II

G. S. PURI

ALTHOUGH all the 13 natural resources mentioned in the first part of this article must have equal development for increasing the productivity of the ecosystem, priorities need to be assigned in this formidable task requiring long-term planning.

Experience in Asia has shown that industrial progress cannot be adequately achieved without first developing plant and animal resources. These are dependent on soil and water. Therefore in the order of priorities water and soil come first.

Water and soils are the two most important resources of Africa on which depends the development of organic resources of a renewable nature. These are related to landforms, geology, geomorphology and climate.

The land area of West Africa generally lies between an altitude of 600 ft. and 1,600 ft. There are some areas of higher elevation, such as Jos Plateau in Nigeria (above 3,000 feet) and the Cameroon mountains (above 7,000 feet). The major rock in most parts of Africa is the basement complex rock system of the pre-Cambrian age. The various types of granites are fairly rich in calcium and magnesium. Aluminium oxide ranges between 13 and 18 per cent. Basalt and epidiorite have about 10 per cent calcium with a small amount of aluminium oxide. The ancient lava flows are however still richer in Ca and Mg oxides, with a lower percentage of aluminium. The younger rock systems formed of shale, sand-stone, phyllite, etc. are comparatively poorer in lime and magnesia. Laterite, ironstone and bauxite have hardly any lime. The magnesia and aluminium content in these may vary from 15% to 62%. The amount of phosphorus is generally inadequate in most soils of West Africa.

The rainfall over most parts of West Africa occurs from June. to October and decreases from the coast towards the interior from

over 113 inches to less than 20 inches per year. The mean daily temperatures in West Africa range usually from 70°F to 90°F. There is an increase of temperature from 90°F from the coast to about 110°F in the north. Minimum temperatures, however, range from 70°F on the coast to about 50°F in the north. Thus, there is an increase in the mean natural range of temperature from less than 80°F on the coast to over 20°F in the north. The most important factor in the development of soil and water resources in Africa is relative humidity. In coastal regions mean monthly relative humidity is generally not less than 95 per cent in the mornings. In dry months it may fall below 60 per cent at mid-day. In northern areas humidity may vary from 30 per cent to 90 per cent throughout the year.

Although the length of a day in hours varies at 10° North Latitude from 11.5 in December to 12.7 in June and July, the amount of solar radiation received per day is not high on account of clouds. The mean annual range of durations of bright sunshine per day in hours in Ghana is from 4.17 at Kumasi to 7.45 at Tamale. During July and August, when the growth of vegetation is at its maximum the minimum figure of 1.29 hours' bright sunshine in August has been recorded for Kumasi. The highest figure of 9.5 hours of bright sunshine is recorded for Tamale during November. The hours of bright sunshine increase from the coast towards north. The yearly average of total incoming solar radiation at Accra in gm. cal. per cm² per day was about 420 in 1955, and 429 in 1958. The highest figures during March and April are 515 and 522 and the lowest figure of 279 gm. cal. per cm² per day was recorded in August 1954.

Rainfall in West Africa varies considerably. As much as 17 inches in a single day has been recorded in the south-west of Ghana and 8 inches per hour has been reached in the same year. Mean annual evaporation in inches is low in Kumasi (55.6 inches) and high in Tamale (up to 72 inches). Generally, evaporation losses are the highest during March and April and increase from the coast towards inland over most parts of West Africa.

These features of climate, geomorphology, rocks, etc. are given to show that conditions of soil and water for the growth and development of natural resources are variable not only during different months of the year but also over different parts of Africa. Very few estimates of water resources have been made. However, estimates for the Volta river seem to indicate that the long-term annual yield from this river is 30 million acre feet of water. Another 15 million acre feet is expected from other rivers and streams. There is one to ten per cent run-off losses of rainfall in Ghana. Some estimates made in Ghana

by the U.S. Department of International Development show the following minimum daily water requirements of human beings and livestock:

1 person (domestic requirement)	—	12-15 gal.
Horse	—	10 gal.
Cow	—	12 „
Hog	—	3 „
Sheep	—	2 „
100 chickens	—	4 „
100 turkeys	—	5 „

For a small rural community of 100 people and 50 head of mixed livestock, there is thus need for at least 1,400 gallons of water per day and for 180 days there is need to provide for storage of 252,000 gallons. At the rate of 6.23 gallons per cu. ft., the requirement of water for 180 days will be 40,452 cu. ft. Allowing for a 50 per cent loss due to seepage and evaporation the requirement for a small rural village comes to 81,000 cu. ft. of water. For agricultural development alone large quantities of water are required in African countries, as evapo-transpiration losses of vegetation are larger than in temperate parts of the world, from where some information is available. Ghana alone proposes to irrigate 80,000 acres of land through the Volta Project under her 7-year development programme. The high Aswan Dam in U.A.R. will help in the cultivation of 420,000 hectares with an additional 300,000 hectares transferred from basin to perennial irrigation. Rufiji basin development in Tanganyika is expected to irrigate 120,000 hectares. Large quantities of underground water have been discovered in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. One reservoir absorbs 1,000 million cubic meters of water from the Atlas rains. There are also great potentials from the Niger, Congo, Zambesi and other African rivers. It is estimated that 400 tons of water is needed to produce just 1 ton of rolled steel and 2 tons of water are required to produce 1 loaf of bread. The present population of Ghana is about 7 million. It will be evident that a great deal of water conservation and storage plans will have to be made together with any plans for industrialisation, urbanisation and other development. All the rocks in Africa do not yield water easily. Clays are very resistant to water loss and in Ghana a borehole of 6" to 8" diameter in weathered granite rock has given a flow of 1,000 gallons of water per hour. Water development programmes will be made by African countries in cooperation with International Hydrological Decade. Arrangements have already been made in Ghana for the establishment of a Water Resources Research Institute.

The soils of West Africa for the most part are derived from the ancient basement complex rock system, whether sedentary

or secondary alluvial deposits. The Paleozoic—Pleistocene soils are sandstone, some limestone and clayey to laterite and ironstone formations. The properties of soils vary with reference to climatic conditions and geomorphology to a great extent and catenary formations are recognisable at most places. The climatophytic earths are dominantly latosols. There are ochrosols and oxysols both in the forest and savanna regions, with acidic or neutral soil reaction throughout the profile. The ochrosols are easily cultivated, having plant nutrients concentrated in the humous layer of the soil. These are strongly leached, especially in the uplands. The removal of tree cover depletes these soils of plant nutrients and essential minerals. Bauxite or iron pan is frequently associated with these soils. In most of the soils in the highly humid regions of West Africa there are great deficiencies of N & P. Other deficiencies sometimes occur in Ca, Mg and K. The oxysols are highly leached, shallow, with PH varying at the surface from 4.5 to 5.3. Organic matter has much lower capacities to hold nutrients. There is a high ratio of sesquioxides to silica in these soils. In highly acidic soils oil palms respond to K. Coconuts also grow in coastal areas. Bananas grow well in these soils that bear natural evergreen rain forest.

The other major type of African vegetation is savanna, occupying mostly laterite and shallow soils, stained with red and brown. There may be soils rich in soda or alumina in this zone. Iron pan is near the surface making these water-logged in heavy rain. There are also ground water laterites and ochrosol-ground water laterites. There may also occur locally patches of tropical black-earth and lithosols and brunosols. The savanna vegetation has preponderance of tropical grasses.

On the whole the soils of Africa are deficient in organic matter, N.P. and sometimes in K and Ca. When irrigated they can be highly productive in the savanna zone. Erosion problems have to be watched. Fire and shifting cultivation are some of the major politico-social problems in development.

This brief survey of water and soil problems indicates the importance of developmental research in making the lands efficient in production through fertilisation, irrigation, conservation and proper scientific management. Water and soils are the basis for energy accumulation and transfer in the ecosystem. With sunshine and temperature in optimum conditions these two become controlling factors. Adequate arrangements must be made for storage of excess water during the rains and its transport in sealed pipes to areas of deficiencies. Losses due to evapo-transpiration must be reduced through scientific methods. It may be stated categorically that the success of development plans of tropical countries would depend upon the wise use of

their land and water resources. Therefore, a high priority must be given to the scientific study of these.

Plant Resources

In the ecosystem development, plants occupy the key position. These are the primary producers of energy and are also important for secondary energy production by animals. Man is dependent on the efficiency of the plants utilisation of energy from the inorganic part of the environment. It has been stated earlier that water and soils can become limiting factors for the sustained production of energy in some parts of the African ecosystem.

Parts with arid and semi-arid climates are those in which the major soil feature is dominated by the presence of laterite, bauxite or iron-stone that needs a far greater amount of care and planning for plant production. The humid areas, however, have a greater production potential and unfortunately till now these have been utilised only under a monoculture programme of a few export crops, such as cocoa, oil palms, some fruits and forestry produce. The great bulk of forest tree species have not so far found commercial uses and under the system of shifting cultivation they are utilised mainly for fertilization of the land for a peasant agriculture of a few tuberous or root crops. This colossal waste of primary energy has to be prevented. There are large numbers of African plants which have found uses in medicine and other directions. Plant development covering these will enrich the total productivity of the ecosystem.

There are extensive grasslands and savanna areas productivity of which is, in some cases, miserably low. As growth of material is quick proper investment in crops would be very desirable to enhance the programme of industrialisation. I have in mind particularly the development of agriculture with cotton, sugarcane and medicinal plants, and superior cereals like wheat and rice with legumes. The importance of development of fruits and vegetables as an industry in the tropics cannot be over-emphasised.

Agricultural production in tropical Africa is at present limited to two types of crops. The first is tuberous crops like yams, cocoyams, cassava and fruits like banana, pineapple, orange, etc. These grow in high rainfall areas in moist soil or in low-lying, shady glades. The growing season lasts 6-13 or 12-18 months. The yield of yams, excluding seed tubers is 5-6 tons per hectare. Cocoyams yield 6 tons per hectare in Ghana and 8-35 tons/hectare in Belgian Congo. Sweet potatoes yield 5-7½ tons/hectare in Ghana and 10 in Congo.

The grain crops are rice, maize, sorghum, millet and wheat. Except for rice and maize all grow in savanna areas, sorghum and millet extending to the dry zone in the north. The two types of food crops are related to the pattern of culture and civilisation in Africa. The first is typical of sparse populations engaged in rural activities, whereas the second is indicative of the slowly developing programmes of urbanisation and industrialisation.

Production of starchy rooted crops requires less land and less labour. Shifting cultivation and bush following are the necessary evil parts of the culture of the people. These are common in tropical West Africa which has an area of 4.7 million square miles and is larger than the U.S. which has only 3 million square miles. West Africa has thus enormous potentialities for development, with its present population of only 80 million. W.A. Lewis (Report on Industrialisation of the Gold Coast, 1953) has rightly stated that "the most certain way to promote industrialisation in the Gold Coast(now Ghana) is to lay the foundation it requires by taking vigorous measures to raise food production per person in agriculture.

The late Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had repeatedly stressed the importance of plant resources development in India's plans for industrialisation and Africa can profit from Indian experience in this direction.

The future development of agriculture in Africa will relate to the second type of food crops, consistent with progress in urbanisation and industrialisation. The present trends in food imports show this clearly. For example, import of wheat flour and rice has increased between 1934/38 and 1953 in Nigeria from 14.1 thousand metric tons to 28.8; in Ghana from 21.6 thousand metric tons to 43.5; in French W. Africa from 84.3 thousand metric tons to 148.5; in Belgian Congo from 5.6 thousand metric tons to 24.5 thousand metric tons.

Similar changes in food habits and agriculture occurred in the 18th century in England in the wake of urbanisation and industrialisation. Wheat became important in place of rye, barley and oats. Since 1880, consumption of rice has increased in Japan and that of barley decreased. In the U.S. since 1909 there has been a decline in the consumption of white potatoes and sweet potatoes. Since the majority of people have industrial and urban activities the evolution in food habits has gone a step further with a decline in the consumption of wheat from 215 lb to 125 lb per head per year. In ultimate development, industrial and urban communities require a diet of more proteinous materials with meat, dairy products, sugar, vegetables and fruits. It is, however, recognised that starchy foods may continue as staple food for many years in Africa but the trend has clearly manifested and should

be followed in a planned development economy with urbanisation and industrialisation.

Nye (J.W.A.S.A., 1957) has given the following wheat flour consumption trends in developing countries:

	Kg/per capita/per year		
	1909-13	1923-27	1951-54
Tropical Africa	0.6	0.8	2.7
Asia	1.6	2.3	5.2
West Indies	24.2	26.2	24.7

In spite of this, cultivation of cereals is not popular in Africa as the yield of tuberous crops and their production costs are low. The data given below is of interest in this connection:

Production cost of yam and maize at Ejura (Ghana)

	Yams	Maize
Labour requirements man days/acre	104	41
Return lb/acre/man day	84	16
Value/lb.	0.429d	0.643d
Value of produc/tacre	£15/14/-	£ 1/14/-
Money return/man day	£ 1/16/2	£ 0/10/-

The rooted group of foods is low in calories—only 70-100 calories/100 gm food whereas cereal grain crops yield about 300-364 calories/100 gm. The latter foods are rich in proteins—6-12% and have iron and vitamins. The tuberous foods have less than 2% proteins and therefore cause deficiency, disease, especially in the low-age group and low income group population.

This brief analysis of plant resources requirements of Africa seems to show that developing countries will need to shift, sooner than later, to rice culture and then strive for a diet with greater quantities of meat, dairy products etc. This requires greater emphasis on cultivation of rice and development of animal husbandry. Science and technology must help in this change together with urbanisation and industrialisation.

Rice is not foreign to Africa. The Western and Southern regions of W. Africa constitute the rice zone. Rice production was initiated in Ghana in 1926. In 1930/31 production was about 300 tons. In Senegal and Mali rice production increased from 8871 metric tons in 1951/52 to 17,061 metric tons in 1954-55.

In Nigeria, the rice average has increased from 4,000 acres in 1942 to 48,000 in 1952 and to 100,000 acres in 1956. Today rice is called the "glamour crop of W. Africa". Rice has great potentialities but it requires labour, constant water and fertilisers, all of which should become available in Africa with industrialisation, irrigation and urbanisation. Along with rice, sugarcane and wheat need development. In an industrially developed country maize can become a food for livestock, sorghum for forage and silage in dry areas and chopped banana stems for livestock feed.

The plant resources programme must be given priority in developing countries for an effective change-over of organised agricultural activities with rice, wheat, and medicinal plants as important crops and cultivation of fodder crops for livestock. This type of agriculture can only develop with irrigation and fertilisation (with both organic and inorganic manures) and should be managed as an industry by urban and industrial communities. This is as much a problem of human ecology as of application of science and technology.

Animal Resources

As stated earlier, animal resources have a great potential for development in African countries, both in the humid tropics and in the savanna zone. There is an ample amount of food material for some parts of the area at present but it is considered that the plant production programme suggested earlier would provide tree, fodder and grass of sufficient quantity and quality for the development of livestock, both as an industry and as part of progressive agriculture. Unfortunately in some human communities there is a traditional taboo on some types of food; for example, pork among Moslems and Jews, horse meat among Christians, beef among Hindus, milk and butter among Malaysians and Dravidians. These have in the past restricted the adequate development of livestock for food and/or industry. A glaring example for Africa can be seen in pig. Man can eat an extremely wide range of food, as anatomically he has developed the incisors of a rodent, the molars of a vegetarian and the canines of a carnivore. There are 1.5 million different species of plants and animals in the world today and the programme of breeding and evolution are bringing in many more types of food material for use by man and other animals. There is very little information available for Africa but Meggitt's (IUCN, 1963) data for

food plants used by the aborigines of Australia given below will show the richness of African plant wealth for food:—

Coast No.	Spp. in samples	Edible spp.	Edible Roots	Edible Nuts	Edible fruits	Edible Seeds	Edible Misc.
„ „	227	152	41	5	68	7	31
%		100	27	3	45	5	20
Inland No.	247	91	10	1	32	33	15
%		100	11	1	35	36	17

Many poisonous plants are brought into human use through animals. Goat and sheep have a wide range of such foods.

There is great potential for wild life development in Africa as well. For this, savanna areas provide excellent opportunities and African waters can also add a sufficient amount of proteins for human food. Talbot has recently given some interesting features for year-long biomass in lbs. per sq. miles of 70,000-100,000 for wild ungulates; 30,000-l- for wild ungulates and domestic livestock; 21,300-32,000 for cattle and 11,200-16,000 for domestic livestock in different parts of East Africa. Wild life eat different classes of food; for example, giraffes feed largely on trees; rhinos largely on bush and wild beasts eat almost exclusively grass. Elephants combine tree, bush and grass and are the early path finders in the tropical ecosystem. Since savanna areas are not of high agricultural productivity, these should be developed for wild life cropping whether irrigation is available or not.

Inland fisheries have another high potential in African countries where multi-purpose dams are being constructed. Tropical aquatic environment is not particularly inferior for animal production, though a high respiratory rate at high temperatures in the tropics may produce a smaller crop of algae in fresh water or in sea.

High temperature affects survival and growth rate since the amount of dissolved O₂ is found to decrease with rising temperature—7 p.p.m. at 23°C. to 4.8. p.p.m. at 31°C. Experiments have shown that species of Tilapia are not suitable for pond culture where temperatures seldom rise above 23°C. High temperatures produce a higher rate of energy flow through the ecosystem and higher productivity. Fish and other

aquatic animals grow more rapidly and breed more frequently if the habitat is replenished with nutritive salts. In Lake George in E. Africa, where the food chain has Algae-Tilapia-Man the natural productivity rate is 120 kgm fish/hectare—one of the highest anywhere in the world (Worthington, IUCW, 1963).

There is one aspect of animal husbandry which has to be looked into carefully in new Africa. Many wild and domestic animals transmit disease to man. In all, 91 diseases are animal transmitted, of which the cow carries 29; hog 15; sheep and goat 18; dog 33; cat 16; birds and fowls 19 and bat, mice and rat 20. Allergy from food is common in human beings. There is no doubt that vegetarian food must be supplemented with animal fat and proteins; as 1 gm. of vegetable protein gives 4.1 cal. and 1 gm of vegetable fat yields 9.3 cal. Animal protein and fat have a higher caloric value than vegetable matter. Wheat lacks lysine. Cob is incomplete food, lacking in lysine and tryptephane and is low in cystane. Meat, milk and eggs are complete protein foods. People in Central and Eastern Africa with the staple food of maize suffer from pellagra, which can be cured by eating proteins. In processing, rice loses 76% of thiamine, 57% of ribe-flavin, 63% niacine and 15% protein. It is, therefore, important to note that food in industrial Africa will be enriched with animal proteins and in the final stage of industrial development the use of animal protein food will rise considerably.

The animal resources development programme must be coordinated with plant resources production and management in developing regions, as a whole, in the ecosystem. This coordination must be given priority in any programme of development.

(To be concluded)

Quarterly Chronicle

INDIA AND AFRICA

In their tributes to Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who died in Tashkent a few hours after signing the historic declaration which brought India and Pakistan to the path of goodwill and friendship, African leaders have recalled the Indian statesman's contribution to world peace. This, according to Senegal President Leopold Sedar Senghor, was in the best traditions of India and that is why his loss was deeply felt in these most troubled times. He said Mr. Shastri was a worthy successor to Gandhi and Nehru.

President Kaunda of Zambia in a broadcast to the nation said: "A fine statesman and diplomat, Mr. Shastri combined softness of approach with firmness of purpose and will." He added: "There is no mistaking the fact that he understood his people. He was their spokesman, sincere and no doubt he always bore the load of the common man in India." President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania expressed the hope that Mr. Shastri's last work at the Tashkent conference would be accepted as a great inheritance for the whole sub-continent and that his name would be honoured by the Indian people as they lived in peace with their neighbour Pakistan. To President Kenyatta of Kenya Mr. Shastri was an ardent and sincere statesman. "This great statesman", said President Sekou Toure of Guinea, "knew during his public career how to show wisdom in conducting the destiny of his country". The UAR observed a week's mourning. In a condolence message, President Nasser said: "Mr. Shastri untiringly worked for peace until the very last moment of his life. The UAR people, who greatly appreciate his struggle for peace, join me in tendering their most profound sympathy to the people of India in this tragic loss."

President Nkrumah of Ghana said: "It is a grave misfortune that he should have died immediately after his strenuous efforts jointly with Pakistan to find a statesmanlike solution to their most vexing problem and restore good relations between their two countries." President Sayed Ismail el Azhar of the Sudan said: "Your country, your people and indeed the whole world will miss this great leader and

statesman who devoted himself to peace and humanity" Prime Minister Hastings Banda of Malawi said: "His death will be felt as a grievous blow not only to the people of India but also to the whole world. His untiring efforts for world peace and for the welfare of people will be ever remembered."

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

On January 28 India and Tanzania entered into a trade agreement and an agreement of friendship and co-operation. The main features of the agreements are: (1) Trade between India and Tanzania will be expanded to Rs. 16.6 crores—an increase of about 66 per cent over last year's figure; (2) India will assist Tanzania in preparing techno-economic studies relating to the various projects which the Tanzanian Government may like to set up; and (3) India will collaborate with Tanzania in setting up in that country industries for fertilizers, caustic soda, processing vegetable oils and agricultural tools. Mr. Babu, the Tanzanian Trade Minister, thanked India for this generous gesture.

That there is wide scope for expanding India's trade with West African countries and for setting up joint ventures is the conclusion reached by an industrial delegation which toured Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Senegal. The delegation found that except Nigeria, West African countries had a limited market. Therefore, medium or small-scale units would be ideal for these areas. The leader of the delegation, Mr. Kamal Nayan Bajaj, said India's experience and knowledge of small-scale industries units would be of immense advantage to the African entrepreneur. It would not be economical for Western countries generally to set up units of such small size and, therefore, collaboration with Indian businessmen and with entrepreneurs from other developing countries was all the more necessary and justified.

At present, India could send out to Africa equipment and technical know-how only under collaboration schemes, he said. Advance import of items to be manufactured subsequently in a collaboration venture should be allowed by the African Governments on a preferential basis. This would enable the businessmen concerned to earn foreign exchange for preparatory work in the African countries concerned for the project and introduction of the item in the African market would help in establishing the same before manufacture is taken up.

RHODESIA

The British Government, "determined to bring to an end the illegal regime in Rhodesia", imposed an oil embargo against Rhodesia

on December 17, 1965. It prohibited the import of oil and oil products into that territory and prohibited British nationals from carrying oil and oil products for Rhodesian use. The rebel Government of Ian Smith responded defiantly to the oil embargo. It barred all shipments of oil supplies to Zambia and announced an increase in import duties on coal and coke that Zambia imports to keep her copper mines working. The Government also moved to restrict domestic consumption of petroleum.

On January 11, the first Commonwealth conference to be held in Africa met at Lagos, Nigeria. The conference was attended by 200 delegates from 19 countries. Eleven Governments, including the British Government, were represented. The communique issued at the end of the conference on January 12 contained the following main points: (1) The Prime Ministers felt that the use of military force could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order; (2) The Prime Ministers would meet again in July if the Rhodesian rebellion had not ended by that time; (3) The Prime Ministers indicated that they reserved their right, if the need arose, to propose mandatory U.N. action; (4) A committee would be set up which would meet regularly in London to (a) review the working of the economic sanctions against the Smith Government, (b) advise the Wilson Government on further action, and (c) suggest measures to help the Government of Zambia.

On January 17 Smith declared in Salisbury that "oil was flowing in". But despite his assurance to the Rhodesian whites that "we will resolve this problem the same way as others", Rhodesia put further restrictions on petrol consumption on January 20. An announcement was made that the petrol ration would be cut by a further 25 per cent and that Rhodesians would have to pay a penny a gallon more from January 25.

On January 31, the British Government further tightened economic sanctions against the Rhodesian Government. It imposed a total embargo on all British trade with Rhodesia. It also warned other nations that it would not be responsible for any debts incurred by the Smith Government.

Though the Rhodesian Government still seems to be in a defiant mood, the sanctions have started having a telling effect on the Rhodesian economy. The Rhodesian iron and steel company (RISCO), for example, has closed down two of its three blast furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces. This is because of the loss of the company's market for steel in Britain and Japan.

How long the rebellion will continue is difficult to foresee at this stage. But the economic sanctions, if effectively applied, are bound to have some impact on the Rhodesian situation. The Labour Government is expected to take more stringent economic measures against the Smith Government. But this is unlikely to topple it.

A list of urgently required essential items for industrial and consumer use in Zambia has been sent to the Indian Government for consideration. The request was made by Zambia to one of the committees established after the Lagos Commonwealth Conference to help that country overcome the effects of the UDI in Rhodesia. The Indian representative on the committee promised that Delhi would immediately consider supplying Zambia with as many items as possible. Other Commonwealth Governments also gave similar assurances. The list includes foodstuffs, consumer maintenance goods and semi-manufactures. Indian assistance will naturally be restricted to the two last categories as India cannot spare foodstuffs, though some items like cooking oil may be supplied. In the other categories are textiles, hardware, cement, batteries and tools.

MILITARY COUPS IN AFRICA

The chances of Nkrumah staging an early comeback seem remote. A few days after the coup there were indications that Guinea might come to his rescue. But the support it gave to Nkrumah was mere bluster as became evident when the Ivory Coast accepted Guinea's challenge to march its troops through the former's territory to Ghana. Some other African countries, including the UAR, Tanzania and Kenya, also came out in favour of Nkrumah and walked out of the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in protest against the presence of a delegation of the military regime. But the majority of African countries were opposed to intervention in Ghana's affairs. In the country itself, Nkrumah had antagonised not only the opposition parties, which were dealt with ruthlessly, but also important leaders of his Convention People's Party whose criticism he did not relish. He turned a one-party state into a one-party rule. This proved to be his undoing and should serve as a warning to those following in the footsteps of Nkrumah.

What were the causes underlying the coup? The Government's ambitious plan for rapid industrialisation had put a great strain on the people, more particularly the middle class. Some of the projects undertaken, like the Black Star Line and the Ghana airways, were obviously overambitious. This led to a deterioration in the economic situation in the country. Between 1953 and 1963, the fall in the prices of cocoa, the main item of Ghana's export, resulted in a loss of \$155 million.

In turn the farmer got less. Thus the most prosperous and the best organized agricultural group found its income shrinking while the prices of imported and manufactured goods went up. This caused dissatisfaction among the people.

Nkrumah's real failure lay in the fact that he could not give to the people of Ghana an efficient and honest administration. Such an administrative machinery would have inspired the people to work hard and face patiently the economic hardships caused by the process of economic development. As this did not happen the people were disillusioned with the leadership. When the army took over the administration on February 24 it rightly accused Nkrumah of bringing Ghana to the brink of bankruptcy.

Another factor contributing to unrest in Ghana was the personality cult. Ideology was pushed to the background and Nkrumah alone became the symbol of all progress. School-children began their day by reciting "Nkrumah is our Messiah; Nkrumah never dies." Among his official titles were Victorious Leader and the Great Messiah. This personality cult had several consequences. First, no serious attempt was made to win over the masses. Second, sycophants and opportunists gathered around the leader. The wife of one of Nkrumah's Ministers imported a gold-plated car and one of his close advisers emptied his private swimming pool to make room for storing the stream of "gifts" he had exacted from local and foreign businessmen. Nkrumah was deserted by almost all his trusted colleagues. A. Sacky, who professed to have complete ideological identification with Nkrumah, felt no pangs of conscience in letting him down.

Of late Nkrumah had become suspicious of his army. He fired Major-General Joseph Ankrah. A few months earlier he announced his plan to form a "People's Militia", which the army took as a threat to its authority.

Nigeria, regarded by many as the bastion of democracy in Africa, was shaken to its roots by an army revolt three days after it had played host to the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference. The unity of the country had been due to a finely adjusted balance of power between the Northern and Western, Mid-western and Eastern Regions. Nigeria, despite its tribal rivalries, afforded an example of co-existence.

The immediate causes of the trouble were that a section of the army was unhappy over the decision of the two assassinated Regional Premiers—Chief Samuel Akintola and Sir Ahmadu Bello—to use troops to crush the unrest in the Western Region. In the words of the ex-President, Mr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was convalescing in Britain at

the time of the coup, the army was insulated from politics until the elections in the West when certain elements of the army were involved in putting down the riots."

The trouble started with the Western Region where anti-government riots broke out in October last year following the general elections which were alleged to have been rigged. There were rumours that the election result was engineered by Northern Region politicians and that Sir Abubakar could not resist their pressure. The Federal authorities blamed the alliance between the Northern and Western Regions for the situation. Many believed that the merger of Sir Ahmadu's Northern People's Congress with a splinter group from the Action Group led by Chief Akintola meant that Sir Ahmadu would continue indefinitely to be the "de facto" leader of the Federation. It was this alliance which enabled Chief Akintola to remain in power in the Western Region after the October elections. The looting and arson that occurred in the Western Region culminating in the death of 20 people brought to a head the crisis over the federal status of the country.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

The Office Secretary of the Council entertained to tea Mrs. Haikal, wife of the Chief Editor of *Al Ahram*, a Cairo newspaper, who accompanied her husband during his visit to India as a guest of the Government. The Office Secretary presented Mrs. Haikal with a reproduction of a graphic by the artist Ram Kumar and sets of books on India and literature on the Council's activities.

IADA meeting

The Office Secretary attended the annual meeting of the India-Africa Development Association.

Publications

The Council brought out a pamphlet on Rhodesia to focus public attention on the African case for majority rule in that colony. It contains an article by the nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, and the text of a speech by Dr. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania.

A supplement on small-scale industries in India and Africa, the second in a series which the Council began with a supplement on textile industries, was sent to the press. The supplement analyses how cooperation between India and Africa in this field can be increased and how India, which has undertaken a comprehensive programme to establish small-scale industries, can help African countries by providing them with machinery, technical knowhow and facilities for training technicians and other personnel.

Appointments

Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, has been unanimously elected Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Mr. Dinesh Singh, Vice-President of the Council, has been appointed Minister of State for External Affairs in the Government formed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Mr. V. C. Shukla, a member of the Council, has been appointed Deputy Minister for Home Affairs and Mr. S.A. Mehdi, Associate Editor of *Africa Quarterly*, Deputy Minister for Mines and Metals.

Book Exhibition

The Council entered 120 books in an exhibition of books organised by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.

Book Reviews

The South African Economy by D. Hobart Houghton. Oxford University Press.

Professor Houghton's declared intention in writing this small but readable book is to provide "mainly for university students"—and "primarily South African readers" though a wider audience is welcomed—a study of the South African economy as an example of "growth and growing pains." The treatment is conventional, almost textbookish, which, given the audience, is not surprising. The facts are well organised though they are from fairly accessible sources and the theoretical frame unsophisticated and unoriginal, in fact ready-made. Professor Houghton has attempted to assimilate—rather perfunctorily and, one suspects, as a gesture of modish homage, and out of considerations of university syllabus—150 years of South African economic history in the Rostowian model of five stages of economic growth.

This metaphysical, almost metaphorical scheme is in some respects a Procrustean bed for the facts of South African economic history. South Africa, in this way of looking at things, was a traditional society till about 1820, the date of advent of the British settlers. From then on till 1933, it went through a long period of transition, at the end of which it was all set for a "take-off." A crucial date is 1867 when diamond was discovered. In retrospect, it was the lesser mineral yielding place to the gold that was discovered in commercial quantities within the next 20 years in Witwaterstrand. Though the Colonial Secretary of the times flourished a piece of diamond in the Assembly and declaimed, "Gentlemen, this is the rock on which the future success of South Africa will be built", it was soon evident that gold was the sovereign mineral. Today (with its 1964 production valued at £366 million) it leads with atomic minerals and coal, taking a distant second and third place and diamond coming further down in terms of the value of production. The end of World War II saw South Africa emerge as an economy well on its way to maturity, with a diversified base, which was simultaneously deepened by the discovery of fresh seams of gold. The next stage of "high mass consumption," the crowning felicity in Rostow's scheme, is still admittedly far away from South

Africa's grasp and, though Professor Houghton does not quite spell it out, may elude her if it continues to pursue the policies it does.

This valiant attempt to treat the South African economy in these conventional terms of a growth model breaks down at many points and Professor Houghton is aware of it. In particular, Professor Houghton does not work out the Rostowian analogy fully. In Rostow's scheme there are "blind alleys" into which economies that have achieved a degree of maturity stray. The military adventurism of Japan and Germany would be examples of this. South Africa is in distinct danger of taking such a wrong turn in consequence of the barbarous racial policies it is pursuing. The analogy may not be perfect and the dynamism of such wrong directions may be primarily economic in Rostow's—and, for that matter, in the Leninist—model and in the case of South Africa it may be more overtly political and racial than economic. But the consequent distortion of the national destiny may not be far different. As Professor Houghton himself recognises, "The danger is racial attitudes and the political policies that they inspire will undermine the forces making for economic growth and destroy the momentum towards continued progress". In view of the calamitous consequences that inhere in these policies, this way of phrasing them would appear, even after making allowance for academic detachment, unduly complacent.

Professor Houghton's other generalisations on the historical experience of South Africa are less ambiguous. He discovers the origin of the African dilemma in the "come-hither-voertsek"—"come here—go away"—one says to a dog in South Africa to chase it away"—tragically woven itself in the country's history. "Almost from the moment of Van Riebeeck's landing, two sets of conflicting forces have been at continuous operation—the one tending to draw the races together and the other tending to keep them apart." There are well-known differences in emphasis, with the Natal and Orange Free State and Transvaal being the most liberal and the Cape Colony the most benighted, with Sir George Grey and Field Marshal Smuts being the relatively enlightened representatives of the ruling classes. That the passage of time has not made for the evolution of what elsewhere has come to be accepted as the only humane and reasonable attitude to the question of race relations is evidenced by the fact that the Tomlinson Commission has come down on the side of separate development involving the undoing of much that had "naturally" taken place before.

The human consequences of this persistent attempt at treating the whites and non-whites as entitled to different political, economic and social rights are only too well known. Even in Professor Houghton's

unemphatic rehearsal, the relevant acts add up to a most barbarous kind of discrimination. And what from the point of view of the theme of the book is even more important, they add up to the crassest kind of economic waste. The subsistence farming in the Reserves, the migratory labour that the system gives rise to and paradoxically distorts at the same time leading to artificial labour shortage by restricting mobility, the constant discrimination in job opportunities and wages, legally sanctioned and where no legal sanctions exist, enforced by trade union coercion, and the stagnation in production in the so-called "border industries" and in the industries inside the Reserves are well documented in the book.

To take only some indicators, in 1952 the average income of the whites was ten times that of the Africans. Africans in the Reserves, into which most of them are forced, were earning less than half the income of the city dwelling Africans. And the situation is steadily deteriorating with the real incomes of Africans declining by 6.5 per cent while those of the whites rising by 46 per cent between 1949 and 1964. Mine wages of white workers rose from R 1617 per annum in 1936 to R 2296 in 1960, whereas those of non-whites actually declined from R 153 to R 140. (All figures reckoned at constant, 1959 prices.)

Industrial colour bar provides an instructive example of the continuity in *apartheid*. As early as the Mines and Works Act of 1911 statutory recognition was given to the idea. And nearly 50 years later in 1964, Mr. Viljoen, Minister of Labour, declared "the agitation for the removal of colour bar in industry. . . previous attempts have failed, because the government is determined to maintain the traditional way of life in the country." But changes are being made despite their economic absurdity, recent years and contexts. The Five Year Economic Programme (published in 1964, Professor Houghton's book was written) states categorically that "it will have to be admitted to skilled jobs if the economy is to achieve the envisaged rate of growth of 5.5 per cent by 1969. But this does not prevent Dr. Dierderichs, Minister of Economic Affairs, from declaring that "a breakdown of the government's job reservation policy would not help the country towards solving its manpower crisis." In point of fact, desperate efforts made to recruit white workers from Europe have been officially admitted to have failed with, for example, only 118 candidates being available for about 1,200 vacancies in the railways. The employers, among them the Railways and the Post Offices, are tacitly breaking the "rules".

Likewise the so-called separate development is running into serious difficulties as a consequence of its economic illogic. South African authorities profess from time to time to consider the nation's economy

political considerations are difficult, if not impossible, to assess even roughly, any attempt to develop the Reserves as a separate entity is likely to be especially costly in terms of economic inefficiency. This is because the foundation of South Africa's economic expansion has been the economic integration of the previously relatively isolated and scattered communities comprising the country's society."

Professor Houghton himself lists the imperatives of economic progress and political stability of South Africa as the conferment of the responsibility of the Government of the country only on those committed to a modern industrial economy in which economic opportunities for all individuals, irrespective of colour or race, are enlarged. "The contrived scarcities" created by the politically entrenched whites and the denial of educational, employment and industrial opportunities by the most uncivilised kind of discrimination should cease before South Africa can reach the stage of high mass consumption. This is a sober conclusion, moderately stated by a book in which the facts speak the more eloquently for being singularly free from special pleading.

N. S. J.

The Rhythm of Violence by Lewis Nkosi, Oxford University Press, 1964, 5s.

The dawn of independence in Africa has had a vitalizing influence on the arts. This was strikingly brought out recently by the fair number of good entries from African member-countries at the first Commonwealth Arts Festival held at London in September. African practitioners of the literary arts in particular seem to enjoy a natural advantage at such international gatherings. They seem to write exclusively in English which in many a new African State has with independence acquired the status of a national language. This also has its disadvantages from the artist's point of view. The work of a budding African novelist, dramatist or poet is pitted against and judged by the norms applicable to the more sophisticated works of the western world with the considerable tradition in modern literature it has developed. But it also means that an African play that sees the light of day through publication or performance beyond the frontiers of the author's country has already passed a gruelling test. Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka's latest work, *The Road*, opened in London recently to the accompaniment of reports of tremendous enthusiasm among the most phlegmatic of Britain's critical juries. Last year similarly was a rewarding year for recognition of African literary talent in the West. Among other things, a new play, *The Rhythm of Violence*, by Lewis Nkosi, a South African who lives in London, was accepted for publication by the Oxford University Press in a new paperback series.

as an indivisible whole and yet constant distortion of this profession is the result of the racial orientation of the policies. The idea itself is unsound and in practice there are further distortions. The Bantu Development Corporation set up on the suggestion of the Tomlinson Commission was provided with resources far less than what was suggested by the Commission. Its functions have been attenuated, being used to support mainly commercial, rather than industrial entrepreneurial talent within the Reserves. Mining enterprise within the Reserves is in about the same moribund state as it was when the Tomlinson Commission reported and only a few other industries have been established within the Reserves since.

In a review in 1964 in the South African Journal of Economics of the "Prospects and issues in the Development of the Reserves", Mr. Nieuwenhuysen, by no means an unsympathetic observer, lists four ways in which "ideology" hampers development within the Reserves. First, the refusal to encourage, and indeed, even to allow, private white capital, enterprise and labour to participate fully in the Reserves limits growth therein. Secondly, primary grade orientation of schooling within the Reserves has meant the limitation of the scope for the creation of higher and more complex skills. Thirdly, the policy of permanent settlement of Africans within the Reserves has created problems of forced limitation of mobility. Finally, the retention of the communal tenure of agriculture has discouraged the kind of experimentation and individual initiative that goes with an individual stake in the land. The position is, in other words, roughly the same as obtained in England before the Enclosures Act of the 18th century. These add up to a fantastic economic anachronism that is not only stultifying growth within the Reserves, but distorting the aspirations for modernity in the rest of the economy.

To sum up, in the words of Professor Houghton, the basic dilemma of South Africa is that "most whites believe that the future progress of the country depends upon the maintenance of white hegemony and in attempting to maintain this hegemony they find themselves adopting measures which conflict with the very requirements of economic growth." What is even worse, this attitude leads them to the deliberate undoing of such "natural" integration as has already taken place under the pressure of historical propinquity and shared economic destiny. Thus not only does *apartheid* run counter to the broad currents of history of the world but of the more limited history of South Africa itself. It leads to an artificial dismemberment of an economy that in its fullest plenitude can be among the most progressive in the world. It creates social tensions and economic difficulties that threaten to destroy the country itself. As Mr. Nieuwenhuysen puts it in the study already referred to, "though the opportunity costs of policies based on socio-

Nkosi's play is set in Johannesburg as the city bursts into "a savage jungle of multi-coloured neon lights, fluorescing nervously with a come hither bitchiness of a city at sundown." The play has for its theme the violence that throbs like a pulse beat just under the surface of life in Verwoerd's South Africa. This undercurrent of violence runs right through the play. It runs through the three scenes of Act I, devoted exclusively to progressive stages of a dialogue between two members of the South African constabulary who, armed with Stenguns, stand nervously on the alert against any threat of violence from the off-stage African protest meeting being addressed by Gaura Zulir, young student revolutionary. Violence is similarly the underlying theme of the longer Act II devoted exclusively to the goings-on in the Clubroom used by a left-wing protest group of university students which attracts the young from all races and into which for the first time walks a young and shy Boer, a didactic ending. Gaura's younger brother, who is portrayed in colours of unalloyed idealism, dies in a vain attempt to defuse the time bomb and save the Afrikaner girl's father who is attending the party meeting to resign from it, convinced of the futility of the ruling party's racist policies.

Mr. Nkosi's writing is charged with passion and is powerfully evocative, but the play as a whole lacks in the sureness of touch that goes with maturer artistry. As one would expect from an African writer, the author suggests a use for music which seeks to assimilate it with the mood of the play.

R. T.

Publications Received

The following books have been received from the Nigerian High Commissioner in India through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi.

Nigeria Speaks (Speeches of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa)

The History of the Yorubas by Rev. Samuel Johnson.

An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria by T.M. Yesufu.

Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (1830-1885) by K. Onwuka Dike.

Nigerian Land Law and Custom by T. Olawale Elias.

Nigerian National Accounts 1950-57 by P.N.C. Okigbo.

Milestones in Nigerian History by J.F.A. Ajayi.

Selected Bibliography on Africa

Compiled by MOHD. AHMAD

ABUN-NASAR, JAMIL. *The Tijaniyya*. New York, Oxford University Press. \$ 5.60. 1965. 204p.

ANSTEY, ROGER. *King Leopold's legacy, The Congo under Belgian rule 1908-60*. New York, Oxford University Press. \$ 10.10. 1965.

ASHFORD, DOUGLAS E. *Morocco—Tunisia, politics and planning* (National Planning Series No. 2.). New York, Syracuse University Press. \$ 2.72. 1965.

BALDWIN, ROBERT E. *Economic development and export growth, a study of Northern Rhodesia 1920-1960*. New York, University of California Press. \$ 6.00. 1965.

BECKER, PETER. *Dingane, King of the Zulu 1828-1840*. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$ 5.95. 1965. 283p.

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
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
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